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INNOVATIVE GOVERNANCE AND NATURAL RESOURCE MANAGEMENT IN
KENYA: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE OUTCOMES
OF CIVIL SOCIETY PARTICIPATION
Jane Omudho Okwako, Ph.D.
Western Michigan University, 2015
Kenya’s environmental sector is embracing co-management to address major
threats to wildlife. In the past two decades, the Municipal-Community-Private Sector
Partnership (MCPP) model evolved to address the threats. This dissertation seeks to
explain variations in partnership outcomes. It evaluates whether the model as introduced
empowers communities to be conservation stewards.
This study hypothesized the impact of five variables. These are decentralization of
power, elite support, capacity of community organizations, partnership formalization, and
resources expended. The findings confirm that three variables are indispensable and two
minimally influence empowerment. More decentralized management structures are
enabling and supportive of empowerment. However, empowerment is only facilitated
when decision making is anchored on strong elite support. Elite interests determine
opportunity and community agency.
Elites are profoundly influential in facilitating or inhibiting empowerment.
Contrary to expectation, greater community capacity does not necessarily translate into
empowerment. Additionally, rapid formalization matters while the resource types
expended are necessary but not sufficient to enhance empowerment. The elite support
variable interacts with the five variables as they influence empowerment. Elites are co-

opted or engage coercively to enhance or inhibit empowerment. Other unanticipated
intervening variables are also identified.
The dissertation’s central features are integration of within-case and cross-case
comparative analysis and evaluation of path-dependent partnership trajectories. On this
basis, I gather context-specific data to explore the experiences of three partnerships in
major protected area complexes. These are Laikipia, Amboseli, and the Mara Triangle. I
conducted interviews, observed ecosystems, and conducted intensive document and
literature reviews. Snowball and purposive sampling guided data collection processes.
The lessons are three-fold. First, the institutional logic of MCPPs is not separate
from the existing historical, organizational, social, and ecological contexts. The model is
not a panacea, yet it is innovative. In two of the three cases it has had little impact on
community empowerment. Laikipia’s decentralized management has enabled
inclusiveness and has provided ideal conditions for rapid and proactive engagement of
communities. The dispensation has reduced conflicts and hurdles for engagement.
Amboseli’s and Mara Triangle’s exclusionary structures have created conflict and
prevented community buy-in. Elite formations straddling bureaucratic, political, and local
coalitions have prevented stable evolution and empowerment.

© Jane Omudho Okwako
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION, THEORY, AND METHODOLOGY
1. Introduction and scope of the study
1.1: The basis for Municipal-Community-Private Sector Partnerships
The escalation of unregulated exploitation and destruction of Kenya’s biodiversity
is having a drastic impact on its rich wildlife ecosystems. Projections indicate an
alarming reality of looming species extinction (Lawson and Vines 2014). Quantitative
and qualitative metrics indicate that large mammal species and genetic biodiversity are
declining in both distribution and abundance (NEMA 2010). For example,
sedentarization, retaliatory persecution and illegal appropriation of wildlife resources
have increased (CITES, IUCN and TRAFFIC 2013, IFAW 2013, Ministry of
Environment, Water and Natural Resources and UN-REDD 2013). A boom in illicit
trading and corruption erode the capacity of overwhelmed agencies and signal a
weakening capacity in managing the intricate web of challenges (AWF 2012). These
problems are causing further declines in ecosystem services and therefore worsening
conditions for wildlife survival. Ineffective legislation and enforcement accentuate
unregulated excision, degradation, and fragmentation of wildlife rangelands (Musyoki et
al. 2012, Republic of Kenya and Giraffe Conservation Foundation 2012). The
unfortunate fact is that the livelihoods of many vulnerable populations rely heavily on
these resources.
A promising fact, however, is that despite these pessimistic trends, current efforts
indicate a growing interest by disparate institutions in abating destruction and scaling up
proactive stakeholder participation. A key resource is local resource-user and resource-
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adjacent communities who are believed to have the capacity to protect a host of wildlifebased ecosystems. Concomitantly, institutionalizing the proactive participation of these
communities as an entry point for securing both landscapes and livelihoods is gaining
traction.
Optimists laud the progressive nature of these efforts as coordinated programs for
inclusive management (Borrini-Feyerabend 2004, Ascher 2007, Bottazzi 2008, Borner et
al. 2009). Proponents of participatory conservation argue that co-management is an
inclusive pathway for local stakeholder engagement. Some of their research has provided
promising evidence on what procedural elements of inclusive governance entail. In sharp
contrast, a systematic analysis of the fundamentals of inclusion, that is, substantive
democratic engagement is lacking. Partly, the source of this discrepancy is three-pronged:
empirical, methodological, and analytical.
Empirically, the goal of this dissertation is to examine variation in the outcomes
of participation of community–based organizations (hereafter, CBOs) in biodiversity
management. Outcomes are evaluated in the context of biodiversity management in three
of Kenya’s focal wildlife protected area complexes; namely, Laikipia-Ewaso, the
Amboseli, and Maasai Mara’s Triangle sub-complex. Analytically, it complements
research on commons management. It seeks to evaluate if partnership-mediated networks
of Municipal-Community-Private Sector Partnerships (hereafter, MCPP) steer and create
political opportunity for CBOs to nurture formal and informal elements of power.
Overall, the broader aim of the study is to investigate procedural and substantive
outcomes of community participation. Methodologically, a comparative case study
strategy is adopted vis a vis the application of a most similar systems design variant. This
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strategy provides context-specific data for exploring MCPP evolution, evaluating
interactions, explaining variation in MCPP-mediated empowerment, and isolating new
variables.
The key objective of this study is to explore the key factors behind the variation in
empowerment of CBOs that lead to improvements in biodiversity management and
livelihoods. Anecdotal evidence, case studies, and basic comparative research have
consistently demonstrated variations in outcomes of ecosystem preservation and
empowerment of local communities among Laikipia, Amboseli and Maasai Mara regions
(see for example Western and Russell 2009, Sundaresan and Riginos 2010). However,
there is yet to be a systematic comparative analysis of conservation regimes or sufficient
explanation for the evident lacuna. Why are Laikipia’s regime and its surrounding zones
faring better at enforcing ecological conservation and incentivizing local management
systems for community participation than its counterparts in the Maasai Mara and the
Amboseli?
The dissertation poses the general research question; does the MCPP model
facilitate the empowerment of CBOs in co-management partnerships for wildlife
protected areas? Under what conditions is empowerment maximized or inhibited? In
addition, it addresses gaps in co-management research by examining the operational
context of resource management modeled on the MCPP framework. Based on these
suppositions, it seeks to: 1) trace the evolution of CBO involvement within the platforms
of the three key co-management structures; 2) situate the effect of attendant partnership
structures on CBO outcomes; and 3) explore the impact of independent variables on
empowerment outcomes.

3

This dissertation simultaneously applies a dual strategy for analyzing
empowerment. It applies path-dependency1 as the key approach and is specifically
underpinned in the notion of initial conditions which is a heuristic for explaining why the
different paths to partnership founding matters for variation in empowerment outcomes.
Thus, a phased model of the trajectory of co-management is crucial in outlaying and
testing propositions about MCPP-mediated empowerment, and more so, dissimilarities in
the strategies and structures influencing empowerment. A complementing analytical
strategy examines the preconditions for successful co-management outcomes. This
situates a role for analytical traditions of participatory development, resource
mobilization theory, and collaborative governance approaches. This dual strategy helps to
demonstrate the definitive mechanisms that help and/or hinder the empowerment of
community organizations.
Kenya’s environmental sector is embracing co-management as a solution to
tackling conservation challenges in a country famous for some of the world’s
biodiversity-rich complexes (Zeppel 2006, Honey 2008, Roe, Nelson and Sandbrook
2009, Republic of Kenya 2009a and 2009b).2 In the past two decades, several
organizations and institutions have been initiating, supporting and engaging partnerships
in biodiversity management. Figure 1 illustrates examples of entities engaged in
collaborative partnerships for wildlife-based biodiversity conservation in Kenya. By
1

I particularly emphasize initial conditions as a notion of path-dependence in order to highlight
the predominant factors that were fundamental in shaping empowerment outcomes. I utilize the
tools of path creation (i.e., the varied strategies of introducing co-management) and junctures
(i.e., the transition from centralized coercive to collaborative management). These features
account for how origins of certain paths have a decisive influence on future events (see for
example, Dobusch and Kapeller 2013).
2
Interestingly, although Kenya’s wildlife sector implemented one of the earliest collaborative
models for state-community partnerships programs in Africa (Sindiga 1995; Honey 2008),
challenges abound.
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forging partnerships, the goal is to abate degradation of bio-diversity and empower local
community organizations. It is worth noting that 70% of Kenya’s wild mammalian
species are inhabitants of land outside the major protected areas. In essence, these species
immensely benefit from host environments in the vast private and communal lands
adjacent to these protected area complexes that act as dispersal, migratory and foraging
corridors, as well as corridors of connectivity (Graham 2006). As hubs where wildlife
populations persist, these lands are valued as important conservation landscapes.
However, landowners have long contested the costs that they accrue at the expense of
wildlife protection and ecosystem conservation. The enforced protection of wildlife
carries a high cost (Norton-Griffiths and Southey 1995, Eliott and Mwangi 1997, Ashley
2000, Norton-Griffiths 2000, Mizutani et al., nd, Cheung 2012). More specifically, the
harmonious co-existence which was indicated by complex but beneficial interactions
between wildlife and livestock in the grazing areas is changing due to competition for
resources and declines in wildlife habitats (AU-IBAR 2012, 11, Butt and Turner 2012).3
In these contexts, an innovative organizational platform, the MCPP, evolved
across Kenya’s major biodiversity landscapes. Through these partnerships, stakeholders
in Kenya’s wildlife sector are forging networks to address conservation burdens, initiate
and institutionalize benefits sharing mechanisms. Prior to the establishment of these
partnerships, the destruction of wildlife ecosystems occurred at an alarming rate (Mburu
2004, Rutten 2004, Mutu 2005, Western and Russell 2009, Sundaresan and Riginos 2010,
Leménager et al. 2014). More importantly, these three wildlife complexes were famous
for over-exploitation of ecosystem goods and underutilization of ecosystem service

3

AU-IBAR is the African Union – Interafrican Bureau for Animal Resources
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Table 1: Entities engaged in collaborative partnerships for biodiversity conservation
in Kenya
Actor cluster

Examples

State-affiliated entities

Agencies such as the Department of Resource Surveys
and Remote Sensing (DRSRS), Kenya Wildlife Service
(KWS), National Environment Management Authority
(NEMA),Kenya Forest Service (KFS), the Ministry of
Environment, Water, and Natural Resources, local
municipalities, and state agencies managing arid lands

The private sector

Local and global ecotourism corporate ventures, tour
operators, the informal sector encompassing small
vendors and artisans

Civil society organizations

Grassroots CBOs, local and global NGOs, community
associations, and social and welfare movements

NGOs

The African Conservation Center (ACC), the African
Wildlife Foundation (AWF), the East African Wildlife
Society (EAWS), International Elephant Foundation,
Tusk, Space for Giants, the International Fund for
Animal Welfare (IFAW), and World Wildlife Fund –
Kenya (WWF)

Global inter-governmental
entities

AU-IBAR, the European Union, The United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), the United Nations
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(UNESCO), the World Bank

International state-affiliate
donors

The United States Agency for International
Development (USAID), the US Fish and Wildlife
Service (Division of International Conservation),
Britain’s Department for International Development, the
German Technical Cooperation Agency (GTZ), and the
Swedish International Development Cooperation
(SIDA)

Research institutions – local
and international

The National Museums of Kenya, the International
Livestock Research Institute (ILRI) in Nairobi, Panthera
Corporation, TRAFFIC (The Wildlife Trade Monitoring
Network), the Frankfurt Zoological Society and the New
York Zoological Society (the Wildlife Conservation
Society)
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programs.4 Additionally, a significant hurdle was the ineffective harnessing of resources.
Local governments and the private sector did not collaborate effectively for successful
biodiversity management. With the initiation of MCPPs, stakeholder networks have
implemented incentives-based payments models across various wildlife and forest
complexes in Kenya. These projects are an avenue for empowerment and conflict
resolution and are effective strategies for encouraging community stewardship (Rutten
2004, Bedelian 2012, Nelson 2012).
More noteworthy is the fact that Kenya’s rangelands5 continue to be degraded amid
competing land uses (Gadd 2005, FAO nd) and as wildlife populations continue to
dwindle, the Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) have assumed a critical role as a
strategy for enhancing stewardship among landowners. Payments for Ecosystem Services
(PES) have been initiated in order to enhance stewardship among landowners.6 In
general, PES refers to a system of payments made to landowners in return for the
4

While ecosystem goods are the products of a well-maintained biodiversity such as water, food,
firewood, forage, medicinal plants, among others, ecosystem services are the vast benefits derived
from ecosystem processes and that support human well-being (Millennium Ecosystem
Assessment, MEA 2005). Ecosystem services embody a classification system of four elements.
According to The Economics for Ecosystem and Biodiversity (TEEB) OECD Office (2010), a
taxonomic classification of Ecosystem Services, constitutes four elements. Provisioning services
are “products obtained from ecosystems such as food, water, wood, fiber, genetic resources”.
Regulating services are “benefits such as regulation of ecosystem processes, climatic regulation,
and water”. Habitat services “highlight the importance of ecosystems to provide habitat for
migratory species and maintain the viability of gene pools”. Cultural are “the non-material
benefits we obtain from ecosystems such as spiritual enrichment recreation, and aesthetic
beauty”. Otherwise, there are other models and typologies used in research studies and policy
implementation across the globe. For a detailed analysis, see Wunder, Sven. “Payments for
environmental services: Some nuts and bolts.” CIFOR Occasional Paper, no. 2. CIFOR, Bogor
(2005).
5
In this analysis, the rangelands constitute the private and communal lands such as group
ranches, which are core ecological elements of protected area landscapes and dispersal areas that
enhance ecosystem services. Conservancies are usually, though not always located within specific
group ranches.
6
While an extensive analysis of PES schemes is beyond the scope of this dissertation, a brief
description of its relevance, global status and institutionalization in Kenya deserves some
mentioning.
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conservation services rendered and aspired as biodiversity preserving activities.
Technically,7 PES is a combination of payment approaches usually associated with the
seminal works of CIFOR’s (the Center for International Forestry Research) Sven Wunder
(2005) and the Katoomba Group (2007). They are usually designed as “formal and
informal contracts in which landowners are remunerated for managing their land to
produce one or more ecosystem services…”(Ecosystem Marketplace, 2011). PES is
based on the concept of ecosystem services which was first discussed among
conservation researchers about a decade ago. However, its recent origins in common
parlance was through United Nations’ Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD)
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA/MEA) and institutionalization via the
Intergovernmental Panel on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (Ingram et al. 2012, 1).
The PES model identifies with the ecosystem-based management paradigm and the more
recently pronounced CBD 2010 Aichi Targets. As a recent global innovation8 that
encompasses a vast array of incentives-based strategies, the model seeks to address
imbalances associated with conservation.9
Sellers such as private and communal landowners and buyers such as governments
and the private sector manage these contractual transactions. The contracts are usually
7

The origin of PES is associated with the global biodiversity capacity findings of the CBD
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment.
8
The United States is an exception. It is one of the few countries where payments to landowners
in return for their conservation efforts have been a major practice for many decades. For a further
review, see the Ecosystem Marketplace (2011).
9
Recent debates seek to replace the term payments with rewards, thus, Rewards for Ecosystem
Services (RES) which proponents argue introduces co-responsibility as a feature of the comanagement (Noorwodjk and Leimona 2010; De Groot 2011). In some evaluations, researchers
have recently used the terms Payments for Wildlife Services - PWS (Birner and Osano 2012),
Compensation and Rewards for Ecosystem Services _ CRES (Swallow et al 2010), and Payments
and Rewards for Ecosystem Services/Rewarding Upland Poor for Environmental Services
P(R)ES /RUPES (Ninan 2009; FAO/IFAD). Other terminologies are laden in economic terms;
for example, Markets for Ecosystem Services, Compensation for Conservation, Benefits Transfer
for Conservation, and Benefit Sharing for Conservation.
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voluntary, (Wunder 2005, 2007) but there are a group of mandatory schemes that are also
widely used across the globe (Wunder et al. 2008). Additionally, they can be donor,
government, or market financed mechanisms (Wunder 2005, 2006). Ideally, a PES
scheme constitutes the following arrangement: “ 1) a voluntary transaction, 2) a well
defined environmental service or a land use likely to secure its provision, 3) at least one
buyer, 4) at least one provider effectively controlling service provision, and 5) if and only
if the environmental service provider secures service provision (conditionality)” (Wunder
2005, 3). Ecosystem services are public goods that are apt to provide some incentives to
landowners or the public in order to enhance conservation. MCPPs serve the purpose of
restructuring incentive systems which motivate landowners to conserve biodiversity.
This dissertation enquires into the level of interface at which the mainstreaming
tools for the payments strategies (at platform and project level) converge to define the
outcomes for community organizations in MCPP-mediated arena. MCCPs innovatively
provide platforms for initiating and implementing the PES model and addressing gaps in
legal and institutional framework by linking landowners’ efforts with benefits streams for
their services. The specific PES projects examined in this dissertation are all ecotourism
and rangeland management projects requiring communities to demarcate and designate a
section of their land and to establish conservation and buffer zones.
Specifics of PES features examined in the empirical chapters are: 1) the animate
co-management features of partnership platforms that initiate, support and scale up
implementation of payments and 2) project-level case studies in three partnerships of
each biodiversity complex. In the context of wildlife conservation in Kenya, payments for
ecosystem services are MCPP-mediated mechanisms that reward conservators to allow
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them to derive optimum or near optimum returns from associated travail in conserving
wildlife. This study applies the design school of payments model as the template on
which to examine transformative potential of these projects through an analysis of how
incentives are packaged and the craftsmanship defining the rewards system.10
MCPP partners in the three complexes under study agree that payments for
ecosystem services can abate systemic decimation of wildlife, degradation of forests, and
empower local landowners. The payment paradigm dwells on the maxim that incentives
must be provided to landowners in order to encourage them to conserve nature. While
considered a recent innovative paradigm in Kenya’s conservation sector, propositions and
experimentation on payment for ecosystem services model are budding phenomena.11
Several projects are also underway with some already formally recognized nationally and
internationally as formal PES schemes.12
The vast communal landscapes across the three ecosystems under study are
significant for wildlife survival. Their ecological significance is also linked to their status
as centers of genetic diversity for grasses (Reid et al., 2005). Community-managed
activities and projects anchored on partnerships are regenerating and restoring rangelands
for wildlife use (AU-IBAR 2012, 21-22, 34-37, Binot et al, 2009, 55-81). The projects
10

Recently, researchers are investigating the design and implementation aspects of PES schemes.
Several works illustrate this trend (for example, Wunder et al., 2008; Engel at al., 2008; Clements
et al., 2010; Noorwidjk and Leimona 2010; IBRD/World Bank 2012). However, PES project
outcomes studies are customary (see for example, Echavaria et al., 2004; Noorwidjk et al., 2012
in press; Swallow et al., 2011; Kerr and Jindal 2012) and are usually complemented with
inventories and /or feasibility reports (see for example Katoomba Group 2006; Mwangi 2005 and
2006).
11
It is worth noting that Kenya’s wildlife sector implemented some of Africa’s earliest
collaborative models for wildlife management in Africa (see Sindiga 1995, Honey 2008).
12
For example, Kenya’s Kasigau Corridor Project covering the landscape between Tsavo East
and Tsavo West National Parks was the first REDD project across the globe to achieve Verified
Carbon Standard validation and verification in February 2011(Code REDD nd, 1, accessed on
July 7, 2013 at http://www.coderedd.org/redd-project-devs/wildlife-works-carbon-rukinga-reddproject/
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are emblematic of MCPP-mediated institutions operating as biodiversity markets that link
buyers (MCPP members) and sellers (CBOs and their respective communities) of
environmental goods such as restored rangeland, forage, and corridors of connectivity. A
related element in MCPP-mediated institution building is through community capacity
building. These platforms and projects have restructured the local interest in conservation
and processes for engaging stakeholders. This has occurred through enhanced
representation and some improvements in accountability and effectiveness of
community-based institutions. The key tool for scaling up participation of CBOs and
their representative communities is through the facilitation resource exchange and
resource sharing across extensive networks of co-management.
1.2: Scope of the study
This dissertation is first and foremost designed as a critical analysis limited to the
wildlife sector conservation and empowerment dynamics rather than broader
environmental (or forest) issues on which the sector is anchored. Policy analysts in the
country’s environmental sector usually labor to integrate (or bisect) the interdependent
forest and wildlife sub-sectors.13 Nonetheless, this study delves into the critical policy
interconnections when necessary as these ecosystems are interconnected landscapes.
Equally important is the fact that this analysis concentrates on indigenous wildlife
rangelands predominantly inhabited by the Maasai who own most of the land that
surrounds the wildlife PAs under study. Additionally, the dissertation focuses on
governance issues only germane to upstream sectors of payments for ecosystem services

13

In fact, both the forest and wildlife sectors are under the umbrella of the Ministry of
Environment, Water, and Natural Resources and have on few occasions been managed under
different ministries.
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operations as a core element though specific domains of downstream operations of the
value chain are analyzed when relevant.
A second feature of this dissertation is that it principally focuses on innovative
institutional design innovations and their related impacts within each partnership rather
than conservation per se. The key unit of analysis is a partnership, which include the
Laikipia Wildlife Forum (hereafter, the Forum), the Amboseli Biosphere Reserve
Management Partnership (hereafter, the Amboseli Management Partnership), and the
Mara Conservancy. However, because I evaluate outcomes at both platform and project
level, I examine three levels of analysis. These are a partnership platform, a CBO partner,
and a group ranch. Within group ranches I evaluate grassroots-driven governance through
contractual conservation. The goal is to illuminate specific aspects of MCPP-bred
institutional innovations. These ostensibly encompass the following features:
•

Governability allows collaborators to facilitate collective action and
resolve disputes over unrewarded conservation. Partnerships have their
basis on laws that govern biodiversity management

•

Nodality is enabled through inter-connected processes for decisionmaking and coordination. Networked activity nodes replaced the
centralized coercive power centers that stifled collaboration

•

Modularity is related to a system of coordinated governance in which
MCPP units operate separately but are integrated administratively
through inter-dependent management

•

Efficiency is embraced as an organizing principle for improving CBO
capacity for conservation and revenue appropriation. Rewards-based
strategies are a favored strategy for enhancing positive outcomes

•

Territoriality is an orientation that guides spatial planning of MCPP
programs. On this basis, bioregional is applied to optimize rangeland
management outcomes. All the MCPPs are pan-district models

•

Diversity is a critical principle that guides strategies for scaling up the
participation of previously marginalized groups and accommodating
12

partner interests. Multi-actor and multi-purpose networks work across
each landscape
•

Stability of each MCPP (i.e, evolution and development) is dependent
on the organizational culture and structure, including the ability to
manage conflict and adapt to social, political, ecological and
demographic changes

•

Capacity-building of community organizations is a key priority of
partnership activities. As such, leaders direct interventions towards
organization, institution, and skills building. Capacity-building
outcomes have implications for project legitimacy, credibility, and
efficiency

2. Literature review
Enhancing participatory governance of wildlife-based ecosystems has been a core
element of dominant discourses on conservation at local, national and global forums
(Stringer et al., 2007).14 An overarching consensus is that the successful abatement of
destruction of biodiversity needs the concerted efforts of all relevant stakeholders (UNEP
2002, IBRD/World Bank 2004 and 2007, UNCBD 2005, FAO 2009).15 There is a
consensus that proactive, inclusive and effective community structures are critical
domains for enhancing stewardship ethos among resource-adjacent and resource-user
communities. However, some studies offer a cautionary tale on participatory programs
modeled on collaboration and decentralization (for example, Larson and Ribot 2005),
arguing that democratized spaces may directly or indirectly reinforce and redirect power

14 Concurrently, it is now widely acknowledged that conservation and development efforts are
intertwined, (see Pimbert and Ghimire 1997, UNCTAD 1997; WCED 2006) and the general
trends show that many institutional initiatives are increasingly seeking to operationalize this
linkage (Berkes 2004; Naughton-Treves 2005). Institutionalized support for these debates is
evident in the growing audience among academics and practitioners who are leading the efforts to
sensitize and mobilize forces for reforms in resource management as part of the broader efforts
for democratic governance and multi-actor partnerships.
15
For example, Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration affirms the direction of this consensus.
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to institutions that embrace and support systemic exclusion of community organizations
(Nelson et al. 2005).
Various paradigms explain the critical enabling factors to enhancing empowering
interventions. Polemics abound, mainstream approaches have progressively shifted from
a binary classification of what successful intervention outcomes entail. Traditionally, they
interpreted enabling structures as those leading to positive changes either in livelihoods
or in landscapes. However, what are the interconnections between conservation of
wildlife ecosystems and community empowerment? For example, in Kenya, community
empowerment outcomes are a function of an array of various MCPP-mediated operations.
This literature review section highlights the leading analytical approaches that provide
tools that effectively bridge the gap between livelihood-centered and landscape-centered
perspectives. This dissertation seeks to integrate lessons from three paradigmatic
traditions: 1) participatory development and rights-based approach, 2) resource
mobilization theory, and 3) collaborative governance approach.16
2.1: Participatory development and rights-based approach
Participatory approach17 overwhelmingly emphasizes definitive enablers and
structural impediments to proactive participation in biodiversity management. In essence,
16

A closer look at these three intellectual traditions indicates that despite the varied conceptual
undertones and conclusions, the three traditions embrace, more or less, a similar vision about why
community organizations should be active partners in resource management. Besides
empowerment, active participation is a healthy ingredient of local development because it
nurtures the capacity of local organizations and enables strategic innovations in governance.
17
The rights-based approach complements participatory approach because it shares common
themes about empowerment strategies. However, it conceptualizes participation as an element of
citizenship rights, not merely a process for engaging and including participants. Key proponents
of this approach include development ethicists such as such as Amartya Sen, Sabina Alkire, Des
Gasper and Thomas Pogge, (McNeill and St. Clair 2007, 30). These experts discuss how lack of
access to resources inhibits free agency and freedom. Accordingly, viewing participation as a
human right helps to counter asymmetries in relational power (Riley 2009).
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it argues that limited access and centralized control accentuate power asymmetries by
limiting participation. Traditionally, biodiversity management in many developing
countries was predominantly a top down and exclusionary system (Pimbert and Pretty
1995, Hackel 1999, Kapoor 200, Few 2002). The ownership of both coercive and noncoercive instruments of control by central and municipal governments fomented the
centralized and fortress models. Studies indicate that despite the reluctance by states to
fully divest the powers to communities (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Nelson 2007, Ngeta
2007, Haller and Galvin 2008, Muttenzer 2008), there is a growing trend indicating that
programs are scaling up participatory systems in biodiversity management (Hulme and
Murphy 2001, Borrini-Feyerabend 2004, Honey 2008).
By design, the overarching goal of co-management is to restructure existing
power asymmetries. The logic is that co-management incentivizes coordination systems
and nurtures a stewardship ethic on the part of local users by encouraging local
proprietorship and regulated resource use (Pimbert and Pretty 1995, 1997). Access and
voice are important themes on which empowerment outcomes rest. More recently, the
focus is on balancing rights and roles of communities in co-management.
Notwithstanding, advocates in this tradition agree that the interconnection between rights
and roles remains to be a daunting challenge for ensuring effective partnership-mediated
results, (Chambers 2002, Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Mitchell 2005). Other advocates are
more sanguine given that using appropriate participatory tools can be effective (Uphoff,
Esman and Krishna 1998, Muller et al. 2008).
The effectiveness of co-management structures in achieving empowerment is
exhibited in different dimensions such as political empowerment and increased capacity
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for self organization (Bliss and Neumann 2009, Riley 2009). Effective co-management
increases a given community’s capacity for self reliance. Some notable empirical case
studies have been done in Latin America (Ahmed and Sanchez Triana 2008), in Kerala,
India (Heller and Isaac. 2001), and in Sri Lanka on Gal Oya (Uphoff 1996, 1998).
Community participation is both a means to an end and end in itself. According to this
approach, communities can negotiate new roles and make demands for rights to access
and management. This can occur through collaboration or creation of alternative arenas
for contestation, mobilization, and organization. Regardless of the strategy of
participation, co-management offers innovative and expanded access to structures for
decision-making.
Interestingly, substantive dimensions of empowerment are given minimal attention
in co-management studies with a few exceptions (such as Singh and Titi 1995, Tandon
1995, Mitchell 2005, Bliss and Neumann 2008, Riley 2009). Changes in the degree of
community representation are not enough without increases in the effectiveness of
institutions’ ability in managing economic and organizational processes. Additionally, a
key prerequisite for effective empowerment is systemic institutionalization of comanagement. For example, a study on a Nepalese Conservation Area by Muller and
associates (2008) found that co-management ventures may look empowering and
successful in some dimensions (by indicators such as improved forest conditions,
increased wildlife populations, and enhanced livelihoods) but when carefully examined,
they are marked by high levels of dependency and inefficiency. The departure of a
supporting intermediary unit spells doom for these programs.
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Co-management programs can equally facilitate the exclusion of some community
groups in a bid to win external support. Citing tensions and divisions between locals and
immigrants, Acciaoli’s (2008) study on commons management in Indonesia’s Central
Sulawe region found evidence supportive of a participatory paradigm occurring
simultaneously with strategic and ideological manipulation by the local leadership.
Community leaders utilized exclusionary discourses that fostered indigenous knowledge
and institutions yet camouflaged as open and conservation-friendly regimes. This was a
strategy used to increase the leadership’s ability and control over lands used and owned
by immigrant farmers (Acciaoli’s 2008)
Because co-management of biodiversity aims at increasing green entrepreneurship,
a good question to ask is, “for whose benefit?” While many proponents of participatory
approaches portray community organizations as resource poor, some research findings
suggest that community organizations can still make substantial resource contributions
(Butterfield 2005). At times they rely on the support initiated by the local governments
(Tendler 1997). Both tangible and intangible resources are critical factors for
empowerment (Krishna and Uphoff 1999:209-210, Pretty and Ward 2001, Gujit 2009:
205). In other words, low levels of resource ownership exacerbate power asymmetries.
This is a reason why proponents of this approach define success based on the evidence of
change in power relations.
Among proponents of participation is the concurrence that formal and informal
rules are at the heart of successful co-management programs. Thus, a more realistic view
of empowerment is that in a co-management setting, it is a product of project structure
and community organization. Ignoring the latter is prelude to failure. Studies show that in
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many contexts, communities are less accustomed to contractual roles (Butterfield 2005,
14) though they can cope creatively through risk adjustment and innovative resource
management (Patel et al. 1995, 117-122). In other contexts they are still able to mobilize
despite higher costs of organization (Butterfield 2006). Rules that incentivize
participation and constrain behavior define the role of institutional design in facilitating
empowerment or accentuating exclusion. On the other hand, local communities have long
established formal and informal mechanisms for planning and managing their
biodiversity (Ostrom 1990, Rønningen 2008) which exist as property rights regimes for
territorially bound public and private resources (Agrawal and Gibson 1999, Ostrom 1991,
Acher 2007, Shahbaz, Gimbege and Haller 2008).
2.2: Resource mobilization theory
A second approach to examining empowerment is the resource mobilization
theory. According to Carnel (1997), this theory includes of two sets of models: the
political-interactive model (represented by Tilly and McAdam) and the organizationalentrepreneurial model (represented McCarthy and Zald).18 The political model
emphasizes the structural factors in society that nurture social movements, including
opportunities for collective action. The latter emphasizes resources as critical variables to
explaining actions and outcomes. Both models are applicable to this study because they
both prioritize internal material and non-material resources as important attributes for
evaluating CBO capacity and conveniently allow for the application of the dimensions of

18

For a more detailed analysis, see Eduardo Carnel “New Social Movement Theory and
Resource Mobilization Theory: The need for Integration,” in Michael Kaufman and Haroldo Dilla
Alfonso, eds., Community power and grassroots democracy: The transformation of social life
(Ottawa: IDRC/Zed, 1997, p.207).
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the CIVICUS Index. The second model is useful in examining pertinent economic,
organizational and leadership resources possessed by community organizations and how
these resources shape participation outcomes.
An analysis of the political actors that facilitate or limit mobilization provides
parameters on which to evaluate the features of political environment that nurtures,
legitimates, or inhibits community mobilization and empowerment. Similarly, the
advantage of analyzing empowerment outcomes on the premises of the second model is
to help validate that the combination of the internal community capacity and dynamics of
co-management structures are interconnected elements in the equation of empowerment.
As will be seen in the empirical chapters, this interconnection is a crucial element in all
phases of co-management evolution and, by design, empowerment. Mobilization and
formal infrastructure of a given community entity provides two important indicators of
community capacity.
The central theme that has dominated debates among proponents of this approach
is, undeniably, the issue of what resources bear upon successful intervention by
organizations. The key tenet is that there is a reliable link between the structure of a
community organization in relation to resource possession and its achievements. An
organization must possess, mobilize, and efficiently manage its resources in order to
incentivize participation. These resources include the associative, material, and numerical
capabilities, organization, and leadership (Ndegwa 1996, Tarrow 1988, McCarthy and
Zald 1977, Jenkins 1983, McCarthy and Wolfson 1996, Butterfield 2006). These
resources create incentives and mechanisms that facilitate recruitment and reduce the
costs of mobilization (Tarrow 1978, 1988, Oliver 1989, Foweraker 1996, Carnel 1997).
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Additionally, the entrepreneurial ability of an organization’s leadership is paramount
(Gamson 1987, McCarthy and Zald 1977, Tilly 1978, Jenkins 1981). For example,
groups with organization and good leadership are more successful than those that are less
organized. Thus, organizational resources are a necessary and a sufficient condition for a
strong and empowered grassroots community organization.
In Kenya’s environmental sector, exemplary cases have been cited in wildlife
management (Honey 2008, LWF 2009), forestry, and livelihood diversification (Ndegwa
1996, Honey 2008) while the absence of resources has been blamed for the weak
bargaining positions of CBOs and other civil society organizations (see for example
Ngeta 2007, Nelson 2007, Muttenzer 2008). Previous research has also demonstrated that
the success of community organizations is a function of the tactics that its leadership
provides (Ndegwa 2004). While resources can facilitate effective mobilization and
activism, proponents of this approach generally reference community grievances and
sustained mobilization as dominant dynamics in co-management. Accordingly,
mobilization is “the process by which a group assembles (material and non-material
resources) and places them under collective control for the explicit purpose of pursuing
the group’s interests though action” (Carnel 1997, 207).
The three cases under study are trouble spot biodiversity complexes where
contentious politics is more of a norm than an exception. Recurrent contestations by
indigenous communities making claims to usufruct rights in these protected areas are a
familiar story. Thus, unlike the other two approaches, resource mobilization theory
provides alternative interpretations which recognize that conflict is an inherent feature of
co-management. In fact, conflict is a prominent rather than an ephemeral element in co-
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management. This approach assumes that strengthening of organizations occurs via
institutionalization at the meso-level; the argument being that it is the point where
distribution of incentives occurs, and cooperation nurtures the antecedents of
participation.19 Accordingly, institutionalization is an inherent logic of collective action
(Tarrow 1988, Foweraker 1995: 70-147, Ndegwa 1996).
MCPP platforms are providing innovative strategies for encompassing interests of
aggrieved communities, though with varied levels of success. A key tenet of the political
model suggests that it is strategic for community organizations to operate at institutional
level (Tilly 1978, Cohen 1985). For example, co-management as a form of decentralized
management can facilitate the empowerment of organizations by creating new
opportunities for mobilization, formal organization, and interactions with new partners
and alliances, (Baiocchi 2006, Cheema 2007). As will be described in the empirical
chapters, an institutionalized environment is not necessarily amenable to the development
of stronger community organizations. Formal platforms can constrain autonomy and
inhibit empowerment of CBOs due to control by and disunity among elites and
government interference. In specific governance contexts, successful interaction between
dominant powerful institutions and community organizations requires that the latter
mobilize countervailing “adversarial” power but must attune their tactics to meaningful
forms of collaboration (Fung and Wright 2003, 260).
2.3: Collaborative governance approach
The third approach relevant to this research study is collaborative governance
approach. Despite its recent prominence as a buzzword, collaboration as a management
tool is not new (McGuire 2006). The earliest accounts examined collaboration in the
19

In particular, the processes of member recruitment and mobilization.
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early 1970s.20 Proponents of this approach agree that collaboration is a response to
various drastic changes in social, cultural, economic, and political aspects that the society
has undergone in the past decades. These changes have served as avenues for
restructuring modes and institutions of participation while simultaneously influencing
results that emerge from interactions between the state and other actors. The state was
traditionally the sole regulator and guarantor of rights and controller of planning and
management of provision of goods and services. The most important shift has been the
reduction in the state’s role and influence. Collaboration is a purposive multiorganizational system of inter-relationships designed to solve problems by creating or
discovering a solution within a given set of constraints (Agranoff and McGuire 2003: 4,
McGuire 2006, Lynn et al. 2001, O’Leary and Bingham 2009).21
Proponents of this approach maintain that successful collaboration entails
effective sharing and exchange of resources and responsibilities based upon partner
resource needs and contributions. In this literature, resources are categorized as financial,
informational, political, and legal (Agranoff and McGuire 2003). This research paradigm
has paid significant attention to analyzing antecedents and outcomes of collaboration.
The resource exchange model of collaboration is a prominent explanatory perspective
with a standing tenet that the need for resources by collaborators is the most critical
determinant of collaboration. More recent research indicates that resource needs only
shape the initial motivations of collaborators in joining networks, but this need is not a
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There is consensus that one of the earliest works on collaboration is the seminal work by
Jeffrey Pressman and Aaron Wildavsky titled Implementation: How Great Expectations in
Washington Are Dashed in Oakland; Or, Why It’s Amazing that Federal Programs Work at all.
21
Despite having its roots in the discipline of Public Administration, this approach has applied
extensively in other disciples such as natural resource governance, rural, urban and infrastructural
development and service provision. See additional definitions by Lynn et al. (2001).
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factor in explaining increased subsequent engagement (Fleishman 2009, 47). The key
implication for examining antecedents to collaboration, however, is in their importance as
initial conditions and as opportunity structures that facilitate (or impede) empowerment
of community organizations. Successful collaboration requires formalization,
specialization, and effective coordination (McGuire 2006). Formalization and collective
coordination empowers participants by facilitating engagement in system-wide linkages
while specialization places upon partners the responsibility of being productive
specialists within their mandated roles. Socialization of participants (Bertels and
Vredenburg 2004) and the scope of consensus among partners (Leach 2002) are equally
important results on which collaboration can be measured.
3: Key concepts and terms
3.1: Co-management
Co-management is as a continuum of arrangements for managing biodiversity that
relies on various degrees of power and responsibility sharing between governments and
local communities (Cash et al. 2006). Ordinarily, major stakeholders are proactively
engaged in planning and decision-making in a partnership (Borrini-Feyerabend 1996,
Conley and Moote 2003). In recent studies, its conceptualization focuses on elements such
as continuous problem solving and learning processes through which partners share
decision-making functions (Carlsson and Berkes 2005). Despite the fact that co-managed
ventures operate as partnerships, in many setups, government-affiliated bodies normally
retain a substantial role in management in comparison to other partners (BorriniFeyerabend 1996:12, Meinz–Dick and Knox 2001:41, Carlsson and Berkes 2005).
Generally, the broader goal of co-management is to integrate sustainable production,
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conservation, and institution building. (Esmail 1997; World Bank 1997a). Co-managed
systems establish procedures for rewards, sanctions, and for definition of rights to access
and management of natural resources, (Hilhorst 2008: 13).
3.2: Collaborative governance
The term governance generally refers to the patterns of collaboration and
coordinated management between state and non-state actors who have a stake in a given
product, program or process that is critical to the production, allocation, distribution, and
management of goods and services in a particular region or sector (see for example,
Lemos and Agrawal 2006). Alternative conceptions focus on the quality of decisionmaking processes including the exercise of power and mechanisms of accountability (for
example, Hilhorst 2008). Both formal and informal organizational structures encompass
the infrastructure of collaboration (Pierre & Peters 2000).
Collaborative governance is a strategic, practical and effective strategy for
realizing positive environmental and developmental outcomes. Its salient dimensions
encompass the infrastructure for changing incentives, knowledge, institutions, decisionmaking, and behaviors (Lemos and Agrawal 2006). As a management principle, it signals
a shift from top-down, centralized and exclusionary management which limited the
participation of non-governmental units (Pierre and Peters 2000, Zaal and Ole Siloma
2006). Prominent governance experts share consensus on specific themes about
governance structures:
1. Multiple stakeholders interact in a participatory process despite the
variations in resource ownership
2. Effective interaction depends on the level of institutionalization
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3. Resource sharing and exchange are key motivations for collaborative
governance
4. Accountability is paramount to effective collaboration
5. Actors operate across multiple levels and across vertical and horizontal
structures
6. Positions of power are based on the resources owned and shared
3.3: Empowerment
The complex multidimensional character of the concept of empowerment has bred
definitional polemics around what qualitative features should be critical in defining it.
As a social science construct, the concept constitutes a thematically rich research
program. The most important contributions to its analysis are outside the field of Political
Science. Paulo Freire’s seminal works by in his Pedagogy of the Oppressed established a
basis for analytical research that currently traverses several disciplines and traditions,
including the development sector. Accordingly, Esman (1991, 6) defines empowerment
as the “expanded opportunities for individuals and collectivities to participate and make
their influence felt in economic and political transactions.” A common denominator
highlighted in mainstream definitions is political opportunity structure which is an
indicative dimension of an enabling process (Stiles et al. 2000; Alsop and Heinshn 2005;
Alsop et al., 2006). A second strand of scholarship focuses on choices, abilities and
values as the key facets of empowerment, (for example Narayan-Parker et al., 2006,
Alsop et al., 2006), including the ability to hold institutions accountable (Narayan-Parker
2002). In this tradition, empowerment must accompany qualitative and metric changes in
specific resources, abilities, knowledge, relationships, and values in specified target
groups or organizations, (Zimmerman and Rapapport 1988, Morgan 1999).
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4: Municipal-Community-Private-Sector Partnership (MCPP)
Mainstream research on biodiversity partnerships assumes various forms.
Categorically, these cohorts constitute comparative case studies, (for example, Mitchell
2005), thematic-analytic studies (for example, Grimble and Wellard 1997, Wettenhall
2005 and Tucker 2010) and evaluations of partnership arrangements (for example, Cleren
2006, Fairhead and Leach 2006).22 In this tradition, there is an emerging consensus
positing that decentralized management is better at engaging marginalized groups
compared to centralized command (Borrini-Feyeraband 2004, Wettenhall 2005, World
Bank 2010). In a collaborative setting, a partner is “a person or group who shares risks
and gains” (Mitchell 2005, 125). The term partnership in this research will follow the
definitions from the works of Ros-Tonen et al. (2007), who are leading experts in Latin
American forest governance. It is a favored term because it is not couched in either of the
dominant approaches to analysis of partnerships, that is, normative and technocratic
approaches. Accordingly, a partnership is herein “a more or less formal arrangement
between two or more parties from various sectors (government, civil society, and private
sector) around (at least partly) shared goals in the expectation that each party will gain
from the arrangement” (2007, 5). The adopted definition assumes that differences in
power and changing incentive structures are crucial aspects that determine governance
outcomes.
Research on partnerships for governance of biodiversity has surged in the recent
years (Ros-Tonen et al. 2007 and 2008, IIED 2009, Tucker 2010) with a consensus that
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The third group evaluates for example company-community partnerships (Vermeulen and
Mayers 2006, Morsello and Adger 2006) municipal-community partnerships (Nortons-Griffiths
2005, Butterfield 2005) multi-sector partnerships (Rosendo 2006, Ros Tonen et al. 2008, Roe,
Nelson, and Sandbrook 2009, Seixas and Berkes 2010).
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decentralized approaches have positive ecological, economic, and socio-political benefits
compared to centralized command and control types (Borrini-Feyeraband 2004,
Wettenhall 2005, World Bank 2010). In traditional command and control structures,
governments claimed sole authority in the management of these resources. However, this
style of management failed to realize the expectations for ecological and livelihood
sustainability.23 The 1990s is the era that signaled a paradigm shift towards partnership
approaches (Wily 2002). Local, national, and global socio political forces contributed to
this shift. Countries with experience in co-management began institutionalizing reforms.
This saw the advent of MCPPs. From a partnership perspective, a MunicipalCommunity-Private sector Partnership is a system of governance modeled on a tripartite
arrangement encompassing a municipality, the private sector and a representative body of
community groups that organizes around the specific goal of ensuring mutual beneficial
outcomes. Such an arrangement assumes that inclusive governance increases socioeconomic and ecological benefits. Thus, the MCPP model has five elements:
4.1: Resources as capabilities
Stakeholders join partnerships in order to exchange and expend resources or to
enhance the achievement of mutually beneficial outcomes. Based on specific resources
that a given stakeholder commands and contributes, MCPPs can act as entry points for
negotiation and consultation. Resources facilitate the implementation of goals. In a
typical MCPP financial, technical, leadership, physical assets, knowledge and skills are
useful resources needed to organize input infrastructure. For the three cases examined in
this dissertation, local CBOs provide indigenous ecological knowledge and skills, land
23

Some of these expectations revolve around the use and management of biodiversity; improper
valuation of contributions of user communities, unequal distribution of benefits and unequal
participation in the design and implementation of programs.
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and other assets for environmental preservation and restoration. Local governments
provide legal instruments that facilitate institutionalization of partnerships. The private
sector provides technical and financial capital.
4.2: Rules and norms
As a multi-actor platform, any given MCPP encompasses an assemblage of
diverse interests and values which compete for attention (Mitchell 2005). A typical
partnership seeks to institutionalize a process that regulates interactions and facilitates
efficiency, predictability, and equity. Regulations stand as general agreements or ad hoc
negotiations (Esman 1991, 81-82). Institutionalization is epitomized in an organizational
structure (Wettland 2005) such as a board or a forum or via informal and ad hoc
accommodations, (Esman 1991). Indeed, many partnerships work best when working
arrangements are formalized (Butterfield 2005).
4.3: Roles/responsibilities
Ideally, a given MCPP operates as a collaboratively coordinated networked
institution. In most multi-sector partnerships, formal agreements define the modes of
participation and the respective inputs that each actor should contribute, their rights and
responsibilities (Butterfield 2005). Power sharing is also central to the MCCP framework
because it determines the design aspects of specialization and division of labor. Roles
specifications are vertical and horizontal jurisdictions that specify the arenas of
participation for shared governance. This element provides some of the most crucial
evidence for demonstrative effects of system-wide participatory governance in MCPPs.
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4.4: Results-based targets
Purposive actors design MCPPs in order to achieve specific targets and mutually
beneficial outcomes. Operationally, an organizational philosophy stated in the mission of
each partnership is the vital instrument that tabulates and establishes the outcome
parameters. These outcomes are associated with specific targets related to each entity’s
goals. Organizational entrepreneurs access, organize, and coordinate the effective use of
various resources that actors contribute to the collective forum. Ideally, success varies
from one partnership structure to another. This depends on how entrepreneurs marshal
and use collective capacity.
4.5: Route to consolidation24
An ideal MCPP is a platform that evolves through continuous process of resource
exchange, resource sharing and resource use. This nurtures a foundation, builds
organization and strengthens the partnership on its course to consolidation. Initiation and
formalization are conflict-ridden phases of MCPP management but in these phases,
partnerships can evolve through strategic and collective management via the creation and
institutionalization of organizational culture and identity. It is also in the interest of
partners to have a structure that coordinates and formalizes collective action.
Consolidation is a challenging process for MCPPs. Building stable structures that
addresses conflict, continually reinforces the foundational values of the MCPP and
improves collaboration are herculean tasks.
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This analysis of MCPP operations will be an adaptation of a format borrowed from
Wandersman et al., (1996), which describes the processes of formation, implementation, and
institutionalization of coalition of partnerships.
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5: Research design
5.1: Hypotheses
Despite the marked similarities, empowerment outcomes for community
organizations and conservation outcomes vary among the three MCPPs under study. A
case study methodology provided tools for isolating contextual elements, actors’ interests
and the interactions influencing variations. Primary and secondary data provided
evidence useful in building a framework for explaining empowerment outcomes. A
framework indicating that empowerment outcomes (including environmental
stewardship) was developed based on five hypotheses using this data. Figure 1 is a
schematic presentation of MCPP model of empowerment.
Thus, the key hypotheses developed for this research were:
HI: The more decentralized is power in co-management, the higher the likelihood
of CBO empowerment.
Based on this premise, the assumption is that as the space for formal structures
decentralizes, it more likely leads to a distribution of power with a simultaneous increase
in inclusiveness and engagement of represented partners. Such a structure, unlike a
hierarchical system has the potential to reorganize power arrangements and to enable
participatory processes. Decentralization does not necessarily alter the status quo (Ribot
1999, 2002), but it can facilitate a power sharing system, (and if institutionalized) enable
community agency. A related assumption is that a co-management structure with more
decentralized authority structure creates a more democratic process of co-management
and an opportunity structure that allows diverse and marginalized groups to negotiate
their rights in a formal system. This, again, changes how actors interact and is a
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convenient avenue for community organizations to make gains in representation and
participation.	
  
Figure 1: Theoretic framework: A schematic presentation of MCPP model of
empowerment

H2: The more extensive is elite25support for co-management, the higher the
likelihood of CBO empowerment.
Admittedly, it is difficult to distinguish whether elite support is a matter of
rallying effort for “public” or collective partnership outcomes or if this support is an
attempt by special interests to exploit resources from collaboration. Ordinarily, elites’ key
interest is to fortify status quo structures in co-management. This, however, does not
mean that elite support for co-management is non-existent. In fact, elites support some
25

The term elite will be used to describe the fact this is a group of actors in possession of
immense resources, which gives them the influence to strategically promote their interests. Elites
are herein described as constituting local community leaders, wealthy landed ranchers,
politicians, bureaucrats, and local government officials. Their education, leadership, and material
resources such as land, businesses, bureaucratic roles or other property (Swartz 1968; Esherick
and Rankin 1990), confer their social status. Some elites wield immense influence and power
because of the close links they have with institutions that manage coercive and non-coercive
instruments of control.
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initiatives, especially if they are strategic to their interests. Elite support can determine
partnership operations because they control what co-management issues count as salient
or legitimate. Additionally, through their control of internal and external strategic
resources important to partnership outcomes, elites control who participates and how
much. Thus, a higher level of their support for co-management increases potential for
inclusive and more participatory structures. For example, if elites support decentralizing
more authority to community partners, it opens avenues for interest accommodation
among actors. This in turn enhances consensus on how to manage natural resources and
revenues, thus bringing more issues linked to community needs to bear upon comanagement institutions. More importantly, community voice in planning,
implementation, and community capacity increases.
H3: The higher the level of capacity of a participating CBO, the higher the
likelihood of CBO empowerment.
This proposition anchors on the argument that a higher level of capacity enables a
community organization to mobilize resources for effective and proactive participation in
co-management. This feature facilitates collective action within the organization as well.
Concomitantly, increases will occur in the levels of empowerment when partners expend,
share, and exchange resources towards programs that further enhance capacity in the
course of a partnership’s evolution. A community organization’s capacity is the total
operative, technical, and resource ownership potential and competence possessed by a
given organization. More specifically, it is reflected in the commitment, resources, and
skills brought to bear on problem solving and asset building (The Aspen Institute 1996).
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H4: Co-management reforms have a higher likelihood of increasing
empowerment with higher levels of formal and rapid coordination at initiation and
formalization.
This proposal relies on the assumption co-management programs derive their
formality as “reforms from above”. But a given MCPP’s evolutionary path is
significantly linked to existing local and national politics vis a vis elite-driven processes
that begin at initiation and continue on course to consolidation. Thus, while the initiation
phase is the period that brings out the greatest variations in the quality of empowerment,
elite unity and consensus (and community buy-in) must anchor partnership agendas and
structures. This is during formalization and consolidation phases. Whence a steady
collaborative path presents promising institutional capabilities for empowerment and its
absence is instability. The significance of evaluating pathways to MCPP evolution is to
tease out the sources of specific operations and innovations, including the variations that
explain empowerment. For example, variations are indicated in scaling up of programs
and partnership orientations towards specific market-oriented institutions such user fees,
eco-tourism, eco-labeling and certification, and scaling up of mitigation support.
H5: The higher the number and more diverse the resource types exchanged,
shared, and expended by partners, the greater the benefits for empowerment
This assumption relies on the argument that institutions, resources, and values are
prerequisites to enhancing substantive change that allows empowerment. Accordingly,
the more formal are the interactions, the greater the benefits for empowerment. Formality
is emblematic of rules of the game and structures that constrain and reward actors in a
partnership. Formal structures tend to enhance substantive changes more than informal
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structures because the binding rules motivate partners to expend more resources needed
to support co-management. Furthermore, formal procedures enable CBO actors to access
resources and to organize effectively compared to informal strategies associated with
protest and dissent.
5.2: Case study research design
5.2.1: Rationale for using a case study strategy
A case study was a preferred strategy due to its perceived advantages in the
analysis of critical themes of this dissertation (following Ragin 1987, George and Bennett
1998, Yin 1994, George and Bennett 2005). From a methodological standpoint, a case
study is suitable for understanding complex social phenomena, in answering “why” and
“how” questions of a research context (Yin 1994, Marshall and Rossman 1993) and
provides tools for examining variation in outcomes of these interactions (Marshall and
Rossman 1993). Generally, the two main goals of case-oriented research are historical
interpretive and causal analytic (Ragin 1987, 35). This research abides on the latter goal
though interpretive data is useful as well. From the perspective of George and Bennett,
the case study strategy enables a researcher to: 1) identify and test causal mechanisms, 2)
specify and measure complex qualitative variables, 3) inductively identify new variables
and hypotheses, and 4) to develop contingent generalizations and hypotheses. From
contextual and thematic standpoints, a case study design was of critical import for this
study.
•

As the first research study on MCPPs and equally the first study on
MCPP-meditated payment for ecosystem services, a key goal was
gaining a deeper understanding of the operations within the three
partnerships
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•

The initial parameter used to select the cases was the need for
geographic representation of interesting cases with variable
collaborative management outcomes. The three partnerships are all in
the Rift Valley geo-complex but are spatially distinct regions

•

The wildlife management sector is one of the most complex and
conflict-ridden development arenas in Kenya. Such a context
necessitates a holistic understanding of the processes used to diffuse
the conflict. A case study provided an in-depth analysis of strategies,
structures, and variations in the results associated with partnerships
structures.

•

The MCPP model is an innovative approach to collective management
of biodiversity. These cases are pioneering partnerships. Thus, the aim
was to focus on specific and interesting aspects of the model and to
explore in depth the context, processes and products of collective
environmental governance

•

Finally, a case study provided opportunity for implementing
triangulation. Thus, the intended rationale of gaining more breadth
from the large amounts of data collected about each case was
juxtaposed onto the goal of ensuring validity of the findings. Multiple
sources of data build a strong case for these two goals.

5.2.2: Rationale for selecting cases
This research entails a comparative case study of MCPP-mediated outcomes in
three reserves with distinct protected area statuses. They are pan-district collaborative
initiatives stationed in some of the world’s most renowned forest and wildlife reserves.
These are the Laikipia, the Amboseli, and the Mara Triangle ecosystem complexes.
Comparatively, Kenya’s forest and wildlife ecosystems rate highly in terms of species
diversity and in endemicity (IUCN 2011). Several of its terrestrial and riparian
ecosystems are international World Heritage Sites, RAMSAR sites, and Man and
Biosphere Reserves. Additionally, the most contentious claims for and against reforms in
biodiversity governance are linked to conflict in these three ecosystems. Progressively,
the implementation of innovative reforms for inclusive management is occurring. This is
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the main subject of this research. The key rationale for selecting the three cases was the
noted variations exhibited in outcomes of collaboration despite exhibiting similarity in
socio-ecological and economic features.
These partnerships play a significant role in nurturing and implementing payment
for ecosystem services initiatives. Additionally, as pacesetters of Africa’s first-generation
pure co-management initiatives, they are leaders in institutionalized collaboration (Honey
2008). Similarly, these ecosystem complexes house the most important protected and
dispersal areas in Kenya. Partnership activities are concentrated in critical ecosystems
encompassing the Mara-Serengeti biodiversity arcs (or the Serengeti Maasai Mara
ecosystem – SMME) and an emerging wildlife corridor in the Laikipia. The availability
of existing secondary data was a motivation. These three complexes are the most studied
in East and Southern Africa (Kideghesho et al. 2013), yet there is dearth of systematic
comparative analysis on co-management efforts within the dispersal areas.
An additional motivation was the fact that these cases provided rich data for
identifying and analyzing interesting thematic and policy questions because they are large
ecosystem complexes undergoing dynamic social and ecological transformations. Of
great importance is the fact that these MCPPs govern important sites of heavy networks
of environmental NGOs and community organizations. This comparative advantage is a
manifestation of useful data pools for gathering information about the ecological, social,
political, and economic capital of these complexes. For example, as large revenue bases
facing governance challenges, data from the case studies provided an opportunity to
capture gaps in legal and institutional framework at national and local levels.
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The ecosystem complexes house dispersal areas located in the richest counties of
the country (Honey 2008, The Daily Nation 2010, The East African Standard 2010).
Simultaneously, the three MCPPs are innovative co-management structures addressing
salient issues covering landscape conservation and securing pastoral livelihoods. Their
operations are significant based on the links between human wildlife conflicts and trends
in biodiversity loss. The three cases are a testimony to the successes and the challenges
that countries experimenting with co-management programs face, what they do, and
consequent outcomes. The three landscape management regimes provide appropriate test
cases to examine these dynamics.
5.2.3: Application of a most similar systems design
The variation in the key independent variable was a basis for organizing and
selecting cases. Thus, the overall design has a strong footing in most similar systems
design. A most similar systems design is a type of a research design in which the selected
cases are similar in all but the key independent variable (King et al.1994, Prezworski and
Teune 1970, Lijphart 1975 and 1977). The cases selected have many significant similarities
in demographic, social, political, and even economic contexts, which warrant application of
a most similar systems design in order to explain why there is variation in empowerment
(and conservation outcomes). It is a comparative design that explores the differences in
order to ascertain the main explanatory elements that lead to these variations. A
comparative design increases validity of measurements and analytical advantage. Apart
from sharing status as partnerships managing Kenya’s critical biodiversity arcs, the three
MCPPs similarly innovatively handle co-management platforms attempting to enhance
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inclusive governance. The thematic descriptor below lists the similarities in social, cultural
and political context in which these partnerships operate:
•

They are co-management systems that derive their basis as reforms
from above established to engage governmental and nongovernmental organizations in co-management

•

They operate in landscapes where the earliest experiments with comanagement occurred in the country. These landscapes have the
highest CBOs involved in wildlife and forest management

•

They are pan-district collaborative initiatives stationed in some of the
most renowned wildlife reserves with the most highly institutionalized
and decentralized district-level resource management

•

They are platforms engaging community entities who own vast private
and group land in the wildlife dispersal areas. Community involvement
largely encompass activities such as restoring and rehabilitating
rangelands in the buffer and conservation zones

•

They are structures operating in regions predominantly inhabited by
the Maasai. The Maasai are one of the few remaining and most
influential of the indigenous groups in Kenya. These ecosystems
support the community’s transhumant and agro-pastoralist livelihoods

•

They are structures that engage communities with a large density of
well-established group ranches and independent local trusts. In these
regions, the common tenure regime is land ownership through group
ranches and collective ownership of titles to land.26

•

They are networks that engage Kenya’s top revenue-earning municipal
governments. The major proceeds are from tourism, but wildlife
predation has also led to chronic and unresolved human wildlife
conflict

•

The three partnerships are direct and indirect institutional beneficiaries
of one of the leading biodiversity conservation funds in the country
such as the two USAID funds from Conservation of Biodiverse
Resource Areas (COBRA) and Conservation of Resources through
Enterprise (CORE) programs. The key objectives of these programs
were to help the Kenya Wildlife Service implement interventions that
increase local community participation in conservation, management

26

Recent studies indicate that there is a shift to individualized holdings due to poor governance
(see for example, Mwangi 2009).
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and utilization of natural resources, to build partnerships to conserve
biodiversity, and to ensure that environmental custodians benefit,
(USAID 1999, 2002).
In an attempt to select cases studies of interest, I followed the principles
advanced by Collier and Mahoney (1996) who emphasize that it is important to select
cases in which outcomes are not based on extreme values or on a narrow range of
variations. The matrix in Table 2 below is a justification for case selection based on
these two principles. It is a thematic description of the attributes of the selected cases of
MCPPs.
5.2.4: Collection of data
5.2.4.1: Triangulation: definition, philosophy and application
In using a variety of data collection methods, this study has capitalized on the
strengths of different techniques encompassing the strategy of triangulation. In essence,
this approach is useful for extracting more meaning from data. Triangulation is an
approach to data collection that utilizes two or more strategies of data collection,
theoretical perspectives and sources of information and informants, to gather, compare,
contrast, investigate, and to analyze related data or phenomena of interest (Denzin 1970
& 2009, Miles and Huberman 1994, Guion 2003, Thurmond 2003, Shenton 2004, Denzin
2009, Silverman 2010). It is highly favored because the researcher can obtain rich data
while maintaining the contextual information and increasing availability of internally and
externally valid and reliable data across methods and sources. A dominant view is that it
offers researchers the opportunity to have confidence in their findings because they can
corroborate and confirm their findings reliably. The philosophy behind triangulation is
the need to offer a multidimensional perspective which enables the researcher to reduce
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Table 2: A thematic description of attributes of the selected cases of MCPPs based
on tenets on case selection from Collier and Mahoney (1996)
Institutional
design at
initiation

LWF – Laikipia
Wildlife Forum

ABRMP –
Amboseli Biosphere
Reserve
Partnership

MC – Mara
Conservancy

Motivation for
initiation

-Entitling program
-Wildlife cropping
experiment

-Gate keeping
program
-Biosphere reserve –
ICD experiment

-Housekeeping
program
-Devolution/reform
experiment

Institutional
innovation
(distinct)

-To enfranchise locals
-Landscape approach
-Diversity
- Subsidiarity

-To enfranchise
locals
-Synergy in legal
frames /pact
- Subsidiarity

-To mainstream
efficiency
-PPP to MCPP
-Subsidiarity

Organizational
orientation at
initiation

Pluralism
“Coordinated”
cooptation

Pluralism
“Reciprocal”
cooptation

Bureaucratic
legalism
“Coercive”
cooptation

Organizational
function at
initiation

Compact
-post-initiation, path
of steady evolution

Consortium
- path of unstable
evolution, postinitiation

Compact
-path of threatened
evolution, postinitiation

Organizational
culture at
initiation

Apolitical arena
Minimum partisan
politics

Politicized arena
-Strong informal
institutions and
partisan politics

Politicized arena
--Strong informal
institutions and
partisan politics

Legal device for
initiating
co-management

KWS order
-Quota law

UNESCO-MAB
-Pact

Municipal order
-Management
Agreement

CBO activism at
initiation

Proactive
-anchor, associational
platform

Proactive
-anchor, advocacy
platform

Reactive
-anchor,

Design at
inception

High modularity

Modest modularity

Low modularity

From above
-both locals and
elites were catalysts

From above
-bureaucratic and
political elites

Impetus for
From above
initiation – elites -locals were catalysts
or locals
of collaboration
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biases, confirm and discover which inferences are valid, and increases a more reliable
interpretive potential (Thurmond 2003:253).
5.2.4.2: Interviewing
Semi-structured in-depth interviews are the key interviewing strategies that I
applied to uncover respondents’ opinions about governance and partnership outcomes.
This entailed identifying interviewees in each region and selecting respondents from the
three sectors (i.e., municipal, community, and the private sector) by utilizing snowball
sampling. Snowball sampling technique enhanced efficiency in respondent identification,
recruitment and participation. Following Neumannn (1997), descriptive, structural, and
contrast questions were asked to respondents depending on the type of interview and the
interviewee. In this technique, preset questions are modified or restructured as the
probing process continues (Neumann 1997, Aberbach and Rockman 2002, Weingraff
2004). Accordingly, I used utilized open-ended questions as the main information
elicitation tool. Three factors guided the choice of using open ended questions: 1) the
degree of prior research on the subject was limited, 2) there was a great need to maximize
response validity, and 3) there was a need to fully engage respondents who were more
expressive and prone to articulate views in with greater detail (see Aberbach and
Rockman 2002: 674). The technique is amenable to extensive processes of elaboration
and clarification. Its strength is that details of a particular issue that was not anticipated
can emerge during probing.
A second feature followed Neumann (1997, 373-374) specifications. Questions
were asked concurrently, though the researcher recognized that a specific type of
question would be appropriate and convenient only in specific stages during the
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interview. In-depth interviewing entailed using open-ended questions. This enhanced the
chances of gathering data on the connection of events and phenomena under study and
respondents’ perceptions (Marshall and Rossman, 1993). Additional information was
gathered in cases where ambiguous responses were provided. It was a useful way to get
large amounts of data. I applied a systematic process of face-to-face interviews. The
questions were followed with probes (i.e scrutiny of responses by asking additional
questions to the interviewee) when necessary. The third feature of this technique was the
use of elite interviews. Elite interviewing provided various insights and an understanding
of crucial partnership-driven outcomes. This group is generally well informed and
comprised of influential members of the community, bureaucratic and private sector
institutions.
5.2.4.2.1: Preparation and sampling
In terms of preparation and sampling, I developed the interview questions through
an inductive review and content analysis of empirical and theoretical literature on comanagement in Kenya and across the globe. At Western Michigan University, I went
through HSRIB training; received clearance and authorization to conduct my fieldwork
(see appendices). Upon arriving in Kenya, the initial phase of fieldwork focused on
securing institutional affiliation, governmental and site research permits, establishing
initial contacts and starting preliminary informal conversations with prospective
interviewees and informants. Authorization was granted from the Government of Kenya
at the Ministry of Education in Nairobi, from respective local government offices of
Narok, Trans Mara, Ol Kejuado and Loitotok and Laikipia) and affiliation was secured
with Strathmore Governance Center prior to embarking on any interviews (see the
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appendices). I developed a work plan to guide my fieldwork program alongside a piloting
strategy. This entailed using the questionnaire to conduct formal and informal interviews
during the initial rapport building sessions at Nairobi offices.27 I used “pilot informants”
as a basis for familiarization and as an initial feedback process, which allowed me to
discuss the key elements of the research and in the process secured interviews with key
informants. With this strategy, I gained valuable initial knowledge, awareness, and
understanding of the study sites and the socio-cultural context, which enhanced
pragmatism in my approach to identifying and selecting potential interviewees and
understanding of logistics and resources needed to conduct the research. With this initial
data, I finalized an organized work plan for my field visits. I was also granted authorized
access to use library facilities at the all the key ministries related to wildlife conservation
such as Ministry of Tourism, NEMA and KWS.
The research questions and goals of this study necessitated the use of nonprobability sampling. Simultaneously, the research design sought to utilize a strategy that
was flexible and effective. In the first phase of my field research, I relied heavily on nonprobability sampling strategies and particularly snowball and purposive sampling. The
rationale that guided data collection was to understand how particular features of
partnerships enable or inhibit the empowerment of community organizations. I was
looking for very specific data with the purpose of gaining a deeper understanding of
MCPP structures and MCPP-mediated outcomes. I used purposive sampling as an initial
strategy with the awareness about interactions within and variations in partnership27

While the protected area complexes under study are all located in the Rift Valley, the central
offices for key governmental agencies and core partnership activities are partly coordinated in
ministry and state agency offices in Nairobi province. These exist across parastatals such as
KWS, KFS, and NEMA, and ministries, including collaborative units from NGOs and INGOs
such as AWF, ACC, USAID, UNEP and many other institutions.
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mediated outcomes and the fact that a specific group of respondents would best help to
ascertain the sources of these differences. I therefore was able to identify and categorize
interviewees based on four elements; region (i.e. study site), representation (i.e.
governmental, private sector, or community), and rationale (or the resources available
from the interviewee, for example, data, contacts, and library) and resource persons
contacted (in terms of cadre and rank). Later on, convenient sampling was a relevant
strategy for targeting the readily available informants from public agencies who are
formulators, coordinators, and administrators of state-affiliated programs at different
ministries and at KWS, KFS, and NEMA. The input of these informants would provide
data on the types of resources they expend, to whom, and what impact on it may present
partnerships. I also applied snowball purposive sampling to identify potential respondents
at the study sites.
Additionally, non-probability sampling strategies would increase efficiency of data
collection and address time and resource constraints. However, the key factor was the
opportunity to increase the number of potential informants, have convenient access to
crucial informants and to crucial contacts from diverse institutions that are usually hard to
access. I specifically benefitted from various informants who provided practical tools for
interviewing Maasai communities and in approaching sensitive state-affiliated entities.
The Maasai are a very welcoming and approachable community but there are important
formal and informal rules that outsiders should be aware of prior to interacting with the
community members. It is usually important to approach a Maasai elder, a local chief or a
respected government officer with close connections to the community. Through
snowball and purposive sampling, I received feedback that enabled me to target my work
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to specific objectives, to engage the right specialists, informants, and sources, and to
control, coordinate, and manage time more effectively.
The research questions dictated the sampling strategy for the selected project study
sites as well. The three ecotourism projects are anchored on a payment model which is
supported by partnerships institutions. The first step was the identification of several
projects through a within-case analysis of each partnership. The goal was to sample
projects designed to facilitate extensive participation of community group ranches in
rehabilitating and restoring wildlife rangelands. Of critical importance was that the
project must request community to demarcate their land into a landscape that separates a
conservation area and buffer zone. This model has been a key entry point for communitybased wildlife conservation where the input of CBOs has been extensive (although with
variable benefits across cases). The second step was the selection of a project that
encompasses ecotourism initiatives with group ranches and their affiliate community
organizations. The rationale for this basis was because the group ranch is a common
mode of land tenure that governs communities’ organizational and operational efforts in
these wildlife complexes. In fact, most conservation areas and buffer zones constitute or
are located within or near the group ranches in Maasailand.
In the third step, I applied purposive sampling to confirm that the project was
anchored on integrated conservation and development efforts rather than pure
conservation programs. There are two reasons for this. First, many recent partnership
initiatives are integrated conservation projects. This is a deliberate attempt for the study
to capture aspects of substantive empowerment. As this study will show, these initiatives
produce different outcomes in the each case, and therefore, gathering data that is specific
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to each project was crucial. The final step entailed the use of convenience sampling. This
helped to situate a rewards and a payments component of these projects. The selected
projects qualified as models that are making significant attempts at reducing pastoralist
vulnerability through livelihoods diversification, asset portfolio expansion, or
strengthening the institutional capacity of group ranch institutions.
In essence, a deliberate decision was to evaluate partnership efforts in promoting
participatory ecotourism ventures. Thus, for Laikipia, I selected the Il Ngwesi Eco-lodge,
at the Amboseli the Eselenekei Eco-lodge, and at the Mara Tirnagle the Kichwa Tembo
Eco-camp. Additionally, these projects manifest how livestock management (a dominant
mode of production) and wildlife conservation (an alternative mode of production)
compete as and/or co-exist as livelihood enhancement mechanisms. Wildlife competes
with livestock for land such as grazing and water resources) and human resources (time
and skills for pasture/land management and herding, revenues for stocking, restocking,
health maintenance, and feeding). The three payments for ecosystem service projects
justify an analysis of rangeland management as an act of balancing conservation with
economic opportunities. Each case of ecotourism project entails efforts to conserve
endemic and threatened species within the reserves and dispersal areas. For example, the
project supported by Laikipia Wildlife Forum is a rangeland conservation program that
improves pasture for herbivores (rhino, Gravy zebra, etc) while the projects supported by
the Amboseli Partnership and by Mara Triangle target the conservation of carnivores (and
particularly the big cats).
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5.2.4.2.2: Implementation
I implemented the fieldwork through interviews and observation from August
2011 to August 2012. After securing the necessary authorization, which is a requirement
by the government, I embarked on a site familiarization process of rapport building and
then began my field research. This was a deliberate strategy to make the data collection
feasible and efficient. I allotted each site a number of days and visits for the initial
familiarization process. I re-organized the work plan when accessibility and resource
challenges came forth. For example, the plan had to be overhauled when members of a
given cohort became unavailable. Respondents from the private sector were initially
hesitant or inaccessible, while I had to handle rules for engaging community informants
and geographical challenges before accessing community respondents. It was also helpful
that many officials in the wildlife and tourism sector made frequent visits to Nairobi for
meetings, workshops, trainings, and seminars. I was therefore able to capitalize on
meeting and interviewing a number of them then in Nairobi.
5.2.4.2.3: Administration
Preliminary field visits and observations in the study areas provided initial data
(and evidence) for guiding further data collection. The second phase entailed intensive
fieldwork and interviewing. The distribution of research questionnaires to potential
respondents were carried out after a first rapport building/preliminary sessions or
invitations that I sent out via email or phone. The other alternative was to conduct an
immediate interview. However, these administrative processes depended entirely on the
respondent’s preference. Informants included private sector investors, wildlife and forest
resources governance specialists, conservation scholars, consultants, experts on
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devolution, senior Maasai elders, officers from district authorities/councils, state agencies
and ministries, private entrepreneurs, officers from NGOs, and community members (of
Maasai and non-Maasai descent).
I identified and interviewed a large number of contacts and informants via
snowball sampling within and across institutions. Prior contacts helped in identifying
potential informants. They notified additional informants and prospective interviewees
about my work (i.e via snowball and purposive sampling). Convenience sampling (i.e.
availability sampling) complemented the two strategies and the rationale was to identify
and/or capitalize on readily available respondents and informants who were immediately
available for interviewing. My attendance in sector trade fairs, conferences, county open
deliberations, and budget days were opportunities to operationalize convenient and
purposive sampling. I met a diverse pool of representatives of the three partner cohorts
and conducted interviews or informal conversations. The assistants and I received the
completed questionnaires through email.
I conducted both formal and informal interviews depending on the logistical
dynamics at hand. I used semi-structured interviews with open-ended questions
preferring it as a tool that would allow me to restructure and reword questions based on
the type of interviewee and context. Operational and logistical challenges that arose
included the complex interviewee preferences, regulated Maasai customs, access to
bureaucratic offices, and sensitivity of the wildlife conservation issues at the time of
fieldwork. When confronted with access and time limitations, I re-strategized my work
plan and conducted interviews by relying on insightful strategies from Mugendi and
Mugendi (2003), some of which include: 1) initiating the interview session with
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interesting questions, 2) ordering questions to allow important questions first, and 3)
logically itemizing related questions. For example, owing to the significant need to
understand partnership outcomes, I reordered the questions in such a way that CBOrelated questions were the first sections of the questionnaire. The specific information
that I gathered included data on structure of partnerships, membership, and benefits for
community organizations. Given the contentious nature of wildlife conservation topic (at
this time), an efficient way was to sample members and non-members of the three
partnerships.
5.2.4.2.4: Interpretation
In some instances, there was need for translation of interview questions and
responses. A reassuring fact was that many Maasais speak reasonably good Swahili that
can allow proper communication. Many interviews were in English or Swahili and were
translated into Maa or Swahili when necessary. I hired three assistants to help me
facilitate a more effective strategy. I was able to identify and hire them with assistance
from state officers at one of the field sites. The roles of the assistants were interviewing,
translation, and rapport building depending on the need and context of the interview. The
three assistants had training in wildlife and forest management. Two were fluent in Maa
as they are from the Maasai tribe while the third was a resident non-Maasai but with
extensive familiarity on the region. The three spoke fluent Swahili and English. I trained
them in skills for approaching interviewees and conducting interview sessions. The
gathered data from interview sessions were hand-written manually or tape-recorded.
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5.2.4.2.5: Complications
My familiarity and understanding of the study sites and their socio-cultural
contexts helped me to approach potential informants with tact and respect. However, I
arrived in Kenya to conduct my fieldwork at a volatile, emotionally charged, and a
politicized policy environment for the wildlife sector. Besides a bureaucratized
authorization process (and especially with state-affiliated agencies), there were times
when I made frequent re-organization of the work plans for interviewing. During this
time, conflict among wildlife sector stakeholders was at its peak and cross-coalitional
contestations surged with squabbles over the contents and the continued delays in the
passage of the wildlife bill. Additionally, at the Maasai Mara complex, a shift to
electronic ticketing prompted Maasai to mobilize and protest the change, which they
viewed as a ploy to deny those revenues that they felt they justly deserved. At the Mara,
the Maasai also feared a potential corruption loophole was in the making as they claimed
that the decision was made without consulting them. This was a sensitive time to
interview the Maasai community and government bureaucrats as well. The predicament
lay in the fact that the Maasai did not embrace the proposed rule. These predicaments
steadily declined as the tensions lessened with shifts in the government’s approach.
5.2.4.3: Review of documents and secondary data
This strategy encompassed identification, intensive reviewing, and interpretation
of documents viewed as having useful data about the context, the actors and their
interactions, and associated outcomes in a given partnership. Documents provided data
for improving theoretic arguments, for thematic and content analysis, and complemented
the data from interviews. Some of the most important documents reviewed include
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thematic, empirical, and theoretic studies on co-management in Kenya and across the
globe; MCPP organizational documents such as monthly and annual reports, director’s
reports, periodic newsletters and policy briefs; national and local legislative documents
such as acts of parliament, orders and decrees, laws and by-laws on biodiversity sectors.
Review summaries of statutes and formal policy statements (from central and municipal
governments), financial allocation reports, among others were examined. Documents
describing provisions of major international biodiversity regimes were also reviewed.
5.2.4.4: Observation
I sought more information through the technique of observing physical, ecological
and geographic features of ecosystems and attended events on invitation, including
meetings, forums, and trade fairs. Using a classification from Marshall and Rossman
(1995), I assessed behaviors (interactions and discussions of actors), and artifacts (in the
landscapes and dispersal areas). As a technique, observation served the purpose of
providing additional confirmation of collected data. Observation was useful during both
formative and final stages of the fieldwork. Marshall and Rossman’s (1995) strategy of
focused observation was applied at the final stages of research to illuminate the critical
analytical themes of interest.
6: Description of cases
6.1: The Laikipia Wildlife Forum
Laikipia district is home to one of the most highly institutionalized and successful
MCPPs in the country. The various community interests organize under an umbrella body,
the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, which represents diverse constituencies from both
governmental and non-governmental entities. Partnership entities have a key interest in
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conserving the ecosystem complex along the Ewaso ecosystem. The partnership was
established in 1992 with collaborating partners encompassing the municipal government
of Nanyuki, interconnected community group ranches, and the private sector. The
partnership’s leadership is elected as representatives of the five regions of the district
while others are nominated or selected. Originally, the MCCP was a structure that was
interconnected along five thematic areas. These were community conservation and
wildlife management, environmental education, tourism development, security, and
finance. It has since expanded to more areas and currently constitutes eight departments.
Compared to its peers in the Mara and Amboseli complexes, partnership activities have
translated into relatively successful outcomes for conservation and the indigenous
community organizations. This ecosystem complex now prides itself as the region
supporting the largest amount of endangered mammals than anywhere in East Africa. This
is largely due to the efforts of the Laikipia Wildlife Forum (LWF 2006, Honey 2008,
Western et al. 2006). The partnership outcomes heralded in this conservation landscape is
serving as a replicable paradigm across Kenya and Africa. However, it is not without
challenges.
6.2: The Amboseli Biosphere Reserve Management Partnership
The Amboseli is the second largest and the second most visited protected area
complex in Kenya after the Maasai Mara. It is located in the Olkejuado County in
southern Kenya. The Amboseli is a UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserve, with a large
portion of the land belonging to the Maasai community. The interest in managing the
Amboseli and surrounding ecosystem drew stakeholders to form an umbrella
organization, which operates as a consortium, the Amboseli Biosphere Reserve
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Management Partnership. The partnership is a network of interconnected community
group ranches under ATGRA, the Amboseli Tsavo Group Ranches Association, two
local governments of Ol Kejuado and Loitoktok, and the private sector. The partnership
coordinates co-management activities in the core area of the park and in the dispersal
areas in four main group ranches of Imbirikani, Kimana, Olgulului/Lorrashai and
Eselenkei and across the complex. The key interest of the partners is enhancing provision
of benefit sharing, facilitating effective collection of park revenues, infrastructural
utilities, and promoting nature-based ecotourism enterprises. This partnership is an
exemplary case of how promising co-management structures can siphon resources away
from crucial empowerment outcomes. Intense coalitional competition diverted
partnership agenda away from transformative change. In such a context, the partnership’s
evolution has been relatively unstable with constant pressure to adjust structures and to
limit dependence and influence of external institutions.
6.3: The Mara Conservancy
The third MCPP of interest involves partners working to conserve Maasai Mara’s
Mara Triangle and the dispersal areas in the Greater Mara ecosystem. The Maasai Mara
corridor is Kenya’s top nature and tourism attraction and perhaps the chief attraction in
Africa as well (Honey 2008). Mara’s strategic importance to the environmental and
development sector is because it accounts for 75% of the country’s wildlife (Western et
al. 2006). Like the other reserves of interest, it is located in land historically used by
Maasai pastoralists. An important section of complex that is of interest to this research is
the Mara Triangle. The umbrella partnership governing collaborative programs in the
Mara Triangle sub-complex is an innovative devolution program titled the Mara
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Conservancy. This collaborative venture is modeled on constituency representation from
local governments of Trans Mara, local communities and the private sector. Like the
Laikipia Wildlife Forum, the management and decision-making is under leadership
comprised of both elected and selected members. The partnership was established to
address inefficiency and corruption which had nearly stalled park operations. Corruption,
land grabbing, elite capture, and minimal revenue returns to the community were
common challenges (Honey 2008, Western et al. 2009). The inception of Mara
Conservancy has seen achievements some reduction in poaching, development of
infrastructure, facilitation and use of renewable energy, and an improved but not perfect
benefit-sharing program. The key challenges for this partnership are institutional,
operational and structural. As will be discussed in chapter 5, the Mara Conservancy
provides an interesting case where tradeoff between effectiveness and representativeness
can make a significant difference in partnership-mediated outcomes.
7: Operationalization of variables
This dissertation has its foundation in qualitative methodology. Qualitative
methods are powerful tools for exploratory research, for providing strong explanations,
and for assessing causality (King, Keohane and Verba 1994, 82-86; Miles and Huberman
1994, 147-148; Yin 1994, Eisenhardt 2002, 5-37; Glasner and Strauss 2009, 17-18).
Researchers can derive testable explanatory propositions from a limited number of cases
(Rueschemeyer 2003, 307). The debate over the legitimate scientific status of qualitative
designs is well-known in the social sciences. These debates have assumed different
thematic and philosophical positions. An important outcome has been the offshoot of
opponents, apologists, agnostics, and defenders of the qualitative research movement.
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Rigorous studies affirming the strengths of qualitative designs in dealing with some of
the methodological, ontological, and epistemological issues have not reduced these
contentious debates either. Counter-responses and evidence offer strong support of the
view that qualitative methods can aid in testing hypotheses and explaining causal
outcomes. More importantly, a qualitative design: 1) is a more efficient strategy for
establishing the regularity of causal events 2) increases validity and reliability (Mays and
Pope 1995: 1, Maxwell 2002, 37), 3) enhancing the level of precision of procedures for
verification and generation of hypotheses and findings (King, Keohane & Verba 1994,
84-85; Glasner and Strauss 2009, 16-17, 18). Qualitative methods are crucial in
addressing the etic-emic dilemma, (Guba and Lincoln 1994:106) and possess an
advantage in estimating causal effects (King, Keohane & Verba 1994).
7.1: Measures of decentralization of power
The key measure of distribution of formal power is the extent of decentralization
of formal power. Dimensions that specify the center of decision-making, fiscal authority
and the institutionalization of rules for power sharing are key indicators of this variable.
It assumed that distributing power across partnership units enhances participation,
deliberation and negotiation, therefore bringing more issues to bear upon institutions. I
examine attributes of decision-making in MCPPs along a centralization-decentralization
continuum. This is based on demonstration in existing research that co-management is a
continuum of power distribution encompassing different degrees of authority among
partners (Carlsson and Berkes 2005 etc.). In terms of overall decision-making authority,
it suffices to examine which partner wields more power, how much power, and with what
resources. I used dimensions of decentralization from Ribot (2002). Thus, I assessed
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indicators such as the presence and role of state-affiliated administrative bodies such as
KWS, KFS, and NEMA and attributes of existing technical and tax codes for managing
resources and revenues. It is obvious that even with successful co-management, local
governments (as local trustees) and state-affiliated bodies command a more powerful
presence in these partnerships but as cases will demonstrate, there are important
variations at the platform and project level. Evidence that local governments and
parastatals set the agenda, plan, and implement programs indicates a less decentralized
system. By evaluating these features, I was able to identify and specify two critical
centers of power. In Kenya, State-affiliated parastatals (operating within or under
auspices of municipal offices) have control over technical administrative activities in
wildlife forest services. This means that they command, expend, and control a reasonable
amount of resources.
I assessed fiscal authority in order to identify which partner enjoys the most
authority in organizing, expending, and distributing revenues from wildlife-based
resources, including how benefit-sharing is structured and what projects are funded. Here
again I use Ribot’s indicators of decentralization. I evaluated technical and tax codes for
managing resources and revenues from wildlife-related biodiversity and specifically the
legal and institutional mechanisms and implementation context for managing 1) wildlife
and rangeland resources and 2) proceeds from tourism and ecotourism. For this
dimension, I gathered interview data and secondary literature on tenure and usufruct
rights for protected and dispersal area use, participation and benefit sharing. I also
examined multiple documents such as legal statutes on group ranches and group trusts,
group ranch by-laws, wildlife and forest conservation laws and by-laws, the Kenyan
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Constitution, and international protocols on protected areas management. This was
complemented by an analysis of activities reports of MCPPs, strategic planning
documents, community rewards and compensation reports, and literature on comanagement. The third dimension that I evaluated was institutionalization via data on
structures for selecting, electing and appointing leaders/managers of partnerships. In
particular, I examined at both MCPP platform and project level how board and committee
leadership assume power and their mandates, the existing tenure qualities, and
constituents that they represent. By examining these features, it is convenient to
differentiate de jure and de facto power among MCPP institutions –which are both
important dimensions of institutionalization and evolution of partnerships platform and
project-based processes.
7.2: Measures of elite support
In order to address the possibility of ambiguity in measuring the variable elite
support, I use direct and proxy measures. The first direct measure is resource
commitments by elites to co-management efforts at initiation and in the course of
partnership evolution. When elites commit resources directly or indirectly, it clearly is
indicative of some level of support for and commitment to inclusive governance because
they own and wield significant tangible and intangible resources that they use for or
against distributive governance. For this measure, I evaluate elites’ roles as political and
policy entrepreneurs in their leadership efforts in mobilization of (human, physical/land,
informational, technical, financial, symbolic, and legal) resources used to enhance
incentives structures for co-management. Elite entrepreneurship is as critical dimension
of support that lowers the costs of mobilization, strengthens the collective identity, and
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steers local mobilization for co-management. The data here include interview data and
secondary literature on co-management in Kenya.
The second measure is a proxy indicator applied and adapted from Burton and
Higley (1987). Here, I assess elite coalition dynamics by utilizing indicators such as elite
differentiation along socio-structural types where I first differentiate them in groupings
(such as local-bureaucratic, political, national-bureaucratic, landed elites, and traditional
community leadership, etc.) and elite competition, which measures contests for control of
MCPP agenda and activities. I then evaluate these two measures by assessing gathered
interview data and secondary literature on elite cross-coalitional dynamics on contentious
co-management issues. The assumption is that a powerful and united elite coalition with
high stakes in co-management can reinforce and effectively enforce its interests – even
when it means thwarting community empowerment or vice versa. Contested issues such
as extension of usufruct rights, revenue sharing, and intense policy debates facilitate or
hamper elite cohesiveness or increases divisiveness. These dynamics influence the
structure of elite support for co-management in terms of emergence and destruction of
policy alliances that are directly or indirectly critical to partnership operations. Some elite
coalitions (especially those led by political elites) are prone to forestalling
decentralization efforts. They can impede mobilization and nurture countervailing forces
that hijack projects and resources earmarked for extending co-management benefits to
communities.
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7.3: Measures of capacity of a given community organization
In order to measure the CBO capacity, I utilized dimensions associated with the
European Center for Development Policy Management.28 CBO capacity is measured by
attributes such as collective capabilities, assets and relationships that each of the three
CBO entities possesses. Particularly, these dimensions allow for an evaluation of both
material and organizational resources of community entities. For collective capabilities, I
evaluated interview and secondary data on an entity’s formal and informal institutions,
depth of mobilization participation via formal and informal activism. For assets, I
evaluated if and why one CBO possesses specific resources such as extensive
membership, land, good leadership, offices, and values while another did not. Assessing
these two elements helped to match them with the ability and capacity of an entity to
participate in co-management. Assessing relationships entailed evaluating both internal
and external context of CBO interactions and the interlocking factors that dominate in the
political environment. A host of local socio-political and legal environments acted as
support systems or bottlenecks vis a vis their linkages with the CBO units
7.4: Measure of partnership formalization
This measure builds on the assumption that a more rapidly initiated partnership
platform operating on strong accommodative and consensus oriented process enhances
participatory spaces earlier and more effectively on course to consolidation. I therefore
evaluated each case of MCPP in their ability to nurture participatory spaces amenable to
open and democratic governance and the speed with which MCPP inception and
formalization were enabled. My argument concurs with three approaches that the
28

The specific report is titled Capacity, change and performance and was prepared by Heather
Baser and Peter Morgan in 2008.
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achievement of effective participation must reposition local organizations within a
proactive partnership strategy rather than one that sidelines them as alternative partners. I
therefore examined data on collective constituency and consensus building at initiation
and examined these processes in subsequent phases for each case. At initiation, I
specifically assessed constituency building in terms of the ability of the co-management
program to achieve community buy-in, and beyond initiating linkages. I evaluated
formalization and consolidation capabilities of partnerships by assessing the scope of
participatory space and the scale of linkages and networks that provide human, financial,
technical and social capital that are all relevant factors that enable program
implementation. Thus MCPP scaling up participation is a paramount dimension assessed
in the course of MCPP evolution. I evaluated interview and secondary data on how each
of the three phases unfolds vis a vis coalitional dynamics. I also evaluated data on
innovations implemented in partnership platforms during each phase.
7.5: Measures of platform resources availed
For institutions, I evaluated the organizational structure of an MCPP by
examining interview and secondary data describing constitutive boards, committees,
sectoral departments (or level of modularity), and initiated markets for ecosystem
services. An MCPP’s possession of legal and organizational capacity is an important
backbone of the implementation structure of program initiatives. These are critical
avenues for active community participation as resources enhance community agency and
complement entities’ efforts in exploiting political opportunity, (Alsop et al. 2006).
I evaluated resources availed in an MCPP platform by assessing data on
organizational structure and program and project scaling up efforts that increase financial,
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technical, human, informational and infrastructural resources to a specific partnership
operation. I also evaluated organizational values by assessing the principles that define
organizational culture of an MCPP and the prominence level of a specific partnership
value. Principles such as inclusivity, effectiveness and accountability are paramount
indicators.
7.6: Measures of empowerment
The first measure of empowerment is representation. This dimension examines
the design of the apparatuses of co-management, the communities’ leadership roles, and
programs for enfranchising them. Beyond these, it assesses if representation initiates and
sustains meaningful input from the communities’ leadership and allows them to be
decisive in shaping the outcomes that affect their constituents. Although the
representational capability of community organizations is predicated upon their internal
capacity, over the long term, partnership operations should serve the purpose of
harnessing and enhancing this capacity. I evaluate formal and informal representation of
CBOs in partnership activities, in decision-making units (such as development,
budgetary, planning and environmental) committees, task forces, monitoring and board
management and engagement by assessing the organizational structure of each
partnership. I also analyze the evolution of joint management in the three phases. Voting,
nomination, and selection mechanisms are structures examined in each case. I also
evaluate fluctuations in representation by examining the expansion and contraction of
mandates of community organizations in the course of co-management evolution. I
examine both platform and project level data for each case. The key sources of data were
interviews and literature on co-management operations of the three MCPPs.
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The second measure of empowerment is effectiveness. Effectiveness is twopronged the performance of CBOs as representatives (with an interest in enhancing
community livelihoods and benefits) and as co-managers (with a simultaneous interest in
conserving wildlife landscapes). Following Lipset (1960) and Ostrom (1990), I evaluate
community organizations’ ability to satisfy the expectations of most of their constituents
through enabling of 1) successful organization and interest articulation, 2) expanded
livelihood portfolios, and 3) co-implementation of co-management goals under minimal
conflict with powerful groups. I evaluated interview data, observed study sites, and
undertook extensive literature review on community environmental stewardship and ecoentrepreneurship.
The third measure is accountability. I assess accountability from two standpointspartnership accountability and project level accountability. I assessed the mechanisms by
which CBO representatives monitor management structures for resources and revenues
and if they can effectively sanction or question MCPP board leadership. Similarly, at the
project level, I evaluate if group ranch members monitor community leaders.
Additionally, I assess accountability by evaluating data on mechanisms for selecting and
electing co-management and project leadership. I use organizational data from
partnership plans and interview data gathered from fieldwork.
8: Analysis of data
8.1: Testing hypotheses and establishing causality
In order to test the proposed hypotheses in each case study, the study employed a
variety of tools during and after collection and coding processes. This key strategy was
an iterative process of going back and forth with the data by identifying, creating,
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justifying, and interpreting data. The strategies recommended by Miles and Huberman
(1994, 262-283) were the key tools applied to ascertain links between related data. I
implemented triangulation by data sources, methods, and theory (following Miles and
Huberman1994, 206-207). The second tool used was to note and analyze relationships
between variables. This process is the effort by the researcher to use progressively
available data and organizing the data along themes and concepts of interest in order to
establish linkages between variables (Eisenhardt 2002: 16). The recorded data availed
different frames, which I used to implement a comparative case strategy. The
specification/measures for the key variables were ready prior to the fieldwork, but I made
adjustments because availability of new data from fieldwork led to improvements in
theory, thus, new hypotheses emerged. Furthermore, the iterative process of building new
evidence enabled improved hypothesis testing. Following Eisenhardt (2002, 17), the
process of building and comparing evidence entailed constant comparison between data
and the measured constructs.
The major strategies for analyzing relationships are strategies from Miles and
Huberman (1994). I analyze instances when the dependent variable and a given
independent variable of interest are both high and low at the same time, when the
dependent variable and a given independent variable increase at the same time, and I also
note if a given independent variable of interest increases first then leads to increases in
the dependent variable.
An additional tool used to test and confirm hypotheses was the application of
cross-case analysis. The basis for this strategy is methodological and theoretical.
Methodologically, case studies are more effective and useful for validating and
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connecting empirical reality with constructed measures. This increases the level of
empirical validity of the resultant theory, (Eisenhardt 1989, 15). From a theoretical
standpoint, Eisenhardt further reiterates that examining cases to test for hypotheses
allows a researcher to develop effective constructs and enables falsification of
hypotheses.
In this scenario, an additional basis is explanatory, where emerging patterns from
one case can be tested in other cases. Cross-case comparison entails finding a pattern in a
case and then across cases or comparing patterns. Both the recurrence and absence of
patterns across cases are valuable in hypotheses testing and for partnership outcomes. A
fourth tool entailed the investigation of intervening variables. The causal diagram
displayed in the theoretic framework indicates the influence of intervening variables
explanations for the variations in partnership-mediated outcomes.29 Finally, a major
endeavor of explanation in this dissertation is counting. Examining how much or how
long a given phenomena or pattern exists identifies the important dimensions relevant for
establishing the scope and strength of variables.
8.2: Thematic analysis
An equally important tool used for data analysis will utilize a technique developed
by Maxwell and Loomis (2003, 364) complemented with the works of Fereday and MuirCochrane (2006). This involves the use of thematic analysis which is a procedure for
searching for themes that emerge as being important to the description of phenomena
under study. Themes development and implementation was before and during the
fieldwork and the basis for theme selection were operational relevance, ontological and

29

Examining assumptions about the role of intervening variable will help address some of the challenges
(identified by Rueschemeyer 2003, 383) that arise when causal effects are not clearly stated or identified.
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epistemological boundaries. Crucial themes emerged from interview transcripts,
documents, narratives, and informal field discussions. Themes from interview data were
identified, categorized and analyzed according to patterns and sequences following Miles
and Huberman (1994, 61).
9: Significance of the study
This study is significant in multifarious ways. Beyond reconciling technocratic,
instrumental and normative views on collaborative partnerships, it offers valuable
insights on their interconnections to path analysis. The study underscores how time, space
and resources define empowerment outcomes. This research stands relevant in three
aspects that would generally define the key aspects of research contributions. These are:
1) contribution to the development of theory, through exploration and explanation of
governance outcomes 2) contribution to discussions and examination of crucial themes of
the paradigm of co-management, and 3) contribution to policy ideas and innovative
policy alternatives in a given issue area. Theoretically, it seeks to uncover the linkages
between three crucial independent variables and outcomes of participation by articulating
different paths of partnership evolution. There is dearth of empirical and systematic
comparative work on state-society partnerships in Kenya and Africa in general. The
dissertation equally contributes to the debates on taxonomic categories and operational
contexts of collaborative partnerships. This effort contributes to research in the sector of
biodiversity management. By exploring and explaining how these programs define
procedural gains and substantive outcomes for CBOs and their constituents, it contributes
to both theoretical and policy tools that provide innovative alternatives.
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As an embodiment of governance research, this dissertation examines the
manifestations of interactions between the state and non-state actors. Thematically, it
covers topics that are gaining currency in academic and policy quarters. It addresses
institutional design aspects of governance systems, capacity building, and empowerment.
The contributions of this disseveration to co-management research are based on the
innovative aspects of the research study. This is the first extensively descriptive,
evaluative, comparative and systematic analysis of MCPPs and MCPP-mediated payment
models. Concomitantly, this study expands the theory of collaboration and provides a
parsimonious model of collaboration, much so with simple and useful heuristics. It
challenges policy makers to complement their intervention targets with tools that
appropriately and effectively capture pathways and prerequisites for co-management.
There is compelling evidence from this study that interventions can have meaningful
impact if these factors are taken into consideration.
10: Organization of the study
Chapter 1 introduces and discusses the key themes and objectives, the scope of
the study, the relevant literature, the research design, the scope and significance of the
study. The specific features entail a description of the problem statement, theoretical
model, methods, operationalization of key dependent and independent variables, and
relevance of the study. It outlays the process and structure of this research and provides a
descriptive summary of the methods used to collect, analyze and interpret data.
Chapter 2 discusses and analyzes the features of the legal framework for MCPPs
and the attendant institutional structures governing MCPP operations in Kenya. The

66

section has two sub-sections; one section analyzing the key features while the second
evaluates the attributive elements that are supportive or inhibitive for MCPPs.
Chapters 3, 4, and 5 are empirical chapters that examine the case studies of
MCPPs; the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, the Amboseli Biosphere Reserve Maagement
Partnership, and the Mara Conservancy. These chapters describe and evaluate the
trajectory of partnership evolution in each case study and the factors that define comanagement vis a vis their role in helping or hindering community empowerment. They
describe the associated mainstreaming strategies for enhancing participation and
strengthening community organizations’ formal entry into the governance arena.
Chapter 6 presents a comparative analysis of three MCPPs. It examined the
hypothesized empirical relationships among variables. The articulation of comparative
parameters is implemented through an evaluation of field data and in using various tools
for organizing, developing, and interpreting themes and phrases from observation and
secondary documents. The chapter presents the lessons learnt and implications of the
study. It suggests further research needed to complete the agenda of the MCPP
framework in semi-liberal states such as Kenya and provides conclusions of the research
study.
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CHAPTER 2
THE LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK GOVERNING MCPPs
1: Introduction
This chapter examines the distinctive features of Kenya’s legal framework on
which MCPPs managing wildlife protected areas anchor. It delves into the key legal
contents in order to elucidate the emblematic features of attendant institutional structures.
The first section is organized around two major subjects: the fundamental principles on
which enunciated statutes are underpinned and the policy provisions that prescribe action,
proscribe activities and circumscribe boundaries of sector stakeholder action. The second
section evaluates the supportive and inhibitive elements of the legal framework and the
framework’s role in facilitating mechanisms for institutions that 1) effectively promote
participatory spaces and empowered communities; 2) ensure accountability in the internal
operations of partnership entities and 3) secure representative and inclusive systems for
community stakeholders.
The analysis specifies that there are only modest efforts at increasing
effectiveness, accountability, and representativeness. Four mechanisms are at play in
providing the parameters for evaluating statutes’ implementation. Norming and scalingup have emerged as supportive tools while gate-keeping and scoping strategies are
exhibits of inhibitive tools of the legal framework.30 Additionally, cross-sectoral
differences exist with regards to implementation and uptake of ongoing reforms which
began with the omnibus law of EMCA, the Environmental Management and

30

An extensive review of these four attributes is described in the last section of this chapter.
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Coordination Act.31 The forest sector has been relatively quick to adjust and transform
while the wildlife sector has largely remained a lucrative laggard which has only slowly
but sporadically accommodated the ongoing sectoral changes.
1.1: The distinctive features of Kenya’s legal framework for MCPPs
A legal framework is a set of codes constituted in formal and informal law which
govern the operations of a given government sector. At best, it “establishes obligations
through rules and mechanisms which are usually aimed at compliance” (Kibiwott, 2008,
4). While compliance is a major instrument that propels the regulative side of a sector’s
legal architecture (the stick component), there are equally various operational incentives
(the carrot element) which are developed to foster compliance through, for example,
protection granting of usufruct rights and expanded participatory modalities (for example,
Baker and McKenzie 2009). The legal framework which guides MCPPs and other
collaborative operations in Kenya is a semblance of diverse laws and policies drawn from
local, national, regional, and international institutional arenas. Kenya’s protected area
system is based on total protection of core areas, surrounded by buffer zones where
limited human interaction and exploitation is allowed and transition zones (UNESCO
2005, Nelson 2012). This land consists of national parks, reserves, sanctuaries, and
monuments located in various terrestrial, riparian, and marine ecosystems.32
Many of Kenya’s laws are statutory in nature and are generally codified using
England’s legal system of rules.33 However, Kenya uses both formal and customary law
as a basis for its legal framework. The formal sources are constituted in Section 3 of the
31

Kenya’s legal architecture for wildlife and forest sectors is highly integrated with numerous functional
and legal interfaces. As such, inter-agency operations, collaboration, resource mobilization, staffing, and
coordination predominate in the implementation processes of major statutes.
32
For a more detailed analysis, see for example, Nelson (2012).
33
Kenya Law Reports, nd. at http://www.icnl.org/research/monitor/kenya.html
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Judicature Act, Cap 8 Laws of Kenya which provides authority to the Constitution, the
court systems, the parliament, and written laws of England as basis for formal law and
associated practice. Figure 2 below is a categorical listing of the various sources of law in
Kenya.
Figure 2: Sources of law in Kenya

Formal law, national
1. The Constitution
2. Acts of Parliament
3.
Subsidiary/delegate/
subordinate
legislation 4. Judicial
precedents

Formal law, international
1. Specific Acts of
Parliament of the United
Kingdom
2. English statutes of
General application
3. The substance of
common law
4. The doctrine of Equity
(English law)
5. Procedures and practice.
observed by courts of
justice in England
6. General rules of
international law
7. Any of convention
ratified by Kenya

Informal law
1. African
customary law
2. Hindu law
3. Islamic law

Source: Adapted from Kelly, Odiwuor and Kelly Eunice. Sources of law in Kenya, p.2.34
After the enunciation of the Environmental Management Coordination Act
(hereafter EMCA), the legal and institutional arena for natural resource management has
been dynamic, as witnessed by an increase in the numbers of active stakeholders, crosssectoral interactions , diversity of agendas, dominating debates, and the notable growth of
sector-related institutions. The legal framework governing the operation of environmental
partnerships is supportive, albeit with obvious shortcomings manifested in challenges at
34

Accessed at http://www.oakadvocates.co.ke, on December 7, 2012.
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implementation, regulation, and enforcement. A statement recently made by a legal
expert in environmental law aptly portrays the extent of these challenges. He opines that
“Kenyans are very good at creating drafts laws and policies but very poor at
implementing.”35
A second noteworthy feature of the system is that it is characterized by multiple
laws, codes, and directives interspersed across multi-sector and multi-actor systems. This
problem is seen as a major impediment to efficient coordination and a compromise to the
efforts to enhancing partnerships at different levels of governance (Krassowska 2009).
Finally, due to its very dynamic nature and as a sector dominated by the participation of
powerful but diverse coalitions of stakeholders (from finance, tourism, environment,
local governments, central government, pastoralist communities, and donors), the legal
architecture governing activities in protected areas and their dispersal areas is constantly
undergoing reforms and reviews, at least in the post-EMCA era.
Kenya’s conflict-ridden and occasionally dysfunctional wildlife policy arena is
driven by stakeholders’ competing interests. This compromises and delay reforms and
contributes to catastrophic outcomes for wildlife. Ergo, until the passing of the 2013
Wildlife Act partnerships in wildlife protected areas were confronting complex, outdated
and conservative laws. More specifically, the legal framework failed to adequately
provide incentives for crucial partners such as CBOs.36 Compounding the challenges
further is the long path to solving the longstanding unresolved issues of just benefit
35

This point was echoed in an interview conducted by Professor Kimani in his article, ‘Participatory
aspirations of environmental governance in East Africa” prepared for the 2010 PADELIA project. See the
Report in the Law Environment and Development Journal, Volume 6(2).
36
The years 2011 and 2012 were attributively tension ridden times as the wildlife legislation was awaiting
parliamentary approval and presidential assent. The bill had been locked in gridlock since 2007 because
protagonists continually disrupted or forestalled enactment through strong counter- responses. The wildlife
policy coalition is very fragile and more heterogeneous compared to it’s the forest and marine sector
counterparts.
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sharing and compensation of afflicted communities. Finally, Kenya’s general approach to
policymaking has been “piece-meal and fragmented” and it was only in the 1990s that
integrated approaches were streamlined into the policy systems (Yatich et al., 2007).
However, there are important changes occurring which are indicative of some
commitment and willingness among stakeholders to provide solutions to the challenges
faced by reserve adjacent and reserve user communities. A momentous occasion was
witnessed in December 2013 when the Wildlife Act was enacted. It is hoped that it will
lead to profound changes in the sector.
1.2: Why a legal framework for MCPPs?
Although enormous challenges define Kenya’s legal infrastructure for
partnerships’ role in managing protected areas, there have been simultaneous
developments in the policy landscape. Stakeholders’ perceptions are changing and
providing both normative and instrumental justifications for a more enabling legal and
institutional framework. This tenuous but emerging character of the policy arena signals
some level of commitment by Kenya in upholding international principles on biodiversity
conservation. It is indicative of the fact that the country is adopting legislations that
promote sustainability and is a demonstration that sustainability is important in and of
itself to Kenya. The legal framework thus, has given partnership programs and projects
legal basis, identity, and force and has provided more impetus for mobilizing resources
that are much needed to strengthen the nascent and weak partnerships regime.
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2: Components of the legal framework for MCPPs
2.1: Principles guiding the framework for MCPPs
Characteristically, Kenya’s legal framework is borne out of the interest to
incorporate norms espoused in major global environmental regimes onto the national
framework. Table 3 provides a descriptive matrix of selected multilateral environmental
agreements (MEAs) that Kenya is a signatory to, including those that it has ratified.
Table 3: A listing of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) that Kenya is a
signatory
Year
signed /
adopted

Year
Kenya
became a
signatory,
ratified

Wildlife
sector
(applies)
√ (Yes)

Forest
sector
(applies)
√ (Yes)

Capacity
building
target partner
/entity

Paris
Declaration

2005

Signed
2005

√

√

Civil society;
State organs
through
Kenya Joint
Assistant
strategy

Convention on
Biological
Diversity (CBD)

1992

Signed
July 1994

√

√

Public

Rio Declaration
UNCED
Summit and
Agenda 21

1992

1992

√

√

The public
Local
communities
Local
governments

Stockholm
Declaration
(United Nations
Conference on
Human
Environment)

1972

Signed
√
2001
Ratified in
2004

√

The public
Local
communities
Local
governments
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Table 3—Continued
Year
signed /
adopted

Year
Kenya
became a
signatory,
ratified

Wildlife
sector
(applies)
√ (Yes)

Forest
sector
(applies)
√ (Yes)

Capacity
building
target partner
/entity

United Nations
Convention to
Combat
Desertification
(UNCCD)

1994

Signed
June 1997

√

√

State agencies

Kyoto Protocol
to the
United Nations
Framework on
Climate Change
(UNFCC)

1997

1997,
2005*

√

√

The public
Local
communities
Local
governments

Convention on
1973,
International
Trade on
Endangered
Species (CITES)

Join
1975***

√

√

The public
Local
communities
Local
governments

Convention
Concerning the
Protection of the
World Cultural
and Natural
Heritage

1972

Signed
1978

√

√

The public
Local
communities
Local
governments

UN Framework
Convention on
Climate Change

1992,
effective
1994

Signed
√
1992
Ratified in
1994

√

Multiinstitutional
capacity
building

African
Convention on
the
Conservation of
Nature and
Natural
Resources37

1968

1968

√

The public
Local
governments
State agencies

37

√

The treaty was revised in 2003
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Table 3—Continued
Year
signed /
adopted

Year
Kenya
became a
signatory,
ratified

Wildlife
sector
(applies)
√ (Yes)

Forest
sector
(applies)
√ (Yes)

Ramsar
Convention on
Wetlands of
International
Importance

1971

Signed
April
1988,
1990**

√

√

EAC Protocol
on Environment
and Natural
Resources
Management

2006

2006

√

√

State agencies

International
Tropical Timber
Agreement
(ITTA)

1994

Signed
1997

-

√

State agencies

Forest Carbon
Partnership
Facility

2009

2009/2010 -

√

State agencies
Resource user
communities

UN-REDD

2009

Observer
Status
granted in
2010*

-

√

State agencies
Resource user
communities

ILO, Indigenous
and Tribal
Peoples
Convention
No.169

1989

Not yet

√

√

Resource user
communities

Universal
Declaration on
Human rights
(UDHR)

1948

-

√

√

Resource user
communities
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Capacity
building
target partner
/entity

Table 3—Continued
Year
signed /
adopted

Year
Kenya
became a
signatory,
ratified

Wildlife
sector
(applies)
√ (Yes)

Forest
sector
(applies)
√ (Yes)

Capacity
building
target partner
/entity

International
Convention on
Economic,
Social and
Cultural Rights
(ICESCR)

1966

1972

√

√

Resource user
communities

Aarhus
Convention38
(UNEC)

1998

A
Though it
European informs
regional
laws on
treaty
participation
* This is the year the treaty entered into force
** This is the year the treaty entered into force
*** This is the year the treaty entered into force

Though it
Resource user
communities
informs
laws on
participation

Such values include sustainability, inclusivity, subsidiarity and equity, among other
values. The international arena acts as a macro-venue for channeling demands for
changes in weak legal frameworks of specific nations. Because Kenya is a party to
several conventions and protocols, it is obligated to support them and implement them in
all of the operations that govern conservation. Normally, the interest of the framers of
Kenya’s laws lies largely in using the partnership model as a core rubric for organization
and for empowerment of governance institutions and collectives. Of course,
implementation remains a key challenge but some strides have been made. At the
regional level, support for these principles and their interface with resource governance
partnerships was occasioned by the growing realization that East African Partner States
38

The full title of the Aarhus Convention is Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in
Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters.
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shared important biodiversity corridors and habitats.39 With this came an urgent need for
collective coordination in order to address the alarming rates of decline in the stock of
biodiversity across the region. The Partner States pledged to apply concerted efforts to
promote partnerships at all levels of the East African Community.
A closer examination of legal framework for partnerships indicates that both
normative and purposive orientations undergird the principles for partnership evolution,
development, and sustenance. The principles can be categorized in three taxa;
1. Principles aiming at securing diverse participation of individuals, groups, and
institutions (such as principles of inclusivity and participation, sustainable
development, intra and inter-generational equity, and affirmative action);40
2. Principles aiming at reforming institutional design of governance structures (such
as principles of Ecosystem Approach, subsidiarity, total economic value,
decentralization, and good governance);
3. Principles aimed at enforcing operational rules (such as Polluter Pays Principle
and Precautionary Principle).
These three sets provide the basis for implementing law on collaborative natural resource
management and for operationalizing values of various policies. They act as referent cues
on which both state and non-state actors can tailor their activities and target specific
venues of programs that initiate, promote and support partnerships.
These principles equally legitimize the power granted to agencies such as KWS
and KFS which have been established to monopolize a number of functions in natural
resource governance. Additionally, they validate legislations that are enabling for the
development of partnerships. For example, state agencies such as the Kenya Wildlife
Service and Kenya Forest Service have the mandate of ensuring that partnership activities
39

See, The Protocol on Environment and Natural Resource Management of 1999 which was signed by the
Partners States and which derived its legal basis from the October 1998 Memorandum of Understanding for
Cooperation on Environment Management.
40
These are principles enshrined in Principles 10 and 3 of the Rio Declaration.
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are guided by sustainable exploitation of natural resources. The normative dimension in
these principles is their role in specifically urging and providing mechanisms that
encourage Kenyans to consume and preserve natural resources sustainably as a moral
obligation for ensuring long-term perpetuity. The purposive element is the fact that these
principles act as frames used to measure the benefits and costs of partnerships programs.
2.1.1: Principles for securing inclusive participation
The first set of principles aim at securing diverse participation in various forms of
partnerships. Kenya draws its basic framework for public participation from various
international environmental management regimes. To honor its commitments, Kenya has
sought to uphold them by acceding to existing protocols. There are continuous efforts at
operationalizing co-management practices in accordance with the principles initiated at
the Rio Conference of 1992.41 An additional international instrument that has informally
guided public participation is the Convention on Access to Information, Public
Participation in Decision Making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters (the
Aarhus Convention). These instruments have brought to the fore the values of
participation and inclusivity in a manner never witnessed before in the law making and
implementation landscape.42 These sets of principles provide the focal point for rights
and obligations of any person seeking to participate, initiate, advocate for, support, or
mobilize resources that aim at nurturing various types of partnerships.
Sustainability is the principle upon which most laws and directives for
partnerships engaged in conservation are based. Kenya’s law follows the definition of
sustainable development provided in UNCED’s 1987 Report Our Common Future, which
41

This is the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED).
Additional anchors are constituted in the new dispensation afforded by EMCA law and the new 2010
Constitution.
42
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defines sustainability as “meeting the needs of the present without compromising the
ability of future generations to meet their own needs”. The government has intensified
efforts to gauge the scope of success with which sustainability is ingrained in
implementation and has established a reporting system contained in its Rio+10 and
Rio+20 Reports.
2.1.2: Principles for reforming institutional design
The second set of principles aims at reforming the institutional design of various
types of partnerships. This set is operates in tandem with principles guiding public
participation. In theory, the three sets of principles are embraced in such a way that they
operate as mutually inclusive elements of the legal framework. While the first set of
principles addresses incorporation, socialization, and infusion of values linked to
sustainability into the policy landscape, this second set emphasizes action and specifically
how institutions should be designed to enable extensive participation of all stakeholders.
The principles of ecosystem approach, subsidiarity, decentralization, and good
governance all encapsulate the spirit by the government to initiate incentives for
stewardship at the sub-national level.
At the statutory level, these principles are stated in the new 2010 Constitution.
The Constitution espouses the principles of “transparent and cost effective administration
of land”; “sound conservation and protection of ecologically sensitive areas”;
“encouragement of communities to settle land disputes through local community
initiatives consistent with the constitution.”43 Similarly, Section 3.3 (a), (d) and (h) of the
Draft National Environment Policy of 2012 consecutively state that the implementation
of environment policy will be guided by principles of:
43

Id, Article 60(1), in parts (d), (e) and (g) respectively.
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1. “Ecosystem Approach: An integrated ecosystem approach to conserving
environmental resources will be adopted and enhanced to ensure that all
ecosystems are managed in an integrates manner while providing a range of
benefits to people
2. “Total Economic Value: The benefits that ecosystems generate will be integrated
into the national accounting system, programs, and projects
3.

“Subsidiarity: The management of the environment and natural resources will be
through decentralization and devolution of authority and responsibilities at the
lowest level possible”.

2.1.3: Principles guiding enforcement and operational rules
The third set of principles aims at enforcing operational rules of partnerships.
They are generally applied to inform and enforce regulatory instruments in the
environmental sector. For example, the polluter pays principle is a deterrent to illegal
destruction of environment while the precautionary principle signals the fact that science
is not the only antidote to addressing conservation challenges and neither is it the only
measure upon which the country can gauge its success in conservation. The government
claims that it will endeavor to advance these principles by popularizing and establishing
an enabling legal framework that engenders them. Of course major financial, structural
and institutional impediments are commonplace but these principles have been widely
applied with very modest success.
2.2: Provisions governing policies and implementation process
2.2.1: Constitutional basis for the legal framework
Kenya’s Constitution has been subjected to amendments that have seen its impact
on natural resource management come in different direct and indirect forms.44 In its

44

These include; (1) the 1982 constitutional amendment which paved way for a single party state and its
monopoly over management of major sectors including that of protected areas estate; (2) the 1991
amendment that saw Kenya usher in a new dispensation for multipartism and a more liberal democratic
order which was more conducive for active participation of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) from
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Preamble, it proclaims “Respect of the environment which is our heritage, and
determined to sustain it for the benefit of future generations”. It calls for more radical
reforms which protect Kenya’s natural resources and secure rights that were previously
ignored or given minimal attention in the previous constitutions and constitutional
amendments. The basic law on Kenya’s land and environmental management is
stipulated in Chapter 5. The section defines some of the principles upon which all
activities and initiatives including partnership-related ones are to be initiated and
governed. Article 60(1) states that: “Land in Kenya shall be held, used, and managed in a
manner that is equitable, efficient, productive, and sustainable, and in principles of land
policy in accordance with the following principles:"
(a) Equitable access to land;
(b) Security of land rights;
(c) Sustainable and productive management of land and resources;
(d) Transparent and cost effective administration of land;
(e) Sound conservation and protection of ecologically sensitive areas;
(f) Elimination of gender discrimination in law, customs, and practices related to
land and property and;
(g) Encouragement of communities to settle land disputes through recognizes
local community initiatives consistent with the Constitution.45
The Constitution confers to every citizen certain rights and roles with regards to
partaking of the benefits arising from the use and protection of the environment. All
the environmental constituency and; (3) The more recent 2010 Constitution which was promulgated on
August 27 is a hallmark document that will see the management of Kenya’s major productive sectors such
as land, wildlife, and forests resources undergo significant transformation.
45

The Kenyan Constitution, Article 60(1).
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persons are granted rights to association and freedom to join any formal and informal
organizations and by implication partnerships. It also confers these rights with some
responsibilities. With the right to having a clean environment and healthy ecosystems
comes a role in protecting it and cooperating with the state and non-state institutions. The
basic provision for citizen participation in environmental management is found in
Chapter IV which constitutes an assemblage of rights, freedoms and obligations.
Participation is assumed as a right in itself and also recognized as a means to achieving
other rights which are protected by law. Another noteworthy dimension of the
constitutional basis for partnerships is that participation entails the rights to access and
use of information. In seeking technical or any other kind of information relevant to their
cause, persons are granted access and user rights to information (in Article 35).
Finally, Chapter IV Section 63 articulates a provision that incentivizes
management systems towards more participation and collaboration as a new opportunity
to protect property rights of communities. As one expert opines that the measures “that
will see …the replacement of trust lands with a new tenure category ‘community lands’
would enable local groups of people to better secure and title their collective properties”
(Nelson 2012, 10). To enhance subsidiarity, the Constitution’s Section 176 (2)
specifically authorizes the county governments to decentralize their functions and the
provision of services.
2.2.2: Customary law as a basis for the legal framework
While the legal lexicon on partnerships is a recent phenomenon, various forms of
collaborative partnerships in Kenya’s protected area sector have been operational since
the pre-colonial times (Mburu 2004, Onyango et al., 2007). Indeed, pastoralist
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communities have long protected important resources such as forests, water resources,
and dry season grazing refuges through customary collaborative mechanisms (Nelson
2012, 3). Additionally, a larger portion of the protected area estate and communal
dispersal lands host diverse agrarian, riparian, and pastoral ecosystems that support the
livelihoods of many communities. Collaboration for commons management within clans
and across territories was applied via binding social mores. Traditional societies in Kenya
lived as communities sharing land-related resources as collective units. The formal
element of partnership in traditional societies is tailored to the fact that with land as a
resource available and accessible to every eligible member, the collective has had to
devise regulations and norms that govern access, use, and preservation of these natural
resources.46 These structures also arbitrated resource-related conflicts by relying on
concerted and collective communal action.
At the informal level, membership in any social unit was and in some
communities still is implicitly based on personal responsibility in protecting the land that
supports the community’s livelihood base. Responsibilities were based on ascriptive and
collectivist value systems.47 These roles existed as explicitly or tacitly expressed rules.
For example, every member of a particular society knew that all forms of environment
were to be nurtured and conserved. The monitoring element is what enabled rational
collaborative surveillance of resources and guarded against wasteful appropriation or
exploitation of resources. Traditional institutions existed and continue to exist as self

46

These structures are tailored according to the common property regimes articulated by Ostrom (1990).
Accordingly, these are elements of pre-modern social institutions described in cultural theories of social
change, particularly modernization theory by Inglehart and associates.
47

83

governing institutions that can successfully limit resource degradation (Kihumbu 2008,
314).48
Customary regulations were further reinforced by traditional hierarchy and statusbased principles of social organization. For example, one system of traditional leadership
is that of wazees or elders49 who had and still do have the influence and social clout as
decision makers and spiritual leaders in the governance of community commons. A
second segment of leadership constitutes the village barazas.50 This is a deliberative
arena (though usually controlled by a cohort of local leadership) which convenes
meetings to mobilize the community members for issue definition, agenda setting and
planning processes. Barazas are still extensively used in various platforms of
management and are effective tools for accessing opinions and resources from
communities. The aforementioned indicate that while planning was hierarchically
structured, monitoring was a collective enterprise engaging all community members.
Customary institutions were among the first systems for organizing partnerships
and are still profoundly influential in organizing management structures in indigenous
communities. The current legal framework recognizes customary law and cultural rights
of indigenous communities, including those related to use and preservation of nature.
Adjudication of cases linked to customary law is carried out by traditional governance
structures and complemented by magistrate courts (Mbote 2009). The government has
48

The term commonly used to conceptualize such institutions is the “African commons”, which refers to “a
variant of common property where land and associated resources are exclusively available to specific
communities, lineages, or families operating as corporate entities.” (Okoth Ogendo 2003, 313). See his
work titled, “The Tragic African Commons: A century of Expropriation, Suppression, and Subversion, 1
UNIV, Nairobi LJ, 107.
49
See for example, Mbote, P.K. 2009. Kenya, in The role of judiciary in environmental governance:
Comparative perspectives by Lousi Kotze and Alexander Paterson, p. 451-478.
50
Baraza is the Kiswahili word which means an assembly, committee, or gathering of elders of a tribe or a
bazaar which operates as an open forum for public meeting in which members of a community dialogue on
issues of concern to the collective.
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implemented laws which protect customary law through the Constitution. Similarly, the
country’s commitment to the international regimes such as 1948 Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (UDHR) has provided a working platform for recognition of customary
laws.
2.2.3: Development planning as a basis for the legal
Development planning is the process through which the Kenyan government
designs its strategies and articulates the tools for implementing development goals. The
plans guide actions on how to stimulate social and economic development complemented
with the provision of human, financial, and other types of resources. The linkage between
development planning and biodiversity management is collaboration in the design of
national and district sector plans and budgets. Hence, participatory planning has
proactively targeted the active engagement of sub-national governments such as
municipalities. However linkages for implementation are weak and monopolized by
central agencies. Additionally, while the current legal and institutional reforms have been
slowly democratizing, progress is hampered by the failure to uproot elite capture and to
fully allow inclusive governance (Smoke 2008). The three plans that anchor partnership
operations in biodiversity management are described below.
2.2.3.1: Sessional Paper No. 10 of 1965
The first legal document for planning socio-economic development that
recognized the importance of wildlife conservation was the Sessional Paper No. 10
African Socialism and its Application to Planning of 1965. While it did not provide for or
advocate any specific type of management, it did set the basis for wildlife management as
an important agenda in planning for economic progress. It is also recognized proper
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protected areas zoning, envisioned commoditization of the wildlife sector and set the
basis for a national acknowledging of the significance of wildlife to Kenya’s overall
development. As the first blueprint legislation for planning in Kenya, it is the statute that
first facilitated the transfer of some powers away from the national to sub-national levels
so as to allow for bottom-up planning.
It categorically provided leeway for extending planning to provinces, districts,
and municipalities so as to ensure progress in each administrative unit (Chitere and Ireri
2010, 9). Based on the initial premises of the document, recent development planning
efforts have deliberately targeted arid and semi-arid lands (hereafter ASALs) as part of
broader efforts to link environment to Kenya’s national development. In this setting,
partnerships have been visibly encouraged. The Ministry of State for the Development of
Northern Kenya and other Arid Lands is mandated by Presidential Circular No.1/2008 to
support partnerships which tackle environmental and food insecurity in ASALs. The
directive has additional support of the Arid Lands Resource Management Project, the
implementation structure for policy interventions in ASALs at the sub-national level.
2.2.3.2: Economic Recovery Strategy Action Plan
Poverty eradication remains an intractable challenge for the government of
Kenya. Despite using various strategies to address poverty, these efforts have failed to
radically transform the development status of the country. When President Kibaki’s
government assumed power in December 2002, its immediate focus was transformative
change modeled on economic recovery. It initiated a new Action Plan for wealth and
employment creation.51 As a strategic action plan, it outlined four pillars which were to
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Indeed, the title of this blue print strategy is Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment
Creation.
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be used to chart a way forward for the country to realize the two dual economic goals. In
essence, the law was modeled on a process which sought to “harmonize strategies for
accelerated economic growth with the country’s poverty reduction strategies....”52 While
this plan was an important instrument for introducing new strategies and thinking about
institutional design of structures that are congenial to socio-economic transformation, it
was equally an attempt to address the adverse effects and pressure on Kenya’s natural
resources landscape.
The crafters of the Action Plan bore in mind that it was important to directly
tackle poverty in order to handle environmental pressures. Second, the Action Plan
particularly envisioned a process of growth modeled on the sustainable development
paradigm. It particularly focused on “promoting actions leading to sustainable
management of natural commons such as land, water, forests to which the very poor
depend on”.53
The Action Plan equally targeted the tourism industry as one of the productive
sectors that was to be revamped. A major component of the sector’s revitalization
strategy encompassed the involvement of local communities in tourism development.54
This was to be facilitated by 1) availing affordable credit and 2) forging partnerships with
major tour venture companies. The Action Plan targeted the tax regime in order to
incentivize further the participation of the private sector.
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Republic of Kenya. 2003. Economic Recovery Strategy for Wealth and Employment Creation, 20032007. Nairobi: Ministry of Planning and National Development.
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Republic of Kenya. 2003. Economic Recovery Strategy
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Republic of Kenya. 2003. Economic Recovery Strategy, p. 26.
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2.2.3.3: Vision 2030
Vision 2030 is the current development blueprint guiding Kenya’s path to
achieving the status of an industrializing middle income country.55 It was launched by
President Mwai Kibaki on June 10, 2008. This is dependent on the realization of an
ambitious GDP growth rate of 10%. Its timing was significant as the Action Plan was
expiring as a model for guiding the country’s path to development. Vision 2030 continues
to be a major instrument for enabling partnerships across the various sector domains that
are directly or indirectly linked to protected areas. First, the planning of the Vision’s
roadmap involved an extensive process of consultation of various stakeholders from the
government, private sector, and civil society. Second, the implementation process is
gauged on successive five-year Medium-Term Plans which are designed with the
expectation that Kenya can effectively meet its Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs).56 Third, it endorses the principles of constitutional supremacy, public
participation, and decentralization which are paramount factors to creating an enabling
framework for partnerships.
Vision 2030 is a critical entry point for non-state entities to seed and sow
partnerships and engage in programs targeted by its plan. In the strategic plans, tourism is
also one of the key sectors targeted as a "key growth driver” to realizing the vision.57 This
is based on the objective of making Kenya to be among the 10 top long haul tourist
destinations in the world. This will be a critical entry point for initiating and supporting
55
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different venues for partnerships in protected areas. Finally, the Vision proposes a
formula for realizing middle income status based on three pillars: economic, political, and
social. Environmental management is referenced in the social pillar which seeks to “build
a just and cohesive society with social equity in a clean and secure environment”.58
2.2.4: Regulation of organizations as a basis for the legal framework
Partnerships engaged in projects that advance conservation goals, social and
ecological justice ordinarily have some formal platform on which activities are
structured. The law requires that any organized platform involving persons or institutions
undertaking activities that have a bearing on conservation be formally organized and
registered. The recent developments in laws and policies are shifting purposes,
participants and programs of all sectoral entities. These developments which started in
the 1990s (after the enactment of EMCA) have introduced a new legal framework for
conservation with major implications for rights and role-based regimes discussed below.
2.2.4.1: Definitional attributes of partnerships
The term partnership was considered a neologism in the 1990s when it was
introduced as a buzzword within the development circles. It gathered more prominent
status during Johannesburg Summit for Sustainable Development of 2002 (Rutten 2004).
Yet, as experience shows, partnerships existed before these developments. Terms such as
co-management have been popular concepts that were well ingrained in the lexicon of
multi-partner management systems in various contexts of the environmental sector.
Partnerships have been part of governance systems which merely assumed different titles
such as “collaboration”, “co-management”, and “shared governance” among other
interpretations. In Kenya, the most concise legal definition of the term partnership is
58
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derived from the Wildlife Bill of 2007. This law defines it as “an affiliation between a
competent authority, stakeholders and other individual or groups formed for the purposes
of conserving and managing wildlife within a specified area.”59 Accordingly, the
experience in the conservation sector shows a pattern in which many formal or informal
partnerships are established by persons, institutions, or both.
2.2.4.2: Authority to establish partnerships
The key law for establishing partnerships is contained in the 2010 Constitution
which states that “It is a duty of every Kenyan to cooperate with state organs and other
persons to protect and conserve the environment and ensure ecologically sustainable
development and use of natural resources.60 Similarly, Article 69 and Article 70 bolster
this provision and serve as codes that give legal substance to any individual or institution
that wants to initiate, support, or establish partnerships in order to conserve Kenya’s vital
ecosystems. In Section 1.2 of Sessional Paper No.1 of 2006,61 the Government states that
it “encourages partnerships with private sector and other non-state actors and wananchi
[in other words, citizens] in order to complement government efforts… NGOs bring
creativity, innovation, and develop strong community links… and act as [emphasis
added] “development actors in their own right”.
2.2.4.3: Rights to legal redress for and against partnership entities
As legal entities, registered partnerships are formally governed by statutes from
various laws and different sectoral policies which regulate the rights partners are granted.
Generally, the language in most codes starts with a frame that encourages partnerships.
They, nonetheless, place restrictions on the scale and scope of activities in order to
59
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regulate behavior and to limit infringement on the rights of other counterparts. Formally
established partnerships have the right of appeal to dispute and defend their rights as
entities. Second, as organizations, partnerships can sue and be sued.62 At the individual
level, EMCA grants locus standi to any aggrieved persons within (or without) a
partnership63 and similarly, any citizen is protected by law under Article 42 in any event
that any of the rights (personal freedoms and environmental rights so accorded) are
denied or infringed upon by any other person or institution.
2.2.4.4: Organizational attributes of partnerships
Another dimension defining the critical elements of regulative provisions for
partnerships is that governing the structure of partnerships. Some provisions are
mandatory while others are voluntary. Formal organization is the prime provision that is
required for many collaborative programs that seek to establish environmental
partnerships.64 Specific regulations include those that define the internal governance of
partnerships such as division of labor, patterns of coordination and communication,
workflow systems, and formal and informal power; membership rules; and structure. A
second set of this sub-type of provisions profiles organizational personnel and
participants (managerial, supervisory, technical, and support staff) who participate in
partnerships. These provisions specify who should constitute formal and informal
personnel and their roles as well. Other provisions prescribe roles based on demographic
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aspects such as the level of education, training, experience, gender, and membership in a
community grouping or social organization.
A third sub-set in this category is a set of provisions requiring that partnership
activity or entity to interface with those of key government agencies KWS or the KFS. If
not, reporting requirements and notices must be made by any partnership working in a
region under the authority of either. This is because the government sees this as a way of
facilitating its regulatory work (in terms of compliance) and encouraging collaborative
systems with its agencies. It is also a way of encouraging organizations to use resources
and technical services available at these agencies. These agencies serve mentoring roles
for new entrants in the complex sector. Finally, these provisions are also used as proxy
public relation tools which facilitate constructive engagement and encourage
participation of a broader environmental constituency. In essence, they enable a platform
for cultivating cordial relations among stakeholders who have for a long time been
adversarial counterparts in the management of the country’s resources.
2.2.5: Sector-specific related law and policy provisions
2.2.5.1: EMCA provisions: The Giant needle in the haystack
The adoption of the Environmental Management and Coordination Act, (i.e.
EMCA) in 1999 defined a critical juncture in Kenya’s history.65 The law is an exhibit of
Kenya’s ascendancy to a pluralistic legal regime. It defined momentum that saw Kenya’s
land and environmental sectors undergo significant transformation through policy and
program reforms at both national and sub-national/county levels. A new state of relations
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EMCA is an omnibus law which is the current overarching legislation for environmental management in
Kenya. The framers of EMCA envisioned a law which would restructure, revitalize, and re-invent
environmental management institutions to a path of good governance and that which would modernize the
sector institutions pegged on frames of efficiency, equity, and empowerment.
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between the state and non-state counterparts who constitute the environmental
constituency was to take force. As previously mentioned, the previous legal framework
was fragmented across seventy-seven statutes. This imposed difficulties in sound policy
implementation. The raison d’etre for implementing EMCA was to implement a
landmark law in which various policy domains would be harmonized as complementary
segments of law.
EMCA established a new institutional architecture whose role was to fuel
innovative reforms and pave the way for radical changes in protected areas conservation.
It is touted as the legislation that overwhelmingly shifted the country’s focus from
command to collaborative management. Accordingly, it can be credited for 1) enabling a
legitimate platform for inclusive and multi-stakeholder management regimes achieved
legal backing, 2) redirecting dialogue back to the role of marginalized but critical
stakeholders such as resource adjacent communities and institutions, 3) enhancing
mechanisms for scaling up support and resources for the re-designing of institutions that
would eventually nurture innovative collaborative partnerships in the sector.
EMCA provides for the Standards and Enforcement Review Committee, the
National Environment Action Plan Committee, the Environmental Impact Assessment
Technical Advisor Committee, and Provincial and District Environment Committees. All
these institutions have had an impact in nurturing and sustaining partnerships at both
national and sub-national levels. EMCA’s National Action Planning framework is an
avenue for decentralized collaborative planning between governmental and nongovernmental actors through which partnerships can come into fruition. This is because
the process involves interactions in which Five Year Plans are shared and prepared by
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provincial, district, and national action plan committees. EMCA statutes have also been
instrumental in pacing and phasing policy priorities geared towards mobilizing resources
needed for conservation partnerships at both national and sub-national levels. For
institutional resources it provides for the establishment of the National Environment
Committee (NEC) which is charged with policy formulation and promotion of
environmental management partnerships, among other goals.66
2.2.5.2: Provisions of forest and wildlife sector laws
The key provisions governing these two sectors are those that cover registration,
formation, and operations of partnerships. The Forest Act of 2005 (Section 46) provides
for collaboration within and beyond the community landscape and endeavors to support
the initiation of Community Forest Associations (CFAs). The architects of this law
envisaged that these structures are strategic entry points for enhancing local organization
and capacity building because they facilitate proactive participation of local communities.
An additional condition stipulates that any community seeking to initiate CFAs must
formally organize, establish working committees, and develop a formal association. For
example, the association must have a working constitution, an organized accounting
system for receipts, management plans, and concise proposals outlining their strategies
for forest use and biodiversity conservation.
This law has encouraged many communities to establish, register, and mobilize
resources for initiation of forest associations and scaling up of activities with larger
partnerships such as MCPPs. As a way to encourage proactive participation in forest
governance, the Forest Act’s Section 47(2) confers members of CFAs various rights.
These include but are not limited to collection of medicinal herbs; harvesting of grass,
66
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honey, timber or fuel wood; grazing; collection of forest produce for community based
industries; ecotourism and recreational activities; contracts for sivicultural operations and
development of wood and non-wood forest based industries.
Concerning the wildlife sector, this study covers the legal and institutional
framework that governed wildlife-based MCPPs prior to the enactment of the Wildlife
Act of 2013. More specifically, it dwells on the Wildlife (Conservation and Management)
Act Cap 376 of 1976 (hereafter, Wildlife Act Cap 376).67 In the wildlife sector, the
poorly designed incentive systems did not enhance usufruct and property rights for
communities. As the most controversial issue in the sector, these two issues largely
contributed to fomenting protracted conflict between local communities and state
agencies. Formal organization is paramount to provisions on wildlife sector management.
For example, Section 19(1-4) of the Wildlife Act, Cap 376 authorized and enabled
MCPP-mediated conservation programs on both private and community land. More
specifically, the law granted authority to interested stakeholders to establish local and
game sanctuaries on private land in consultation with local municipal authorities. This
particular locus of interaction between communities, the private sector, and
municipalities has been important in facilitating various collaborative programs and
projects. The key enabling vehicle was the requirement that planning and design of
regulations governing the operations of these sanctuaries be done through joint efforts.
The chapters analyzing the case studies reveal that this arena accounts for the
greatest share of activities that tie MCPP’s intermediary roles to capacity building of
community organizations. The key weakness of the provisions in section 19 (above) is
67
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that it was overridden and contradicted by section 9 (1) of the same statute which granted
KWS overbearing powers to manage all of the wildlife in Kenya’s protected and
unprotected areas. This ambiguity was the leading contributor to the long-lasting tensions
between KWS and community managers of wildlife conservancies across the country.
Additionally, while the law provided specific tools to incentivize participation, the Act
had not since 1977 articulated a clear and formal regime for extending user rights to
wildlife for communities.68 More so, decision-making was still monopolized by state
agencies such as KWS and KFS.69 It is therefore not surprising that this era (1977-2013)
was a challenging era to initiate, organize, and sustain an MCPP.
Participation rights to co-management conferred to local communities was based
on land tenure status and residency. Similar to its counterpart in the forest sector where
CFAs design and develop plans, in the wildlife sector, a landowner had to prepare a
Management Plan for a conservation area with assistance from the KWS. Otherwise, the
local government was responsible for the preparation of a management plan with respect
68

This is because in 1977, the Kenyan government banned sport hunting and various forms of consumption
of wildlife products and resources. Prior to the ban, wildlife management was governed by the Wildlife
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to each reserve under its jurisdiction. Group ranches and community conservancies70
(which lacked legal status before December 2013, but were well-established entities in
the wildlife sector) were the key associational platforms for the wildlife sub-sector. There
were additional statutory and non-statutory committees that constituted public, private,
and civil society stakeholders.
The current law has instituted radical changes in aspects such as access,
management and benefit sharing of wildlife resources. Part VI Section 40 (1) of the 2013
Wildlife Act states that a community can register a Constituency Wildlife Associations
(CWA) provided they register with the County Wildlife Conservation and Compensation
Committee. In Section 40 (2) the association is duly encouraged to enter into partnerships
that enhance sustainable use of wildlife resources. A second entry point for capacity
building is through conservation anchored on benefit sharing. The Wildlife Act of 2013
provides a legal status to benefit sharing within conservancies. This provision was
lacking in the previous law. The new law provides a mechanism via an institutional
framework anchored on the Kenya Wildlife Regulatory Council. The council has the
mandate to grant user rights and regulate partnership activities within conservancies
owned and managed by local CBOs. The new rights to wildlife utilization and
consumption will now include culling, cropping, research and tourism, which were
prohibited in the previous law.
Another important area of provision in the two sectors covered the types of
participants and personnel who can constitute a partnership. The pre-2013 legal
framework set requirements on involvement and representation. The expectation was to
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streamline inclusive participation as a key component of partnerships. Ordinarily, the
basic requirement for most laws was that local communities engage in some form of comanagement. For example, the Third Schedule of the Forest Act imposes a requirement
for public consultation and mandates government authorities to publish a notice in
relation to the proposals prepared for those activities. These arenas provided some space
for direct and indirect forms of participation in co-management.
On average, most pre-2013 sectoral provisions (and the new law) mandated that
KFS and KWS agencies constitute key decision-making structures of MCPP programs. In
some instances, the two agencies were only to serve advisory roles. Profiling and vetting
of participants was a key provision of forest and wildlife-based statutes. Some provisions
required that quotas apply in constituting decision-making structures while others merely
stated demographic metrics to define the scale of inclusiveness and diversity. These
provisions were designed to mainstream participation of marginalized groups (such as
rural women, youth, and indigenous communities) to participate in partnerships. While
the law was weak in extending significant rights to communities for wildlife
management, it provided a numerous avenues for community participation and capacity
building. Table 4 describes these arenas.
Concerning the role of private sector participation in partnerships, the Forest
Rules of 2009 authorizes KFS to invite the private sector to participate in sustainable
management of state forests “whenever circumstances make it necessary to do so” and
prescribes the types of agreements KFS can enter into with the sector.71 In the wildlife
sector, partnerships are encouraged among individuals, corporate, and community land
owners. Regulations governing technical qualifications for persons involved in
71
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management of PAs are found in codes that require linkages with KFS or KWS or those
that specify conditions for a professional conservator to direct partnership ventures.
In the pre-2013 era, the Constitution specified the roles of local governments
while allied statutes in the forest and wildlife sectors complemented these provisions.
Section 60(2) of the Constitution vests all public land to county72 governments, which
have this authority in trust for the people who reside in an area. This means that the
county governments have significant leverage in any type of land and natural resource
management partnership formed within their jurisdictions. As the representative of the
state at the county level, these local governments are required to supervise activities that
enable the implementation of Article 69(1)(a) of the Constitution which is to “ensure
sustainable exploitation, utilization, management and conservation of the environment
and natural resources, and to ensure equitable sharing of accruing benefits.”
Equally important were provisions that governed organizational platforms. The
Forest Act set a specific platform for KFS-community-municipality collaboration as a
requirement for all forest management partnerships. Forest Associations are established
as implementation platforms for co-managing forest resources. Regardless of the type of
partnership, the Wildlife Act Cap 376 in its Section 3A(l) mandated the KWS to provide
advice to the government, local authorities and landowners on the best methods of
wildlife conservation and management. A final set of provisions governed mobilization
of resources. Partnerships usually require enormous amounts of resources to support their
operations. MCPP-mediated ventures could obtain funding through a myriad ways. In the
forest sector, there is a Forest Management and Conservation
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Table 4: Arenas for community participation and representation in wildlife and
forest management
Community
Representation Platform

Wildlife Protected Areas
Management
Specific entity

Administrative management Private and communal
conservancies
Associations

Wildlife conservation
association – sub-national

Boards

Local conservancy boards,
national-level boards
Barazas, council of elders,
(Wazees), group ranch,
Buffer zone conservation,
and wildlife conservation
committees
Village and ward level
committees, budget
committees
Provincial environmental
committees, district
environmental committees,
district wildlife
conservation committee,
public complaints
committee (national)
Representatives, trustees of
park and reserve-adjacent
groups
bomas, bandas

Committees: micro-scale

Committees: Social and
Welfare Development
Committees: meso-scale

Planning and
implementation Teams

Forest Protected Areas
Management
Specific entity
Community forest
associations, Forest
conservation committees
Forest Conservation
Association –NACOFA
(national)
Local and national boards
Barazas, council of elders
(Wazees), forest
conservation committees
Forest committees
Provincial environmental
committees, district
environmental committees,
public complaints
committee (national)
Representatives of forest
user groups in planning and
inventory teams

Task Forces

Security guards, conflict
resolution teams for grazing
rights

Forest guards, conflict
resolution units arbitrating
disputes in forest use

Monitoring and Assessment
Units

Ecotourism ventures
management, wildlife
resource inventory officers,
buffer zone, and landscape
restoration officers

Forest demarcation officers,
forest resource inventory
officers, ecosystem survey
officers
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Fund to support community-based forest projects while in the wildlife sector there is a
Wildlife Service Fund to support wildlife conservation causes. The difference between
the two is that the statute in the latter pegs this fund to extensive control and imbalances
in access which favor KWS, the state agency managing wildlife resources in Kenya.
2.2.5.3: Provisions of the Land (Groups Representative) Act
The key provision of this act governs membership and structure of community
CBOs that partner with municipalities and the private sector. Group ranches are
“privately titled collected rangelands used for communal livestock production which
provide a way for pastoralist communities to formalize rights over communal pastures…”
(Nelson 2012, 3). They were formed after a government-commissioned study known as
the Lawrence Report which concluded that group-based as opposed to individual
registration to land titles would better serve the purpose of maintaining the Kenyan
rangelands where most pastoral communities reside and sustain their livelihoods. These
rangelands also border a vast acreage of Kenya’s protected areas. Overstocking and its
attendant negative effects of individually structured tenure on forest and wildlife habitats
was a major issue that the report sought to outline.73 As the findings revealed negative
evidence, the government stepped in to address the problem by enacting the Land
Adjudication Act and the Land (Groups Representative) Act.74 Some objectives of group
ranches are to abate environmental degradation, increase productivity in pastoral lands,
increase the capacity to learning, reduce landlessness, and to modernize the livestock
73
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See generally, Nortons-Griffith, M. and Said M., 2009. The future for wildlife on Kenya’s Rangelands: An
economic perspective. pp. 5-6 and Mwangi, E. 2005. The transformation of property rights in Kenya’s
Maasailand: Triggers and motivations, CAPRi Working Paper No. 35.
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production sector of the pastoral systems using culturally sensitive tools that would not
harm the traditional way of life of the communities (Ngethe, 1993).
2.2.5.4. Mobilization of partnership resources
Regulations guiding resource mobilization activities (and especially for the
financial category of resources) are concise despite the fact that they are spread across
various domains. Many partnerships receive assistance from various national and
international institutions and agencies such as state ministries and agencies. Additional
support comes from institutions such as UNEP, UNDP, IUCN, GEF, AWF, IFAW,
WWF, FAO, USAID, DANIDA, and GTZ, among others. These institutions normally
establish their own regulations that usually replicate (or at times challenge) national and
local legal codes. Forest and wildlife partnerships receive a lot of funding from overseas
and as such are governed by donor regulations or agency agreements of the funder. At
most, they are based on stringent requirements for accountability and sustainability as
conditions for extension of funding. The legal codes derived from the NGO Act and
Regulations do not limit the amount of financial assistance and partnership program can
access from a funder or a donor as long as the due course of law is followed. Many
organizations in Kenya rely on three main sources of resource mobilization structures
available to MCPPs. These include 1) a public charity system called “Harambee”, 2)
through access of financial assistance from the Forest Management and Conservation
Fund and the Kenya Wildlife Service Fund75 and 3) mobilization of informational
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Harambee donations are governed by the provisions in the Public Collections Act (Cap 106). The
Wildlife Fund provisions are found in Part II, Section 5A (3a) of the Act. Though the Wildlife Service
fund mainly supports operations of the Service, the Act further mandates that the Fund shall be paid out to
“…launch, operate, or expand projects of wildlife conservation and management”.
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resources from indigenous Maasai communities who are known to host a vast repository
of ethno-botanical and conservation knowledge.
3: The legal framework for MCPPs: Supportive or inhibitive?
An assessment of the supportive (and inhibitive) attributes of Kenya’s legal
framework for partnerships can be assessed by evaluating the tools and instruments used
in the design, planning and implementation of policy. The obvious positive enabler is that
collaboration is expressed in a more promising narrative that continues to supplant the
paralysis-centered earlier narrative that dominated pre-EMCA and pre-liberalization
years. Kenya’s current legal framework governing operations of biodiversity partnerships
has made advances that prioritize democratize and incentivized practice as a priority goal
(see for example, Anyonge-Bashir and Udoto 2012, Nelson 2012, KWS 2012, RoK
2012).
Illustrative elements of the existence of policy and legal support for partnerships
in Kenya are witnessed by the government’s efforts in:76

76

•

Popularizing ideas and debates centered on collaboration;

•

Mandating and authorizing action that encourage and enable
collaboration;

•

Mobilizing resources for nurturing and sustaining partnerships;

•

Supporting the already ongoing initiatives that are anchored on
partnerships;

•

Participating in and encouraging partnerships and especially at the
local level scale;

•

Fast-tracking policy and procedures for the development of
environmental partnerships;

As stated in various policy and legal documents and program evaluations.
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•

Initiating specific programs that feed into partnerships;

•

Mainstreaming principles that support and inculcate values
amenable to collaboration;

•

Streamlining operations and enhancing compliance at the national
level which inform and liaise with local level partnership
initiatives;

•

Working in concert with local, national, and global stakeholders of
the environmental constituency so that incentives for collaborative
management are increased;

•

Restructuring laws (which are comprehensive and remedial), and
which respond to and to allow different forms of partnerships to
flourish.

The anticipation is that partnership models will eventually empower communities and
reform weakly aligned institutional and economic incentives that have deterred progress
towards sustainable development. On this account, it is relevant to assess if the current
legal framework:
1. Supports and facilitates the growth of effective institutions which target real
empowerment of enforcement agencies, partnership entities and subsequently
communities, the latter a previously marginalized cohort;
2. Enhances and ensures that accountability characterizes the outcomes of
interactions between state agencies and partnership entities and in the internal
operations of both;
3. Promotes, provides, and secures representative and inclusive systems for
community stakeholders whose participation in PAs management is needed
for more successful outcomes in collaborative governance.
This dissertation develops four typological indicators on which to evaluate these key
parameters of the legal framework for MCPPs. The four typologies are 1) norming 2)
scaling up, 3) gate-keeping and 4) scoping. Norming and scaling up are supportive
strategies while gate-keeping and scoping are inhibitive strategies.
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3.1: Supportive elements of the legal framework
3.1.1: Promotion institutional effectiveness
Effectiveness as a core attribute of a supportive legal environment is comprised of
various features. With respect to environmental governance, it is the degree to which the
legal framework achieves its targeted and intended objectives for proper and full
operation of the institutional agencies that coordinate partnership activities. Beyond this
functional element, the legal framework is the reflection of the body politic as it defines
how the policy system determines political outcomes within the sector and beyond.77
This study favors a more comprehensive definition of effectiveness. In particular, it
follows two popular definitions. One is by Lipset who defines effectiveness as:
…the actual performance of a political system … the extent to
which it satisfies the expectations of most members of society, and
the expectations of powerful groups within it … marked by an
efficient bureaucracy and decision-making system which is able to
resolve political problems… (Lipset 1959, 87-88).
In the case of protected areas management, it is important to assess if local user and
adjacent communities are not only empowered but also if they are also fully cushioned by
the legal framework. The emphasis on addressing power asymmetries and reconciling
divergent interests is a fundamental issue that partnerships should address in order to
have fully effective outcomes (Ros Tonen, 2012). Insightful tools about effective
management are drawn from Ostrom’s tenets on how actors concretize collaboration into
institutions for governance of common pool resources. Accordingly, a group is effective
to the extent that it has the ability to self govern through established rules for allocation,
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This is also because the legal infrastructure does not exist in a vacuum, but rather is a part of a larger
whole. The famous Eastonian Systems Analysis presupposes that policy (or decision outcomes) is a product
of demands, support, and feedback (see Easton 1964).
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appropriation and exploitation of resources and for limiting or inhibiting depletion or
misuse (Ostrom 1990).
3.1.1.1: Norming strategies for enhancing effectiveness
There are evident norming strategies reflected in Kenya’s laws and policies.
Norming entails a process of establishing new values (or strengthening existing ones) as
regular codes of practice so that they are conducive to policy implementation and act as
referent cues for identifiable collective effort. The main purpose of establishing norms is
the need to influence the behavior of actors in the policy space so as to facilitate the
convergence of expectations (Krasner 1983) and to improve collaboration (Keohane
1995) among other purposes. Besides these, an additional purpose is to ensure that the
norms are robust and resilient enough to guide practice and behaviors of actors, (Greico
1990). Some strides have been made towards enhancing effectiveness in Kenya’s
environmental sector. A pro-active publicizing and value-ing culture are gaining traction
as critical norming tools. For example, the prevailing prism which was anchored on a
single pro-conservation narrative has been augmented by an encompassing conservation
narrative. First and foremost, normative underpinnings are a new core and salient
component of the legal framework for facilitating partnerships. The intents are to involve,
educate, and gather input from all the stakeholders and especially from communities and
grassroots organizations.
One innovative aspect of the new norming culture is the fact that normative
yardsticks are now considered as complementary (rather than inferior) to the purposive
yardsticks of the major institutional systems that govern protected areas management.
Currently the legal and institutional frameworks have legitimized participatory norms as
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tools for effective engagement. The previous framework only supported de jure
conferment of participation rights which were stated in law but were not established in
practice. All the major sub-sector legislation including pending bills have given explicit
recognition of collaborative norms as a guide to policy and practice. Equally, the
credibility of policy outcomes is being pegged on such norms and are now widely
discussed alongside the market-oriented (consumption and commercial) views of
sustainable conservation.
A second norming tool for enhancing effectiveness has been institutional support
for the current shift towards holistic elements of sustainability. This element entails
appreciating that both conservation and consumption as interrelated facets of biodiversity
conservation and that neither of the two should compromise the other. In other words,
there is more appreciation that effective achievement of conservation outcomes
simultaneously supports the rich biodiversity and the livelihoods of communities. This
has put the ecosystem approach at the center stage of policy agenda and design, though
its application and success varies across regions. This approach has achieved a prime spot
in the current conservation agenda of all the major laws and policies related to forest,
wildlife, water, and tourism sectors.
A third norming tool for enhancing effectiveness has been to amass the growing
support for these values and marshalling resources to allow for improvements that can
nurture and sustain collective effort that was missing in the existing institutional system.
The process has entailed, for example, mainstreaming programs and structures that
enhance collaborative environmental management. Mainstreaming new structures at both
national levels (through civil society representation and participation in preparation of

107

environmental action plans) and sub-national levels (through representation and
participation in development, budgetary, and environmental committees) are examples.
This has led to the cultivation of needed intangible resources such as improved
communication, information sharing, and collaboration which are preconditions for
collaborative practice.
3.1.1.2: Scaling-up strategies for enhancing effectiveness
Scaling-up is a process that involves “…expanding, adapting, and sustaining
successful policies, programs or projects in different places and over time to reach a
greater number of people” (Hartmann and Linn, 2008, 7). The major scaling-up
strategies for enhancing effectiveness can be assessed by evaluation three pathways to
scaling-up. These include grafting, integration, and replication processes. Grafting
mechanisms implant or enable different elements of law to act and to co-determine policy
outcomes (Hartmann and Linn, 2008). First, most laws in Kenya are provided for or
appended onto the Constitution. The new 2010 Constitution is relatively supportive of
extensive citizen participation as it sets out various legal domains for organization and
mobilization of resources. For example, it promotes reforms in land tenure, participation,
forest and wildlife management, and general environmental protection.
Grafting is equally exhibited in inter-sector linkages that are integrating
environmental management and participatory systems into their organizational and
development planning. These are innovative features of the legal framework that have
been designed to help operationalize policy principles stated in various laws and
strategies such as for Vision 2030 and other multilateral agreements based principles such
as Agenda 21 and Rio Principles. To a certain extent, Kenya’s record on integrating
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environment into planning for poverty reduction is at best mixed (UNDP-PEI, 2006, 9)
and is generally characterized by weak interfacing with overall development (UNDP-PEI,
2006, Kawrssoka 2009).
Replication involves a process whereby a given policy component enables or
leads to expansion of services to more clients in a given geographical area, or enables this
process to expand from one geographical region to another (Linn 2012, 1). A second
attribute, "functional" replication, means that a policy system enables additional
programmatic areas of engagement to take form, at times including the establishment of
new institutions (Linn 2012). Figure 4 is an organogram that illustrates the composite
institutional entities that define the institutional entities governing environmental
partnerships.
An important indicator of functional replication at the national level is exhibited
in the expansion of institutional mandates and organizational components which now
enable and accommodate new roles and responsibilities for newly established state
agencies and community organizations. In order to enhance effectiveness, state agencies
that coordinate policy have been fully empowered. This implies endowing institutions
with “infrastructural powers” and authority that allows them to perform their tasks by
granting them the capacity to implement logistical and political decisions without
intrusive and extensive state intervention.78 So far, the prime initial institutions
established to govern operations of partnerships were the Wildlife Conservation and
Management Department (WCMD) and the Forest Department but they were disbanded,
and new administrative entities such as KWS, KFS, NEMA and related ministries have
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This means that the state or its representative institutions to which it delegates roles have the ability to
penetrate society by increasing contacts with society and benefits (Manin 1984, 59, 114, and 117).
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been formed. New provisions have increased the mandates of these agencies compared to
their predecessors. Replication processes have led to the creation of new sub-entities
operationally integrated with the core state agencies.
As a consequence, both KWS and KFS have affiliate capacity-building
institutions that help them achieve operational effectiveness. For example KFS is able to
forge forestry partnerships (capacity building and economic ventures) through KEFRI’s
support programs to implement natural, dry land, and industrial farm forestry, forest
plantation technology, program partnership networks, and tree seed nursery operations.
KEFRI’s counterpart, KFS, intervenes in rehabilitation and restoration efforts of Kenya’s
vital water towers, including recently innovations in establishment of payments for
ecosystem services and monitoring carbon storage (KFS 2011).79 In the wildlife sector
affiliate institutions such as the KWS Training Institute, the Manyani Fields Training
School and the National Museums of Kenya perform similar roles related to supporting
conservation capacity building programs. In contrast to KFS, KWS has fully grafted its
operational programs onto the national security institutions which are helping KWS
enhance its effectiveness in the efforts to combat wildlife crime and to protect property
(see KWS Law Enforcement and Regulation Strategy).
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These programs have a significantly concentrated in the restoration of the Mau Forest Complex (the most
endangered forest complex) though there are numerous efforts across the country’s forest complexes.
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Figure 3: An organogram showing the institutional framework governing
partnerships
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Affiliate
Agencies

Acronyms
CFA
CoE
CWA
DDC
DEC
DRSRS
FCC
WCC
KEFRI
KFS
KWS
KWTI
LA
MEMR
MFW
MoA
MoT
MPND
MSD-NKAL
NEMA
NES
NEC
NGO
PDC
PEC
TCI
VDC

Community forest association
Council of Elder
Community Wildlife Association
District Development Committee
District Environment committee
Department of resource survey and remote sensing
Forest conservation committee
Wildlife conservation committee
Kenya forest training institute
Kenya forest service
Kenya wildlife service
Kenya wildlife service training institute
Local authority
Ministry of environment and mineral development
Ministry of forestry and wildlife
Ministry of agriculture
Ministry of tourism
Ministry of national planning and development
Ministry of state development for northern and Kenya and arid lands
National environment management authority
National environment secretariat
National environment committee
Non-governmental organization
Provincial development committee
Provincial environmental committee
Traditional customary institutions
Village development committees

Finally, the level of sectoral and agency financial support80 is a key indication of
replication strategies of programs established by the legal framework. Support from
donor grants has increased from an estimated K.sh. 162,050000 to K.sh. 443,370000
(Bird and Kirira 2008). For the first time, the government has introduced and allocated
funds to support programs on governance, legal framework and institutional

80

There are considerable challenges in accounting, collecting and collating pertinent financial data and
estimates for the environmental sector in Kenya (Norrington-Davies and Thorton 2011; Bird and Kirira
2008, 18; Geller et al., 2007, 4). These challenges are due to the large discrepancies between reported
estimates and the real disbursements.
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arrangements. This component constituted five of the 94 sub-components of the projected
programs and Ksh. 1,300 million of the Ksh. 103,036 million were allocated to this
support program (KFS, 20). While these two proportions are not significant, they are
indicative of a new shift which recognizes initiatives that strengthen governance
processes in a sector previously mired in command-type management failures.
Through geographical and service replication, EMCA established roles for new
statutory partnerships which are fully protected by law. State agencies are mandated to
work in concert with other national agencies, local governments, privates sector, and
communities. EMCA also provides for the establishment of statutory committees to
enable implementation of any laws that are supportive of or have a bearing on
collaboration or partnerships and has been instrumental in facilitating additional policies
geared towards mobilizing resources for partnerships at both national and sub-national
levels. For institutional resources it provides for the establishment of the National
Environment Committee (NEC) which is charged with policy formulation and promotion
of environmental management partnerships, among other goals.
Additional indicators of horizontal and geographic replication are exhibited by the
fact that commercialization regimes have been authorized, supported, and encouraged so
that they can act entry points for facilitating partnerships. For, example, the new Forest
Policy is embedded on principles of nurturing and supporting both the ecology and
livelihoods of resource adjacent communities. It detracts from both eco-centric and
anthropocentric views and rather encompasses a larger vision for sustainability. The
policy encourages commercial ventures in agro-forestry and supports capacity building of
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CFAs. In the wildlife sector, the Conservancy Regulations of 2012 emphasize the need to
devolve management to community groups which surround the wildlife protected areas.
3.1.2: Enhancement accountability and transparency
Norming strategies enhance accountability through provisions that require
agencies and partnerships to routinely provide information on matters concerning
resources, restoration and preservation of the environment. The existing statutes have
established autonomous institutions such as KWS, KFS, and NEMA which coordinate
and foresee sector operations. Norming processes for promoting financial accountability
were introduced in early 2000 with the first initiatives targeting to mainstream scheduled
reporting requirements for public agencies under the Public Audit Act of 2003. These
provisions require submission of financial accounts to the Ministry of Finance, other line
ministries and the Kenya National Audit Office. Similarly, the submissions must be made
within three months of the end of financial year. Some observers have opined that this is
a "step in the right direction towards accountability" (Bird and Kirira 2008, 17). PAs
management entities must be all registered organizations and are also required to present
yearly reports to respective registrar offices.
Scaling-up process has been extensively applied to buttress accountability in the
operations of coordinating agencies and partnership entities. First, there are more avenues
protected by law which enable citizens to hold public officials and institutions
accountable. Citizens now have legal recourse through constitutional, customary, and
sectoral laws, which have increased the responsiveness of institutions and facilitated
feedback mechanisms. Second, there is increased scope for enhancing horizontal
accountability with the increased access to information. Public officials from KFS, KWS,
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and NEMA are required to provide any relevant information that is of interest to PAs
management partnerships. A recent study revealed that the legal guarantees for access to
environmental information provided by existing laws in Kenya are relatively strong (IMF
2012, 37).
3.1.3: Recourse to representativeness
By definition, representativeness implies a system which fully enfranchises local
peoples or their representatives with institutions operating through accountable
representation (Ribot 2010) and where people have meaningful input that is decisive in
shaping policy output (Dany 2008). In the current national discourse on conservation, the
issue of participation has once again become the new norm as it has indeed taken a
dominant national position. The net effect of this normative appeal is that it has
positioned representativeness at the center stage of PAs management. This has facilitated
the mainstreaming of participation issues into the structures of governance. Norming has
also promoted the processes of devolving powers to local level institutions such as local
governments, committees, and associations. It has also re-introduced pluralism as a core
principle of governance for partnership entities.
Substantively, a key indicator of representativeness is how the law addresses
stakeholders’ demand. The forest sector has made major strides in making substantive
changes that allow greater input from communities. By all indications, the wildlife sector
has had longstanding struggles on issues of community participation, benefit sharing and
compensation. This is because of the weak responsiveness of the legal regimes towards
solving these issues. In the current context, the government is pursuing a process for
increasing representativeness though not as vigorously as communities would want.
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However, there has been much discussion in many policy circles that there is need to
compensate communities as a step to forging workable partnerships for the benefit of
conservation of wildlife and improved livelihoods. The government set up the Predator
Compensation Fund (PCF) to enable communities to access refunds for losses incurred
from problem animals. The findings of one study noted that this initiative led to positive
outcomes exhibited in increased tolerance levels for carnivores and the desire by
communities to have the project continue (Rodriguez 2007, 59) but it is not the answer to
squabbles over participation and compensation.
Through devolution, several formal avenues for partner interaction such as local
and district level committees, associations, capacity building programs, planning and
conflict resolution, consultation, and management committees have been established.81
These operational and management systems are designed to transform the civic
orientation and economic resource bases of community organizations. These
opportunities were lacking in the previous pre-EMCA legal regime. The new framework
serves the purpose of enabling and directly conferring agency to institutions that are
amenable to the preferences and representation of grassroots community organizations
and the private sector. There are also specific quota provisions specifying the proportions
of seats, positions, or platforms for the participation of marginalized groups and CBOs.
Designating formal powers to sub-national entities and local organizations encourages
communities to mobilize both leadership and organizational resources. It energizes
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For example provincial environmental committees are constituted by representatives of sub-national
government institutions, civil society and the business sector; of which one representative comes from the
local authority, another from regional development bodies, two from farmers and pastoralists, and two from
NGOs.
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communities to mobilize resources for organizations and for associations to sprout (see
for example Mbuvi et al., 2010, Ongugo et al., 2007, Ogada 2012).
A study by Ongugo et al., (2007) found that after the implementation of Forest
Act, more communities actually formed associations by selecting and electing new
leadership, which enabled these communities to engage pro-actively in forest
conservation and related ventures. A recent study found that when communities
participate in these associations, inclusiveness and consensus-oriented learning increase
opportunity for the voiceless members in monitoring and resource allocation processes
(Kagombe and Ogungo 2010, 4-6). More recent findings conclude that CFAs are also
better able to contact, consult, and collaborate through partnerships (see Koech et al.,
2009; Ogada 2012). Indeed, mobilization along such organizational frames has enriched
associational life in these regions (Mogoi et al., 2012; Banana et al., 2009; Ongugo et al.,
2007).
In the wildlife sector, the existing group ranches and conservancies within
protected areas and surrounding dispersal areas are re-emerging again as key partners in
conservation (Glew 2010, Moiki 2011, Homewood et al., 2012) or as surrogate
associational platforms for wildlife associations. The Wildlife Act 2013 strengthens their
impact as it defines and enables a legal status to conservancies for the first time. They
will have more connective capacity and encourage more interactive relations among
locals and with government institutions such as District Development Committees
(DDCs) and local authorities. Otherwise, significant impacts of these two entities can be
conceived through their roles as vital incubators of various resources (social, political,
and human, and cultural) that communities have needed and underutilized for a long
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time. In this respect, it can be assumed that the new 2013 Wildlife Act has the potential to
enhance representativeness in protected areas management.
The integration strategy (for scaling up programs) has been relatively weaker as a
strategy for enabling participation. A good example is with the UNCCD principles, which
are most commonly applied as parameters that guide the implementation of
environmental management. These principles advocate bottom-up and participatory
approaches, entrenchment of gender balance, use of indigenous knowledge, and
participation of diverse stakeholders. Representativeness in Kenya’s wildlife sector has
been to some extent facilitated through various incentive-based mechanisms (Unyonge
Bashir and Udoto 2012, Wanyonyi 2012, Nortons-Griffith 2000). For example, the
benefits-based and compensation models in the wildlife sector are used to incentivize
communities to engage in conservation efforts privately or in collaboration with others.
Additionally, there are revenue sharing mechanisms in which park entrance (and
conservation) fees are distributed to surrounding community institutions that contribute to
wildlife conservation efforts.
While these are bold steps, a much broader access and participation by
community organizations have not been significant in helping build local organization
capacity. There is an imminent possibility that this may change with the post-2013
Wildlife Act dispensation This is because the legal framework has availed statutes for
promoting procedural participation and has provided a formal avenue that grants
substantive (property) rights to communities. The wildlife sector is a complex system
which is strategic to Kenya’s development process. However, the paralysis that had
plagued the policy process stalled the enactment of the Wildlife Act. A group of powerful
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conservationists threatened to counter any provisions that would introduce expansive and
substantive entitlements to communities. Their “fears” were based on the notion that
these rights would increase unchecked poaching and irresponsible hunting.82
3.2: Inhibitive elements of the legal framework
3.2.1: Scoping strategies
Scoping is a strategy which circumscribes the range of rights granted and roles
assigned to a specific individual and institutional actors within a given policy making
setting. The overarching goal of scoping is to delineate specific boundaries and define the
extent to which actors and institutions can participate in partnerships. While it is not an
inhibitive aspect per se, scoping leads to inefficiency of institutions and limits
participation. For example, a recent Kenya case study conducted by the IMF revealed that
while the legal guarantees and provisions governing access to information had improved,
those governing public participation in environmental decision-making are relatively
weak (IMF, 2012, 37). A related effect of scoping on effectiveness is related to the fact
that institutions and interests usually intersect at nearly every stage of policy and program
development. Thus, limiting activities of specific entities or individuals to one or only a
few activities diminishes opportunities the full mobilizing of resources crucial for
intervention in management practice. This has been a leading issue in wildlife and marine
resource conservation where excessive scoping is inhibiting the growth of long-term and
sustainable partnership arrangements.
Accordingly, mainstream critiques on environmental management practice argue
that top-down and weakly designed decentralization programs have higher proclivity to
82

Characteristically, a major section of this group comprises of international conservation coalitions with
enormous financial and technical resources and with immense powers enough to maintain the current status
quo or to swing and shift policy away from pro-consumption agenda.
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promote apathy and high attrition rates in collaborative programs. Another related
concern is that it is common practice in developing countries such as Kenya to have laws
granting to a group of stakeholders de facto rights to participation without empowering
them or granting them full latitude in the various stages of policy and program
development. This disjunction emanates from the fact that while the newer instruments
are being developed, the politico-legal environment is not operating tabula rasa.83
Evidently, much legislation until 2013 existed as updated or revised versions of previous
ones, some of which were exclusive in character or lacked capacity to operationalize
devolution. Furthermore, the new legal context has served to fortify new institutional
compacts on one hand but is simultaneously forestalling the development of progressive
policy interventions in some sub-sectors as the proceeding sections of this chapter
illustrate.
Scoping of funding resources usually occurs in national budgeting prioritization.
For Kenya’s budget preparation and allocation context, reliable budget apportionment
largely hinges on how a given sector is perceived in terms of its numeric contributions to
the GDP. The predicament of forest and wildlife sub-sectors stands herein.
Conceptualization of sector contributions based on GDP measures militates against the
country’s efforts to achieve sustainable development. Additionally, sector appraisals
conducted by donors have revealed that allocation strategies are deeply super-imposed
onto a culture that promoted poor mainstreaming of environmental issues into
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In essence, this implies that that the development of law and policy for PAs partnerships is linked to
path-dependent circumstances which are essentially historically defined. In other words, they are not
created on a “clean slate”. For an extensive analysis of the tabula rasa metaphor/analytical approach, see
(Peters 2005, 51; Offe 1998 26-28). In PAs management, remnants of weak governance prevail. These
include an entrenched corruption at national level, weak local governments, local apathy, command type of
management, and clientelism are still compounding influences on policy outcomes.
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development planning (Bird and Caravani 2009; Bird and Kirira 2009; IMF 2012). For
example, a study by Ruhiu (2004) found that financial resources disbursed to wildlife
sector are usually inadequate compared to other sectors. One of the reasons for low
funding, he opines, is because “conservation is considered as a drain rather than a gain.”
More recently, a Public Expenditure Review (PER) conducted under the auspices
of PROFOR84 highlights similar experiences in the forest sector where government’s
earmarked budget allocations are generally smaller and forest departments are underresourced relative to their mandates (Fowler et al. 2011). The review cites that this is due
to the lack of political will to support a sector deemed as a poor contributor to the
economy. It further notes that allocated funds provisions are usually erratic and are
disbursed in lower figures compared to those stated in the budgets. These issues not only
undermine the efficiency of KFS as an organization vested with the authority to manage
the entire forest estate in the country, but they also limit its ability to mobilize resources
from other partners with stakes in the forest sector.
To a certain extent, scoping mechanisms that affect the forest sub-sector also
emanate from internal sub-sector operations, particularly in the design of internal intrasector funding mechanisms and interests of key sector funders. Development partners’
key priorities are in covering spending to support conservation programs while those of
the Kenyan government largely focus on reforestation and regulation/inspection (Fowler,
23). Thus the proportion that each contributes to programs determines scoping levels of
activities. More specifically, it relates to the ratio between recurrent and development
expenditure, and more so, in a sector that is largely donor-reliant if not donor-dependent.
84

The Program of Forests (PROFOR) initiative was created in 1997 and is currently one of the core global
research programs on forest research. It supports in-depth analysis and encourages production and
dissemination of knowledge that can lead to sound forest policy in any region of the globe.
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It is also apparent that the surge in poaching is an indication that some activities
are underfunded and are weakening wildlife collaborative regimes at both national and
sub-national levels. A prominent newspaper commentary reiterated this point when it
stated that KWS only covers 25% of the wildlife territory and yet is underfunded (The
Daily Nation, 2012). It further noted that this largely contributes to attacks on wildlife.
Another weak area of the wildlife sector’s financial regime is in scoping through granting
access to special funds to specific agencies, entrenched imbalances in funds access and
limited access by other stakeholders in the sector. One such strategy is exhibited in the
wildlife statute in which the KWS controls and uses a large portion of the Wildlife
Conservation Fund to manage its internal operations. This locks out institutions from
park-adjacent communities which immensely contribute to wildlife conservation in the
communal and private lands. This strategy has been blamed for fortifying the
monopolized mandate of KWS and fomenting its uncooperative attitude towards parkadjacent communities. Finally, at the county/municipal level, the process of devolution
has not been matched by transfer of proportionate financial and human resources to
enable an easy transition to a collaborative practice at the sub-national scale.
A related process for scoping strategy is linked to statutes which give KWS and
KFS extensive monopoly on the structure and the scope of participation of individuals
and entities. While the noted adherence to requirements for formal organization is
indicative of a strong regulatory regime, the numerous stringent requirements for
registration and hefty fees are hindering the pace of mobilization and formalization of
community organizations. For example, in the wildlife sector, overbearing powers of
Kenya Wildlife Service over pertinent decisions have increased while those of
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communities and private sector continue to be limited. This has not been an attractive
option as concerns have been raised over a re-centralization of management of wildlife
resources and related revenues by KWS.
With regards to agencification,85 the legal framework has strengthened KWS,
KFS, NEMA and other subsidiary institutions, which despite transforming a few sectorbased programs has equally led to fragmentation and multiplication of roles across
sectors. In fact, the new wildlife law will establish new agencies and management entities
such as the Wildlife Authority and county committees. Several officials whom I
interviewed in the field openly mentioned that one of the key hurdles they face is that of
overlapping of mandates, and this is common in a number of jurisdictions. This usually
leads to a hands-off ambivalence approach on the part of staffers, inter-agency
competition, and at times conflict. 86 What this means is that the current framework runs
the risk of limiting institutional proprietorship, a process much harder to reverse
considering the sectors’ historical intricacies. Seemingly, the two inter-related yet
disjointed aspects of macro-sector governance are reinforcing these challenges.
3.2.2: Gate-keeping strategies
Gate keeping is a management strategy which assigns a specific individual or
institution the authority to oversee one or few aspects of decision making at a given phase
of policy development within a trajectory or context of resource allocation.87 This gives
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This is a strategy for institutionalizing management systems for planning and implementation of policy
by transferring powers to new autonomous organizations. In essence, it entails the establishment of entities
that are structurally disaggregated from government ministries [and] … operate under more businesslike
conditions than the core government bureaucracy… at arms’ length from the core of government …” (Dan
et al 2012, 9). See also Bach et al (2012).
86
This is as a reaction to the fear of stepping onto another agency’s mandate or a looming confrontation
response in the event that it happens.
87
This description is adapted from Lewin’ (1947) seminal work which is credited for first introducing the
term to socio-political studies.
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the assignee the power to filter the types of activities, actors, or outcomes that constitute
the policy process, which ordinarily would be those that cater for this assignee’s interests
or constituents with whom they are aligned. Gate-keeping is exacerbating problems of
accountability in environmental governance institutions in Kenya. The legal framework
has created incentives for the supply of institutions for enhancing accountability but it has
failed in supporting other equally relevant initiatives.
Agencification has strengthened state agencies yet has failed to invest similar
resources to strengthen local organizations and institutions surrounding protected areas.
This explains the obvious presence of weak entities for community representation in
these areas. The supply side is being witnessed in the shortcomings of regimes that target
increased participation of non-state stakeholders in partnerships. An example is indicated
by the fact that communities are encouraged to enter into partnerships and yet they lack
the requisite capacity to effectively enter into such arrangements. One study has noted
that CFAs’ internal arrangements are usually not well developed for them to implement
the programs entailed in forest management (Nahama and Mbuvi 2009; Nyandiga
2009).88 Alternatively, capacity building efforts should have preceded the granting of
such rights as more resources are likely to be under-utilized or over-utilized with weaker
community and private sector institutions.
Another key gate-keeping feature in the legal framework is exhibited in the
wildlife statutes of Wildlife Act Cap 376 which regulated and denied legal status to the
creation of private conservancies. It seeks to limit participation by mandating that these
entities must be registered with the soon to be created Wildlife Authority. Conservancies
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Nahama and Mbuvi’s assessment particularly references this assertion in their title “We are nursing
community forest associations; But for how long? A challenge for partnerships if forest management”.
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have always existed and have been effectively managing wildlife resources using their
own operational codes. In the process of transposing these new guides for action, policy
makers have confronted tensions between stakeholders’ competing values
(conservationist and preservationist versus consumptionist/commercial use on one hand
and, anthropocentric versus eco-centric on the other hand). The existing policy scenario is
at best characterized by enduring tenuous relations among stakeholders .89 While norming
has become a trend for introducing, framing, and legitimizing the discourse on
participation, its real effect as a mechanism has much to do with the fact that the input of
community on the ground is still not decisive. However, it is safe to conclude that
communities are now less marginalized. The stark reality is there are always oppositional
forces seeking to dislodge participation-friendly values. Oppositional forces are not
entirely drawn from formal-legal structures; customary structures restrict participation as
well.
There are some associated gains from gate-keeping, but at whose expense? The
pessimistic tone of the core narrative on wildlife conservation regimes is telling of the
inherent challenges. Damning sentiments are echoed in various reports and studies. Some
components of the legal framework (at least prior to 2013 Wildlife Act) have been
labeled as “draconian” and “outdated” (Magiri 2007), and anchored on a “neocolonial
structure” dominated by the tourism industry at the expense of communities (Cheung
2012). These attributes are telling of the challenges that situate the invisibility of
community interests and how they are perpetuated by gate keeping norms engendered in
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The potential to create issue conflicts generally exist as tensions between for example: equality and
hierarchy, citizen participation and participation based on expertise, and equity and efficiency. (The dual
manifestation of value conflicts are borrowed from Bason, 2010).
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both agencification and decentralization strategies. It is common knowledge that wildlife
resources are the lifeline of Kenya’s tourism sector. Tourism contributes about 10-12% of
Kenya’s GDP ( RoK 2006; Wanyonyi 2012). In the year 2010, wildlife tourism sector
earnings alone injected approximately Ksh.73.6 billion (US$ 740 million) into the
economy (Ministry of Tourism 2011) which compared to the 2007 Ksh 65.4 billion
earnings. (See Kenya’s yearly tourism earnings in Table 5). Wildlife rich areas are
bastions of Kenya’s wildlife-rich regions. However, powerful local level functionaries
from state agencies and local governments collude with the local elites to deprive
communities of the lucrative revenues accrued from sector earnings (Honey 2008).
Table 5: Kenya's tourism indicators, 2001-2010
Tourism earnings
(Ksh in Billion)

Number is visitor
arrivals in Kenya
(‘000)
993.6
1001.3
1146.1
1360.7
1478.9
1600.5
1817.0
1203.2
1490.4
1609.1

Number is visitors to
parks and reserves
(‘000)
1664.1
1784.1
1570.0
1820.5
2132.9
2363.7
2495.1
1633.9
2385.1
2758.8

2001
24.3
2002
21.7
2003
25.8
2004
38.5
2005
48.9
2006
56.2
2007
65.2
2008
52.7
2009
62.5
2010*
73.7
*Provisional
Source: Kenya National Bureau of Statistics, Sectoral Reports
Accessed from http://www.knbs.or.ke/tourism_summary.php, March 2, 2013

Alienation of important stakeholders has been exacerbated by the structural
inefficiencies of the sector and the exploitation of internal divisions among community
institutions (se for example, Ondicho, 2010). This system works as an established system
of patronage and clientelism. Thus, one of the single most important inhibitive attribute
of the legislative framework is centered on the “tourism as an exploitation tool” thesis.
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But what drives this systemic exploitation? Gate keeping mechanisms facilitate the
predicament of local communities. For example, agencification and decentralization have
acted as gate keeping tools by penalizing local communities. For example, statutes
governing decentralized governance selectively grant rights to state agencies and local
governments and are biased against communities. This can happen in three instances.
First, the local governments are better able to filter out participants and programs which
do not serve their interests. Second, these entities control all the major channels of
participation, channels of access to resources and key avenues for conflict resolution.
Third, local governments are entrusted as overseers all forest and wildlife
resources at the sub-national level. The obvious attribute widely acknowledged by many
is that local governments are riddled with corruption and patronage problems. However,
because the law enables their commanding presence, local governments can and do
monopolize revenue management process. Kipuri (2008) observed that despite the efforts
to promote inclusive benefit-sharing mechanisms in Kenya’s wildlife sector, this
framework will remain inadequate for two reasons. First, the apportionment of these
revenues is skewed to favor local governments and the private sector. Second, given the
configuration of forces at the local level, it is unlikely that the revenues will ever
effectively trickle in substantial scale to local communities. Local institutions are
therefore entrapped in contradictory relations of overwhelmingly undemocratic
institutional arrangements; decentralized systems with re-centralised sub-national
governance.
These are common symptomatic features that explain why revenues accrued by
tour companies are not trickling down to these communities. The private capture 95% of
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earnings received from wildlife tourism (Nortons-Griffith and Said 2010; Homewood et
al., 2012). There is also mounting evidence suggesting the persistent nature of marginal
returns to wildlife protection by local communities and their continued marginalization.
These regions are some of the least economically developed ( Ngeta 2010, 427;
Homewood et al 2012), the most impoverished areas in Kenya (Mizutani et al., 1999;
Hughes 2006; Nelson 2012) suffering high incidences of poverty.
From the aforementioned, it appears to be the case that a weak system of
institutional incentives comes in as a decisive factor in defining governance outcomes of
wildlife protected areas management. This is because wildlife resources are a lucrative
commodity that can provide high rents with negative repercussions on governance
processes.90 There is also the related contentious issue in policy framing struggles among
protagonists in the sector. This emanates from the lack of consensus around how to best
utilize wildlife resources. There are two main arguments. The first camp favors the idea
that the law should allow for sustainable consumptive use of wildlife. The second is
preservationist. Ngeta (2010) avidly summarizes the preservationist principle:
Preservationists conceptualize human activity in nature as motivated
by commercialization that is likely to result in overexploitation and
species decline. Their view, wildlife can be observed and photographed
but should not be touched. Only then can sustainability be achieved, (p.
434)
The preservationist narrative currently dominates and defines the legal regime for
wildlife conservation in Kenya. Unfortunately, it has been blamed for engendering the
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This is the well known resource curse thesis, which is a dominant body of thought in the field of resource
economics and political economy which dwells on describing, analyzing, and explaining the characteristics
and origins of the well known systemic and structural socio-economic and political challenges arising from
over-abundance of natural resources in richly-endowed states. It starts from the premise that the ownership
of immense natural resources is a disincentive for socio-economic and political development. Some
analysts have presented this thesis as a paradox as they delve into problematique on why resource
abundance does not necessarily translate into economic, political and/ or economic stability, (see for
example, Karl Lynn 1997, Connelly 2010).
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weak structural incentives that deter full-scale community participation in wildlife
conservation. There is consensus across extensive research reports that neighboring
landholders accrue colossal costs from conserving wildlife resources (Mburu et al., 2012,
Kinnaird and Obrien 2012, Norton-Griffiths and Said 2009, Nortons-Griffiths et al.,
2009; Ngeta 2007 & 2010) and that there is a large discrepancy between the costs
accrued by the communities and the meager compensation provided by KWS in Maasai
rangelands that surround major wildlife PAs in Kenya. (RoK 2007 Draft Wildlife Policy,
25; Kipuri 2008, 26; MacLennan 2008, Sindiga 1995).
Additionally, hosting wildlife or engaging in wildlife conservation does not
necessarily yield greater direct benefits to livelihood portfolios of these communities
(Homewood et al., 2012).91 These circumstances explain why benefit sharing and
compensation models have significant appeal and feature as prominent mechanisms for
securing the trust and participation of communities. Yet, the mere use of compensation is
not a sufficient condition to achieve commitment. Compensation may change the
attitudes of landholding reserve or park-adjacent communities but not about the
governance processes (Rodriguez 2007). Mismanagement and corruption that plague
structures have made locals skeptical of such tools, but at the same time communities’
lack of awareness about policy operations exacerbate the problem of trust (Rodriguez
2007).

91

Some studies explore this position further noting that while landholders incur losses from hosting
wildlife (through predatory behavior, problem animals, and diseases), these losses are negligible (Mizutani
et al., 1999). This conclusion, however, is distant from mainstream conclusions largely because it examined
a region with comparatively different socio-ecological attributes from the commonly studied regions in the
Maa-speaking (Maasai) territories.
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This raises important empowerment questions as it points to the need for proper
timing and designing issues for PAs governance programs, in other words the need for a
proper phasing and pacing of interventions. Assigning participation rights must be
preceded by intensive political empowerment and capacity building processes which
allow communities to have leverage to confront the messy and confrontational politics in
the wildlife sector. Extensive education efforts and awareness creation are needed. Mere
application of compensation strategies in regions with less capacity and weakly
empowered groups only marginally transforms power relations. If at all, it cannot solve
the problems of continued marginalization of local communities.
Gate keeping is also exhibited in the conduct of legislative processes. At the
macro-level, a key inhibitive feature of the legal framework is the structure of legislation
in Kenya’s parliament. This is particularly so in agenda introduction and law making. It
bears repeating the observation that Kenya’s policy process is characteristically very
dynamic yet ineffective with regards to the dimension of implementation. Likewise,
legislative conduct encumbers a system that grants legislators formal and informal gate
keeping powers. Such include powers in setting legislative agenda, controlling of agenda
type, scheduling of debates and decisions, adoption of bills, among others.92 This can
explain the frequency and permanence of gridlock in the wildlife sector legislation
manifested by poor policy output. It also explains the source of alleged manipulation and
changes in the 2007 Wildlife Bill. Legislative productivity93 has been at best poor with
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Legislative studies in Western democracies have advanced rigorous models to explain legislative
behavior, some of which have informed this analysis (Crombez and Hix 2012; Woon and Cook 2012).
Important seminal studies are subsumed in the pivot, party, and information theories of legislative behavior
with each presenting central roles of these factors in shaping legislative outcomes.
93
Legislative productivity is a simple indicator defined by the number of legislative enactments within a
specified period of time, what legislators do with proposed legislations, number of bills passed and
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regards to enabling the development of progressive wildlife policy. Various stakeholders,
surprisingly including both preservationist and pro-consumptive cohorts, have blamed
Members of Parliament (MPs) for using sabotage tactics to manipulate and stall policy
development in the wildlife sector.
The impasse in the years 2007-2013 was a outcome of the failure by MPs and
their delaying of tabling and discussing bills, denial of bill scheduling opportunity, and
their reluctance to debate, adopt, and pass the wildlife bill. The preparation of the wildlife
bills and proposals was, however, inclusive and representative of a wide array of
stakeholders at the national level. Indeed, the process was participatory and highly
consultative involving selected committees drawn from major stakeholders in the wildlife
sector (WWF, nd). Tensions started and increased among stakeholders as some groups
argued that the parliament progressively (between 2007 and 2012) revised the content of
the original 2007 Bill. They argue that it was imprudent of lawmakers to use this bill as
the final document and added that it lacked legitimacy because it was a revised format of
the previous bill which was prepared in a more consultative process. They also argued
that it threatened representativeness as the possibility of including the agenda of
community-based constituencies had a higher probability of being ignored.
4: Conclusions
This chapter examined the legal framework on which MCPPs are founded and
operate. The key finding is that the legal framework is supportive but with a weak
enabling institutional framework. It underscores the fact that post-EMCA reforms and
proposed changes are not cosmetic. The vast programs instituted and the amount of

processed, queuing time taken by a specific proposal or bill as it awaits debate or passage (borrowed from
Jill and Thuber 1997)
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resources expended speaks to the fact there is some level of commitment to implement
the necessary interventions. Indeed, some of the failures should not obscure the progress
being made in the sector through scaling up and norming strategies. In fact, the analysis
also points to the need to evaluate sub-sector policy dynamics and how different subelements of the legal framework shape policy outcomes. For instance, the striking
differences between forest and wildlife sector outcomes outlay the sources of inter-sector
differences.
The aforementioned issues equally highlight both the opportunities and the
challenges that the crafters of institutions for coordinating protected areas governance
face. This analysis pointed to the lingering question on how to best involve local
communities in the current reform efforts seeking to endear both formal and informal
institutions to the newly afforded dispensation. It does underscore the immense efforts by
the government to peg these reforms onto novel principles about sustainability and
inclusiveness.
Concluding that the existing legal framework is congenial to empowering
partnership operations simply means deducing that policy makers have made major
inroads with regards to the matter. Yet, this is not the case. What is obvious about the
shortcomings and strengths of the legal and institutional framework is that both dynamics
underscore the fact that the mere existence and modest reforms of a legal framework with
enforceable statutes should not be conflated with effective and inclusive institutional
programs. It will take years for the Kenyan legal landscape to socialize actors and
institutions into responding to the ever dynamic policy system. As long as scoping and

132

gate keeping continue to be dominant aspects of policy reforms, the path will take a long
process to empowering communities.
Finally, the fragmented nature of the institutional framework explains the need for
a single coordinated legal framework. This will enhance coherency and synergy across
the various laws. MCPPs face regulations from manifold laws interspersed across the
environmental sector. Characteristically, the legal framework embodies different sets of
“self-contained regimes”, in other words, specialized along different issues (for
organization, regulation, administration among others) in protected areas management.
However, such architecture creates a complex system of inter-linked yet incompatible
sets of laws and principles governing the different sub-entities of partnerships. On the
other hand, it simply means that these sets of laws are addressing different legal subjects
yet partnerships exist as unitary collaborative programs. The aforementioned highlight
the suitability of a single legal framework on which the vibrancy and vitality of PAs
partnerships can be mapped accordingly.
The fragmented legal system is partly responsible for the poor mobilization and
collaboration among stakeholders. Hence, the model should rely on four key principles:
mutually supportive laws, adjoining diverse organizational resources, facilitating
institutional collective action, and ethos of collaboration. Activism by civil society and
social movements have exposed policy-makers’ erratic support for reform and constantly
questioned their commitment. The government’s overriding goal as depicted in its
various statutes is an expanded space for participation. Efforts to have a more inclusive
process reverberate across many communities. While these intentions are only stated on
paper and just enacted into law in 2013, Kenya will take a steady but slow pace to design

133

effective partnerships that improve the capacity of CBOs. Regardless, the enactment of
the Wildlife Act of 2013 is a step in the right direction despite the fact that the opponents
of the legislation have launched attacks while seeking its repeal.
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CHAPTER 3
THE LAIKIPIA WILDLIFE FORUM
1: Introduction
The Laikipia Wildlife Forum (hereafter, the Forum) is one of Kenya’s leading
conservation entity modeled as an MCPP. Its founders initiated the partnership to address
the costs and externalities associated with conservation in Laikipia.94 They envisioned
that inclusion of all stakeholders would be an effective strategy for setting a collaborative
platform, mobilizing resources for co-management, and implementing a benefitsenhancing partnership program. This process facilitated organizational expansion through
modularity and intensive partner activism. To this end, major attempts focused on
institutionalizing representativeness and effectiveness. These initial conditions enabled its
partners to enhance modest levels of accountability, which eventually nurtured a resilient
base for partnership consolidation and community empowerment.
The Forum is poised to be one of the most successful MCPPs in Kenya. The main
goal of this chapter is to extrapolate the features of its organizational structure onto its
operations in order to evaluate if its design facilitated the empowerment of its community
partner and its constituent communities. The chapter first discusses the partnership
features. It then proceeds to explain the mechanisms that are at play in the attempts by the
Forum’s leadership to fine-tune its internal operations as a tool for facilitating CBO
agency. There is an indication that CBO empowerment is, ceteris paribus, an outcome of
interdependent structural and contextual factors. The Forum’s ability to delegate co-

94

An externality herein highlights the fact that landowners preserved wildlife and protected Laikipia’s
ecosystem without any form of formal compensation. As such, these landowners incurred enormous costs
by bearing the burden of protecting an ecological complex that is not a public protected area complex.
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management power to community institutions was because of a favorable political
dispensation nurtured in a conflict-free initiation context. This set a trajectory favorable
to scaling up interventions that enhanced representative and relatively effective local
institutions, but which was not consistent along each phase of MCPP evolution.
1.1: Collective management of wildlife commons in Laikipia
Laikipia is one of the most important hubs for biodiversity and a leading wildlife
conservation landscape in the country. It is “arguably … one of the last viable refuges for
large terrestrial mammals in East Africa” (Laikipia Wildlife Forum and Space for Giants
2012: 6). Two features are indicative of these statuses. Laikipia’s growing status as a
leader in preserving the ecosystem of a protected area complex is anchored on innovative
MCPP-mediated projects serving a host of diverse public, private, and community
stakeholders. A second feature is that this record of accomplishment “has been achieved
at low cost to the state purse unlike the state conservation areas, which are subsidized”
(Kock, 2010: 72). Prior to the initiation of the Forum, the management of Laikipia’s
ecosystem was a fortress system that was exclusionary, predatory, and with weak
participatory structures.95 Under this system, significant power asymmetries existed
among stakeholders in ecosystem conservation. Communities were not empowered to be
proactive actors and/or beneficiaries of the wildlife largesse. These features can describe
the scale of power asymmetry between state-affiliated partners and CBOs prior to the
entry of the Forum:
•

KWS was the sole custodian and guardian of all wildlife PAs
including in private land,

95

The fortress system is an approach to conservation management that is based on total state control of
wildlife conservation activities and outcomes in a given conservation program (Brockington 2002).
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•

Human wildlife conflict was rampant in Laikipia due to high
incidences of predation

•

Private and communal land owners bore immense costs for wildlife
and ecosystem protection and land owners were considered as
destroyers of ecosystems

•

Municipal governments had weak incentives to reform exclusionary
structures

•

Communities were vulnerable to climatic and ecological shocks
because they lacked avenues of protection and arenas for participating
in promoting mitigation, and

•

Communities were considered to lack the capacity and competency to
conserve wildlife and ecosystem. As such, their rights and roles were
not fully subsumed onto partnerships.

The Laikipia ecosystem complex prides itself on being one of the regions where
the first Payment for Ecosystem Services projects linked to wildlife through payment for
wildlife service (PWS) projects were formally initiated. The Forum is a type of
institutional innovation that has provided a platform for initiating, supporting, and
implementing MCPP-mediated payment for wildlife services. Prior to the Forum’s
establishment, there was no institutionalized system for an effectively functioning
payments-based projects. Descriptively, 1) Laikipia’s ecosystem was reducing at an
alarming rate, 2) ecosystem goods were being over-exploited, 3) capacity for ecosystem
services programs were under-utilized, 4) the harnessing of ecosystem services provision
was poor, and 5) there was not a well-coordinate payments model with a prominent
incentive mechanism to encourage conservation. The Forum initiated projects designed to
change power asymmetries by incentivizing conservation systems through participatory
and rewards-based asset building projects.96

96

An example of a MCCP-mediated PES project is examined in a subsequent section of this chapter.
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1.2: Location as context for MCPP
Laikipia County97 is one of the 47 counties in Kenya. Laikipia’s protected area
complex stretches along the equator where contrasting climate conditions interface. High
potential areas (i.e. with high precipitation, fertile soils, and favorable altitude) exist in
contiguity with less productive zones and arid areas. Laikipia’s aridity and status makes
its population highly vulnerable to extreme climatic conditions and prone to problems of
food insecurity and poverty. These challenges are outcomes of the seasonality of rainfall
and land use patterns (Sombroek et al. 1982). These agro-climatic particularities have
greatly informed the programmatic and operational character of the Forum.
Laikipia is a region with a high diversity and density of wildlife. Its bio-diversity
status places it only second in density to Maasai Mara (Georgiadis et al. 2007, Ogada
2012, Laikipia Wildlife Forum 2010 and 2011). The Forum’s Wildlife Conservation
Strategy 2012-203098 states that Laikipia houses “higher populations of large mammals
than any protected or unprotected landscape in Kenya, outside of the Maasai Mara
National Reserve …with over 95 species of mammals, 540 species of birds, over 700
species of plants and almost 1000 species of invertebrates … [and an] assemblage of
large, globally threatened mammals…” (6). Similarly, the document (6-7) further
highlights Laikipia’s notable bio-ecological attributes:

97

This was Laikipia District prior to the 2010 Constitution. The structure of Kenya’s local government
changed with the promulgation of this new Constitution. Previous districts were converted into 47 counties
that exist alongside 175 local authorities. Administratively, the counties are now the second tier of
governance in Kenya.
98
This document was co-prepared with the Space for Giants organization. For an extensive description of
Laikipia’s biodiversity and ecology, please see the document. Laikipia Wildlife Forum and Space for
Giants. 2012. Wildlife Conservation Strategy for Laikipia County: 2012-2030. Nanyuki: Laikipia
Wildlife Forum.
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Figure 4: Location of Laikipia's protected area complex and the I1 Ngwesi

“ … [it] contains half of Kenya’s black rhinos, the country’s
second largest population of elephants, Kenya’s third largest and
only stable population of lions, the world’s sixth largest population
of African wild dogs, a large proportion of the world’s remaining
Grevy’s zebras…as many as two thirds of the world’s remaining
Reticulated giraffe, a globally significant population of cheetah
[and] Kenya’s largest population of patas monkeys and unique race
of hartebeest.”
The need to preserve and sustain these ecological attributes was the initial impetus for
mobilization and collaboration of Laikipians who also anticipated benefits from
coordinated collective conservation programs.
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Ethnically diverse communities that comprise of the Mukogodo Maasai, Kikuyu,
Meru, and European settlers of British descent define Laikipia’s demography.99
Additionally, the Samburu, Turkana and Pokot inhabit different areas within Laikipia and
its contiguous areas. A vast majority of these communities rely on the support system of
the Ewasi Ng’iro River catchment system. Laikipia’s population in the 2009 census stood
at 1.85 million. The Forum serves about 300,000 Laikipia residents (Laikipia Wildlife
Forum Newsletter January 2013: 1).
Laikipia’s economy predominantly consists of livestock and dairy production that
constitutes 82% of the land area situated alongside a mosaic of other land use including
areas for military use, horticulture, pastoral systems, ranching, fenced livestock, mixed
livestock and wildlife, croplands, smallholdings and few towns (Kock 2010 December:
71). Agri-businesses constituting both large scale and smallholder farming (Ericksen et
al. 2011) add to the agro-economic value chain of the county. Laikipia’s vast land belt is
composed of private land that has been converted into private protected areas where
prominent eco-tourism ventures and commercial forestry are upcoming sectors. These
ventures are supporting both wildlife conservation and livelihoods systems in ways never
envisioned by many experts and policy makers (Western et al. 2009). Poverty rates for
Laikipia and Samburu stood between 35-45% in 2011 (Ericksen et al. 2011: 19).100

99

Laikipia was predominantly a Maasai territory prior to colonial occupation in Kenya. European settlers
following an agreement with the Maasai leaders expropriated this land. This placed a vast portion of
Maasai land under the Scheduled Areas regime which led to loss of land by the Maasai and the eventual
separation these areas into gated European-only locales (Kohler 1987).
100
Poverty densities vary across the various sub-regions of Laikipia’s high and low potential areas.
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2: Operation and structure of the MCPP
2.1: Organizational principles and objectives
The Forum’s key operational documents emphasize that its mission is designed to
facilitate a mechanism that can effectively operationalize principles of sustainability and
representativeness. For example, its Strategic Plan 2010-2015 reflects its focus on
achieving optimum economic benefits for all its members. The entity’s diversity is
reflected in the array of members drawn from various groups and locales. This is
epitomized in its open rule for membership. The Forums embrace of neutrality is its
apolitical identity through which it purposely works with clients and members regardless
of their political alignment. Communities’ role in project management is operationalised
through subsidiarity, hence programs are designed to enhance greater delegation to and
ownership by communities.
As a pan-Laikipia initiative, the primary objectives of the Forum are “the
maintenance of ecosystem integrity and processes and the development of community
conservation projects in wildlife dispersal landscapes and the development of wildlifebased enterprises” (Save the Rhino International n.d.).The second objective presupposes
that the Forum will mobilize and expend resources to empower local community
organizations to be committed partners in the preservation and provision of ecosystem
goods and services. The Forum’s key interventions are designed to facilitate the
achievement of these goals:
Promotion of a network for a collaborative and inclusive co-management system:
•

establishing a platform for initiating and institutionalizing local
support,
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•

mobilizing various stakeholder constituencies for collaborative
management,

•

mobilizing financial resources, and

•

enhancing collective capacity for co-management.

Protection of biodiversity in Laikipia:
•

initiating collective action nodes through subsidiarity and modularity,

•

expanding the capacity of the Forum’s members and non-members,
through programs such as eco-literacy, entrepreneurial skills
enhancement, and other techniques, and

•

encouraging dialogue for micro and macro planning within and across
Laikipia locales.

Promoting community participation in Laikipia:
•

enhancing organizational and institutional capacity of community
organizations, and

•

promoting PES-based projects and opportunities such as payment for
wildlife services.

2.2: Organizational rules guiding partnership operations
The legal status of the Forum is in its legal personality, institutional identity, and
functions. The Forum is under a legal regime that requires it to operate as a standard notfor-profit company limited by guarantee. The general rules are in the organization’s
founding documents such as the Articles of Association while additional rules are
project-specific and dependent on the type of project undertaking in which the Forum is
involved. These rules embody strategic and normative elements that evolved over time,
though some were operationalized during its initiation and formal inception. The Forum
set up its secretariat in Nanyuki. Through its consultative and planning arenas of various
kinds such as annual general meetings, committee meetings, taskforces, and other
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departmental forums, the partners periodically re-evaluate the rules for managing and
restructuring partnership operations.
2.3: Organizational roles of key decision-making actors
The chief executive director is the head of the Forum’s core executive team. The
director assumes this leadership upon election based on his/her skills and specialized
knowledge of social and ecological interfaces within the Laikipia landscape. The director
has both managerial and fiduciary responsibilities and oversees the day-to-day operations
of the Forum. He/she can also delegate some roles to the committees and is usually the
key convener of all the critical meetings and briefings by the secretariat. In many comanaged regimes, the board of a partnership should be a reflection of the diverse interests
affecting the operations of the partnership activities (Sherry and Fondhall 2003). The
Forum’s board composition usually constitutes approximately 10 to 12 members. The
board is the core agenda setting and decision making unit for the Forum. It fairly reflects
the local and geographic jurisdiction and is diverse and representative. Officials elected
from five geographical units in Laikipia County express representativeness in its
membership. Additional board directors are the KWS district warden and those co-opted
from Mpala Research Center (MRC) and Laikipia’s tourist industry. The board is
accountable to the Forum members and structured as such in order to limit interference
from excessive bureaucratic participation.
The Forum envisions a partnership with proactive and beneficial participation of
all of Laikipia’s communities and their organizations. The key legal requirement is that
participating community partners must organize as forest user associations (for forest
sector), wildlife associations, group ranches and sanctuaries (for wildlife sector) and
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water user associations (in the water sector). Operationally, the Northern Rangelands
Trust is the key umbrella institution representing many communities within the Forum.
Two critical factors define the role of this institution in the Forum. The Forum targets
local community organizations because of the resources and assets that they posses.
Additionally, capacity enhancement is a prerequisite for meaningful participation in comanagement. The Forum recognizes that for the partnership to have a definable impact,
community participation must be its key focus.
Community organizations serve multiple roles. They are the key units which 1)
embody and represent the nucleus of grassroots collective action, 2) source and organize
voluntary human resources, 3) represent the institutional setting for valuing of benefits
and costs of community engagement with the Forum, and 4) they are nodes for installing
democratic governance and structures for lobbying for an expanded and locally
appropriate interventions.
The Nanyuki Municipality is the administrative headquarters of Laikipia County.
Nanyuki is the commercial hub of the region and its core role in the Forum is to act as the
public arm of co-management at the local level and to legitimize mobilization efforts of
the region’s communities. The municipal government is the organizational and
administrative centerpiece of operationalizing the political and democratic realm of
subsidiarity. By hosting the Forum’s secretariat, the municipality provides an official
status and an operational locus for activities. Environmental protection is part of the
formal mandates of local governments (Ribot 2002), and as such, they enforce
environmental laws within their jurisdictions. For example, with a surge in in-migration
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and projected potential of booming businesses in Laikipia, there has been increase in
pressure on wildlife habitats. The municipal government’s role has been to ensure
Figure 5: An organogram illustrating the structure of Laikipia Wildlife Forum
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appropriate administration of land tenure contracts to abate such pressures on Laikipia’s
land.
The private sector generally constitutes for-profit business entities owned and
operated by individuals and/or organizations. They came on board because of presumed
attractiveness and accessibility of profit-linked ventures in the conservation sector. The
private sector’s specific roles within the Forum are multifarious. The sector joined the
partnership to catalyze conservation entrepreneurship and to create a spontaneous
investment climate in the region. The sector is the marketing arm of the Forum and as
such, its role is to promote and sell Laikipia as a brand name with unique facilities and
opportunities. The sector equally provides direct and indirect financial support for startup programs and backstopping to enable program and project sustainability (Laikipia
Wildlife Forum and Space for Giants 2012; Leménager et al, 2014). The private sector is
nurturing new strategies for local diversification of livelihoods through its extensive
participation in the tourism and eco-tourism value chain.
2.4: Organizational relations among partnership sub-entities
There is a standing consensus that two critical preconditions for the initiation and
sustenance of any co-management partnership are formality and legitimacy (Ostrom
1990, IUCN 2003, Borrini-Feyeraband 2006), both of which must be derived and
adjusted in the context of changing social and ecological dynamics (Folke et al. 2005).
These two elements have formed the backbone of relationships within the Forum’s task
environment.101 This is its outreach strategy for tapping into its membership resource
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This analysis follows a general definition of a task environment. Descriptively, theories of collaborative
management maintain that an organization’s task environment constitutes the totality of factors that have
the potential to influence an organization’s key goal. According to Hauschild et al., (2011, 421), a task
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pools. The Forum’s leadership recognizes that ancillary partners such as KWS can
provide useful support for its programs and are, therefore, included as part of its support
system. Partnership interventions are equally coordinated as multi-purpose programs
designed across interconnected multi-actor structures.
Over the years, the Forum has seen an increase in its membership and its
programs. For example, during its inception, partnership activities were only organized
around two programs, namely, the community conservation program and the tourism
program. Progressively, programmed activities increased to four with the addition of the
wildlife management and security programs. Currently the Forum’s programs are
coordinated along these themes: conservation enterprises, environmental education, forest
conservation, rangeland rehabilitation, security, tourism sector support, water
management, and wildlife management (Laikipia Wildlife Forum Laikipia Wildlife
Forum, http://www.laikipia.org/programmes-top). A second arena for coordinating
relations among Forum partners is via geospatial categorization that establishes five
zones for the program interventions of the Forum. These constitute the Ewaso Nyiro unit,
the Central unit, the North Western unit, the Ewaso Narok unit and the Eastern unit.
2.5: Group ranches as arenas for commons management
What are Group Ranches? How do they work? Group ranches are forms of
common pool management institutions that operate as and are managed by groups (under
committee leadership). Each group that owns a group ranch is formally registered and
land ownership is governed by a group title. Many group ranches are located in pastoral

environment “…contains those sector’s that an organization’s strategy directly deals with and whose
changes or discontinuities have a greater effect on a manager’s decision.”
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ASAL102 regions in Kenya where they exist as collectively managed land. The
importance of group ranches traverses economic, political, ecological, and social
purposes. They support 67% of cattle, 86% of shoats, all camels and most of the wildlife
species in Kenya (Viet 2011, 1). These ranches sustain the pastoralists’ livestock-reliant
livelihoods. They provide pasture, water and land for agro-pastoralists. They were
established in 1968 with the enunciation of the Group Representative Act, Cap 287 of
1968. Please refer back to Chapter 2 which described their origin and legal status.
How do they work? They are governance entities for managing rangelands in the
Trust lands mostly located near wildlife-protected areas and which are under group tiles.
While a group manages land, livestock is herded and kept as private property. Group
ranches have legally established committees that have jurisdiction over their
administrative boundaries. They are models for “cooperative tenure” (Fratkin 1997) and
institutions. Accordingly, they operate as entities in which 1) parceling of Trust land into
ranches with freehold titles held by groups of [mostly] pastoralists; 2) registration of
permanent members of each ranch; 3) exclusion of members from other ranches; 4)
allocation of grazing quotas… ; and 5) development of shared ranch infrastructure
through loans to the group … ( Veit 2011, 5).
Aspiring and potential ranch members approach land adjudicators who assists
them to demarcate and establish land boundaries.103 Upon fulfilling the stipulation in the
laws of Groups Land establishment, they can be registered as a formal entity at the
Registrar of Lands who issues them a formal certificate.
102

Arid and semi-arid lands
Traditional Maasai customs did not allow individuals to own. Land was communally owned as
“oloshons”. An oloshon is a territorial section of shared group land. In fact the Maasai ability to own or
transfer land individually is a recent phenomena (Fratkin 1997).
103
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As previously mentioned, the move to establish group ranches was encouraged by
the government with considerable support from donors. Ranches were desirable units for
abating the “tragedy of the commons” in pastoral lands. Accordingly, a prominent
assumption is that pastoralists are highly predisposed to maximize their herds and
overstock in these areas (Fratkin1997). At the time and today as well, resources in these
rangelands are in danger of being depleted. With looming desertification, critical wildlife
is threatened wildlife. Because they surround key PAs and MCPP partners want to
conserve the fragile soil conditions of these lands, to expand this habitat and corridors of
connectivity for wildlife (i.e., charismatic and endangered species), and to conserve
grassland and increase biomass for wildlife and livestock use I provide an extensive
analysis on why group ranches dissolved in Maasailand and why some members opted
out of group ranches in chapter 4. Generally, a plethora of factors triggered their
dissolution, including factors such as: 1) the steady incorporation of the Maasai into
modern world (Galaty etc), 2) the marginalized Maasai galvanized support from
progressive (educated and political) elites who had long wanted to implement
privatization (Fratkin 1997) 3) the lingering threats of land excision and grabbing from
immigrants and the government. Corruption also undermined cooperation as the group
ranch committees sold and allotted group land to outsiders.
3: Evolution and growth of the MCPP
The wildlife-cropping program was a precursor to partnership inception. Prior to
1992, many landowners across the country had intolerant attitudes toward wildlife
because they incurred immense burdens by hosting wildlife on their land. Landowners’
near universal hostility toward wildlife gave communities little incentive to conserve
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wildlife (Nortons-Griffith 2000) and to uproot the thriving bush meat trade, which were
linked to wildlife deaths (Ngeta 2007). This led to a precipitous decline in wildlife across
Kenya’s major wildlife protected and dispersal areas. The Kenya Wildlife Service
initiated a regulated wildlife-cropping program in 1992. The key goal of this program
was to incentivize conservation efforts of landowners across some selected regions in the
country.104 The allocation of cropping quotas was based on proportion of resident animals
on a land lot and adherence to requirements such as dry season animal count,
maintenance of data on spatial distribution of species and species population dynamics
(Ojwang 2004 2-4). Licenses targeted landowners whose lands served as corridors,
connections, or refugia for wildlife and other forms of ecosystem goods useful for the
sector value chain.105 Laikipia was designated as one of the pilot-testing sites for
establishing conservation-enhancing capabilities for the wildlife cropping program.
However, it was not until 1997 that cropping licenses were issued under the aegis of
Laikipia Wildlife Forum (Ogada 2000).
3.1: Initiation (1980s-1997)
The initial conditions that defined the Forum’s empowerment outcomes included
structural, legal, and economic factors. A key factor was the mobilization of resources for
the eventual implementation of a wildlife cropping program. The program’s initial impact
was that it provided an enabling legal and institutional framework with regulatory,
104

The programs has been described as aiming to “…establish sustainable wildlife utilization as a viable
land-use option in areas outside national parks and reserves … along with training and certain
responsibilities delegated to them by KWS. In return, participants in the program receive certain wildlife
benefits including revenue sharing rights, to consumptive utilization and assistance with non-consumptive
enterprises such as tourism.” (Safari Web nd). This was accessed from http://www.safariweb.com on
August 27, 2014). Utilization benefits excluded the use of species enlisted under any special protection as
scheduled, endangered, or threatened (Ojwang 2004 2-4).
105
KWS established an ancillary institution, the Community Wildlife Service (CWS) which acted as an
intermediary through which wildlife development funds for social investments were disbursed to
communities (Berger 1993, KWS 1996 cited in Nortons-Griffith 2000).
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compensatory, and rewards based instruments which favored proactive community
participation.
3.1.1: (Subtle) elements of a shift in power asymmetry
Many community wildlife sanctuaries emerged in Laikipia during the 1990s
(Muthiani et al. 2011). Communities in Laikipia had toyed with the idea of establishing a
platform for collaborative management. It was not until the early 1990s when they fully
galvanized support for a formal partnership and subsequently established the Forum in
1992. The Forum’s initiation significantly benefitted from enabling efforts of local elite
ranchers (and to some extent local political elite, including the support of G.G. Kariuki
and Francis Ole Kaparo. The initiative of the Kenya Wildlife Service equally facilitated
the Forum’s formal establishment. There is no precise evidence to derive strong
conclusions about the presence of dense networks beyond quotidian relations.106
However, social and political capital anchored the economic basis for collaboration and
propelled the initiative for a partnership.
A founding member of the Forum, a conservationist and rancher, Kuki Gallman
has provided a narrative documenting the impetus behind the initiation of the partnership.
She acknowledges that her inviting of a cross section of ranchers and landowners to her
ranch in 1990 was a key first step to the inception of the Forum.107 The aim of these
meetings was to enable communities in Laikipia to discuss mechanisms for collaborative
conservation and appropriation of Laikipia’s rich biodiversity, in particular its diverse
wildlife herds. Accordingly, conservation efforts were to dwell on strategies for
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In essence, the fact that Laikipians rallied to initiate this collaborative platform does not necessarily
translate to an established claim for the presence of strong cross-group networks or social capital.
107
This narrative is found in an online article titled “Kenya: Laikipia Wildlife Forum” Kuki Gallmann is a
writer and a renowned conservationist. She is also the author of the best seller I Dreamed of Africa.
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expanding safe habitats and migratory routes for the vast endangered wildlife. Thus, the
initial primary focus was the protection and conservation of rangeland spaces to allow
free movement of wildlife in the entire Laikipia landscape and later to facilitate the
implementation of the cropping program.108 At the time, the founders of the Forum
focused on building a base constituency of local conservators by relying on this inchoate
structure.
A formal agreement did not materialize; neither was it acknowledged during these
meetings. However, this initial effort progressively rallied and galvanized ranchers from
the southwestern sector of the Ewaso region. The ranching elites groups and communities
at large were motivated to promote wildlife as a source of income. This was occurring at
a time when the beef market in Laikipia was progressively weakening (Heath 2001). One
agenda stood out among the founding collaborators. The focus engendered an inclusive,
collective, and collaborative process. This structure, which was a co-supervised
arrangement, was a key factor that would define the success and feasibility of the
partnership. To be sure, the Forum’s early structures were technically (though not
formally) representatively monopolized by the private sector and to some extent by
institutions and actors with strong links to the local and central government. For example,
KWS, Lewa, Borana, and other large private ranching organizations were vocal subentities. The local communities’ collective power was weak because it was divided across
its fragmented units.109
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These are not formal designated protected areas. As previously described, many large tracts of land are
private lands despite the fact that they act as migratory, breeding, and/or transitory habitats for wildlife.
Indeed, only about 5% of the region has formal protected area status, with an additional 1% set aside
exclusively for wildlife in (private) fenced reserves (Georgiadis 2010:7).
109
It is important to clarify that the Northern Rangelands Trust, the umbrella CBO currently representing
most of the community groups and ranches across Laikipia and Samburu regions, was only established in
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In any policy arena, triggering factors are external and internal events that define
what policy makers and partners would do to initiate a solution to a given program’s
problem (Kingdom 1996). Initial problems identified during the founding moment are
crucial parameters of initiators’ motivations and capacity.110 The key rubric is how
initiators perceive the costs and benefits of participation and how this calculation plays
out as a strategic information kit to potential partners. Prior to the Forum’s formal
inception, an initial empowering attribute was the Forum’s structure for coordinating
mobilization efforts. It was simultaneously designed to extend access information to as
many potential participants as possible and to provide as much information as possible
about the benefits of the wildlife cropping program. The efforts were enhanced by the
support of Community Wildlife Service; an affiliate institution of Kenya Wildlife
Service.
Proponents of democratic biodiversity management agree that an informed
community is an empowered community. Clearly, the need for an open information
system for community partners was crucial. Provision and access to information
heightened community awareness about the program. More importantly, potential
participants had the incentive to sustain successful wildlife herds. Access to information
equally enabled communities to organize and mobilize their own resources and to
scrutinize the benefits of the program. Accordingly, vertical accountability and
transparency, were at least, initial strengths of the Forum’s establishment. This improved
legitimacy and initial credibility of the program in the eyes of local community partners.
2004. Prior to that, community constituencies only organized as beneficiaries and clients of the Forum.
These units structurally fragmented across networks of inter-group ranch linkages.
110
In the agenda setting models of governance, a problem is a condition or situation that needs to be
addressed but a problem only becomes an issue when it receives attention (Cobb 1983). The weight of any
problem in the agenda is a crucial determinative component; it is an indication of what is to be done.
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For example, the open disclosure of the programs’ details provided empowering cues that
facilitated organization and collaboration across group ranches. The key structures of
information gathering and dissemination were barazas, field trips, briefings by KWS
officials, and intra-community liaison forums. Thus, concerning information bases of
empowerment, communities in Laikipia were privy to useful and strategic information,
anchored on a more solid legal structure.
Concerning institutional design, a key attempt by its founders was to restructure
power asymmetries via consultation. Achieving this goal included a system for extensive
consultation and participation of local communities through existing informal and
indigenous institutions such as barazas, group ranches, and wazee forums. For example,
the Forum’s founders clearly attempted to abridge the diverse interests that existed across
Laikipia landscape. Herein, the empowering effect was the attempt to initiate
representativeness as an intrinsic goal of the program. Internally, the Forum prioritized
“unity” of diverse groups as a crucial strategy to implementing the program (Sundaresan
and Riginos 2010). Thus, because interest articulation of most partnership entities
occurred in this context, the Forum was spared of the usual conflicts and segmentation
that usually characterizes inception process of co-management programs.
Additionally, the associational orientation of the Forum was an open, pluralistic
process. This enabled representatives to take the center stage as a core guide to
formalizing the partnership’s future interventions. This focus engendered extensive
collective action with mentoring from KWS. As an association targeting extensive local
participation, the Forum was designed to initiate direct contact with community structures
(Elliot and Mwangi 1997, Ojwang 2000). Because an associational structure was a
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mandated provision for licensing, this was the first step in which the Forum’s members
established a partnership compact. As an entity, the Forum initially succeeded in unifying
regional management objectives (Sundaresan and Riginos 2010).
A related empowering aspect of this founding was that such a conflict-free
context allowed poorly developed community organizations to mobilize more resources
and establish formal networks. New sites of empowering communities exhibited by
intense networking among local institutional entities was particularly common in the
years 1990-1992 and 1995-1997 (see for example Sundaresan and Riginos 2010,
Muthiani et al. 2011) and later between 2002- 2004. These are important junctures in the
Forum’s history. The Northern Rangelands Trust is an outcome of such bolstered
networks whose growth was progressively secured by the Forum’s inclusive and
consultative platform.
By initially engaging community guardian institutions as partners in comanagement leadership, a new and representational order was formed. By measures of
substantive democracy, this was a step to acknowledging that community organizations
were strategic partners and legitimate beneficiaries. At this point, community
organizations that joined the Forum assumed power vis a vis what organizational
governance theorists call “constitutive power” and “systemic power”. The former
“constitutes a distribution of resources through the use of institutions and structures”
while the latter “combines the capacities of actors to mobilize resources for the survival
of the system” (Avelino and Rotman 2009: 553-554). Assuming these two elements of
power by communities was facilitated by the enabling environment, which implanted a
culture of acceptance and legitimized participation.
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Beyond being democratic and active sites of policy implementation, these initial
networks acted as “spaces” for participation. According to Gaventa who is a leading
scholar on participatory development, spaces are “opportunities …where citizens can
…affect policies, discourses and decisions that affect their lives and interests” (2006: 26).
For example, the planning and designing of the association’s initial structures was
possible with significant input of communities. A key factor that explains the early
mobilization success of the Forum was that its founders were able to amass and organize
vast resources and resource bases in the district and with minimal level conflict. The
founders mobilized and targeted organizational bases from established community group
ranch committees and sub-forums. Additionally, they also amassed leadership resources
driven and supported by a united elite coalition from the community and the private
sector. The land tenure system was also anchored on a strong property rights regime.
Thus, with specific reference to empowerment, the extensive process of tapping into
these resources by the founders enabled communities to exploit spaces and to appropriate
the benefits yielded from innovative power (as participants, planners, designers,
organizers, and beneficiaries).111 The wildlife program’s directive had granted all
(associational) participants the authority to make decisions relating to wildlife utilization.
Accordingly, I argue that innovative power facilitated the initial effectiveness of
community organizations through inclusion and participation in the Forum. More
importantly, the initial dispensation facilitated by extensive coordination enabled a more
structured and substantive participation for communities. In fact, despite the lack of a
core/peak organization, communities participating in the Forum faced a more favorable
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Avelino and Rotman (2009, 552), describe innovative power as interactions which “create or discover
new resources.”
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dispensation that leveled out the disadvantages of an absent representative umbrella
CBO. Communities’ participation spaces were spared the jostling and inter-coalitional
conflicts among elite groupings. They were equally spared of the usual tense collision
between local institutional entities and the leadership of the partnership.
A related aspect of empowerment vis a vis innovative power can be captured in
the scale with which key policy entrepreneurs exploited the policy reform process. To put
this in context, at the time of the Forum’s founding, these entrepreneurs facilitated the
endorsement and adoption of a landscape-based approach right at inception (Georgiadis
2011: 2). This approach to management meant that associational interventions were
implanted on a pan-district model targeting Laikipia’s entire ecosystem. Georgiadis et al.
(2007: 474) argue, “intensive conservation activities in this region aimed at maintaining
integrity of ecosystem processes across a mosaic of properties with contrasting land uses”
(see also Didier et al. 2011). The empowering benefits of such an approach was that it
provided a mechanism for scaling up representation across the different regions in
Laikipia and establishing units that reflect these interests as well. By accounts of path
dependency, at this juncture the partnership’s inclusive posture was cemented. This set
the trajectory for the Forum’s institutional infrastructure for scaling up representation.
It is reasonable to conclude that representation was a key institutional design
principle that defined the Forum’s initial founding. More importantly, because no single
partner was an asymmetrically powerful institution, its initiation process was more
amenable to innovation. This is because commitment to representation successfully
aligned partners’ interests towards conservation and securing the rights of Forum’s
member rights to wildlife utilization. This was encouraging, enabling, and
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accommodative of proactive engagement of key partners from the onset of the program.
Building a representative constituency was the basis for maintaining networks and
mobilizing resources. Again, such a cornerstone of empowerment was facilitated by the
near absence of communal and elite factional conflicts, Much effort was used in
strengthening the MCPP and constituent organizations. Accordingly, I argue that the
Forum was designed to enhance empowerment through its efforts at cultivating a more
diverse arena for a proactive pro-conservation constituency.
Effectiveness of community organizations during the initiation phase can be, in
one way, evaluated vis a vis the efforts by its leadership in helping catalyze attitudinal
change toward conservation. Leaders fostered confidence in the wildlife utilization
program and propagated mutual trust between communities and other members. This
leadership increased communities’ trust in the program, allowing them to envision
participation benefits as a protection rather than a threat to their rights. In order to secure
commitment from communities, the Forum had to establish a process for marketing the
wildlife utilization program as a benefits-laden program. Of course, there was the
challenge of convincing landowners and particularly indigenous communities who had
long suffered from unresolved human-wildlife conflict.112 Laikipia is one of the major
regions prominently categorized as zones of intense human-wildlife conflict (USAID
2004, IPAR 2005, Mburu and Birner 2007).
The Forum’s apolitical identity clearly gave it an outlook of neutrality and a mark
of acceptability among many potential members. This further facilitated a platform that
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In essence, the problems of hosting wildlife in private land were exacerbated by the bureaucratic red
tape that stifled efficiency of compensation mechanisms for aggrieved communities and landholders. It is
understandable that perceptions and impressions of such communities were configured around apathy,
pessimism, and defensiveness.
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nurtured constitutive power thus, allowing partners to value the benefits of potential
collaboration. Finally, its apolitical character expanded the basis for “systemic power”
with which partners could collectively identify and map contours of collaboration in
order to appeal to a vast majority of local partners. All these elements of power nurturing
processes served to facilitate the inclusion and participation of communities, as will be
discussed in the next chapters, in ways that other counterparts could not.
3.1.2: Elites as facilitators of associationalism: patrons of conservation?
The cropping program acted as an appropriate opportunity for activism by elite
policy entrepreneurs and local community leadership. It is obvious that local
organizations mobilized well enough to access the political opportunities afforded by the
receptive system and reform in legal framework. However, local elites equally sought
audience and resources from communities and their respective organizations. A more
productive strategy for organizations to successfully access decision-making platforms is
through exploiting intra and inter-elite divisions, in essence, political opportunity
(Jenkins and Perrow 1977, Tarrow 1994). This standing premise views elite coalitions
and interests in monolithical terms and as debilitating to empowerment projects. The
Forum’s inception presents a unique experience beyond this interpretation. For example,
this one-sided assessment conceals, the fact that strong and committed community elite
coalitions (that animated the Forum’s inception and progressive growth) helped rather
than hindered initial positive co-management outcomes.
Thus, capitalizing not on the internecine struggles but creative and collaborative
activities vitalized associational linkages among elite and local constituencies. It can,
however, be cautiously ascertained that the Forum’s initiation phase was organizationally
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dominated by two cohorts of elites (the landed ranchers and local influential politicians)
who were a core group of political entrepreneurs of mobilization. To use a better term,
elites assumed two mutually inclusive roles. This was through value claiming and
value.113 By strategically placing contentious issues on a public platform that pulled
resources of public and private actors, these elite groups were the first group to mobilize
resources that established the Forum as an association.
The opposite is true as well. In terms of power, this analysis lays bare why issues
central to elites can take precedent and prominence even in open, consultative arenas
such as those of the Forum. This partially explains why the prominence of wildlife
utilization schemes formed a core agenda during the Forum’s formative years and at
organization phase. Elites and particularly the large ranchers were powerful players in
Laikipia’s conservation sector and continue to be. They are an asset-rich cohort that is in
ownership and control of land resources constituting about 40.3% of the land in Laikipia
(Letai 2011). The elite coalition within the Forum was certainly not a uniform or a
coherent unit, though they were a united front in the effort to establish a representative
association. The elite constellation, ideologically, was united in some issues but divided
in others, It has been noted that elite coalitions exhibited elements of “competing
sustainabilities” (DePuy 2011). In essence, they were entangled in a locally embedded
but complex networks guided by competing frameworks . For example, there were elite
ranching families and groups who were pro-wildlife while others were merely tolerating
wildlife and discouraging wildlife presence in their properties (Georgiadis 2007: 474,
Deney 2005). It is, therefore, useful to question three aspects of elite support that
113

These are negotiating strategies (that I borrow from Schoon and York (2011) used by these
entrepreneurs to influence decision toward an issue that is of interest to them. They are tools for brokering
deals among groups.
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influenced the Forum’s initiation and contributed to initiatives for community
empowerment.
Who did elites mobilize and why? Prominent literature on collective governance
emphasizes that resource-user and resource-adjacent communities are bound to establish
institutions that help regulate the utilization, access, and sustenance of natural resources
(Uphoff 1986, Ostrom 1990, Rasmussen and Meinzen-Dick 1995, Agrawal 2007). The
Forum’s initiation indicates that elites played the role of nurturing organic institutions for
collective action useful in the management of commons (i.e., wildlife and rangelands).
This group distinctively constituted the ranching and local community elites and some
politicians. This indicates that elites can support a program that protects their interests
regardless of the presence of other interests, but only as long as they can protect their
own interests. Elites mobilized local community members as a strategy designed to
extend participation and to localize benefits through and by ensuring the initiation of a
strong, large, and diverse associational network. Landed elites encouraged communities
to provide open and accessible habitat and open range for wildlife (Gallmann n.d.,
Western 2006). Communities joined the Forum, of course, anticipating beneficial
commercial returns from these activities.
This crucial commitment and support by elites enabled community empowerment
because it facilitated an institutionalized entry of community organizations in the
initiation of the Forum. Subsequently the empowerment was crucial in enabling
communities to appropriate benefits of wildlife cropping. These activities amplify the
three approaches (previously mentioned) to focus on the central importance of
opportunity structure and alliances as spaces for enabling procedural democracy.
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However, these approaches also accord elites too much role in defining opportunity. The
Forum’s evolution indicates that both crises (which was the need to address humanwildlife conflict and immense losses in livelihood portfolios) and politico-legal reforms
(which were availed by KWS and which initiated Wildlife Cropping Program) can create
opportunity not just for locals but for elites as well. In fact, elites were eagerly
anticipating reforms just as most Laikipians were. Seen at this angle, elite support and its
vocal elements were important, but not the sole reason behind the created opportunity. It
is also plausible, however, to argue that while opportunity for participation and
partnership initiation were entirely not dependent on elite support, elite presence ensured
the likelihood, off take, and the gradual formalization of the Forum.114
Why were elites supportive of the initiation of a co-management platform?
Dominant theories of participation and collaboration focus on elites parochial and
particularistic interests as the key determinants of success and failure of co-management
projects. The main interpretative fulcrum for proponents of participation, including some
variants of the literature on collaboration, is the elite capture thesis which argues that
elites 1) have perennial captive interests, usually with the intention of controlling and
hijacking projects, 2) are exceedingly self interested individuals and/or groups, and 3)
locals mistrust them because of these reasons. Thus, largely, elite presence or
intervention hampers rather than harnesses local community influence and participation
in co-management. These interpretations are precise partially and imprecise in other
respects. The developments surrounding the Forum’s initiation queries these claims and
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Other reasons have been discussed as important catalysts that enhanced elite mobilization efforts during
the initiation phase of the Forum have been discussed elsewhere. According to USAID (2000: 11)
“…expanding populations of poor farmers were gradually moving … from montane areas to find land;
outside individuals and organizations …[were] buying large areas of wildlife rangelands; and insecurity in
rangeland areas …[were] on the rise due to trans-boundary cattle raiding…”
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illustrates that elites strived to conquer the hearts and minds of Laikipians by strategically
placing the discourse of access and benefit sharing as a public benefit and for a collective
conservation purpose.
The first reasonable interpretation is that elite support is less an attribute of
confluence of intergroup interest than it is of concurrence of interests. I argue that elite
support was an episodic concurrence of elite interest with those of the local community
prompted and propelled by salient issues of the day. In this case, the key motivations
being to access wildlife largesse, exploiting consumptive uses associated with wildlife
resources, and to solve human-wildlife conflict.
Concurrence implies that challenges and opportunities prompted and catalyzed
by an environment ripe for agreement and, by implication, collaboration. This has
empirical implications as well. It is difficult to verify if elites were really in support of
wildlife utilization for its own sake, in order to promote their group interests, or as a
means to empower communities. Regardless, the display of their support through
concurrence was more prominent in their articulation of associational benefits that tie
participation to the wider discourse of access and benefits sharing. More importantly, it is
implausible to interpret elite support as a dynamic of interest convergence (between them
and the community), in other words, the likelihood of uniformity of elite and local
community interests is rare. That said, the public space acted as a platform to advance
elite interests while at the same time (inadvertently) aligning these sets of interests with
others located in multiple arenas.
At the same time, elites can use a unifying language (with or without self-centered
purposes) to enlist and amass support for a specific cause. In this case, the Kenyan
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government had initially been reluctant to devolve wildlife properly rights all over the
country (Ngeta 2007) and when opportunity was availed, elites developed a common
theme uniting Laikipians to the tune of “we (collectively) bear the burden, we
(collectively) reap the rewards.” (Respondent L1). This constructed a collective identity,
and regardless of the intentions and motivations of elites, it was a step to empowering
communities as it integrated community interests and structures onto the associational
platform of the Forum. Still, this does not explain why a very strong elite coalition
emerged and sustained the Forum’s initiation process. Neither does it mean that elite
leadership role precluded strategic intents for increasing lucrative earnings associated
with wildlife conservation. In fact, this was a prime goal for most elites.
A second factor is that the leading elite coalition, of mostly large-scale ranchers,
landowners, and influential local politicians estimated the benefits of participating in and
supporting the Forum’s inception by projecting outcomes of ecosystem conservation.
This is according to publicly available reports provided by the Forum. In essence, the
context of rich but dwindling ecosystem goods and services necessitated action because
elite ventures and livelihoods relied on the health of Laikipia’s ecosystem. Thus, it did
not matter who gained as long as they (i.e., elites) too were in a place to make gains and
reverse the trends of dwindling fortunes. Elite roles in spearheading and launching of
Laikipia’s conservation efforts was with assistance from local, national government state
organs and international donors (see for example, USAID 2000, Georgiadis 2007,
Sortland 2009, Western 2009, Sundarasen and Riginos 2010, DePuy 2011).
What level of initial support did elites provide? The level of elite support for the
establishment of initial structures of co-management was modest but significant
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considering the fact that their support was from the landed (ranching and farming),
community and political sectors with occasional complementary support from indigenous
elites. These groups availed resources that managed collective action. Elite intervention
included setting the agenda for introducing access and benefit sharing as mechanisms for
scaling up conservation-based rewards systems. Elites were instrumental in initiating a
negotiation platform for precursor institutions that would later catalyze the inception and
formalization of the Forum.
Additionally, by using targeting and contacting strategies, elites were effective in
mobilizing partners for the MCPP’s inception through personal contacts, group contacts,
and public fora (USAID 2000, Giorgiadis 2007, Elliot and Mwangi 1997a, 1997b, 1998,
Western 2006). Elites rallied communities along a unifying narrative. Thus, an
empowering context for representation and organizational effectiveness was nurtured in
the group dynamic that was created in this climate. More so, the association, including its
community constituents escaped the usually tense politics coupled in adversarial
pressure, contestation, and stalemate. Eventually, under the aegis of KWS, the members
established the Forum in 1992. Through this platform a pilot program for collaborative
management was formalized (Laikipia Wildife Forum 2007). This context had
subsequent implications for the engagement and growth of community organizations.
3.1.3: Organic evolution and associational roots of community capacity
Organizations with sustainable capacity have resources that serve the purpose of:
1) building abilities, 2) building relationships, and 3) building values (UNEP 2002).
Community organization’s participation in initiating the Forum enabled them to build
networks and to gain access to resources available through these connections. The
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Forum’s precursor organizations were designed as enablers of additional capacity needed
to implement the wildlife utilization program. For example, its founders focused
primarily on strengthening relationships, enlisting community support, and of creation of
cross-scale networks across the district. Relational theories of organization emphasize
that effective entities embrace the philosophy of inclusiveness as a guiding pillar for
cultivating commitment, leadership and networks (Vermeesch et al. 2013). Inclusiveness
was a core element of the Forum’s normative and strategic orientation. In pursuing this
tactic, its founders sought to integrate community structures through this initial
engagement. The Forum’s initiation platform was designed to be an arena for scaling up
the interactive capacity of community organizations to enable successful program
implementation. In the years leading to 1990s, leaders in Laikipia were already
mobilizing support for collective action. The key members considered that in order, “to
safeguard the wildlife populations, there was need to consider the district as an ecosystem
and … to enlist the support of the communities” (Kathiani et al. 2011, 5-7).
I raise the caution that the playing field of co-management was not symmetrical
though it was representative. Local community capacity was weak.115 The less structured
community entities were at a less favorable position than the well-organized private
sector and well resourced municipal governments. The lack of a formal umbrella entity
meant that opportunity to exploit benefits of the wildlife cropping program was lacking.
Although the value of inclusion was legally embedded into the Forum’s core programs,
fragmented community organizations were less suited to fully exploit the benefits of the
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This analysis by no means indicates that a community is a homogenous unit. However, it is analyzed
based on a simple geo-economic boundaries and socio-demographic aspects that describe local residents
who reside in a given landscape.
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program. Thus, despite being less prone to a context of tension or exclusion, as will be
discussed later, this may explain why claims have been made that only the large scale
ranchers benefitted from the wildlife cropping program. From the standpoint of
empowerment, community organizations were effective to the extent that they played a
role in organizing political, social, and economic capital and mobilized resources from
their constituents. At the time of the Forum’s initiation in the early 1990s, there was no
umbrella organization representing community interests within the Forum. A large
number of fragmented informal entities and ad hoc units (as indicated by the membership
data) exhibited local community membership. It was not until 2004 that the Northern
Rangelands Trust (NRT) was established.116
Community capacity was not simply a matter of internal organization, but the
external environment provided a fertile ground for its evolution as well. Thus, a holistic
querying of the attributes of capacity and the interconnections to participatory spaces
suffices. Given that, the Northern Rangelands Trust has its origins in the associational
structures of the Forum; its organizational evolution underscores the importance of
context as a dimension of capacity. A key ingredient to its establishment was the openly
pluralistic dispensation afforded by the directive on which the wildlife-cropping program
anchored. The Kenya Wildlife Service directive mandating the establishment of
associational structures nourished a platform ripe with incentives for mobilization of
community resources, including those for collective action. Likewise, the Forum’s
founders were dependent on community and its assets as this would allow for rapid
mobilization and formalization. Undeniably, these assets were valuable, necessary and
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It is currently the most important and most networked institution representing and coordinating several
if not most community efforts through networks of mostly indigenous group ranch linkages.
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urgently needed. Additionally, the numerical weight, land and human resources that the
various local formal and informal organizations would bring to the table were crucial to
the wildlife-cropping program. Community members equally had high stakes in the
program.
This was essentially a scenario of mutual recognition, which enabled a
representation to become the cornerstone of the Forum’s early interventions. In light of
these developments, a claim that community organizations in Laikipia confronted a less
threatening arena and a more favorable space with freedom to participate in early comanagement phases is not an overstatement. The arena was supportive of extensive
participation as communities were endorsed as formal strategic partners in the efforts to
implement the wildlife-cropping program. A related implication about capacity is that the
accommodative posture provided incentives to internal community mobilization that
would later enable the formal evolution of the Rangelands Trust. More importantly, the
Forum’s founders bore some costs of mobilization toward the initial establishment of the
CBO. In fact, the Forum’s founders had no choice. The interest was to position a wellcoordinated and cohesive community organization.
These illustrations provide evidence that the socio-legal context placed fewer
constraints to community mobilization and organization (at this phase, in favor of
partnership growth). This would set a path that would enable the steady evolution of a
more functional and stable apparatus for coordinating community interest (i.e. the
Northern Rangelands Trust). The absence of a restricted space, however, did not fully
cushion communities or ensure stability of the wildlife-cropping program. More
importantly, while local communities in Laikipia were not openly marginalized or
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alienated, (based on the evidence of openness of associational membership), the absence
of a single authoritative coordinating chaperone for the community (during this phase)
meant that its interests werenot fully represented.
Effectiveness is an important aspect of community capacity. Membership alone
did not guarantee access to decision-making structures or significant benefits. As will be
described in the section on the Forum’s formalization phase, organization facilitates an
entity’s capacity to secure substantive benefits. The initial absence of community
organization was an aspect of poor ability to exploit and mobilize resources. This may
serve to explain the weak proprietary capabilities and weak benefit streams accruing to
communities from the wildlife-cropping program (Elliot and Mwangi 1998: 13). In
essence, weak community organization placed communities in a subsidiary position
without much ability to exploit the benefits of the program. More importantly, weak
community organization largely contributed to the disproportionate proprietary benefits
of the wildlife utilization program to the private sector and rich landed elites.
3.2: Organization (1992-2002)
Organization entails the formal inception of a partnership entity. For the Forum,
this entailed establishing the key apparatus for decision-making and program
implementation. The Forum’s organization phase was not disrupted by influences and
infiltrations from community or politically affiliated elite-led contests and competitions.
This gave community members room to exploit and establish linkages for coordinated
wildlife management. Fewer disruptions and tensions attenuated the negative effect on
mobilization.
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3.2.1: Power sharing as formalization of partnership
Local ranchers’ interest in sanctioned wildlife cropping on private land
(Georgiadis 2010: 2) was instrumental to formalization of the Forum. The directive from
the KWS granted the Forum members rights to independent management of wildlife. It
was in the interest of the founders to initiate an association structure with intact and
integrated coalitions. This less confrontational platform was the enabling factor that
helped its organizers to establish structures for co-management. With associational
activism serving as the bedrock of collaborative coordination, its founders organized and
institutionalized as entitling program that was broad based and inclusive. There are some
important observations about the Forum’s formalization. This phase encapsulates its
evolution to a fully-fledged partnership. The process unfolded smoothly. More
importantly, full delegation of management rights granted its members discretionary
powers to manage the program. Attributively, procedural and substantive outcomes
increased representation, participation, and extended usufruct rights through a formalized
process for wildlife utilization and management. This context, combined with a
dispensation that predisposed communities to collaborate, created enabling conditions for
powers to shift to communities. However, this was only until the termination of the
program. The Forum was to facilitate the monitoring process of wildlife management.
The mission that guided the Forum’s organizational practice from 2002 to 2009
was “to conserve the integrity of the Laikipia ecosystem, by creatively managing natural
resources to improve the livelihood of its people.” This changed but very marginally in
2010. The current mission of the Forum is “to conserve Laikipia’s wildlife ecosystem’s
integrity and improve the lives of its people by bringing its societies together to conserve
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and sustainably use the natural resources on which they depend” (Laikipia Wildlife
Forum Newsletter 2011). Additionally, power relations changed as collective resources
continued to strengthen the Forum’s organizational culture. To this end, the Forum was in
a position to grant itself the status of “a pioneering dynamic and membership-driven
community conservation and wildlife management association” (The Laikipia Widlife
Forum Website) built on a solid base of local support and an ardent elite coalition.
The established structures were designed to expand the Forum’s network and
alliances for collaborative practice. More importantly, its leadership continually
endeavored to enlarge the network of its members and the development of inclusive
management templates. For example, during this phase, re-structuring entailed a
(re)framing of institutional objectives and adoption of new strategic plans to support
institutional growth. It was only during its formal launching when identifiable
organizational units were established. As the organization grew, it morphed into a fullfledged association of landowners who collectively negotiated procedures for wildlife
utilization and conservation.117 This stabilized the MCPP. Its leadership developed
structures designed to scale-up participation and operations through both functional and
geographic integration. Community input in co-management was decisive in that
delegation facilitated participation and demanded accountability as well, and did so
through proper monitoring and sustainable use of wildlife resources. Authority to
communities included 1) planning wildlife resource use, 2) monitoring wildlife resource
use, 3) devising management plans for wildlife resource use, 4) organizing capital to

117

A former member and director of Mpala Research Center (MRC) emphasizes “with investors foreseeing
greater returns from non-consumptive uses of wildlife, eco-tourism enterprises proliferated on private and
communal properties in the region. Cooperation among landholders favoring wildlife was spurred by
growing awareness of the need to maintain sufficient space for species…” (Georgiadis 2010).
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enable sustainable use of wildlife-based resources, and 5) mobilizing community
resources.
Community organizations were effective in their roles in organizing the Forum’s
platforms for the program. Community input was crucial in the design of the partnership
units and departments. The Forum’s extensive modular design was a structural tool for
scaling up delegated authority. Modularity was exhibited in the following features: 1) the
extensive scale of activities across several sub-sectors and sub-jurisdictions, 2) the strong
and scaled-up presence of multifocal, multipurpose, and multi-actor units, 3) the large
and dense network of members’ abridged interests, and 4) the scale of coordination,
organization and specialization. It also maintained linkages spanning the vast Laikipia
landscape and contiguous environs. The expectation was that extensive engagement of
communities would refine constituent competencies of local organizations and nurture
complementary ones (Laikipia Wildlife Forum 2010, 2012).
In an effort to spread powers to manage wildlife within communities, the Forum
sought to balance power through regional representation. Its board membership
comprised of both elected and selected leadership drawn from different sectors and
regions reflecting its diverse membership. This was exhibited in board membership,
committees, and councils. This structure served to limit complaints and stalemate over
board recruitment, selection, and partnership operations. The special and annual meetings
were an avenue for scrutinizing and evaluating board’s leadership. These interconnected
interventions by the MCPP’s leadership helped to promote buy-in among various
communities within and beyond Laikipia.
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3.2.2: Elites’ preservation pedestal? (A near) paralysis from the wildlife cropping
coalition
Elites in Kenya’s wildlife rich regions have a reputation for corruption and a habit
for hijacking and sabotaging projects that appear to restructure the status quo. It is usually
the local Maasai elites (Cattarinich 2001, Thompson and Homewood 2002, Honey 2008a,
Snyder 2012), or foreign elite individuals or coalition (Manyara and Jones 2007), or both
local and foreign elites (Honey 2008b, Mailu et al. 2010). With Kenya’s legal framework
awash with stiff and more protectionist regulations, the survivability of partnerships
modeled on wildlife conservation face enormous durability challenges. Partnerships may
seem stable at initiation but can be vulnerable during the incubation and formalization
phases when partners are developing task boundaries, estimating scalability of intended
interventions, and projecting the benefits of collective action. The Forum did not escape
this fragile context. For example, some members joined the forum with grand
expectations and intentions of maximizing opportunities from the wildlife-cropping
program. They, therefore, only extended their participation based on anticipated benefits
from future rewards-based programs.
Secondly, it is important to note that from the perspective of power, elites are not
usually accustomed to or would not usually support power-restructuring projects which
imbalance or threaten the status quo that is in their favor. During the Forum’s progressive
development and formalization, game cropping was a critical power-sharing scheme in its
own terms. However, it did not allow extensive power imbalance. If at all, it transformed
wildlife resources into a commodity. Tentatively, the Forum had to organize in order to
survive and remain relevant as an associational platform. The level of local elite support
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during the organization phase is as a mixture of activism and ambivalence. This was
particularly so right after the ban on wildlife cropping.
Elite support for co-management during this phase was manifested in their
support and coordination of constellations that organized agendas and mobilized
resources for the Forum’s institutionalization. This support was anchored on a wellintegrated local elite coalition mostly confined within and led by the large ranching
coalition (see, for example, Gallmann n.d;,Georgiadis 2007), occasionally but tightly
interconnected to a second cohort, the tribal-communal elites. The ranching elite were the
core and the most vocal basis for co-management support. This group constructed and
commandeered a vision of an association designed to include local communities in comanagement. Thus, the Forum did not have to endure the threat of inimical fractious
disruptions from conflicts among elites , the outcome of which was a platform ripe for
collaboration.
There are two implications for community empowerment. An empowermentfriendly platform sprouted because the elite power base(s) organizing collaboration were
in consensus over the goals of the association. Degraf (1983) argues that elite capacity to
concur on essential programs is a requisite condition for successful outcomes of a
program intervention. The dispensation afforded by the wildlife cropping directive which
mandated associational initiative prior to granting of wildlife utilization rights equally
facilitated a platform amenable to agreement along a coherent purpose. This produced a
less alienated community as well. An additional effect was the fact that the influence of
political society was, compared to that of the economic society, minimized because the
latter was larger, more proactive, organized and vigilant. This attribute describes crucial
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political-economy interpretations presenting and linking elites to program
implementation. Admittedly, Graf’s argument about the influence of elite formations and
behavior once again suffice. In the case of the Forum, the organizing elite coalition was
what I would refer to as an “autonomous stratum” (borrowed from Graf 1983). The weak
presence by the statist-bureaucratic elites in the initiation and organization of comanagement structures served to spare the Forum of unwarranted and extensive
interference by this group. This allowed for a platform for a pro-conservation and proinclusive system.
Elite activism supported the devolution of wildlife management despite the fact
that local communities also stood to gain from the change in policy.118 Despite the
wildlife-cropping program’s unprofitability (Elliot and Mwangi 1997b, 1998, NortonsGriffith 2007, Mailu et al.,2010), many elites continued to participate. However, when
the profits linked to the wildlife-cropping program began to wane significantly, there
were intensified calls by the same elites for more expansive usufruct rights to wildlife
resources. There was an obvious awareness among all partners and Laikipians in general
that the government would be less willing to institute any measure that extends these
rights. However, elites resorted to aggressive calls for radical changes in the wildlifecropping program. Their specific goal was to exert pressure on the government to
increase the quota limits on wildlife cropping. This not only threatened the continuity of
the program that had supported communities’ livelihood base (and would have continued
to enhance a path to effective benefit-sharing programs); it also set the basis for the ban
on wildlife cropping. Communities were better with than without access rights that the
wildlife-cropping program had provided.
118

See the next few sections in this chapter.
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In this context, understanding the evolution and structure of elite support and/or
interests matters. These events attest to the fact that elites’ parochial interests are a
ubiquitous element of co-management program implementation. In other words, one
interpretation is that elite support for co-management was only a pedestal on which they
could bargain and secure additional privileges for wildlife utilization rights from the
state. This demeanor of elites was camouflaged during the initiation of the Forum.
However, during the Forum’s formalization, it became clear that to elites, wildlife
conservation mattered, but profits did mattered more. It is not surprising that when
intense pressure for increase in cropping quotas and extension of user rights (i.e., around
2002-2003), Laikipia was one of the most concentrated sites of activism in the country.119
The main impetus actually came from ardent elite pro-cropping policy entrepreneurs such
as G.G. Kariuki. He was the parliamentarian behind Kenya’s famous Wildlife Bill
introduced in parliament in 2004.120
An additional form of support from elites was their role in framing issues for the
Forum’s organizational values. Framing is a strategic tool that elites can use to steer or
sabotage co-management because as a group, they have vast resources and influence at
their disposal. It is usually the case that elites will be supporters or saboteurs depending
on how participatory programs serve their interests. The legal context (i.e., which was
supportive of wildlife cropping) at initiation and prior to the Forum’s formal inception
119

It is important to note that it was not only in Laikipia that the pressure on the state to increase wildlife
cropping quotas and user rights was taking shape. These claims were gaining traction across the regions in
which the program was implemented.
120
Geoffrey Gitahi Kariuki, famously known as G.G., Kariuki was the first Member of Parliament for
Laikipia County. This was at the onset of independence in 1963. He is one of Kenya’s longest serving
politicians and the current senator for Laikipia County. According to biographical accounts by Nyambura et
al. (2013), G.G Kariuki is credited as one of the prominent Laikipia political elites who worked to cement
better inter-group relations in Laikipia. But according to GG Kariuki, championing the claims for
increasing quotas was going to benefit all Laikipians, again, with great awareness that the state was not
going to succumb to these pressures.
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greatly shaped associational activism within Laikipia. In other words, it created a
supportive elite cohort. The legal platform had a major role in determining elite roles.
The model demanded by the KWS wildlife cropping directive “guided” (or incentivized)
elite efforts toward inclusion and “public spirited” roles. For example, elite framing of
access to user rights for wildlife resources as a compensation issue helped to draw
community involvement. Elites were vocal in informing local stakeholders on how to
value and voice concerns about costs.
This opportunity may have facilitated community capacity through the extension
of arenas of participation, negotiation, and consultation. Elite framing equally attracted
sentiments that ended up rallying previously reluctant groups to support the program. In
some respects, elite accentuation of the conservation as a cost also served the purpose of
linking conservation burdens of not just elites, but also of the local landowners. This spelt
the formal beginning of the Forum and an endorsement of the view that local
communities had rights to access and to decision making. Finally, in contrast to the
initiation phase, elites openly supported benefit sharing because they needed to protect
their interests. The landed ranching elites continued to be the key facilitators, and
advocates of associationalism.
At the peak of time when the Forum was gathering momentum, the government
terminated the wildlife-cropping program. The findings of a government commissioned
Report by Tasha Bio-services Limited presented evidence of the program’s negative
impact on Kenya’s wildlife. This report and other studies offer conflicting suggestions
about the real causes that led to the suspension and eventual banning of the game
cropping program in 2003. The wildlife anti-cropping coalition in Kenya argues, with
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backup from the Tasha report, that cropping contributed to declines rather than increases
in wildlife numbers and especially of herbivores (Mbaria 2003, Wamithi and Goodall
2003, Redfern 2003). In some reports, Laikipia was a leading bush meat hotspot (Mwenja
2009). 121
The leading advocate and an anti-cropping movement leader, Josphat Ngonyo,
has recently clarified in a strong lambaste directed at pro-croppers that the reasons why
the wildlife cropping program was disbanded was because many operators abused the
quota limits (The Daily Nation: September 18, 2013).122 Ngonyo further insisted that
reports on wildlife abundance numbers were “driven by economic interest, and especially
when landowners gave exaggerated figures of wildlife abundance.”123 He further added,
“…some croppers resorted to poaching to meet market demand after exhausting their
quotas”. His claims about skewed access to benefits was based on his argument that
large landowners cropped and benefited more than small land owners and the latter group
was arrested for hunting non-threatened species. According to Animal People Online
(2003), this biases heightened animosity between landowners and communities.124 These
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Bushmeat is herein defined as “wildlife harvested using illegal hunting methods, from endangered or
threatened species, taken from PAs, and /or taken for unsustainable commercial or non-commercial uses
(BCTF 2008, cited in Mwenja 2008). It may also denote “meat from wild animals that have been hunted
illegally, which aside from being used for personal consumption, is often sold commercially” (Balme et al.
2012: 3).
122
Ngonyo is a co-founder of an organization called Youth for Conservation.
123
This is according to the Washington-based Animal People Online, which quote him in their report titled
“Bush Policy and bushmeat” for October 2003. It is found at
http://www.animalpeoplenews.org/03/10/bushmeat10.03.html.
124
But the pro-wildlife group dismisses these allegations and claims made by Ngonyo and his group. Some
experts provide region-specific accounts citing,for example, that over-harvesting played a little role in the
declines of wild herbivores in Laikipia (Georgiadis et al. 2007). Other studies provide a host of reasons
such as the fact that the scale of quotas was set very low - at a 15% scale - and then reduced later; the
stigmatization of the bush meat trade in the conservation policy arena (Nasi et al. 2008: 38). An
exceedingly restrictive regime with tight regulations (Nortons-Griffith 2007), rising opportunity costs
(Elliot and Mwangi 1997a, 1997b 1998), the program’s unprofitability to ranchers (ibid); leakage effects,
and a presence of a large black market which increased demand for illegal bush meat and thus negatively
impacted positive aspects of the program (Ngonyo 2003). Finally, as an inadequate policy framework, its
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arguments uphold the caution fronted by some proponents of devolution about outcomes
of legal reforms concerning how they best serve the interests of the bearers of the burden
of conservation. They echo the concerns that even major reforms, which devolve wildlife
management rarely translate into full enfranchisement of local populations (Ngeta 2007,
2010). In fact, it may further exacerbate disenfranchisement from local resources as
communities incorporate into the extended ecosystem services market structures
(Brockington et al. 2008).
After the ban, the partnership’s viability was uncertain as the raison d’être for its
status and its incentive anchor mechanism was off the shelf.125 In the wake of this ban,
the absence of a strong incentive presented an obvious potential stalemate to further
MCPP organization. In fact, there was an exodus out of the Forum by many members
(Gitonga 2011). It is not unusual for members to exit from a group or collaborative
program when the incentives diminish or are eliminated (Olson 1965). However, this
exit did not significantly affect the organizational base of the Forum (Sundaresan and
Riginos 2010). After the ban came a stronger and resilient MCPP. Because a section of
the elite pro-cropping coalition remained in the partnership and because this coalition’s
non-cropping interests had strongly permeated the Forum’s operational mantra, its
presence and contentment was central to the Forum’s influence and durability as a
partnership. With the ban on cropping, its leadership acted strategically. The Forum’s
unexpected durability is best interpreted as a path dependent outcome of earlier efforts in
failures linked to its inability “to halt and reverse the decline in bush meat have tended to be driven by
conservation rather than development agendas (DFID 2002, 32).
125
Many ranchers and business ventures anticipate the resumption of wildlife cropping as this issue was reintroduced to the current Wildlife Bill of 2013. However, many anti-cropping coalitions are emerging and
contesting the introduction of this section as it was not in the original bill (of 2007) which was
consultatively prepared by the broader and representative wildlife constituency in the country. Some anticropping groups have occasionally labeled the Laikipia Wildlife Forum as pro-hunting coalition.
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designing a strong, stable and a cohesive network of landowners and local partners. The
Forum remobilized and nurtured a new espirit de corps to keep the intentions and
inspirations of its founders intact. It built new momentum around new but related
objectives.
3.2.3: Organization as tapping of community capacity
The organization phase is integral to capacity building of community
organizations because their engagement builds their abilities as negotiators and decisionmakers. Additionally, this is the phase in which partners’ resources are needed and are
expended for problem solving, including planning and initial project implementation. The
challenge of building capacity in was the stark reality of engaging unstructured, delicate,
distant, and apathetic communities. Of course, the scale of this problem varied from
community to community and from project to project. These issues posed major costs for
co-management initiators and organizers.
However, whereas the initiation phase and the early organization phase of the
Forum saw a poorly organized community, by the time the Forum was fully formalized,
the Northern Rangeland Trust-NRT had been established. This organization sprouted
under fewer constraints than would an ordinary co-management organization in the
country. The favorable legal and socio-political context bolstered mobilization and
internal organization of the community’s disjointed units. Additionally, despite its initial
fragmented organizational apparatus, the participation of local community generated
resources that helped to create a relatively modest and effective leadership within the
NRT. These strategies consisted principally of intra-community alliance building, crosssectoral, and cross institutional networking, and intensive member recruitment.
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Gradually, with the organization’s heightened role within the Forum, it was able to
strengthen its internal capacity. The level of effectiveness is its ability to attract a large
and committed community membership base and enhance self-organization from scratch
within the Forum’s institutional base. Both the municipal and private sector partners
offered support.
The great strength of the Forum was that its structures were designed to build both
the capacity of the MCPP’s operative organs and its client community organizations in a
relatively simultaneous process, at least during this phase. This is because community
organizations were prime structures for project implementation. Unlike during the
initiation phase when capacity building occurred through efforts in forming cooperative
relationships, this phase embarked on interventions that built both relationships and
abilities. While communities gained formal institutionalized entry into decision making
(via consultation and representation) during the initiation phase, the organization phase
allowed them into the arena as legitimate partners in decision-making. Community
representation and participation substantively involved electing and selecting delegates
for various positions in the Forum’s board, committees, village level forums, and in
implementing co-management. The fundamental assumption of the Forum’s leadership
about community participation rested on belief that community ownership of projects and
programs was a more practical and effective tool for delivering intended outcomes for
conservation (Laikipia Wildlife forum 2004). The Forum’s leadership delegated
supervisory roles to its departments and especially those that were linked to community
village forums and resource user associations.
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3.3: Consolidation (2005 to date)
3.3.1: Institutionalizing power sharing through proactive collective participation
The Forum ideally displays the features of a consolidated partnership. Its
consolidation is a product of its internal evolution and external changes within and
outside Laikipia. Member resource commitments have continued to fortify its decisionmaking structures and organizational development. Its extensively specialized
governance structure (as described in its organization and interactions) is telling of this
process. The Forum’s consolidation benefitted from the promulgation of the
Environmental Management and Coordination Act of 1999, the formal ban on the game
cropping program, and its designation as one of beneficiary implementers of USAID’s
CORE and COBRA programs. With its strong organizational base, the partnership has
been able to exploit avenues for accessing resources, advocating for and implementing
policy changes, and expanding its network base. This consolidative ability is exhibited in
multiple ways. First, collaboration within the Forum has historically been viewed and
applied from the prism of adjoining partner mandate, effort, and benefit sharing, in
essence collective empowerment. This process created a sense of symbolic unity rather
than a sense of alienation. Second, its projects were designed to help lower transaction
costs for members and non-members who were in need of buying and supplying
ecosystem services. Concomitantly, its institutional resources have been indispensable at
furnishing its organizational stability.
Despite the termination of the wildlife-cropping program, the Forum continued to
scale up participation in other co-management programs and policy advocacy. For
example, it increased its institutional entrepreneurial orientation by scaling-up operations,
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initiating new add-on programs, and expanding its role in national policy making for
protected areas. This saw its active entry into bio-enterprise sectors. Thus, the Forum
transformed from an overwhelmingly single-focused collaborative system into a fully
formed multi-purpose entity addressing crosscutting and related environmental and
livelihood diversification programs. The current membership is relatively diverse and
comprises of about 36 large-scale ranches, 47 community groups, 50 tour operators, 54
individuals, and 8 interest groups (KWS Strategic Plan 2012: 41).
The Forum’s revenue base anchors on a diverse, dense, and committed
membership. Its ability to operate with autonomy and independence from donors is
telling of its stable financial base and support. Additionally, four major lock-in elements
aid in facilitating consolidation and power sharing in co-management. These are
forumness, fiscal independence, functional specialization, and flexibility. According to
the partnership’s leadership, forumness entails the “act of bringing people together to
work on matters relevant to the organization’s purpose, defining common goals and
pooling resources” (Laikipia Wildlife Forum Director’s Report 2011). Inclusiveness and
representativeness are the principle bases for the Forum’s grand strategy. Both help in
enhancing its mobilization strategy and in locating and marshaling resources from its
members’ and prospective collaborators.
In as far as fiscal independence is concerned, the long-term goal of the Forum has
been to secure sustainable institutions and resources for the preservation and provision of
ecosystem goods and services. Mobilization of resources continues to be a core activity
of the partnership. Its strategy for securing financial resources has focused on two tools
that are unique to its identity. It allows open membership, and it has deliberately assumed
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an apolitical character concerning membership, mobilization, and contracting processes
of its multifarious projects. In terms of functional specialization, the Forum is a highly
specialized MCPP. It exhibits a high level of modularity and subsidiarity.
Modularity is an operational strategy in which collaboration processes decompose a
specific activity into various subsets of inter-related programs and processes (Granovetter
1973). Scaling-up and mainstreaming tools usually inform the Forum’s modular
structuring of partnership programs. The Forum’s embrace of modularity is its eight
thematic programs that are coordinated as autonomous centerpieces of operations.
Subsidiarity is enshrined in the belief and practice that activities, effectively managed by
communities or grassroots institutions, be devolved to the respective institutions. Finally,
regarding organizational flexibility, it is the partnership’s interest to allow flexibility in
programs as a way to increase effectiveness. Flexibility is both an organizational and
operational attribute (IUCN 2000, Sherry and Fondhal 2003). Flexibility is interwoven in
normative and strategic ideals. The Forum operates as a learning organization by
adjusting its activities in accordance with changes in its external environment.
Partnership activities are tailored toward flexible approaches that rely on learning tools
rather than a blueprint approach. This allows for locally appropriate and sustained CBO
and community engagement.
3.3.2: Elites envisioning of natural paradise as collective patrimony126
Without the committed assistance of elites and their role as the real torch bearers
of the Forum’s purpose, its evolution and maturity would not be as stable. In their quest
to design a system of collective patrimony that could benefit Laikipians, elites continued
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This is in special reference to the fact that elites saw wildlife usufruct rights as legally entitled benefits
and a collective estate for the Forum’s members.
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to act as policy advocates for the entire region. Until December 2013 when the Wildlife
Act was ratified, elite coalitions continued to lobby for and persistently advocated for a
change in the legal regime that governs wildlife management in Kenya. They demanded
the inclusion of an effective system that is sensitive to and rewards community efforts in
conservation. Policy entrepreneurship and advocacy efforts by prominent Laikipia elites
such as G.G. Kariuki, the late Dr. King of Laikipia Wildlife Forum, Kuki Gallmann, and
former National Assembly speaker Francis Ole Kaparo have provided extensive impetus
for Laikipia’s interest in national wildlife discourse. They have continued to strengthen
the ideals of the Forum beyond the local grid by introducing bills in parliament,
questioning the legal framework governing the sector, promoting incentives for
collaboration among diverse Laikipians, marketing and branding Laikipia’s ecosystem
products, and mobilizing funds for the MCPP. For example, it is elite effort that enabled
it to conduct successful cooptation strategies for increasing membership support for its
co-management They are a key group of participants in the coalition that proposed
changes in weak sections of wildlife policy. A representative group was recently involved
in the preparation of the Laikipia County strategy for devolved governance.
3.3.3: Co-evolving capacity: Community organization and negotiated access to
resources
The Northern Rangelands Trust has attained a conspicuously visible presence
within the Forum and is a more stable and enduring organization. To be sure, it is not a
partner on the periphery in terms of decision-making. More importantly, it is a peak
organization for managing community organizations in Lakipia and Samburu regions. Its
effectiveness is equally reflected in its ability and roles in articulation and aggregation of
community interests all over Lakipia and Samburu. For example, it has been at the
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forefront in helping coordinate the program support and mobilizing groups to organize
and establish resource forest, water, and wildlife user associations and bio-enterprises.
With only few instances of sporadic conflicts, it has the advantage of exploiting extensive
economies of scale associated with resources availed by a fairly well coordinated
collective action. Its leadership has attempted to establish good working relationship with
elites and private sector partners and helped preserve organizational identity.
Additionally, community empowerment has been institutionalized through annual
capacity development initiatives which work with about 40-50 community conservation
groups in matters related to management planning, conflict resolution, and fundraising.
The Forum’s laudable effort in facilitating the first known, region-wide, institutionalized
fiscal infrastructure for emerging community projects and programs has attracted more
donor funding and has transformed Laikipia into an investor-friendly attraction node. The
Forum continues to act as a medium through which communities voice their concerns.
A final exegesis of MCPP-mediated changes in power asymmetries is exhibited in
institutional formations and a more favorable context for consolidation. First, unlike its
counterparts in the Mara and the Amboseli which operate within public protected area
landscape, the Forum faces fewer constraints in mobilizing and committing resources for
community based interventions. A second related factor is that the Forum’s structure
escapes the challenges that come with the (re)centralization (as in the Mara) and
externalization of MCPP activities (as in the Amboseli). This is because its core
operations are functionally separate from dominant operations of the state agencies such
as KWS and NEMA.
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Laikipia is largely constituted of a large complex of private protected area, and its
municipal partners have a weak influence compared to those in Narok, Trans Mara,
Kajiado and Loitoktok that house the Mara and the Amboseli eco-complexes. These
structures have a direct impact on decision-making. Comparatively, the Forum faces less
interference from state-affiliated political entities and elites while CBOs have extensive
legitimate arenas of participation and face fewer threats to cooptation. These
inconsistencies serve to illustrate the continued misgivings by proponents of participation
about the real influence that collaborative platforms play in changing power asymmetries.
4: Collaboration proper: The Il Ngwesi Eco-lodge as a case study
This section analyzes collaboration at the project level. An analysis of MCPPmediated Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) projects better captures how incentives
are packaged and the kind of craftsmanship behind MCPP-mediated innovations. This
kind of analysis also sheds more light into the constitutive incentives that lead to
beneficial outcomes for community organizations. Projects outcome analysis will rely on
the design school of PES, which will help provide tools for examining the transformative
potential of the Il Ngwesi project.
4.1: History of the PES project
II Ngwesi is a Maa language term that means people of wildlife. The lodge is a
venture that was set up to enhance conservation and provide an alternative livelihood
support base for the local Maasai’s transhumant and agro-pastoral society. The Il Ngwesi
Eco-Lodge127 is an ecotourism project situated within the Laikipia Plateau National Park.
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The lodge goes by various titles such as the Il Ngwesi lodge, eco-lodge, conservancy, sanctuary, and
Group Ranch. All these are terminologies that signify different governance processes inherent in the
management of the landscape at Il Ngwesi. They also pose varied implications for community management
vis a vis the existing legal framework for governance. For example, conservancies did not have a legal
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The lodge is under collective ownership by about 550 households of the Il Ngwesi Group
Ranch (FAO 2013). It is located at the Il Ngwesi Group Ranch which is about 200 square
kilometers (20,000 hectares or 48,000 acres) of acacia grassland. The II Ngwesi is a
conservancy and can, according to IUCN’s taxa, be classified as an Indigenous and
Community Conserved Area (ICCA) under Category II and V. The lodge emerged as an
eco-venture within the context of a growing recognition that ICCAs had a role in helping
incentivize wildlife conservation in Kenya (Nelson et al. 2007, Nelson 2012). The Il
Ngwesi Group Ranch and Lewa Wildlife Conservancy established it. While the start up
negotiations with Il Ngwesi community were spearheaded by Lewa, (which is a member
of the Forum), other actors such as the African Wildlife Foundation, the Kenya Wildlife
Service, and USAID provided various types of resources that sustained the negotiation
process and eventual implementation of co-management.
One of the major forces behind the Il Ngwesi’s initial implementation occurred
through funding under USAID’s Conservation of Biodiverse Resource Areas (COBRA)
program that initiated in 1992 and terminated in 1998. Laikipia was a focal area for
wildlife and was a priority region needing support in order to buttress conservation
efforts. The second related initiative building on COBRA was another USAID program,
the Conservation of Resources through Enterprise (CORE) which was initiated in 1998
and terminated in 2004. The key aim of CORE was to provide financial support as an
incentive for landowners in areas contiguous to protected areas. Il Ngwesi became a
direct beneficiary of both. The COBRA components were implemented and given
additional support from African Wildlife Foundation and KWS. Other complementary

status before the December 2013 Wildlife Act yet group ranches have had both a legal basis and status. The
former serves an ecological purpose, the latter serves as sociological and administration purpose.
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donors included Liz Claiborne and Art Ortenbury Foundation. The Il Ngwesi community
received Ksh. 10,000,000 of initial capital through the African Wildlife Foundation
(Ramser 2007, 42). With help from Lewa, KWS, and USAID, the Il Ngwesi community
established the first community-owned lodge in the country in 1996.
The key process that catalyzed the initiation of the lodge was the negotiated talks
between the Il Ngwesi community and a neighboring business venture called Lewa
Downs (Lewa in short, see subsequent sections). Later on, the Borana Ranch, which is
another private venture, became part of these negotiations as well. Representatives from
these businesses approached and proposed that the community establish a formal group
ranch and later set aside some land for the lodge and a conservation area. 128 Lewa and Il
Ngwesi were at the time in possession of different resources. Lewa had financial
resources to expend for the initiative that Il Ngwesi Group Ranch lacked though the Il
Ngwesi was in possession of land and human resources (Lewa n.d., UNDP 2002).
4.2: Operability of the project
The demand for ecosystem services for recreation and biodiversity conservation
set the basis for MCPP activities within the Il Ngwesi group ranch. The establishment of
the eco-lodge was based on a clear demand for ecosystem services. As previously
discussed, its origins are based on the dual goals of conserving biodiversity and enabling
the community to exploit lucrative tourism venture operations through an ecotoursim
project with a goal of enhancing the local asset base. Buyers of ecosystem services and
intermediaries such as the Laikipia Wildlife Forum were also interested in ecosystem
services that would help conserve the endangered, endemic, and endeared species
128

This was occurring against the backdrop of an increasing sub-division and parcelation of communal
group lands which was prompted by poor governance within the group ranches, among other factors. The
lure for sub-division of more lucrative land tenural options (See Mwangi 2007, Mwangi and Ostrom 2009).
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existing in the Ewaso ecosystem. These buyers, and particularly private ventures such
Lewa saw the potential of the Il Ngwesi landscape in supporting and restoring these
species.129 The PES modalities that governed the establishment of the eco-lodge are
under the biodiversity protection category that emphasizes the restoration of rangeland
for ecosystem stability and sustainability.
Lewa (and later Borana Ranch) saw an opportunity to engage in a business
venture. Negotiations were facilitated by KWS and feasibility studies followed in order to
establish the potential of land in the group ranch. Lewa is a conservancy that operates as
a business trust privately owned by the Ian Craig family. For Lewa, there was need to
sustain its business venture which was threatened by lack of space for its vast but
threatened wildlife. The elephant population was growing, but the area could not support
the herd. The demand for water, land, and safety led Lewa’s owners to approach Il
Ngwesi and negotiate for additional space. A related basis for the establishment of the
lodge was an historical nightmare and ecological problem, basically, dwindling wildlife
numbers. Estimated figures indicate that more than half of the rhino population had been
poached between 1970 and 1980.
The key Il Ngwesi community CBO transacting the contract was the Group Ranch
Management Committee (GRC). In 1996, the Il Ngwesi community established a
Community Conserved Area (CCA) under acreage of 9471 hectares (Northern Rangeland
Trust n.d.). In this case, Lewa (and Borana ranch) became the major private buyers of
ecosystem services, key founders, and financiers of Il Ngwesi Conservancy. The Forum,
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According to Wunder (2008), there are usually two reasons why buyers would be interested in markets
for biodiversity conservation: 1) they house rare and endangered species in their ecosystems and 2) they are
usually in excellent condition or have the high potential to act as ecosystem service (ES) pools. Il Ngwesi
fulfiled both conditions.
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through its Tourism Sector Support Program made a phased entry into the
implementation process of the PES project assuming dual roles of a buyer and an
intermediary. The Forum immediately took over the roles of supporting and facilitating
marketing transactions and capacity building for Il Ngwesi. Lodge operations are and
have been supported by other investors and intermediaries as well. The contract
transacted for the operations of Il Ngwesi Eco-Lodge initiated one of the few formally
recognized PES projects in Kenya (Mutunga and Mwangi 2006, Swallow and Yatich
2006, Swallow et al. 2007, Thaxton 2007, Tallis et al. 2008, Katoomba Group 2008,
2009, Sundaresan and Riginos 2010, Birner and Osano 2012).130 The lodge was
established as a voluntary transaction aiming to increase the benefit streams from
protection of a rangeland ecosystem and appropriation of services at Il Ngwesi. The
contract conditionality links onto several features of planned community management of
the eco-venture. As a conservancy, the II Ngwesi Group Ranch serves several purposes
including the provision habitat, migration corridors, and refugia for wildlife, among other
ecosystem products and services.
Accordingly, the Il Ngwesi group ranch is demarcated, encompassing a settlement
area and a conservation area. The latter constitutes a core area and a buffer zone. The
lodge is located in the core area. There is limited activity allowed in the conservation
area. The core area has a radius of 5km.square while the buffer area totals 6,000 ha
(Northern Rangeland Trust 2007a). The conservation area was designed to preserve the
dwindling and endangered Grevy’s zebra, wild dogs, elephants, and rhino, among other
endemic and endangered species. Most of the wildlife clusters around this ecosystem are
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A majority of these studies are descriptive and classificatory reports on emerging PES projects in
Kenya.
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IUCN Red List species. Il Ngwesi community is the ecosystem service provider
compensated for conservation activities needed by buyers and beneficiaries. There is an
implicit assumption about risk sharing between the community and Lewa (the private
sector) though some analysts have described this arrangement as a weak regime that
disadvantages Il Ngwesi more than its private partners.
4.3: Efficiency of MCPP-mediated empowerment
4.3.1: Property rights framework
The Il Ngwesi ecotourism venture is a PES project set on a land tenure system
that is protective of full community rights to land ownership. 131 Il Ngwesi is an exhibit
of a rewards-based PES design, which strengthens the argument that effective PES
contracts are usually anchored on group contracts (see for example, Kerr 2010b) where a
platform for community management and collective effort exists. The Il Ngwesi
community has full ownership of the land and the conservation area including the
management rights over these areas. The land is under a communal title and thus the
ownership of the facility is by Il Ngwesi Group Ranch members. The Il Ngwesi Lodge is
the first formal community-owned and community managed ecotourism facility in the
country. The community, through its CBO, the Il Ngwesi Trust, fully manages the lodge
facility. It is also one of the most famous and successful eco-lodges in Africa (ESOK
2013, WTA 2013).132 The community manages wildlife resources with support from the
Forum, Lewa, Northern Rangelands Trust and KWS. The Il Ngwesi manages all the
payments accrued from the venture. The company makes all resource allocation decisions
131

The group ranch is also supported within the provisions of the Group Lands Representative Act (CAP
287 of 1968) while the protection of wildlife falls under the Wildlife Act. These two statutes, EMCA, and
other municipal by laws provide complementary regulatory basis for PES enforcement.
132
Hereby, Ecotourism Society of Kenya and the World Tourism Association (the latter, an Africa
affiliate).
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and whose activities are monitored through annual meetings and inter-committee forum
deliberations. The community and Lewa share the risks of wildlife management. The
Forum has always stepped in as an ancillary institution.
4.3.2: Payments and rewards framework
The Il Ngwesi lodge is Africa’s top performing eco-lodge (WTA 2013) in terms
of empowering and enhancing sustainable land use practices (Harrison 2001, UNDP
2002, Ramser 2007, Said 2010, ESOK 2013). In this collaborative setting, both the Group
Ranch Committee which is the administrative arm of the group ranch and Lewa are
bound by the contract. Benefits for the the Il Ngwesi board, and its affiliate institutions
are pegged on performance criteria and are usually “effort based payments” (see OECD
2010: 3, 2013: 62.). The aim is conservation of local biodiversity by keeping its capacity
intact and secure. The lodge is the ecotourism enterprise that provides financial earnings
while the conservation area is the locus for enhancing, preserving, and nurturing
ecosystem services. Payments are accrued by conserving 80% of community rangeland
through the restoration of range, grass banks and pasture (ESOK 2013, NRT 2013). The
Il Ngwesi Board runs the lodge while the Il Ngwesi Community Trust runs the
conservation zone. Administrative activities across the landscape are mutually
interconnected, and the committees usually work as core teams in all conservation
programs and projects. Payments for ecosystem services directly go to the community,
specifically to the Il Ngwesi Trust, through the user fees charged by the lodge and other
payment models in an affiliate project called the Rangeland Restoration Program. For the
lodge to operate efficiently and provide optimal benefits to the community, the Il Ngwesi
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board for the group ranch with assistance from the Forum has had to organize the
community to undertake the following activities:
•

Organize into cohesive structures which can be tapped for collective
action and for managing biodiversity,

•

Establish a Community Conserved Area with a core and buffer zone by
demarcating and designating land according to conservation and
subsistence metrics

•

Establish a dispersal area available for endeared, endangered and endemic
species,

•

Manage controlled grazing and practice sustainable herding,

•

Monitor ecosystem resources of interest (locate, identify, and assess
wildlife and biomass characteristics and conditions), and

•

Engage its members in community monitoring and wildlife security
provisions.

The agreement also places responsibility on community institutions to be proactive in
monitoring wildlife health and security through the Forum’s Range Security Program that
provides information on poaching, injured animals, grazing practices, and illegal logging.
The process of community monitoring convenes through the Scouts Monitoring Program
(AU/ UNEP/GEF 2008) which is a more cost effective way of wildlife and habitat
monitoring as these scouts are usually drawn from the Il Ngwesi community. The scouts
are employed as staff and/or volunteers who assist in basic data collection, enumeration,
and inventory maintenance of data pools.
There are crucial CBOs, and specifically committees, which coordinate
community members and enforce land use practices. Management and monitoring is via a
dual system of administration within the conservancy and the settlement area. The Group
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Ranch Committee (GRC) 133 is the core administrative unit of the community. Its role is
facilitated through support from additional committees that exist as permanent units or
have been established out of this project’s role in the conservation area. The Forum has
played a role in nurturing, organizing, and sustaining a number of these committees by
supporting the formal ones and establishing or supporting ad hoc committees. The
management of the lodge is a model of committee structures. These are the committees:
•

The community trust committee (also the natural resource
management committee) - which is responsible for land and income
management (through the Il Ngwesi Company),

•

The security committee – which manages the ranch and the rangeland
through its radio operations and state of the art communication
systems,

•

The peace committee – which handle human-wildlife and regular
inter-community conflict resolution processes,

•

The grazing committee – which manages the core area and the buffer
zone and implements grazing by-laws,

•

The finance committee - which is usually established when new
projects are initiated to help manage and coordinate financial aspects
of a given project,

•

The livestock program liaison committee – which works more with the
grazing regime and PES reward system, and

•

The Il Ngwesi marketing committee – which complements livestock
management committee and enforces the grazing regime.

The net effect of delegated management and, by design, community ownership compared
to the tutelage systems used in the Mara and the Amboseli, is that it enlarges the scope of
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Under Kenya’s legal statutes, the Il Ngwesi lodge operates as a Group Ranch Trust which, in essence,
mandates that its leadership be under a committee called the Group Ranch Committee (provided under the
1968 Group Lands Act).
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incentives that propagate positive responses about the project. By enabling a direct
decision-making role for Il Ngwesi community structures, the project has facilitated both
the procedural and substantive outcomes to trickle down to the community. Procedurally,
democratic governance was implemented, albeit with some shortcomings, compared to
many similar projects across the country. Substantively it has increased effectiveness of
the community institutions to plan and implement an asset building base that expands the
community’s portfolio and reduces its vulnerability and marginalization.
5: Conclusions
The Laikipia Wildlife Forum portrays a case in which co-management programs
enhanced power shifting during inception and formalization of the partnership. However,
the real shifting of power was not sustained during formalization. The program
transferred ownership to a majority of Laikipians only up until early formalization phase.
Additionally, while there are strong proprietary rights regimes that secure land tenure,
only a minority owns most of Laikipia’s land. Amid these, there have been major
attempts at empowering communities to own the process of wildlife management. The
evolution and operations of the Forum indicate that its core programs are designed to
proactively establish contact points with community institutions and to encourage some
level of ownership.
The Forum evolved in an open and consultative process though it was an elite-led
bottom up initiative. Elite support has been crucial in sustaining the core operations of the
MCPP. This mechanism has helped to boost uptake of capacity building interventions for
initiation and implementation of co-managed projects. Otherwise, with years of
experimentation and formalization, the Forum has become a leader in private protected
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area governance. It has facilitated some of the most viable and stable biodiversity
protection projects for endangered species as other reserved areas record declining
statistics. But what structural elements explain these outcomes?
In accounting for the outcomes of MCPP-mediated empowerment, tools from the
three lines of inquiry that informed this study provide only a partial account on why the
Forum was successful in designing community empowerment programs.134 By accounts
of these three approaches, the Forum should have ceased to expand and become stagnate
as an organization after the ban on wildlife cropping program. Additionally, inertia could
have been accentuated by absence of collective action. Participation approaches cannot
project the Forum’s organizational survival with looming (or potential) collective action
problems. Admittedly, based on the tenets from these three approaches, the cost of
maintaining commitment toward the Forum was high considering the fact that wildlife
cropping which was a key incentive to participation was disbanded in 2003. The reverse
occurred; the Forum instead scaled-up its operations and redirected efforts to projects that
eventually increased its resilience and consolidation.
Resource mobilization theory provides insufficient tools to help explicate the
level of elite support as a factor explaining the Forum’s attempts at empowerment. It
focuses on and highlights how elite divisions provide better opportunities for community
organizations to mobilize, exploit, and access avenues for potential empowerment. The
Forum’s experience indicates that elite cohesion is an enabler rather than inhibiter of
community empowerment. If at all, a CBO can also exploit opportunity as long as
partners operate in a setting allowing for strategic coalition building. This also brings to
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These are participatory approaches, resource mobilization theory, and collaborative governance
approaches.
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the fore the issue of concurrence versus confluence of elite and local community
interests. Proponents of collaboration offer inadequate conclusions by presupposing a
confluence of interest between elites and local communities as a key element of resource
sharing and exchange. This is a rare happenstance. It is more realistic to interpret this
interaction as concurrence of interests of these two groups. For example, in the case of
the Forum, partner interest concurrence initiated and formalized the organizational
persona of the partnership. This set a basis for expropriation of benefits from collective
wildlife management.
Additionally, collaborative governance approach insufficiently explains why there
was a major scaling up of pro-community interventions compared to other types of
projects. It cannot fully explicate the source and sustainability of an institutionally
embedded orientation that was immensely supportive of capacity building interventions.
It cannot elaborate why modularity became a design feature of the Forum’s operational
strategy.135 Modularity enabled the partnership to integrate activities of its eight
departments more effectively. In fact, the case of the Forum proves that co-management
has enormous externalities, but that inclusive co-management builds on organizational
economies of scale and scope. A governance approach would not sufficiently elaborate
why elite support was successfully elicited and enlisted in a collaborative effort in which
those elites stood to contribute more resources. Alternatively, while resource mobilization
theory is able to connect collaboration to elite and local community interest concurrency,
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Modularity here simply refers to an organizational configuration in which several discreet units within
the entity are functionally independent but are efficiently connected to each other through interdependence
(Langlois 2000).
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it does not allow for a full analysis of the mechanisms that sustain the Forum’s
partnership base.
More importantly, evidence points to overall effectiveness of MCPP-mediated
empowerment. This depends on two core aspects: 1) the program and project design
aspects, such as the roles for and types of initiators, managers, and contract features and
2) the contextual variables defining the implementation process, such as community
socio-demographic features which include CBO capacity, property rights regimes, and
the existing legal and institutional frameworks. As was previously mentioned, the starting
point for the Forum’s operational success is its astute ability to exploit its organizational
economies of scale through intervention that enable scaling up its operations and
interventions. The main evidence for this is its dual role as a buyer and an intermediary in
PES project implementation.
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CHAPTER 4
THE AMBOSELI BIOSPHERE RESERVE MANAGEMENT PARTNERSHIP
1: Introduction
A given co-management partnership’s evolution and empowerment role are
function of its internal organizational stability and its capacity to address contingencies
from the external environment. The Amboseli Biosphere Reserve Management
Partnership (hereafter, the Amboseli Partnership) can be considered sui generis
concerning the features of its evolution. The Amboseli Partnership is a classic case of
how a partnership poised to be successful at empowering its community nurtured
antagonistic power instead.136 But partnership-mediated empowerment is a factor of its
embeddedness in the radical social and ecological transformations that have occurred in
the Amboseli complex in the past two decades and the status of the complex as a Man
and Biosphere Reserve.
The designation of the Amboseli complex as a biosphere reserve was the first
prima facie evidence of a launch pad of co-management encompassing power sharing
and some level of power shifting. Yet, as will be discussed, the Amboseli Partnership’s
inception in an amenable context did not ensure that its evolutionary trajectory would
continue as a pro-empowerment platform. The partnership’s unstable structure was an
outgrowth of an exclusionary system cemented by a coalition that developed between
136

As already discussed in chapter 3, there are immense positive gains associated with extending
participation to community guardian institutions within MCPP co-management platforms. This is because
participation nurtures various types of power. These are positive/constructive elements of power such as
“constitutive”, “systemic”, “innovative” and “transformative” power (Avelino and Rotmans 2009). Please
refer to Chapter 3, p. 19-20 and footnote 15. However, there are also negative outcomes associated MCPP
platform interactions. Platforms can also nurture destructive “antagonistic power”. Otherwise, Avelino and
Rotmans (2009) define antagonistic power as a situation “when one type of power prevents or resists
another”. See their article titled Power in Transition: An interdisciplinary framework to study power in
relation to structural change, European Journal of Social Theory, p. 553-554.
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powerful state functionaries and the conservation sector. This set a trajectory that
hindered empowerment of its community partner. This chapter will examine the inherent
systemic processes constituted in the partnership’s organizational evolution and growth.
It will then evaluate the features and scope of the opportunity space for the empowerment
availed by the co-management program.
1.1: Favorable antecedents to collaboration in the Amboseli complex
The Amboseli National Park (hereafter, the Amboseli) is a geographic jurisdiction
of one of the zones of the Amboseli Biosphere Reserve (hereafter, Amboseli complex)
which is a UNESCO Man and Biosphere Reserve.137 A proper analysis of the Amboseli
cannot be isolated from this status. The values of biosphere reserves are significant (see,
for example, UNESCO 1999, 2005, 2008). The Amboseli complex achieved this status in
1991. In this setting, the Amboseli and the surrounding ecosystems integrated onto a
137

This is a reserve located within a given protected areas PA’s socio-ecological domain and is accorded
the highest priority for its endowment and support of biodiversity. It is valued as a crucial habitat for
endangered species and considered as laboratory for sustainable development experiments (Ishwaran
2008). Conservation practices operate on a regime developed by the UNESCO Man and Biosphere (MAB)
office.
MABs fall under the soft law instruments of international statutes for biodiversity conservation (Jeffrey
2003). MABs are prototypes of multiple and multilevel environmental governance. They are also one of the
oldest tools for implementing international conventions and as such serve the anchoring role for
implementing treaties such the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD), The RAMSAR Convention, and
Migratory Species Convention (Jeffrey 2003).
Many studies done on application of the program to a particular biodiversity-rich reserve have been
descriptive and at best case studies. Most recently, research is moving toward examining outcomes and
impacts of these initiatives across the various designated geo-spaces of the globe. The first studies done on
MABs mainly described the structure, types, geographical concentration, and the workings of MABs ( for
example, IUCN 1998, UNESCO 1999, 2002). Follow up studies maintain a case study strategy and
descriptive analysis as well (for example, Fernandez-Gonzalez and Aylward 1999; Price 2000, Lu et al.
2003; Croze et al., 2006; Kusova et al. 2008). These are assessments of a given MAB initiative describing
the process for negotiating and designating zones as biosphere reserves. Some recent studies have also
concentrated on analyzing the conceptual undertones and issues behind key themes in MAB programs,
(Ishwaran et al., 2008) and its application to global environmental issue management such as climatic
change (Ishwaran 2008). More recently, scholars specializing in multilevel governance perspectives have
attempted explaining outcomes through intensive explication via qualitative assessments and/or
quantitative assessments (for example, Ostrom 2005, 2009, Pennington 2008), while some have maintained
an analytical perspective (Cole 2011). Most of the findings in these studies allude to the perceived
advantages of the multi- level governance and management systems (Ginnis 2009; Folke et al., 2005,
Berkes and Folkes 1998).

201

pluralistic-cum-polycentric governance system. The complex exhibits a multi-tiered
system that has significant implications for collective action, social and ecological
systems in the region.
Figure 6: A map of the Amboseli Biosphere Reserve

The original biosphere reserve illustrated in Figure 6 encompassed138 “a core
comprising of the Amboseli National forest Park, a buffer comprising of surrounding
group ranches (Olgulului/Olalarashi, Kimana, Eselenkei, and Mbirikani), and a transition
zone comprising of the entire Kajiado district” (Croze et al., 2006). As a biosphere
reserve, the Amboseli complex serves the following functions articulated in the Seville
138

Social and ecological transformations have led to changes in the size of each zone’s acreage.
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Strategy:139 The Strategy articulated 1) a conservation function, 2) an economic
development function, and 3) a research and education function. The first two purposes
embody the - overarching goals of localized approach to planning and management while
the third is recognition of the purposes of the site for scientific learning. UNESCO (2002)
further highlights that these reserves are “living laboratories for testing and
demonstrating integrated management of land, water, and biodiversity”. The biosphere
reserve designation presupposes a collaborative arena for networking and forging of
collective power. While the implementation of mandated rules may not be perfect, Man
and Biosphere Reserve regime operationalization is an option that potential designees are
keen to apply. This is because a candidate region’s designation is incumbent upon
successful implementation of specific provisions, including collaborative and inclusive
governance. This was a critical basis for the evolution of the Amboseli Management
Partnership.
The Amboseli Partnership is a product of dynamic social and ecological changes
in Amboseli Complex. It has its foundational basis on Amboseli complex’s biosphere
reserve status but its immediate evolution is due to the surge in ecosystem threats within
the Amboseli complex.140 Despite its small land size, the Amboseli is the second most
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The Seville Strategy is a compendium of process and program recommendations which establish and
provide legal basis to biosphere reserves via UN’s Resolution 27/C/2.3. The formal initial platform that
designed the Strategy was a UNESCO-led conference in which about 400 country delegates from 102
countries and other experts convened in Seville, Spain in March 20-25, 1995 (UNESCO, n.d). The Strategy
provides a toolkit for developing effective biosphere reserves and enhancing operational effectiveness of
network reserves. While anchored on CBD premises, the Strategy distinctively set a regime that legally and
operationally links conservation and development as intertwined processes. For an elaborate review of the
Strategy, see UNESCO. 1996. Biosphere Reserves: Seville Strategy and the statutory framework of the
World Network. Paris: UNESCO.
140
The Amboseli Partnership is a unique case in which the MCPP’s organizational logic served to impede
the process of constituting a stable institutional infrastructure similar to those of the Forum and the Mara
Conservancy. With this in mind, I chose to describe its recent efforts at managing organizational stability as
the phase of re-organization rather than consolidation per se. The MCPP is in the process of reconstituting
itself after a long stint of inertia. As will be discussed, this element is its consortium-like arrangement,
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visited reserve complex in Kenya (KWS 2012). It, therefore, plays a crucial role in
sustaining the foreign exchange earnings from the services provided by the reserve.
Degradation and the near decimation of wildlife prompted action from the partnership’s
conveners. By PES benchmarks, the Amboseli supports and provides a diverse set of
ecosystem services.141 More importantly, it supports an impressive array of charismatic
species (elephants, lions, rhinoceros, giraffes, cheetahs, zebras, buffalos, wildebeests,
impalas, gazelles, hyena, baboons, bats, and over 400 bird species) attract both tourists
and funding from global conservationists (Dowie 2009, 73). Notwithstanding, its socioecological status has been a key driver of initiatives which seek to introduce new
approaches to reform management systems within the complex. To this end, partnerships
have been a growing trend deemed as solutions to conservation and development
challenges. This set the basis for collaborations such as the Amboseli Partnership.
1.2: Location as context for MCPP
The Amboseli Partnership convenes as a consortium of partners interested in
conserving the Amboseli ecosystem and enhancing the provision of related ecosystem
services. The key interest is supporting sustainable land use practices to protect the three
ecological zones. The Amboseli is located in the Olkejuado County of Rift Valley
province on the north-west side of the famous Mount Kilimanjaro and near the Tanzania
border. It is part of an ecological complex called the Kilimanjaro Heartland. It covers a
land area of 392 km. square (Okello et al. 2008). The government declared it a national
park in 1974. In 2005, the government degazetted it and handed it over to the Olkejuado
County Council. There was a reversal in this order in 2010 after a high court judge ruled
which has served as the operational model implementing MCPP activities. This attribute will be described
in subsequent sections.
141
Please refer back to the chapter 1 for an elaborate description of ecosystem services.
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that the transfer of management was in contravention of the law. The park is currently
under the management of the Kenya Wildlife Service.
Amboseli’s climatology summary would classify it as an arid and semi-arid land
(ASAL) (de Leeuw et al., n.d.). Like the Laikipia and Narok-Trans-Mara circuits, the
surrounding populations are highly vulnerable to extreme climatic conditions and prone
to problems of poverty and food insecurity. Comparatively, the Amboseli complex is
much drier, has lower rainfall, and is a more vulnerable grazing land because it was once
a dust bowl. Immigration, privatization and sedentarization are exacerbating climate
change and further degradation of land. The rainfall pattern in the Amboseli complex is
bi-modal like in most of Kenya. The Amboseli complex has an ecology that shares a top
hot spot status with the Maasai Mara as Kenya protected area systems with the highest
density and diversity of wildlife (Okello 2009). It supports a system with rich avian and
mammalian fauna with more than four hundred and fifty species types respectively
(Nature Kenya 2010). There are local springs served by Mt. Kilimanjaro, swamps, and
grassland that provide various ecosystem products and services for a variety of species.
The Amboseli prides itself as a host to the world’s longest study of elephant behavior and
life history (Elephant Voices n.d. 1).142 The Amboseli hosts endeared and endangered
carnivores such as lions, cheetahs, hyenas, and leopards and ungulates such as zebras and
wildebeest (Murphy 2010).
An ethnically diverse cluster as that of Laikipia populates the Amboseli and its
environs. The Maasai predominantly inhabit it though there are non-Maasai groups from
other parts of Kenya who are largely Kikuyus and members of other tribes such as

142

This is the Amboseli Elephant Research project headed by the renowned American conservationist
Cynthia Moss.
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Kambas, Luos, and Luyias (Wangui 2003) and a small group of tribes from Tanzania
who settled after the privatization movement began. Individuals and group ranche
members own most of the land in the contiguous areas. There are very few Europeans
who lease property within the park and park-adjacent areas. The economy of the
Amboseli complex is predominantly livestock production and agriculture. A large
majority of its population is directly and indirectly reliant on transhumant livelihoods,
agro-pastoralism and eco-tourism. The droughts in 2000 and 2005 increased the scale of
dissolution of many group ranches that led many Maasais in the area to adopt sedentary
livelihoods. However, “only 8% of the district of Kajiado is classified as having some
potential for rainfed agriculture and most of this is …close to Nairobi” (de Leeuw n.d.).
The Amboseli is Kenya’s second highest earning wildlife tourist destination.
Municipalities and local communities earn revenue that supports development programs
and livelihoods. Sand harvesting and mining are other predominant activities in the area.
2: Operation and structure of the MCPP
2.1: Organizational principles and objectives
As previously mentioned, the Amboseli Partnership convenes as a consortium of
partners interested in conserving the Amboseli ecosystem and enhancing the provision of
related ecosystem services. The partners’ aim is to facilitate mechanisms that promote
sustainable land use practices that protect the three ecological zones of the biosphere
reserve. The Amboseli National Park is one of the most important protected areas in
KenyaBecause of its threatened status; the Amboseli Partnership is working to develop
collaborative platforms in order to engage all the critical stakeholders who can help
mitigate these threats. Like any co-management partnership, its additional objectives
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constitute resource mobilization, protection of stakeholder interests, and development of
incentives for conservation, including regulatory and compensatory measures. The key
objectives of the Amboseli Partnership are to:
•

Secure critical wildlife habitat, corridors and connectivity systems

•

Facilitate collective management and monitoring of ecological
dynamics

•

Initiate and enable a platform for establishing and supporting PES
projects

•

Increase partner collaboration in securing community support for
conservation

•

Coordinate and implement mechanisms for improving, supporting and
securing community livelihoods

•

Devise and implement conflict resolution mechanisms in order to
abate the prevalent human-wildlife conflict

•

Provide a vision and support mechanisms for the operationalization of
biosphere reserve regime through the development and
implementation of management plans

2.2: Organizational rules guiding partnership operations
The Amboseli Partnership is a voluntary collaborative platform that allows
stakeholders in the Amboseli complex to source and exchange resources for comanagement (see Figure 7). Its foundational basis stems from two features. First, its
structure is not embodied in any legal code like those of the Forum or Mara Conservancy
which are not-for-profit companies. It is an amalgamation of institutional entities
collaborating to provide a putative anchor for protecting the ecosystem in the Amboseli
complex. Second, the partner entities have a long history of prior contact in collaborative
projects targeting conservation. Due to this history, these entities have always tended to
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co-manage projects combining formal and informal meta-arrangements that do not
necessarily peg collaboration onto any structured institutional palette.
While the Amboseli Partnership exists as an associational forum for implementing
conservation projects, it operates like a nodal consortium that convenes when specific
problems require solutions or opportunities for resource exchange arise. Thus, partners do
not adhere to strict rules that usually formalize participation. Additionally, partnership
rules are applied according to operate as project-specific and program-specific
agreements. In the absence of key collaborative projects that tie partners to any specific
initiative, partners rely on supplementary rules to guide formal and informal organization.
There are however, requirements that partners engaged in specific projects develop
MoUs, agreement plans and action plans, which guide formalized planning and
implementation. Like the Mara Conservancy, the partnership’s organizational culture
embraces a technocratic approach even though it is not the key pillar for guiding program
implementation processes.
2.3: Organizational roles of key decision-makers
The Amboseli Partnership relies heavily on the board to transact and implement
projects.143 The board at the MCPP secretariat is the most important decision making unit
within the partnership. This board constitutes a team that reflects the local social,
administrative, and geographic representation of Amboseli and operates around the
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The Amboseli Partnership has a core board for the consortium that unites the stakeholders and partners
that manage the Amboseli ecosystem. It is an amalgam of several consortia units constituted by diverse
membership structures convened by the MCPP. A consortium is initiated when different actors come
together to establish an entity constituted by a single point of contracting (Coulson 2012), in other words
signig agreements. Herein, is the MCPP secretariat. This is despite the fact that its members have a solid
independent base and/or interactions with other consortium members. The focal point of contracting exists
despite members’ independence and interdependent relations.
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salient issues at hand. Related subsidiary boards operating hierarchically below
secretariat do not usually reflect diversity or representativeness.
The overall board is comprised of members representing the central and local
government, members from the Maasai people, and other stakeholders in the wildlife,
forest, and wetlands sector who can provide skills and expertise in protected area
management. The board selection process is usually more rigorous compared to its
counterparts due to the custodial role of Kenya Wildlife Service and frequent
politicization. The partnership’s core board composition is also much larger than those of
the other two cases are. The board is a major policy making decision unit. It reviews and
approves MCPP management plans, supports the executive and other departments in
project coordination and implementation, coordinates resource mobilization, and
negotiates lease agreements. The board is accountable to its members but the level of
involvement of governmental functionaries is higher than in Laikipia and the Mara
complexes.
The Amboseli Partnership is a unique type of partnership in that it has multiple
secretariat units linked to each other but weaker than the MCPP secretariat. Its neartechnocratic orientation is a reason why the core secretariat unit is stationed at the
municipal-KWS office in Olkejuado. Similarly, this unit acts in consort with subsidiaries
at the municipality of Loitoktok, at the African Conservation Center (in conjunction with
the African Wildlife Foundation) and the MAB offices in Nairobi. The Amboseli Tsavo
Group Ranches Association and the Amboseli Tsavo Group Scouts Association
(ATGSA) serve equally as subsidiary secretariat units. Unlike the secretariat units in
Laikipia and Mara partnerships, this structure has specialized units linked to their parent
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Figure 7: An organogram illustrating the consortium structure of the Amboseli
Biosphere Reserve Management Partnership
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entities at their subsidiary secretariat locations. These are independent but interconnected
secretariat offices with core, program, and support staff. The role of each secretariat is to
manage and implement partnership conservation projects, and specifically to design and
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coordinate inter-partner contracts, coordinating operational aspects of projects,
developing CBO capacity building projects, and complementing institutions.
The Amboseli Partnership’s consortium model is exhibited in its structure that
integrates thematic and administrative committees, task forces and working groups which
act as sub-platforms for formalizing and coordinating project implementation. The
steering committee is the most important of all committees. Its key roles are agenda
setting, and it is usually constituted by high-level officials from various institutions.
Other types of committees are wildlife compensation, law enforcement, technical,
business, scientific, community education and partnership, finance, research, and
monitoring, wildlife and forest management, and marketing committees. These
committee members’ key role is to represent partners’ interests. Some committee
members are nominated in a quest to uphold regional balance while others voluntarily
contribute their expertise.
The Amboseli Partnership’s organizational history and culture influences the role
that the key CBO, the Amboseli Association plays in the partnership. This association is a
potent force in community conservation owing to a system of precursor institutions that
cultivated relatively strong and numerous pre-MCPP associative networks. The key roles
of ATGRA are to coordinate and manage conservation functions within and among the
community group ranches, formulate and develop advocacy frames for negotiating
communities’ roles and rights within the partnership, cultivate and sustain community
consensus necessary to support ecosystem conservation, oversee community project
management, and to identify potential partners with whom the community can
collaborate with.
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The Amboseli Partnership engages the municipal governments of Olkejuado and
Loitoktok. Both are located in the Rift Valley province. The administrative headquarter
for many activities is in Olkejuado. The key roles of these governments, like those in the
Laikipia and Mara, are to act as the public arm of co-management. They act as centers
for operationalizing the political and democratic realm of subsidiarity. The two municipal
governments receive a lot criticism for supporting Kenya Wildlife Service’s roles in
securitizing conservation in the Amboseli complex.144 These governments conjointly act
as the focal institutional apparatus for developing and enforcing laws and by-laws. These
municipal governments are among the most powerful local governments because
Olkejuado is one of the richest counties in Kenya (IFRA 2007). They facilitate and
convene barazas for deliberation, conflict resolution, and agenda setting.145 They are
strong marketing and brokerage entities for promoting markets for ecosystem services
within the Amboseli complex. Finally, through the development, conservation, and
finance committees, they serve as institutional apparatuses for complementing
community and private sector-linked committees. They liaise with these entities and help
in building the capacity of local conservation CBOs.
Like the Greater Mara Ecosystem, the Amboseli complex is a top lucrative
landscape that provides crucial ecosystem services. This status cannot be discussed
without situating a role for the private sector. While a majority of studies provides
pessimistic undertones of private sector activities in conservation, this sector plays a
significant role in many partnerships. Of course, its profit motive supersedes other goals,
144

The implication here is the increasing use of police and government rangers’ force to administer
conservation and conflict resolution efforts. The security apparatus has increasingly managed to amass
significant powers in the major decision-making roles in co-management.
145
As described in chapter 2, barazas are public deliberation forums which serve several purposes - public,
communal, and private.
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but this does not mean that it cannot or does not contribute to conservation or
development. In the Amboseli complex, the private sector supports a variety of activities
that enhance the protection of ecosystems and the provision of ecosystem services. The
major roles of the private sector are:
•

Initiating platforms for joint venture partnerships which promote
sustainable land use in the group conservation areas

•

Marketing Amboseli’s ecosystem products and services

•

Providing funds for eco-venture start up and scaling up

•

Improving and providing infrastructural services such as water pumps,
road networks, technology and communication

•

Implementing principles of corporate social responsibility in the
conduct of their practices

•

Supplanting or supporting capacity building initiatives which improve
community capacity in ecosystem conservation

•

Protecting and supporting (natural, capital, institutional, and social)
community assets

•

Promoting social innovation through various collaborative projects,
and

•

They also should enter into and support a fair contracting culture with
interested stakeholders.

2.4: Organizational relations among partnership sub-entities
Among the three cases of MCPPs under review, the Amboseli Partnership has a
platform that should by design best uphold the principle of representativeness. It has
made major attempts, but with quite some challenges. This is because its foundation has
an organic linkage to a platform that necessitated and mandated an inclusive system. Due
to its connection with the Man and Biosphere Reserve program, Amboseli Tsavo Group
Ranches Association (i.e., the Amboseli Association) has been a critical stakeholder and
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one of the most significant partners in the management of the Amboseli complex. In comanagement, the principle of representativeness is operationalised more efficiently when
complemented by accountability and effectiveness. Instability has impeded the Amboseli
Partnership’s ability to achieve these outcomes. Still, because the context for comanagement is tightly linked to MAB designation, the partnership exhibits a haphazard
system for mainstreaming and scaling-up programs that increased localized and
grassroots driven planning and implementation. It is important to mention that despite
this haphazard dynamic, the active role of Amboseli Association in proposing, endorsing,
and approving management plans of the Amboseli is telling of the partnership’s attempts
at operationalizing representativeness. The Association negotiated and articulated
community interests when the plans were prepared.
3: Evolution and growth of the of the MCPP
3.1: Initiation (1987 - 1997)
3.1.1: Power point: Collective and epistemic claiming of a landscape of co-existence
The proximate catalysts of the formation of the Amboseli Partnership are its
founders’ interests in forestalling ecological destruction within the Amboseli complex
(and cultivating a conservation-friendly society). A second concern was to forestall an
impending conflict over resources (Thompson 2002) driven by rapidly changing
demographics accentuated by in-migration (Okello and Kioko 2010) and excision of
Maasailand (Galaty n.d.). By late 1980s, the Amboseli complex had turned into a dust
bowl (Lovatt Smith 1997). The immediate stimulus, however, was the dispensation of the
biosphere reserve status of the Amboseli complex The complex needed a system of
institutional infrastructure which would fast track the operationalization of the MAB
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regime post-designation. For its founders, Amboseli Management Partnership’s network
infrastructure provided strong economies of scale for collaboration and a strategic base
for implementing bioregionalism.146
The Amboseli Management Partnership is a unique variation of MCPP, exhibiting
a hybrid of the Laikipia Wildlife Forum in some features and the Mara Conservancy in
others. The partnership also displays extreme dissimilarity with both in some aspects. For
example, its inception did not emerge in a collaborative arena for exploiting reform in
wildlife’s benefit access policy as was in Laikipia Wildlife Forum. Neither was it
established to radically restructure protected areas’ administration was in the case of
Mara Conservancy. This is because its inauguration was not a reactive mechanism but
was emblematic of an already existing pattern of institutional development in a socioecological complex that was adapting to a MAB regime. In this context, the Amboseli
Partnership emerged as a putative anchor for a system that was in need of an organized
platform for bioregional planning. The partnership originated as a product of socioecological dynamics and a strong tradition of public-private partnerships. The Amboseli
Management Partnership was as a practical mechanism that could allow collaborators to
mobilize resources and implement workable interventions. Its inception was validated
through local and external affirmation. The partnership, therefore, only derives its basis
and institutional persona from being an affiliate podium for organizing and implementing
biosphere reserve management plans and for marketing and branding Amboseli
ecosystem’s integrated conservation efforts.
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Bioregionalism is a philosophical principle strongly connected with the view that the biophysical and
human worlds are connected through dynamic evolution and interactions constituted by this realm (Pfueller
2008). Management plans for biosphere reserves are informed by these bio-regionalist assumptions.
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A second structural element related to Amboseli Partnership’s putative role at
initiation is the multifunctional status of the Amboseli complex embedded in the three
biosphere reserve designations. This structure influenced the context of partnership
initiation in terms of extending advantage to multiple stakeholders within the
collaborative arena. Thus, the partnership’s evolution and its attendant empowerment
sub-structures are examined via 1) the “sources of power held by partners involved in
collaborative governance” at initiation and 2) “the arenas that collaborative process
provided for the use of power” (see for example, Purdy 2012). Both dimensions capture
how collaborators in the partnership sought to enhance mechanisms for conserving a
landscape of coexistence between humans and wildlife.
In terms of sources of power, the partnership’s co-management interventions were
enablers of CBO empowerment. These interventions provided opportunity for the
Amboseli Association to be a legitimate partner and for it to access, exchange, and
expend resources in the implementation of partnership activities. This equally enabled it
to achieve legitimacy from other partners. This process presented a context for comanagement due to the fact that the designation process ideally stipulates stringent
provisions that demand localized grassroots planning and implementation process as a
condition to achieving a biosphere reserve status. The Amboseli Association ATGRA
therefore had a strong presence during the initiation of the MCPP. It was a visible actor
and its efforts were embryonic to the formal facilitation of the partnership. For example,
it was proactive in representing the interests of the community vis a vis its role in
proposing, endorsing, and approving of the first management plan of the Amboseli
complex.

216

Collective claiming of resources propagated new elements of power. This
occurred at a micro-scale level at the grassroots and macro-scale at the consortium level.
Embedded in these structures was systemic power that among other roles 1) facilitated
collaborative designing and planning of management plans in 1991, 1996, and 2008, 2)
mobilized new partners for collaborative protected areas management, and 3) mobilized
financial resources for sustaining the partnership’s activities at initiation and postinitiation. Interactions across partnership networks enabled the Amboseli Association to
play a leadership role within subsidiary sub-systems as well. The inception process was
co-owned between the CBO and non-governmental organizations at the micro-scale,
between community-based organizations, the municipality and the private sector at the
meso-scale, and among several consortia at the macro-scale. Besides, communities in the
Kajiado area have over the millennia operated robust nested governance systems
connecting families, clans, localities, and alliances (Ostrom and Mwangi 2009: 215).
These interlinkages operate at different scales with strong institutional capabilities
(Ostrom and Mwangi 2009). The efforts in supporting the designation process served to
enhance initial institutional robustness of community institutions while the Amboseli
Partnership formally complemented the existing empowering dispensation.
MCPP-mediated empowerment activities received facilitative support in the
Amboseli Partnership’s arena of collaboration through an enabling process of interest
alignment of various institutions and scaling up of opportunities for direct and indirect
forms of participation. Its initiation was a ripe process for enabling systemic power and
nurturing innovative power. This is because the dispensation enhanced a change in power
relations encompassing both power sharing and some power shifting in co-management.
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Innovative power enabled partners to cultivate an arena for a pro-conservation
constituency. For example, the partners collectively negotiated and initiated regulatory
tools and systems for managing wildlife. Amboseli region became one of the most active
sites in the country for integrating regulatory and compensatory incentives-based tools
for managing wildlife and rangelands. A second effect was that it facilitated attitudinal
change as communities were engaged in new participatory mechanisms and which had
legal backing within MCPP structures. With regards to systemic power partners were
able to cultivate an arena for a pro-conservation constituency because the participatory
culture enabled was an incentive for actors to mobilize both new stakeholders and
financial resources. For example, the extensive involvement of group ranches
surrounding the Amboseli core was a striking feature during this era. These are the
Olgulului/Olalarashi, Kimana, Eselenkei, and Mbirikani ranches. Overall, the
dispensation presented an ideal context for participatory co-management. Yet, as will be
described, the Amboseli Partnership’s inception in an amenable context did not imply
that its evolutionary trajectory would not undermine empowerment of communities in
subsequent phases.
The first element indicative of an MCPP-mediated power sharing was the
institutional presence of a pact-like147 agreement that was formalized between the local
Maasai community and conservation stakeholders at large. Ideally, the partnership’s
founders had to incorporate this element onto its institutional design and its
empowerment strategy. This pact became an element of constitutive power vis a vis its
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The Seville Strategy for Biosphere Reserves recognizes that biosphere reserves are ‘essentially a pact
between the local community and society as a whole”. (For a detailed description of this feature, see
www.unesco.org/mab/doc/brs/Strategy.pdf).
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role in acting as a precursor institution to a pro-inclusive arena of co-management. As a
precedent for collective governance, the MAB-ingrained pact was an empowering tool of
power sharing. It gave communities a stronger negotiating position in succeeding/future
co-management platforms including that of the Amboseli Partnership. This impact was
significant during the initiation phase and re-organization phases of the partnership’s
development. The Amboseli Association’s strong position and its standing as the core
community organization articulating and advocating for the interests of communities in
the Amboseli complex occurred due to the impact of initial conditions. In essence, the
CBO started on a strong footing with the establishment of the partnership unlike in the
Laikipia Wildlife Forum case in which pre-MCPP linkages were distinctively informal
and in the Mara Conservancy case in which there was no favorable pre-initiation context
all.148
The second impact of collaboration is the Amboseli Partnership’s organizational
evolution including its internal structure and its foundational basis. The partnership’s
co-management system validates Gulati and Gargulio’s (1999) relational embeddedness
thesis that the density of networks in a partnership and similarly the scale of structural
cohesion within it have an impact on a partnership’s collective power. However, in the
case of the Amboseli Partnership, this connection between network density and collective
power is present though it is not a linear but a dialectic link.149 Herein, organizational
path dependency applies. Initial conditions influenced the institutional design of the
148

To put this in a comparative context, the Amboseli was granted MAB status in 1991; ATGRA was
formed in 1994/5 and was already in the arena of interaction with various stakeholders by the time the first
formal consortium of the Amboseli Partnership was being launched, which is in 1997.
149
The analytical model developed in this dissertation is a phased empowerment model that strengthens
this observation. This model incorporates a phased analysis of MCPP evolution and is able to isolate,
distinguish, and elucidate the real impact of power sharing and power shifting aspects of MCPP-mediated
activities as enablers or inhibitors of CBO empowerment.
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partnership (whence, its founders adopted a consortium model), and the capability and
commitment of its constituent partners in steering and strategizing empowerment
interventions for communities in the Amboseli complex.
For example, a strong network between various pro-community and proconservation advocacy coalitions was relatively cohesive in creating an initiation
platform and aligning the diverse consortia interests with the partnership agenda. In the
context of relational embeddedness, and systemic power for that matter, the partnership’s
MAB-linked internal cohesion helped the founders to set a basis for collaboration with a
strong anchor for building expectations and incentives. More specifically, the MAB
platform conveniently stimulated an arena ripe for cementing relational and structural
embeddedness150 prior to the inception of the partnership. But what was the impact of this
inception process in the long haul? The regime platform availed by the MAB
dispensation comprised of an array of formal and informal institutions at the behest of
MCPP founders and collaborators in the Amboseli complex. This favorable window of
opportunity was clearly lacking in the cases of Laikipia Wildlife Forum and the Mara
Conservancy. Its partners had the advantage of exploiting and organizing avenues for
sharing and shifting power. Yet, as will be seen, initial embeddedness does not preclude
internal instability within a partnership. Neither does it imply an entity’s capability or full
commitment by its partners in steering successful empowerment projects.
A favorable socio-institutional context for initiation is necessary but not a
sufficient condition for MCPP strength/stability and by implication not a sufficient
150

Relational embeddedness “highlights the effects of cohesive ties between social actors on subsequent
cooperation between those actors” (Gulati and Gargulio 1999, 1446) while structural embeddedness
“captures the impact of the structure of relations around actors on their tendency to cooperate with one
another” (Granovetter 1992).
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condition for enabling better community empowerment outcomes. An interesting finding
is that for Amboseli Partnership, the factors that helped its initiation are the same that
hindered its subsequent growth. The scale of relational embeddedness, which was its
strength, also turned out to be its weakness. In other words, a unique attribute of the
partnership was the presence of both contradictory (i.e, both ) partnership linkages
embedded in its internal fabric. Operationally, the partnership’s evolution is a trajectory
anchored onto these two related but opposing systems in which the strength of one
process catalyzes the presence of the other. The section on organization phase examines
this dynamic.
What was the role for the epistemic coalition: Was it an alternative empowering
platform? As characteristically hyper-diverse savannah ecology (Thompson 2002, 68)
and a biodiversity-rich eco-circuit, the Amboseli complex commands a strong presence
and visibility of different epistemic coalitions.151 Additionally, as a multifunctional
landscape, it underpins a multilayered system of management comprised of formal and
informal institutions that have drastically evolved over the past years. A third aspect that
attracts attention is the politics that have surrounded its protected area status. The back
and forth gazettement and de-gazettement of laws have attracted more attention and
scientific investigation. The fact that Amboseli’s elephants are the most studied of this
group’s species in Africa and the globe attests to its research and advocacy appeal to
scientists and conservationists of both anthropocentric and eco-centric persuasion.
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Epistemic communities are herein utilized according to Haas (1992: 3) definition which describes it as
“a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an
authoritative claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain of issue-area.” This gives the
professionals clout and power for defining and negotiating agendas and policies (Sutton 1999: 6).
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In terms of sources of power, conservation-based debates presented an
opportunity for community institutions to provide information as resources that were
unique and remotely available to other coalitions. The interdependent nature of coalition
interactions was an important element in giving partners, including CBOs of different
consortia, representational identity and vitality. It is common for different advocacy
movements to co-evolve in a common policy arena (Dobusch and Quack 2008). An
important point worth noting is that some coalitions pursue localized activism while
others prefer to utilize transnational arenas (Dobusch and Quack 2008, see also McAdam
1996, Tarrow 1998). The Amboseli Partnership’s initiation was facilitated when diverse
yet conflict-prone coalitions aligned their resources to negotiateand support a common
conservation agenda that could save the Amboseli complex (Thompson 2002).
Relationally, the influence of these diverse coalitions and each coalition’s impact
as a claimant was linked to the leadership roles they played in setting a podium for an
inclusive paradigm of conservation. This was a competitive arena that was transformed
into a turned collaborative arena, at least in the 1990s (Thompson 2002, Mburu 2004,
Rutten 2008). At a more specific level, the Amboseli’s elephant protection debacle152 that
was an important site of debates in the 1990s is a case in point. At best, this interactive
arena was site of “competing science and polities” (Thompson 2002, 186). At the same
time, this arena succeeded in providing a conflict resolution mechanism for a sensitively
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This was an inceptive pre-MCPP stage, which introduced group issue positions on via agenda setting
and issue framing by oppositional coalitions. This attributively is related to conservation paradigms within
and around the Amboseli National Park and particularly those governing elephant herds. According to
Thompson, there were two groups of epistemic coalitions: the pro-community conservationist coalition
with a localist identity and the pro-wildlife recreation services user/buyer coalition with an internationalist
identity (which I would assume is a preservationist cohort). Each group inscribed and endorsed its view vis
a vis favored conservation debate and philosophical worldviews (Thompson 2002: 172-181, 186) though at
the end of the debate there was an agreement over the operational issues of bio-regional management after
the successful co-optation of the pro-wildlife cohort.
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charged issue unlike in Mara Conservancy’s initiation where compromise was absent
during MCPP initiation.
Accordingly, Thompson further reiterates that there was an “alliance between
science and politics” despite the fact that it was not an easy embrace for either side
because there were “political compromises and alliances” (185). The pro-community
conservation coalition prevailed and ended up co-opting the preservationists into a forum
for initiating community-based management as a leading paradigm for guiding
interventions in the Amboseli complex. In lieu of the conflict-prone character of
conservation policy making in Amboseli, this coalitional apparatus acted as a bottom-up
process for cultivating an initial source of social consensus, though not necessarily
political consensus. As Thompson further observes, “the debates did not coalesce into a
holistic frame of reference.” The important point is that the participative and deliberative
character of the arena of interaction tempered adversarial dynamics.
Structurally, an inbuilt consortia interaction and embeddedness served to
propagate constitutive and innovative power.153 These include enabling of, but are not
limited to the fact that, MCPP embeddedness 1) availed and built new platforms for
information sharing and learning, 2) scaled up processes for initiating and supporting
benefit sharing programs, 3) initiated new structures for collaborative management of
natural capital of the Amboseli complex, 4) initiated new structures for management of
the financial capital of Amboseli complex, and 5) institutionalized advocacy roles at the
meso-scale. Another dimension of empowerment by coalitional consortia system is the
role it played in grounding data/information onto conservation narrative that served as
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According to Avelino and Rottman (2009), constitutive power entails “a distribution of resources
through the use of institutions and structures.”
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evidence for planning and organization of projects. It specifically nurtured innovative
power with regards to providing ideational (values), informational, and institutional
resources. For the latter, it formally introduced a community-centered management
paradigm for elephant conservation (Thompson 2002: 186) and cemented it onto the
MCPP initiation platform. An element of cooperation among competing interests was
exhibited as a dimension of transformative power was a feature of partner interactions.
In fact, Thompson suggests that this interactive arena led to the “connecting of different
orders and scale of things, without reductionism or holism” (186) at least during the
MCPP’s initiation. The partnership’s organization building phase is a different story.
These coalitional networks validate Resource Mobilization Theory’s tenets on
how accessing resources from strategic coalitions and alliances, including technical and
expert input can improve chances of empowerment. The experience of the Amboseli
Association indicates that representative CBO structures can effectively gain entry into
decision-making arena pursuant to alliance building with (only) a stable coalition. In this
instance, alliance building may not have directly enabled power shifting but it was a
fruitful arena for power sharing embodied in the consultative processes, public
deliberations, knowledge exchange, and socio-scientific evidence sharing. This
subsequently led to coalitional groups agreeing to endorse and support community
management paradigms in the 1990s. It also strengthens governance and participation
approaches’ tenets that collaboration rather than alienation of community institutions best
serves the agendas of socio-ecological justice. In fact, as this initiation context indicates,
this arena does not imply a conflict-free process, yet it allows engagement and exchange
of resources among potential MCPP partners. In lieu of a strong level of positional and
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relational embeddedness, the local communities were at initiation, proactive and
meaningful participants in the deliberations and construction of a paradigm of bioregional
conservation. Community impact was important and strategic in terms of enhancing
coalitional effectiveness and representation (see for example, Croze et al. 2006, Mburu
2004, Rutten 2004).
3.1.2: Elites as satellite conveners of a partnership discourse
Elite influence during the Amboseli partnership’s initiation and its subsequent
impact on CBO empowerment predominantly exhibit supportive elements but only within
some elite. This supportive group was constituted by anti-dissolution elites in the group
ranches, bureaucratic elites at the municipalities, and a small coalition of private sector.
According to the non-supportive elite group, empowering communities would mean
extending significant usufruct rights to communities whom they viewed stereotypically as
“non-conservators” and “over-exploiters” of wildlife resources. They would, then, most
likely threaten the lucrative base of the wildlife sector because empowering them would
meant (an imminent) loss of wildlife stock. The pro-dissolution community elites on the
other hand were merely uncooperative because they wanted group raches to be unstable
or at least be dissolved in order to allow privatization to take course. In Kajiado, like in
Laikipia, landed elites are powerful players in its conservation sector. In essence
whichever group or issue that strikes balance with their interest presents room for this
group to offer its support. The overall elite coalition is certainly not a coherent unit as
well. The Amboseli has a diverse grouping of elite coalitions. During the initiation of the
partnership, elites supported the process though this depended entirely on coalition
structures and the nature of interest alignment with the community, business,
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bureaucratic, political, or conservationists coalitions. Generally, because elite presence
from community, the local bureaucracy, and conservationist sectors was heavy, it
provided a supportive role during the inception of the MCPP. Elites from all these
coalitions (above) were active supporters of the partnership’s co-management goals with
the exception of business elites who favored a more preservationist system (Thompson
2002) and the educated pro-sedentarization and pro-subdivision elite groups whose
efforts largely engendered clamoring for group ranch dissolution (Ngethe n.d, Hendrich
and Harvey 1998).
Generally, most elite groups were active during partnership initiation and were
also co-opted to serve in their roles as secondary mobilizers, advocates, issue shapers and
interest aligners, but of course with strategic ties only to coalitions with similar interests.
Preeminence of elites did not translate into surmountable negative influence. Despite
elite’ role in strategic alliance building, their influence was tempered and/or neutralized
by the fact that they were not the real conveners of the MCPP initiation platform. Rather,
KWS, USAID, and the African Conservation Center (hereafter ACC) acted in concert
with community representatives from ATGRA (see, for example, Mburu 2004, Croze et
al. 2006). Thus, heavy NGO and think tank presence within the Amboseli reduced elite
capture by increasing the scale of elite coalitional politics and positive influence.
Additionally, most of the critical strategic resources used in nurturing the partnership
engendered mobilization outside the elite confines (control). Besides, as already
mentioned, associative and deliberative structures afforded by the MAB dispensation
already existed during the MCPP’s initiation. Formal cooperation mediated by relational
embeddedness produced a new and expanded arena of cooperation prompting elites to be
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pro-inclusive. With respect to empowerment, the implications are both structural and
relational. First, since elites were visibly absent as MCPP initiation leadership, the
initiation process allowed partners to socialize and negotiate more extensively. This
allowed partners to nurture systemic and constitutive power with moderate elite
influence. . Secondly, it allowed communities to leverage resources and good leadership
with minimal elite capture. Third, elites’ divisive and polarizing impact was contained, at
least in the short term allowing partners to facilitate crucial social and political resources.
3.1.3: Propagating community capacity in a pre-MCPP socialization arena
In order to evaluate the connection between community capacity and the
Amboseli Partnership’s empowerment outcomes, three rubrics developed by UNEP
(2002) stand relevant. These rubrics describe capacity as a process for continuous
“building of abilities, relationships, and values”. The founders of the Amboseli
Management Partnership were, by design (through their proactive effort in building an
inclusive initiation arena), and by default (structurally pegged onto Amboseli complex’s
biosphere reserve status), pressured into recognizing the surrounding communities and
their institutions (see for example, Thompson 2002, KWS 2012). Underpinned in this
structure was an arena which provided community momentum and amenable incentives
for the key community-based organization, the Amboseli Association. The association
acculturated to being a better negotiator with its partners in the decision making arena.
Additionally, communities and group ranches surrounding the Amboseli’s were in
possession of various assets (Western 1994) which strengthened the Association’s
capacity during pre-initiation and during initiation of the partnership. This was an
important backbone to helping this organization assert community rights up front. The
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Amboseli Partnership’s evolution indicates that CBO capacity is a requisite variable for
enabling empowerment during the initiation and subsequent phases of a partnership.
These constitute legal, human, organizational, technical, and natural assets.
Evidence from this case also concurs with participatory development, resource
mobilization theory and collaborative governance approaches on the need for community
organizations to have organizational and legal capacity in co-management settings with
ambiguous or unstable property rights regimes. The pre-MCPP socialization process also
strengthens resource mobilization theory proponents’ spotlighting of the significance of
material and organizational resources for community organizations. The Amboseli
Association’s strong position during the inception of the MCPP was its possession of
crucial resources needed not just to fast track the biosphere reserve plan; but it was also
needed to complement the new resource pool for the partnership as well. This is because
a large portion of community land was designated either as buffer or transition zone of
the biosphere reserve. This compelled its partners to consult and negotiate with the
Amboseli Association as the chief contact point. Additionally, the associations’
leadership, though not always homogenously united, constituted the core policy group
that proposed and facilitated the preparation and implementation of the first management
plan for the Amboseli complex in1991.
The MAB dispensation equally suffices as a mediating factor via its system of
gradation that classifies human activities within a specified bio-geographic area. These
rules apply in the facilitation and implementation of the three functional goals of any
biosphere reserve. By design, it, therefore, presumes and provides a role for local
institutions such as community based organizations, to be proactively involved in co-
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management. This provision for public involvement introduced communities to the
participation arena of co-management. Thus, unlike its CBO counterparts in Laikipia and
the Mara, the Amboseli Association’s participation was buttressed before the initiation of
the MCPP through regular consultation and CBO engagement. This provided it with
extensive contacts, collaboration, and further capacity building opportunities during the
phase of initiation and the early period of MCPP formalization. Unlike its CBO
counterparts in the Laikipia Wildlife Forum and the Mara Conservancy, the Amboseli
Association:
•

Positioned itself strategically to lobby for the rights of its constituents
because it had the requisite scope of social acceptance before the
inception and at initiation of the MCPP

•

Occupied a special and strategic niche in representing the real
demands of Maasai community as the only grassroots and region-wide
advocacy-based CBO

•

Exposed its leadership to participatory decision making prior to the
inception of real MCPP because of the opportunity availed by MAB
designation in 1991

•

Socialized earlier into an arena of collaborative planning and as such
its leadership had the advantage of exploiting elements of relational
embeddedness

•

Strongly connected to informal networks that existed before the
MCPP’s initiation which exposed it to conflict resolution strategies at
grassroots, local and regional scales.

On this account, the MCPP initiation arena served to enhance the capacity of the
association in multiple ways. Empowering was enhanced as a capacity building process.
At initiation entail these features:
•

The group ranches in Amboseli were the first to benefit from the
Kenya Wildlife Service’s newly initiated benefit-sharing schemes
(Western 1994: 43)
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•

The Amboseli communities were assertive in fighting for their rights
to revenue benefits in Olugul Olarashi because they possessed
organizational capacity (Western 1994)154

•

ATGRA maintained a strong position in the pre-planning and planning
phases of the partnership process. In fact, the CBO was powerful
enough to negotiate its terms, at least on condition that its advocacy
role was maintained as a strong element of the collaboration process
with its partners (Croze et al., 2006).

Paradoxically, community advantage during initiation phase is not a sufficient condition
for the sustenance of empowerment. As will be described in the succeeding section of the
organization phase, relational advantages are only useful if agreements and rules are
effective in responding to the interests of all the constituent partners in a co-management
setting.
3.2: Organization (1997- 2007)
3.2.1: Oscillating power and the crafting of a discourse of disempowerment
In the organization phase, the MCPP partners established a consortium of
institutions for formalizing conservation transactions. This was inbuilt in an ad hoc
structure constituted by two municipalities of Olkejuado and Loitoktok county
governments, a CBO representing all local group ranches (i.e., the Amboseli Association)
and the private sector. Because the Amboseli is a national park, it is under the full
custodianship of Kenya Wildlife Service, which also works with leading conservation
NGOs such as the African Conservation Center (ACC) and the African Wildlife
Foundation (AWF). Like its counterparts in Laikipia and Trans Mara, internal
partnership mechanisms are highly dependent on the external environment. There are
three major catalysts that led to formal organization of the consortium: 1) a failed
154

The Olugul Olarashi is the group ranch that is closest to the core section of the Amboseli National Park
and, as such, a section of its land is occasionally considered as part of the the core of the biosphere reserve.
It is the closet group ranch to the exclusive core which is the key revenue-generating zone.
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implementation of the 1991-1996 Amboseli Management Plan, 2) the need to solve
rampant human/wildlife conflict in the Amboseli complex, and 3) KWS’s new
institutional infrastructure and organizational culture.
The Amboseli Partnership’s formal organization has multiple roots. It was
initiated in 1997 as an institutionalized mechanism to coordinate the inclusion of group
ranches in the Amboseli complex biosphere reserve system. This is the putative
foundation of the partnership. Its founders’ efforts particularly targeted the ATGRA as a
link institution for bringing communities as crucial partners on board. The effort was
spearheaded by the African Conservation Center and funded by USAID’s Conservation
of Resources through Enterprises (CORE) program (Croze et al. 2006: 21). The
partnership assumed a loose structure in this facilitative podium. Later on, the New York
Zoological Society added immense capital funds to the forum. This partnership was and
continued to be a comparatively weaker MCPP in terms of the institutional logic defining
its structure and operations. This may be because it had multiple origins: institutional,
structural, and associative. Institutionally, it was loosely embedded as an amalgamation
of formal and informal entities. It was organized as an amorphous and less structured
system. Concerning its associative elements, actors were embedded in numerous dense
networks of coalition/consortia-like structures. Structurally, it was an appendage of the
biosphere reserve program and similarly an attempt to operationalize the program.
A related aspect in this structural anatomy is that in terms of power dynamics, the
Amboseli Partnership exhibits features dissimilar to Laikipia Wildlife Forum’s near
oligopolistic model and Mara Conservancy’s near monopolistic co-management model.
Institutions external to the partnership’s core organizational units influence and at times
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implement the key decisions. A list of these forces includes but is not limited to the
KWS, ACC, AWF, the World Conservation Society (formerly, the New York Zoological
Society), and the International Federation for Animal Welfare (IFAW). These institutions
are promoting conservation efforts with a lot of scrutiny but with strategic motivations at
the same time. In terms of empowerment, there are effects linked to the complex structure
of internal and external power linkages. These include 1) a change in organizational
culture and with an embrace of “coercive conservation”155 and securitization of
conservation, 2) institutional design impacts linked to the development of a nested
consortium, and 3) power asymmetries which were reinforced through hegemonic
coalitions via the legitimation of a discourse of co-existence.
Concerning organizational culture, the Amboseli Management Partnership is a
structure embedded in strong advocacy and associative rubrics ideally organized around
as a consortium. This means that various centers of power from different jurisdictional
arenas avail resources for implementing management plans for the Amboseli complex but
under one focal arena (usually at the MCPP secretariat). This has a limiting effect on the
partnership’s empowerment capacity because it fuels a less cogent and less concretized
culture as an anchor of partnership programs. Additionally, since biosphere reserve laws
operate only as soft law mechanisms, partners cooperate and mobilize resources only in
good faith, at times with limited commitment, and success.
The partnership’s organization reveals that an MCPP can act as a platform for
strategic aggregation and universalization of particular conservation tools and cultures.
This occurs when dominant partners succeed in supplanting and supporting a core
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This term identifies with the works of Peluso (1993). An elaborate discussion about coercive
conservation is in subsequent paragraphs of this section.
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conservation ideology of a favored conservation coalition. This is the second story of the
Amboseli complex and the Amboseli Management Partnership. In an effort to secure the
vital wildlife corridors and habitats in community land represented bythe Amboseli
Association, state-linked and private-sector partners in coalition with conservationists
were able to create a master narrative of co-existence which at this stage managed to
supersede the conflict narrative. The complex context of disempowerment is a paradox of
participation. The participation of the association in the partnership encouraged the
creation, legitimation, and domination by the master frame of co-existence, though its
intention was not to do so. This was during the early phases of organization in the late
1990s to early and mid-2000s. The association reduced its participation after its
leadership noted the skewed nature of the conservation deals. Communities were not
being compensated based on the losses that they were incurring from wildlife predation.
Neither did they receive the genuine amount of gate revenues accrued at the Amboseli
from tourism and other services. Other socio-ecological changes were in effect to reduce
its activism as well.
Concerning institutional design, the Amboseli complex’s biosphere reserve status
created a useful springboard for initiation of collaboration but was less critical in
enhancing organization. It created a sense of organizational dependency with regards to
the MCPP’s structural ties to its task system156 and 2) a sense of entitlement on the part of
community. The partnership’s evolution confirms Ngeta’s (2007, 2010) conclusions on
how liberalizing co-management systems exacerbate problems for interventions designed
to achieve socio-ecological justice. In fact, this status is the fountainhead of the
156

In organization and collaborative governance studies, a task system is simply an organization’s external
environment that constitutes various aspects of its linkage to other systems. These may be legal, social,
economical, or political organizations and/or institutions.
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partnership’s weak posture and weak record in community empowerment during
initiation. In this case, the path-dependent context of MCPP-mediated outcomes is
evident in the partnership’s organizational evolution in which the initial context of
partnership formation (embedded in efforts to operationalize the biosphere reserve plan)
defined its organization and ultimately its weak consolidation. This explains why it has
had stints of both high and low activism with a leadership constituted by proactive
collaborators in one time (1997 to 2002), inactive in other times (2003 to 2006), and later
again proactive (2006 to 2008). This is, but cautiously, interpreted as MCPP activism
fluctuating depending on contingencies and opportunities. This had implications on the
CBO partners at least in terms of engaging and capacitating community institutions for
the uptake of development and conservation interventions.
In contrast to the Laikipia Wildlife Forum and the Mara Conservancy which are
anchored on compact collaborative models, the Amboseli Partnership is anchored on a
consortium model. Hence, it resembles a locally loose conglomerate with an intermittent
nature. This structure has direct and indirect implications on the scale of empowerment
interventions that the partnership can undertake. Because of this instability, its
institutional design circumscribed CBO participation and input, therefore, directly
limiting empowerment. This strategy of project selection and elimination was applied to
weed out interventions which may have been important for empowerment, but none-theless considered of less priority, scoping limited and circumscribed interventions that
partners could undertake for a given project. Thus, this MCPP mirrors what governance
scholars may label as an adhocracy (i.e., is close to a structureless system) It lacks finesse
and has a weak managerial apparatus. The history of its organizational culture provides
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evidence for why community empowerment is low scale. Its structure is designed to
respond to urgent problems that arise when coalitions and communities introduce threat
agendas. It will also be proactive when local communities confront partners of the failed
pact, supposedly one of the issues the partnership is supposed to resolve.
Additionally, in contrast to the Laikipia Wildlife Forum and the Mara
Conservancy that are pluralistic and bureaucratic structures, the Amboseli Partnership is a
polycentric system. Polycentricism157 is a governance system with many decision-making
centers of power and levels of management (Ostrom V. et al., 1961, Ostrom E. 2005,
2009, Anderrson and Ostrom E. 2008, Fabricius et al., 2008). The Amboseli Partnership
is an instructive case depicting how institutional networks can facilitate and support the
formation of polycentric systems. Actually, the biosphere reserve system had a definitive
impact on the partnership’s modus operandi as it influenced coordination among different
MCPP members and non-members. While it may have created a system of concurrent
power exercised via multiple institutional interfaces, it can at least be credited for 1)
creating an arena amenable to socio-political and ideological diversity, 2) creating
political opportunity, and 3) consolidating (and later fragmenting) partners’ collective
capacity in implementing conservation and overall community empowerment.
On a negative note, polycentricism has served to create multiple arenas of power
and nurtured organizational sub-structures and sub-cultures; with some less congenial to
sustainable collaboration. Much of this impact began during the mid-stage of the
organization phase from around the year 2003. Polycentricism undermined coordination
and system stability. Amboseli’s socio-ecology has a strong system of independent but
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Analysis under the leadership of prominent scholars such as Vincent Ostrom and Elinor Ostrom.
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nested customary institutions (Ostrom and Mwangi 2009) which were superimposed onto
formal management structures such as municipal bureaucratic systems, committees, and
state agencies. Additionally, observations made by this study point to strong autonomous
group ranch organizations which operate as self-governed units within the MCPP
framework, whose activities are circumscribed by the well positioned and authoritative
local governments of Olkejuado and Loitoktok, a powerful conservation cartel, and
private sector magnates with strong influence on the MCPP’s management politics.
Additional implications for institutional design vis a vis empowerment here are two
pronged. The key attribute is that the partnership’s governance infrastructure aligned
institutions, structures, and opportunities for management in ways that scaled up direct
and indirect participation but equally inhibited real CBO participation and weakened the
benefit sharing process implementation. This is because, apart from coordination issues,
multiplicity of several powerful and very weak sub-entities could only facilitate
minimum safeguards for community empowerment, as efforts were conjoined, but
weakly, onto a single solid and steady collective entity.
A related implication is that since major activities operate through its titular system
of co-management, and continue to do so due to KWS’s full custodianship of the
Amboseli National Park and all of Kenya’s wildlife resources, the Amboseli
Partnership’s activities exhibited a tendency of dwelling on enforcement, monitoring, and
conflict resolution (a typology from Ostrom 1990). Thus, an unfortunate outcome was the
relegation of an anchor that could allow community appropriation of benefits from
market for ecosystem services. For example, an oft-cited study by Croze et al. (2006: 16)
reveals an interesting interplay:
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“The situation in Ol Tukai158 [was] totally unplanned for and frankly
chaotic. The Olkejuado County Council, far from taking leadership role
and imposing a unified vision for this very special ‘core within the core’
[…] evidently over the years [was] no more than a collector of rent.
Stakeholders have tried to jointly manage certain aspects, for example, the
electric fence that was installed under the auspices of KWS and ACC”
As this evidence points out, this is clearly an imbalance that disempowered communities
considering for example that (IFAW 2012, www.ifaw.org) confirm that the Amboseli
“comprises of only 10% of elephants’ range and ecosystem.” This implies that nearly an
entire rangeland for elephants consists of community group ranches.
Concerning other manifestations of power asymmetry during the partnership’s
organization phase, a turn in the conservation narrative occurred. Due to the heavy
presence and influence of international conservationists with a stake in Amboseli, it
became apparent that it was not going to be business as usual in the MCPP’s approach to
conservation.159 The support of major conservation coalitions that had long stood for
integrated conservation and development on which the partnership’s collaboration rubric
was founded started waning. With time, the tense policy atmosphere only contributed to
weak and equivocal coalitional support for community socio-ecological justice.
Partnership dynamics in this phase expose the inherent weaknesses of
participatory approaches, resource mobilization theory, and collaborative governance
approaches. An assumption that unites these approaches vis a vis interpretations of
empowerment is their presumption that CBOs (can) access reasonable capacity and
connective resources to infiltrate opportunity spaces afforded by collaboration, and even
when this capacity is lacking, collaborators can take advantage of political opportunity.
158

Ol Tukai is the core area or exclusive core zone of the Amboseli Biosphere Reserve
Between 2003 and 2005, two other related forces served to attract conservationist presence: 1) national
dynamics linked to the ensuing conflicts over the impending provisions in the Wildlife Bill and President
Kibaki’s ploy with (de)gazettement of the Amboseli
159
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However, what is the structure of this collaborative arena? Actor coalitions in the
Amboseli demonstrate that it would be difficult or near impossible for CBOs to
successfully infiltrate or even exploit this space successfully. CBOs lacked the power to
match those of state-affiliated entities, the private sector, and conservation-based NGOs.
In fact, communities were not the only claimants or competing managers of natural
resources. Communities stood as disadvantaged partners. In these conditions,
collaboration actually served to marginalize and alienate CBOs.
Furthermore, these three approaches also inadequately capture the
interconnections between material resources that partners bring to bear on collaboration
and structural attributes of a rentier economy. In effect, partnership connections can be
assessed with regards to their role in changing or maintaining power asymmetries. This
leads to three questions: What resources do partners bring and with what motives? What
are the real purposes of bringing these resources? What does this mean for power
distribution among partners? The Amboseli Partnership’s evolution indicates that not all
resource exchange processes create an enabling environment for empowerment of CBO
partners. In fact, these activities can be inimical to the organic and organizational growth
of not just the CBO but also the partnership. For example, resulting organizational
instability and inertia that characterized the Amboseli Partnership late post-initiation is
telling of this effect.
By all indications, lucrative sectors such as tourism, which are anchored on
wildlife conservation in many under-developed economies such as Kenya, are
predisposed to nurturing rentier wealth. This wealth entraps national and local economies
into neo-patrimonial ties (Ritcher and Steiner 2007) and is often engraved onto a “rentier
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psychology” (Ngeta 2010, 122). Municipalities of Olkejuado and Loitotok can evade
accountability to local communities, as rentier thesis would suggest. This explains why
one of the richest municipalities and revenue generators exists besides dilapidated and
inaccessible infrastructure in many sections of the Amboseli complex. Corruption is a
common element of the administrative culture of many institutions around the park,
including community institutions (Honey 2008, 2009). Of course, these processes are
linked to other organizational and operational aspects of the MCPP. A second anchor of
rentier wealth is the partnership’s weak internal organization that created an institutional
infrastructure which ended up competed with the MCPP’s organic institutions. This is an
alliance between state functionaries and conservationists that advanced interests and
goals separate from those of the partnership. This linkage generates more rents onto an
already existing tourist-linked rentier system. Indeed, it diversified the rents (and
resource) base for state functionaries and officials. Nevertheless, the real effects are on
substantive empowerment. In terms of empowerment, the partnership’s evolution
indicates that collaboration can act as an arena for localizing tyranny of globalizing
conservation by imposing a contested conservation regime and enabling the state to disempower local communities.
This raises a third issue. The three approaches which informed this study (i.e.,
participatory development, RMT, and governance approach) can only offer simplistic
heuristics for evaluating MCPP-mediated empowerment. They all under-theorize the
elements of partner resource exchange in terms of supply, use and access of resources.
They also rarely dwell on ideational resources. There is a major focus among the three
approaches toward exchange and access of tangible resources as key factors in initiating
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CBO empowerment. A phased model, as used in this study, focuses on arenas and decomposed power by fruitfully explicating the different scenarios of power sharing and
power shifting. This model captures the inbuilt power dynamics, for example, between
the state and conservation groups that created new spheres of influence for partners and
how these features reinforced asymmetrical centers of power. By situating the
partnership’s evolution in phased junctures, it enabled the study to capture and clarify,
through a power decomposition model, the tensions which have long prevailed in comanagement research.
The power decomposition model delves into a related and interesting question.
How did archenemies, (that is, the state and conservationists), manage to nurture a system
of hegemony that legitimated a disempowering discourse? An oft-cited reference is
particularly instructive on this subject: Peluso (1993) (see also Lipschutz et al., 1993a). In
order to situate these dynamics, Peluso describes a “coercive conservation” thesis and
argues:
“…state interests appropriate the ideology, legitimacy, and technology of
conservation as a means of increasing or appropriating their control over
valuable resources and recalcitrant populations. While international
conservation groups may have no direct agenda for using violence to
protect biological resources, their support of states which either lack the
capacity to manage resources or intend to control ‘national’ resources at
any price, contributes to the disenfranchisement of indigenous people with
resource claims” (1993).
She further intimates in a second publication that:
“State concerns with the economic value may influence conservation
groups to use economic terms to justify their protection and preservation
strategies…management and control over local resources, the use of
violence becomes an expedient means of exerting state control in the name
of conservation or legitimate domain” (1993b52).
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Peluso’s observations, which were compiled in her study of the Amboseli in 1990s, help
illustrate the continued disenfranchisement of local communities in the supposed benefitsharing scheme initiated by KWS. Communities were promised a 25% share of the
collected gate fees but have only been receiving 2% (Lion Guardians 2012). It also
emerges that a coalition of conservationists and particularly biologists felt that
communities lacked the requisites scientific and ecological knowledge to give them
reasonable active role in conservation (Okello 2009).
These developments led to a situation that reversed the benefits to the state
through a new ideational framing. By Peluso’s account, state-linked functionaries were
able to exploit and manipulate the discourse of conservation, successfully proposing its
logic and legitimization. This occurred because the dominant coalitions succeeded in
tactfully aligning the co-existence logic (i.e. communities needed to co-exist with wildlife
irrespective of the costs), with the economic arguments that in essence embody natural
resource conservation, though in this case, their intention was to enhance wildlife
preservation it would be preservation through exclusion of the community. However, the
real problem is with conservationists who pandered to the state’s claiming of
conservation guardianship. Conclusively, by Peluso’s account, conservation coercion
cannot occur without international support. To put the argument in context, communities
faced immense threats and shocks from the droughts in 2000 and in the years 2005 to
2006. In particular, the latter was very disastrous as pastoralists in Kenya died and lost
close to 60% of their livestock (Okello 2009). During these periods, it would have made
sense for the Maasai to access and use some of water and grazing points within the core
zone of the park or surrounding park boundaries. It did not make sense to the KWS
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rangers. In fact, electric fences expanded to limit access to the park to the Maasai (Okello
and D’Amour 2009). This was the beginning of a problem, and indeed a complex one.
The Maasai vehemently opposed the denial of access and entered the park without
permission arguing that they too have hosted wildlife on their land and had incurred
uncompensated costs over many years. KWS on the other hand responded by arresting
local community members who committed infractions by “invading” the park. KWS also
levied costly fines to these communities. The Maasai community later responded by
resorting to retributive killing of wildlife arguing that, “KWS only cares for wildlife and
not Maasais.”160 This was the beginning of a second-generation securitization regime in
protected areas conservation. KWS immensely increased its security operations within
the park and around the group ranches; in some occasions harassing local Maasais in their
own land in the name of preserving wildlife.
3.2.2: Elite role in (dis)organization: Bulwarks of tenure transformation?
The evolution of the Amboseli Partnership during this phase challenges the
assumptions of the cohort of participatory development scholars who overlook the inner
structural elements of stable communal property regimes by characterizing them as
inclusive simply because of their homogenizing effects. Usufruct rights are not the most
important indication of intra-community democratic character. An attribute of the Maasai
rights regime is that it embodies an exclusive system through norms and rituals of social
practice.161 Generally, Maasai customary law defines a good portion of land management
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This phrase finds common expression among many disappointed Maasais who argue that the KWS has
relegated community rights in favor of wildlife rights.
161
Because of the normative standing that these institutions have, they are relatively “strong” and are
firmly cemented in a tightly knit socially bound community. But they are also weak because they are
anchored on structures that alienate a core group of the population from owning assets. For a more detailed
analysis of Maasai social institutions, see Grandin (n.d.) and Galaty (1992, 1994).
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and ownership rights within the group ranches despite the fact that these ranches have a
basis in formal law through the Group Land Act of 1968. Customary law primarily
stratifies the community along role, age and gender groupings.162 For example, young
men, women, and the aged cannot own land. In other words, a person’s position reflects
his /her portion of assets such as land. This structure was progressively perceived as
undemocratic. Additionally, socio-economic changes that put pressure on livelihoods,
including an impending threat of excision by immigrants into Kajiado, led to intensified
calls for sub-division (Galaty 1992, Ntiati 2002, Ngethe n.d., Mwangi 2007, Burnsilver
2007).
Elites from the community leadership cohort were receptive to the idea of
privatization of group ranches for genuine economic reasons. Nevertheless, their role in
exacerbating conflict within community is a different element. They rationalized group
ranch dissolution as a way to enable them to expand opportunity onto other ventures.163
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Customary law can be described here as anchors of institutions that are communitarian but not
egalitarian per se.
163
The evolution of a privatization movement in Kenya’s Maasailand is best evaluated by examining three
aspects that describe group ranch parcelation dynamics and phases in which group ranches were dismantled
from their original structures. Parcelation occurs in progressive stages as the group ranch members continue
to handle outstanding issues such as ownership structures, loan repayment, clarification of membership and
access rights post-subdivision. In other words, parcelation is, de facto, until an official adjudication process
and the government has formally issued title deeds (Grandin 1984). Parcelation consists of three processes.
Sub-division is the first phase. It is the parcelation of previously integrated communal land, (i.e. group
ranches) into several pieces of land through fragmentation and transformation of the communal tenural
rights regime. This encompassed the first phase of group ranch parcelation process which started around
the mid 1970s (Ngethe n.d.) and early 1980 (Grandin Jacobs 1984a, Kimani and Pickard 1998). Several
factors accentuated this shift; structural, economic, administrative, social, demographic, and political (see,
for example, Galaty 1992). All the major institutions played a role in catalyzing the sub-division process:
- group ranch institutions themselves were ineffective, inefficient, and exclusive through their
denial of registration and membership to youth, women and the elderly
- the local and central governments failed to help enforce governance rules, improve
infrastructure and extension as services even in the face of failing structures
- international organizations such as USAID and the World Bank supported the dissolution
citing group ranch failure to realizing conservation outcomes set in the 1960s.
Dissolution was the second phase. It occurred from the mid 1980s and was at its peak in the early to mid
1990s. It involved the complete parcelation of intact group ranches. Structural tensions and the uneven	
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Elites were not the only group receptive to the idea. The youth were persuaded by the fact
that they had been excluded from owning land. Elites gave calls for dissolution
tremendous impetus and exploited the activism of excluded groups such as the youth and
warrior age sets. The elite’s role in destabilizing the socio-economic fabric of the region
is an issue worth noting. While they were reasonably justified in seeking alternative
livelihood opportunities and playing a role in transforming an exclusive property rights
system within the community, they are equally culpable in creating avenues of
disempowerment and disorganizing the MCPP’s role in the region. A key issue is that the
new landed elite class and bureaucratic elites established a parallel economy of land sales
that created a strong predatory system that served to exploit the community’s natural
asset base in Kajiado (Galaty 1992, 1994; Ntiati 2002).
Another related impact is that elites (landed, community leaders, and business
coalitions) can be implicated in facilitating selective patrimony. These groups had argued
that dissolution of group ranches would help marginalized community members, but their
interests and role post-dissolution served to perpetuate more inter-group and intergenerational tensions and conflicts over resources. Elites contributed further to the
creation of a new uneven system of resource appropriation that accentuated land
degradation to threatening levels. In fact, elites (and outsiders) were the real beneficiaries
of dissolution and not the ordinary Maasais. In effect, there emerged a satellite
community of competing Maasai economic institutions. Privatization also generated an
benefits system led many group ranch members to favor and facilitate dissolution (Mwangi 2007, refer to
Chapter 2).
Privatization is the third phase. It began in the early 1990s and cemented as a regime transformation
process by late 1990s. Privatization involves community members abandoning the communal property
systems and shifting to an individualized tenure system. Unlike sub-division and dissolution, privatization
was distinctively a radical transformation of culture and institutions of the Maasai structures on which
group ranch governance was first based. This increasingly led to individualization. (Grandin 1991).
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enclave economy that increased the alienation of locals from real participation in the
emerging conservation and economic sectors. All these events served to impede not just
the capacity of the community organization (ATGRA) to execute its leadership with
authority; it also influenced the partnership’s institutional base as well. Privatization had
the following effects on the Amboseli Management Partnership:
•

Socio-economic transformation and privatization of land reinforced
the partnership’s putative structure and limited its capacity to
coordinate the collective effort of its partners. The MCPP’s
organization weakened as it could not effectively galvanize support
nor effectively access resources from its CBO partner

•

Privatization led to the propagation of new class formations and
income polarization between new landowners and group ranch
members (Galvin 2009). This increased marginalization and the
growth of an informal economy, including new power formations that
destabilized the partnership. The MCPP’s organizational foundation
was overshadowed and overwhelmed by the new system of patrimony
that began to permeate Kajiado’s social system

•

Previous pro-CBO consortia members jettisoned the idea of group
ranch tenure as a viable option for sustainable conservation. This
affected a host of rights regimes within the community. FAO (2000)
provides a triadic taxonomy of land rights which include use rights,
control rights, and transfer rights. Privatization destabilized all these
regimes and compounded the challenges of tenural conflict among
community members and between communities and the wildlife
agencies. The Amboseli Partnership was drawn into these conflicts

•

There occurred a shift in power within communities as young men
from previously marginalized age-sets and a new middle class
acquired land and ventured into agriculture and agro-pastoralism
(Grandin n.d., Galaty 1992). Rights shifted drastically within the local
informal structures of the Maasai system. A second shift in power saw
a new wave of elites from other parts of Kenya who came to buy land
and those who came and settled in Maasai territories after buying land
in the area. Privatization equally facilitated a shift of power within the
CBO-headed coalition. Due to the internal weaknesses of ATGRA,
international NGOs and new groups assumed a new authoritative
space. This explains ATGRA’s ephemeral role from mid 2000s.
During the pre-dissolution era, group ranches had kept ATGRA intact
by providing resources, rules, and stability.
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3.2.3: Abeyance in community momentum and the dialectic of group ranch
dissolution
Group ranch dissolution and privatization were extremely destabilizing forces on
Kajiado and many Maasai regions. Due to their abrupt and deep impact on the Kajiado’s
social and ecological dynamics, inchoate structures such as the Amboseli Association
faced more challenges. When group ranch parcelation started in the 1980s, Kajiado
became the focal locus of these changes as most group ranches in the area resorted to
subdivision. Of particular importance was the fact that dissolution began to reverse some
of the gains made in the formalization of the Amboseli Partnership. Dissolution had both
inhibitive and supportive aspects on MCPP dynamics in the empowerment project. Some
commentators allude to the perceived benefits of privatization while others claim that it
was a destabilizing rather than a stabilizing force. The key advantages of group ranch
dissolution were that that the program:
•

Paved way for the participation of actors who would have been
typically excluded by previous tenure and socio-political structures

•

Led to observable increases in agricultural production among
individual families and ranchers (e.g. Mwangi 2007, Okello 2009)

•

Helped to transform closed non-egalitarian institutions that limited
upward mobility. It also promoted new forms of agro-entrepreneurship
(Galaty 1992, Ntiati 2001, Rutten 2004, 2008, Mwangi 2007)

Disadvantages of group ranch dissolution are:
•

Recomposition of Maasai social institutions through fragmentation and
segmentation of the Maasai community’s social fabric . This was via
changes in systems of authority, resource allocation, and management
(Galvin 2009)

•

Speculation over land deals (Galaty 1994, Fitzgerald 2013) as a new
bloc of agro and eco-entrepreneurs invaded Kajiado, seemingly
destabilizing the local land market
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•

Diversification of actors in livestock production as outsiders and
insiders sought to exploit the sub-division process. This encouraged
and molded new competitive entrants onto the market

•

Alienation of community members. Maasais felt increasingly alienated
by the ranch committee members (Anderson, 162). By increasing
intra-community structural heterogeneity, dissolution created
mobilization problems as it led to low uptake of interventions by
fragmented units across the landscape

3.3: Re-organization? (2007 to date)
3.3.1: Power (a)new: A collective reconstituting of an adhocracy
Previous work has shown that collaborating partners learn from past weaknesses
when re-designing their organization (Bryson et al. 2006). Organizational learning is,
however, dependent on internal and task environments of the co-management institution
and how entities manage both systems. The Amboseli Partnership’s re-organization,
starting in 2007, was a renewed attempt by its partners to revitalize and expand the
existing vertical and horizontal linkages. It was a deliberate move to anchor comanagement in a framework encompassing coalitions which could negotiate new terms
of participation. Given the volatile nature of conservation politics during this period, the
MCPP leadership targeted activities that aimed at triggering and promoting buy-in among
community stakeholders. Additionally, to re-enlist this support, the overarching pillar for
reconstituting the MCPP involved enhancing institutional innovation. This would have
great implications on empowerment.
As things currently stand, there is an onerous task for ABRMP’s leadership with
respect to its role in developing an institutional order free of fragmentation across formal
and informal networks and multiple power centers. What seemingly occurred during the
reorganization phase was the outgrowth of an adhocracy. This is because leaders
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continued to pursue independent intra-partner rather than collective ideals. Nonetheless,
this occurred with less vigilance than in previous phases. Additionally, while there was
great potential from economies of organizational scale and scope, many coordination
problems abounded. There was not a single formal coordinating unit that underpins this
newfound zeal and collective capital. It is still difficult to tell if the Amboseli Ecosystem
Trust, the African Wildlife Foundation (which was a big funder of the new management
planning process) or the African Conservation Center’s secretariat is coordinating the
MCPP’s reorganization at the municipality-KWS secretariat. The partnership’s
reconstitution is a process as complex as its organization. Similarly, roles are not neatly
defined vis a vis the implementation process of the management plan. A strong element
of relying on multiple functional entities across many issue areas leaves the MCPP
loaded with a variety of committees, taskforces, workgroups, forums, and departments.
Like the Mara Conservancy, its organizational culture is also highly technocratic due to
the strong influence of research NGOs and conservation cartels with stakes at the
Amboseli.
The implications for community empowerment are both procedural and
substantive. As a structureless entity, the Amboseli Partnership has yet to enhance a
podium for improving organizational effectiveness vis a vis its goals of enhancing
community benefits from collaborative conservation. For instance, community
participation and its true share in the benefit sharing process are weakly articulated in the
latest management plan of 2008 to 2018. Additionally the plan’s characterization of
benefit sharing policy failures places blame on community structures rather than systemic
elements of co-management. The plan’s prioritization of community interests is low.
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Only one of the five management programs targeted as an intervention mechanisms relate
directly to community ownership and control.164 Strategic interventions targeted
improvements in collaboration but minimally contribute to community ownership of the
co-management process.
Without discounting the key organizational accomplishments in this phase, a
notable success was that partners regrouped and developed the action plan in the very
first place. Nevertheless, there is an issue of institutional design. It can bring both
positive and negative effects to empowerment. The action plan re-introduced a dominant
role for KWS. The Olkejuado Council-KWS linked consortia are happy to be the key
backstopping agents in these renewal efforts. The partnership’s structureless system also
serves to reinforce a role for these consortia in stabilizing the inherent chaos among
partners. For example, KWS has been an authoritative force, though occasionally
illegitimate in the eyes of the local Maasais, in co-opting community leadership and
institutions across the Amboseli complex. For example, a major effort to revamp the
Amboseli Association was under the aegis of KWS. This was crucial as association’s
capacity and influence within the community had faded by the time the partners were
designing this new plan.
Additionally, the partnership needed social and political capital for this initiative,
yet the transaction costs for mobilizing communities were much higher due to the
immense social and ecological changes that had taken place in the landscape. KWS and
other partners came in handy. On the other hand, the inherent disempowering feature
164

These programs are the 1) ecological management program, 2) tourism development and management
program, 3) community partnership and education program, 4) security program and 5) ecosystem
operations program. For a detailed description of these programs, see the Amboseli Ecosystem Management
Plan 2008-2018.
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again, is that the partnership’s major resource mobilization strategies are dominated by
KWS while resource production is dominated by NGOs and the private sector, at least
with regards to financial and technical resources. This means that the likelihood of the
conservation narrative fully embracing a design that can boost benefit streams for
communities is low. Arguably, it also reinforces a preservationist culture though it poses
under the pretext of a conservationist narrative. This is a major bottleneck against
discarding coercive conservation in ecosystem management.
3.3.2: Emerging elite consensus as political will for re-inventing partnership
In the re-organization phase, elite support for collaborative management shifted.
This was exhibited by elites’ accommodative posture (and this was common across many
elites, though not all coalitions). One interpretation may be that, as a group, they saw the
revamping of the partnership as an opportune time to be key players in reviving
collaboration and to act as facilitators and planners of a second founding. While this is
not characteristic of all elite coalitions, a majority with the exception of some landed
elites from the community offered and continue to offer reasonable support for comanagement. A second interpretation is that elites re-strategized their approach to
handling conflict, competition, and collaboration. They became more cautious of
collaboration processes and sought, rather, to be team players. Owing to the
unpredictable nature of conservation politics in Kajiado, they had to re-think their role in
the power equation both rationally and normatively.
Finally, there was a growth of a new sense of belonging within elite groupings
that is separate from the previous elite structure at initiation and formal inception which
was more heterogeneous. The new groupings engendered classifications that coalesce
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more around identity than around issues. This is because the land question in the
Amboseli complex became more politicized, confrontational and very complex leading
many Maasai elites to mobilize their constituents around socio-ethnic categories. This is a
means to negotiating and protecting their landscape and to protecting it from excision by
the government and new immigrants. At the same time, elites are envisioning a new role
for collaboration based not entirely on conservationist logic but also an economic one.
This approach that has a good following across the community. Maasais see the potential
in agro- and eco-entrepreneurship as venues for capital accumulation and livelihood
transformation. This explains why there has been a recent surge in community forums,
debates, and barazas and elites have assumed a new role in mobilizing communities and
galvanizing their support to revamp ATGRA and a new partnership.
Additionally, a relatively new attribute is that major non-Maasai elite coalitions are
strategically acting as ancillary ambassadors and champions united to negotiate for
stronger community representation. Collaboration finds expression in their discussions in
order to tamper the strong identity-based cleavages. It is costly to appear anti-community
or appear inactive in this environment. There are penalties such as social labeling with
connotations (such as land grabbers, foreigners, greedy, and/or exploiters) and
ostracization. This has led to an institutional order that I would call covert alignment
across elite coalitions. This process was a strategic means to offer support for
collaboration and co-management. The danger of this type of support is that it is only
effective in offering symbolic support for exploiting and maneuvering the complex
politics of wildlife resource conservation and for appropriation. This has created an
artificial base of support with no profound impact, but none the less important for
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mobilizing resources for revamping the Amboseli Partnership. The surge in numbers of
deliberative forums during this phase of the MCPP’s evolution is telling of these
developments (see for example, Reid et al., 2007).
3.3.3: A rejuvenated community capacity in a new representational order
The complex interplay between social and ecological pressures in Kajiado had a
severely impacted partner interactions, especially so within the CBO-led coalition. These
pressures nurtured more competitive and few complementary inter-relationships. At the
beginning of the partnership’s re-organization phase, partners were therefore keen on
fostering more CBO participation (see, for example, KWS 2012). The Amboseli
Association had been inactive and near defunct from 2003 to around 2006. Similarly,
there was also a very low level of trust for state affiliated institutions from communities
(Lion Guardians 2012). As stated in the previous section, the key booster for
implementation pre-reorganization was network building. The new approach was
institutional innovation. However, it failed as an element for reforming organizational
structures and in reconstituting the partnership’s organizational culture. The key strategy
underpins 1) building new relationships with the community, 2) re-building previous
ones, and 3) disbanding conflicting apparatuses.
On a different note, however, the community needed to address its own internal
organization issues. It was weakened but was still an authoritative force in the landscape.
Again, this attribute of resilience is its exposure (i.e.,the Amboseli Association ) to both
collaborative and conflict-prone contexts of co-management planning and
implementation of MAB regime-linked activities. This explains the partners’ attitude
toward the CBO in the pre-design and design stages for the management plan. Partners
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recognized that the Amboseli Association was a potent force in the power equation and
was represented despite its seemingly weak capacity. This recognition and direct
involvement in planning is a strong element of empowerment indicative of both
procedural and substantive dimensions.
Nevertheless, the current scenario of collaboration within the Amboseli
Partnership is obviously limiting the full capacity of association as a partner in a different
direction. The planning process was practical, but implementation has been a different
story all along. For example, the management plan, envisioned as the key capacitating
vehicle, is neither a practical nor a genuine tool because most of the goals are not aligned
with giving communities an upper hand in designing their own conservation programs
within their land. Various reports and commentaries distinctively refer to the Community
Scouts Program and particularly the Lion Guardians Project as a noble and practical
opportunity for community capacity building and empowerment. However, its impact has
served the interests of wildlife and conservationists as well. In fact, the program employs
a very small proportion of community morans (or warriors) as guardians. This does not
lead to meaningful change in the community; neither does it significantly improve the
aggregate household asset base.
A second program that has received much attention is the Carnivore
Compensation Scheme. This project is replete with controversies and inefficiencies that
have seen communities receive payments that do not reflect anything close to what they
lose through predation, diseases, and destruction of crops. These are all costs incurred
from hosting wildlife. There is however some promising effort being undertaken in
building the capacity of community to uptake PES project skills for better conservation
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and management in some sectors. For example, some projects bundle up conservation
projects by integrating carbon stocks and watershed services as a way to diversify and
increase the revenue stream for communities in the Amboseli. With direct financial
benefits, community stewardship is increasing and the viability of the Amboseli
landscape is showing some promising outcomes.
4: Collaboration as constrictive co-management: Porini Eco-Lodge as a case study
This section examines the key features of an eco-tourism project which is a case
study of MCPP-mediated empowerment with an exegesis of the mechanisms and models
of implementation. By juxtaposing the project outcomes onto the procedural-substantive
empowerment continuum, these outcomes are discerned as modest power sharing and
very weak power shifting interventions.
4.1: History of the PES project
Porini is a Swahili language term that means “in the wild”. The project founders
use the word as an acronym for Protection of Resources (Indigenous & Natural) for
Income, thus Porini. The pre-project negotiation and planning began in the mid-1980s
(Zeppel 2006) though a more formalized deal began in 1995 (Rutten 2004) under the
auspices of KWS. The aim was to encourage the Eselenkei community to set up a
wildlife sanctuary in partnership with a private investor. The lodge was set up in April
1997 (Zeppel 2006: 127) in a portion of land leased from the Eselenkei (also Selenkay)165
Group Ranch owned by the Kisonko Maasai. It is located inside the Eselenkei
Conservation Area (ECA) which constitutes a total land area of 15,000 acres in the
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This group ranch was established in 1979 and has about 11,200 members owning 47,974 ha of land. A
Group Ranch Committee of 10 representing the three clans of the members (Coupe et al. 2002: 7-8)
administers it.
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northern section wildlife dispersal area of the Amboseli complex in the Loitoktok
Division. It is about 100 miles from Nairobi.
4.2: Operability of the PES project
The eco-lodge is located on a land area that is under a leasehold concession
between Porini Ecotourism, which is a non-profit company as the concessionaire, and the
Eselenkei community as the lessor. Under this recreation concession, the partnership’s
formal agreement initiated the Porini Ecotourism Project. The agreement was signed in
1996, formalized in May1997 with a contracted period of 15 (Zeppel 2007: 127). These
provisions condition this voluntary contract:
•

The title to the conservation lot would remain with the Eselenkei
community

•

Porini would operate, manage, and improve recreation infrastructure
within the given conservation lot

•

Porini was granted exclusive use rights of Eselenkei Conservation
Area (ECA).166 This designated about 10% of community land as a
sanctuary

•

The operator would gain a business opportunity to provide recreation
services and support its tourist enterprise

•

The community was to provide land to be designated as a conservation
area and to support the operator in providing tourist recreation services

•

The community could graze inside the ECA but according specific
provisions pegged on grazing range capacity

•

The community would gain resources including finance, infrastructure,
and usufruct rights such as access to grazing and water areas for their
cattle during the dry season.
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This was after Porini demanded that a formal registration of Eselenkei Conservation Area must precede
the signing of the agreement (Zeppel 2006, 127).
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Simultaneously, as a PES-like project engendering a rewards-based process and
payments linked community efforts to specific conservation activities and outcomes.
These are commonly referred to as “effort-based payments” (see OECD 2010: 3, 2013:
62). Additionally, the formality of the concession agreement is anchored in the Land Act
(1968) Cap 287, which mandates sustainable land administration by community group
ranch committees. Thus, the role of relevant CBOs in this project has similar operative
structures and functions to those of the Laikipia Wildlife Forum.167 The key expectation
is Eselenkei community’s enforcement of sustainable grazing practices within the
conservation area. The CBO structures ensure that regulations limit excision and
encroachment by checking, reporting, and securing conservation borders. Because some
lease clauses are in contestation, it has created a miscreant culture among the community
based on claims of skewed land use rights favoring Porini and denying the Eselenkei
community clear and fair usufruct rights to the conservation area.
Porini project’s concession contract was designed to favor of the investor right
from its initiation, making it less capable of ensuring community empowerment. This
happenstance was not entirely an outcome of the contract design alone. It was also an
outgrowth of structural weaknesses within the Eselenkei community and a limiting legal
framework for group ranch administration. The primary source of contention was that
Porini’s exclusive rights limited the community from pursuing its livelihood base in three
ways: 1) jurisdictional-administrative, 2) financial, and 3) scope of usufruct rights. The
project’s evolution also reasserts participatory development proponents’ observation that
tenure and contract regimes hold the key to empowerment. Not surprisingly, the project’s
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Like many other group ranches, this group ranch is governed by a legal trust, which is a company
limited by guarantee as the holding representative institution.
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initiation was not problematic. However, once implementation began, the real issues
emerged.168 Various commentators and observers provide vivid illustrations of the
sources and elements of the conflict.
Jurisdictional factors posed additional problems for this project. The prime factor
leading to the clash between Porini and the Eselenkei community was the granting of
exclusive rights of 7000 acres to Porini without community consent. According to Rutten
(2004) “…the committee either was unaware, or failed to notify members…most
members understood that the 40 acres were the full extent of the lease” (11). The group
ranch committee (GRC) did not consult group members when signing the final contract.
Thus, the benefit-sharing agreement confined its rewards to a plan that disfavored the
community. Porini seemed to have an upper hand in accessing large benefits. However,
the prime cause of this discrepancy was the group ranch committee’s ineptitude and
corruption. The agreement had been finalized earlier following a series of group ranch
meetings and a final decision had been made that the contract would be signed minus
exclusive rights. This committee was not transparent when negotiating the final
concession agreement. By the time project implementation began, the community was in
disbelief by their entrapment in a fait accompli.
This design problem (of an adjusted contract) set off a domino effect that saw an
emergence of ambiguous rules for access, use and management of the conservation area
and surrounding community land. In this regard, the legal framework equally inhibited
corrective measures that could help tackle the committee’s ineptitude. Under law, the
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Rutten’s Partnerships in Community-based ecotourism projects: Experiences from Maasai region,
Kenya(2004) and her oft cited Park Beyond Parks are some of the most important references describing
the ensuing confrontations and tensions in project implementation. See also Mburu 2004, Okello 2002,
Coupe et al (2002).
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group ranch committee has protection because it is a key representative, administrative,
and project approval entity. Nevertheless, law can only be an enabler of empowerment
with community readiness and ability to effectively uptake legal support. It is incumbent
upon communities to create effective and accountable self-government mechanisms that
build their capacity to negotiate agreements with the external entrepreneurs. This is rarely
the case. While the Group Ranch Act sets strict provisions for community consultation
and implementation, the enforcement relies heavily on commitment and professionalism
within the group ranch committees. It bears repeating that these committees have a poor
record of leadership and a high proclivity to corruption (Ngethe n.d., Ntiati 2002,
Mwangi and Rutten 1995). In fact, they frequently find ways to override legal provisions.
The tensions between the Eselenkei and Porini erupted and surged because “the
agreement did not mention what access group ranch members [had] to the conservation
area…” (Coupe et al. 2002, 12). Moreover, an imbalance in the contract denied the group
ranch members access and usufruct rights to the rangeland. Coupe and associates
documents that in the event of an injury by wildlife inhabiting or foraging within the
conservation area, group ranch members could not seek insurance from the operator but
from their group ranch office. This was a skewed compensation structure considering that
the contract initially allowed grazing within the conservation area. Additionally, when the
community’s stocking densities increased, it was not granted additional grazing land but
access was based on the initial contract capacity clause.
In 1999, due to internal strife over the contract, the group ranch members decided
to establish a Conservation Committee to complement the work of the group ranch
committee in administering the annual fees received from Porini. Members agreed that
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each committee should manage the revenues on a 50:50 arrangement (Coupe et al. 2002,
Rutten 2004). This did not work, as the conservation committee could only exist as a
passive surrogate of the existing committee. For one reason, as Coupe and associates
argue, Porini insisted on “continuing to liaise only with the ranch committee, with whom
they made the original agreement.” (12). It suffices to mention that the conservation
committee’s positive standing and following within the community was legally
irrelevant, because its existence is not backed by any legal provisions in the Group Ranch
Act. For a second reason, the conservation committee’s weak presence was linked to the
fact that its management was run by apparatchiks and disgruntled exiles who were former
group ranch committee members. Rumors abounded that its leadership was corrupt as
well (Rutten 2002). Additionally, the embattled group ranch committee was not fully
isolated as some group ranch members favored the Porini project and saw its potential in
helping improve their livelihoods. The Conservation Committee finally disbanded.
The underlying administrative issues portray weak capacity that serves to limit
community institutional proprietorship vis a vis its interaction with the private sector who
are usually well resourced and internally cohesive. With such weak influence, it is
unrealistic to imagine that CBOs would successfully negotiate contracts that empower
them or their communities. It is also telling that the bulk of the recommendations
advanced by proponents of participation and resource mobilization theory should focus
on internal capacity issues of communities and more specifically, substantive elements
such as effectiveness and accountability. Their immense focus on empowerment as an
element of endogenous mechanisms and interventions militates against a healthy and
practical inquiry into the why and how of empowerment.
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Porini is interesting in that it is a formally recognized community institution that
through its leadership negotiated a disempowering contract. The result is a conservation
project that excludes communities from an equitable benefit sharing process. Similarly,
protests in the conservation area used by Eselenkei clans have been futile. However,
confrontational protest politics have waned as a tactic for mobilizing resources and
support, and this may have built some level of measured understanding between the
investor and the community. The community relies heavily on local Members of
Parliaments (MPs) and chiefs rather than national or bureaucratic elite to quell conflict,
facilitate reconciliation and increase amicable relations around the conservation area.
This does not mean that renewing investor-community relations has been a smooth
sailing. Infact, the Porini project encountered spells of aggressive tactics by the
community, including (among others) burning of facility structures, stamping out project
sign posts, illegal grazing and settlement, threats, pressure for venture staff dismissal and
media campaigns (Coupe et al. 2002, Rutten 2004). To date, the community continues to
contest for their rights.
4.3: Efficiency of PES under the MCPP model
4.3.1: Property rights framework
The importance of strong property rights resurfaces again. Mainstream comanagement studies focus on property rights as an end in itself, yet it is also a means to
an end. Property rights incentivize conservation processes in arenas of co-management.
In fact, it has been noted that in Kenya, “co-management is favored by owning titled to
land” (Mburu 2004: 6). Porini’s ecotourism project is not a case of excision. Porini’s
inequitable profit-making strategy and tensions with the community were enabled by
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weak guardian community institutions. The battle stems from community claims that the
group ranch committee awarded a lease contract to Porini in a scheme that aimed to deny
the community its proper share of the deal. When the agreement finalized, group ranch
members were not aware that Porini won exclusive rights to the conservation area
(Rutten 2004). The pressure and strong negotiating position of Tropical Places (Porini's
parent company) lured the ranch committee into signing the contract with an exclusive
rights clause.
A fair assessment of Porini’s goals must also refer to its mission. Though it may
seem symbolic, Porini argues that it supports a strong property rights regime that protects
the land of the communities with which it collaborates. Its investment model “favors
lease arrangements rather than full land buyouts which, it argues, displaces local
communities, destabilizes their livelihood systems, and dis-incentivizes wildlife
conservation” (Porini Website). In terms of empowerment, the community has little or no
influence in managing the conservation area.
4.3.2: Payments and rewards framework
As previously discussed, unclear property rights are considered to be significant
barriers to the successful implementation of PES projects (Padilla 2005, Greiber et al.
2009). The Porini ecotourism project serves to validate this argument. The nature of the
contest politics of tenure in this case is not about ownership but access and management
of resources and revenues derived from protection of ecosystems and provision of
ecosystem services, particularly, the recreation services inside the Eselenkei
Conservation Area. This case is more paradoxical as it illustrates how intra-community
forces work to deny members the rights to benefits sharing from a collaborative project.
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Secondly, weak MCPP-mediated efforts do not help either. The community’s role is
neither bleak nor as promising as that of its counterpart in the Il Ngwesi project. In order
to evaluate the real empowerment outcomes for the Porini Project as a case of Payment
for Wildlife Service (PWS) program, we can evaluate four features of its efficiency in
four aspects that provide a way to capture procedural and substantive impacts. (See figure
5.3).
5: Conclusions
The Amboseli Partnership’s evolution indicates that collaboration can
simultaneously enable empowerment and accentuate (dis)empowerment of communities.
At inception, empowerment occurred through extensive consultation and decision making
by the CBO partner. At organization phase, arenas of collaboration allowed the CBO to
partake of the opportunities afforded but also legitimated its exclusion in subtle ways
through an overbearing conservationist narrative to deny the community its rights.
Conservationists and the private sector were key actors that nurtured the structures that
impeded empowerment. Both sectors jettisoned their role as advocates of community
rights. At re-organization, overemphasis on networking rather than institutional
innovation served to limit empowerment opportunities due to the lack of coordination and
the reinforcement of a fortress system of the KWS apparatuses. There were multifarious
sources of low levels of empowerment. Maasai social systems are themselves primarily
stratified and thus undemocratic and exclusive making them disempowering structures as
well.
All the hypothesized relationships were confirmed in this case study. In addition,
three other factors observed in the Laikipia case, namely MCPP convener-facilitator
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characteristics, property rights regimes and organizational evolution, mediate the
empowerment process in Amboseli. Certainly, distributing decision-making power turns
out to be the most important explanation for increased (or weak) community
empowerment. In this case, decentralizing power was not enough to allow real
empowerment. This is because strong internal contradictions and external influences
weighed heavily on partnership activities that in turn sapped effort from crucial
empowerment interventions. In particular, during the organization phase, the
partnership’s agenda positioned the private sector’s agenda, with conservationists and the
two municipalities of Olkejuado and Loitoktok as the key agents for planning and
implementing the conservation agenda and projects.
The findings on the Amboseli Partnership’s evolution affirm that elite support is a
strong determinant of empowerment in all the three phases of partnership evolution. This
variable equally manifests itself as a strong influence at the project level. Elite support
impacts community empowerment in multiple dimensions. First, during the initiation of
the partnership, the elites supported the process though this depended entirely on
coalition structures encompassing advocacy, bureaucracy, community, conservationist,
epistemic, and political coalitions. Additionally, the Amboseli Partnership’s experience
reveals the fact that CBO capacity is a critical variable during the initiation phase of
partnership and at formal inception. In fact, this evolution serves to explain ATGRA’s
resilience in the face of abrupt changes in the socio-ecological system around Kajiado.
Evidence from this case also concurs with the three approaches that informed this
research. There is need for community organizations to have more capacity in comanagement settings with weak property rights, but as was discussed, even strong
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property rights regimes can break down due to external perturbations and unaccountable
community institutions. Thus capacity is paramount here as well. Furthermore, the
partnership’s pre-MCPP socialization process afforded by the MAB dispensation
complements the Resource Mobilization Theory proponents’ spotlighting of the
significance of material and organizational resources for community-based organizations.
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CHAPTER 5
THE MARA CONSERVANCY
1: Introduction
The Maasai Mara National Reserve (hereafter, Maasai Mara Reserve) is Kenya’s
most important protected area complex and the country’s key source of tourism-based
revenue. Prior to the inception of the Mara Conservancy, the reserve’s inept, corrupt, and
inefficient management system threatened the survival of the reserve’s ecosystem, the
municipal and national revenue base, and local livelihoods. These concerns tie to the
worrisome trend in which the unabated decline of iconic mega fauna within the reserve
and dispersal areas threatens to decimate this important element of biodiversity (Cheung
2012). These concerns equally prompted an unanticipated response from a section of
leaders of Trans Mara government. They initiated the Mara Conservancy as a partnership
for introducing effective management.
In an interview with the BBC, the Conservancy’s Chief Executive, Brian Heath,
described the pre-MCPP era’s sorry status in provocative but realistic statements. He
stated, “…the Mara is seen as a cash cow. All the revenue… goes out and nothing gets
ploughed back… money remitted was being taken by corrupt officials within the county
council...”169 Under such circumstances, it was paramount that radical reforms addressed
these issues. Moreover, it came as a surprise when the management rights of the Mara
Triangle transferred to the Mara Conservancy. The municipal government’s steadfastness
in devolving rights to this entity nurtured a backlash that would come to have major
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This interview is titled “Kenya’s Maasai Mara Game Reserve under threat” was conducted by Andrew
Harding of the British Broadcasting Corporation’s (BBC) on 4/9/01. This interview took place during the
initiation phase of the Conservancy. The complete interview can be found BBC online at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/events/newsnight/1531204.stm
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implications for the MCPP’s role in Kenya’s most significant protected area complex.
This chapter investigates the nature of the tensions that propelled structural challenges for
CBO empowerment for a partnership whose reform-oriented agenda anticipated more
empowered communities yet created a much weaker community constituency.
2: Devolution and contested reform at the Mara Triangle
The key mission of Mara Conservancy is “working with local leaders,
communities, and tourism partners in order to better protect the Mara Triangle and its
surrounding ecosystem through the use of effective and efficient management methods
that enhance the economical value of conservation to better protect the Mara complex
and its surrounding ecosystem” (Mara Conservancy n.d.).170 Unlike the Laikipia Wildlife
Forum and the Amboseli Partnership, this partnership’s model has very specific
objectives and has a less complex organizational structure. According to Jones (2008), its
conservation goals are to “reintroduce the roan antelope and wild dog, to ensure a healthy
population threshold of species such as rhino and lion, and to study means of facilitating
regeneration of the dwindling numbers of balanites trees and forest and woodland
cover….” The dynamics in the co-management program of the Mara complex suggests
that the distribution of decision-making power is the most important explanation for
community and CBO empowerment, and its lack thereof.
Regardless of the perspective on empowerment that appeals to an observer, the
undeniable fact is that the initiation of the Mara Conservancy is a case of devolution, at
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The term Mara complex consistently applies in this chapter. This area constitutes the Mara Triangle and
the eastern reserve section, which is the Mara Reserve and the adjacent dispersal areas. The Triangle and
the Eastern Mara Reserve are the core areas of the Maasai Mara National Reserve. They were until recently
administered by Trans Mara and Narok local governments respectively. The Trans Mara government
transferred the Mara Triangle’s management authority to the Mara Conservancy. This is the section under
investigation. Under the current law and after the 2013 elections, the Narok County technically manages
both sections though the Mara Conservancy is yet to hand over management to the Narok County
government.
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least in theory, though not entirely in practice. Devolution immediately nurtured
transformative power when management of the Mara Triangle transferred from the
municipal government of Trans Mara to the Mara Conservancy. However, the ensuing
politics and power struggles among partners presented a paradox that proponents of
participatory development have always feared. While there was a successful transfer of
power, the issue to investigate is to whom and what institution the power transferred. The
tensions exhibited in Mara Conservancy’s evolution and the protracted struggles serve to
validate participatory development proponents’ apprehension about what real power
shifting and power sharing means for devolutionists.
In this MCPP, the design sketchily embedded the community’s role. Reform
through devolution can facilitate democratic management of protected areas.171 Yet,
Ribot (2011) cautions that it matters into whose hands these discretionary powers
transfer. Additionally, Ribot argues that effectiveness is not the only indicator of reform.
Notwithstanding, there is need for awareness that designers of MCPPs face a difficult
balancing act as they have to address tradeoffs between effectiveness and
representativeness. That was the dilemma for the founding leadership of the
Conservancy. Additionally, its leadership had to amass resources to address a legacy of
abysmal management and elite interference. Extreme inefficiency is a plague in the
management structure of the Maasai Mara Reserve. The pre-MCPP system lacked
mechanisms that could incentivize conservation or enable sustained community
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I categorically use the term devolution in this case study unlike in the other two cases because the Mara
Conservancy is a clear case in which management powers were fully transferred from a governmental to a
non-governmental entity. The Mara Conservancy retains the powers and authority over the Mara Triangle.
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empowerment in the Mara complex.172 The ecosystem in the Mara Complex was under
threat and the reserve’s status as a large pool for biodiversity products and recreation
services was immensely degraded. This mismanagement had progressively reduced the
quality of the park’s tourism. It was ineffective at addressing increasingly deteriorating
security and was inefficient at managing challenges linked to the reserve’s poor
infrastructure. This was the basis for the introduction of PES projects of the Mara
Conservancy.
In its June 2013 report, the Mara Conservancy stated “the policy in Kenya where
wildlife belongs to the state and people are expected to co-exist with animals at their
expense does not work. Our challenge is to find ways to provide incentives for people to
protect animals on private land. It is a huge challenge and we need to think outside the
box. If we do not, there will be no wildlife left outside protected areas in a few years…”
The Mara Conservancy has promoted payments for wildlife services (PWS) schemes
though its key focus is on managerial reforms and infrastructure development. Its
reconstruction programs are helping ecosystem services providers such as &Beyond and
ecosystem goods preservers (including reserve-adjacent communities) and other buyers
to optimize on safer, efficient and more reliable infrastructural systems within the Mara
Triangle. Due to these efforts, the movement of people and wildlife are now secure,
poachers and predators are contained, recreation services quality has improved and
surpassed veteran ventures, and operational costs are modest for private ventures. This
occurred largely because the protection of the ecosystem and the supply of needed
ecosystem goods and services are well coordinated. However, as will be seen, this
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The Mara complex, hereafter, refers to the geographic and jurisdictional boundaries encompassing the
Maasai Mara National Reserve and adjoining private and group lands near the reserve in the wildlife
dispersal areas that are largely Maasai communal lands. This landmass is the Greater Mara Ecosystem.
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orientation has sidelined real community engagement in PES implementation process
within the Mara Triangle.
3: Location as context for the MCPP
The Mara Conservancy is a partnership with the mandate of managing the Mara
Triangle. The Mara Triangle is the Western section of the Maasai Mara Reserve and
constitutes about one-third of the reserve (see Figure 5.1). The Mara complex forms part
of Serengeti-Mara, which co-traverses land areas in Northern Tanzania encompassing the
Serengeti National Park and Southern Kenya where the Maasai Mara Reserve is located.
The Mara complex is the ecological link point for the Serengeti and Mara complexes. It is
approximately 6000 km. square, of which the reserve covers 1,510 km. square of the total
area leaving approximately 4,490 km. square as an unprotected (Richmond-Coggan 2006,
9) area of about 510 km. square. The Conservancy is famous as the habitat for the famous
wildebeest and zebra migrations considered one of the Seven Wonders of the World.
A climatology summary of the Mara Triangle would classify the area as an arid
and semi-arid land, ASAL (Ondicho 2005). The surrounding populations are as
vulnerable and prone to food insecurity as their counterparts in Laikipia and Kajiado.
Poor and intermittent rains affect agricultural productivity in major sections of the
Triangle. Comparatively, however, some sections of the Mara Triangle are located in rich
agricultural and grazing land that receives high rainfall. The ecology of the Mara
complex places it as one of Kenya’s richest, in an area of about 510 km. square. The
Conservancy is famous as the habitat for the famous wildebeest and zebra migrations
considered one of the Seven Wonders of the World.
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Figure 8: Map of the Greater Maasai Mara Reserve

A climatology summary of the Mara Triangle would classify the area as an arid
and semi-arid land, ASAL (Ondicho 2005). The surrounding populations are as
vulnerable and prone to food insecurity as their counterparts in Laikipia and Kajiado.
Poor and intermittent rains affect agricultural productivity in major sections of the
Triangle. Comparatively, however, some sections of the Mara Triangle are located in rich
agricultural and grazing land that receives high rainfall. The ecology of the Mara
complex places it as Kenya’s and indeed one of the world’s protected areas with the
highest density and diversity of wildlife (Georgiadis et al. 2007; Ogada 2012). It is also
the only protected area system in Kenya with a population of indigenous black rhinos and
the only park in which they are native species (AWF 2009, 8). It is a top hotspot and
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home to the large carnivores and serves the largest habitat for endangered species in
Kenya. However, fears loom large as these species are facing extinction due to rampant
poaching and competition from shifting livelihood practices that favor livestock keeping.
Mara complex’s demography is ethnically diverse though the Maasai community
constitutes the largest cluster. These communities rely on the support system of the Mara
River and the Maasai-Mau Forest. Maasai group and private ranchers own a large portion
of land contiguous to the reserve. Some private land is on lease to foreign companies
engaging in ecotourism ventures (Bedelian 2012). Livestock production and agriculture
are the predominant activities in the Mara complex. More than three-quarters of its
population is directly and indirectly reliant on transhumant, agro-pastoralist and tourism
ventures. This complex is Kenya’s highest earning wildlife tourist destination (NortonsGriffin 2007) and Narok County is Kenya’s richest county as its earnings usually stand at
about KSh. 1.2 billion per annum and KSh. 200 million per day (Kemei 2011). Narok is
also Kenya’s leading producer of beef, wheat, and barley, which all propel the economies
of Narok and Trans Mara.
4: Operation and structure of the MCPP
4.1: Organizational principles and objectives
A clear understanding of the operations of the Mara Conservancy is its
foundational basis (i.e., initial conditions). This MCPP was specifically set up to
implement new management practices for addressing structural and administrative
inefficiencies in the reserve. In fact, its key role was to provide management expertise.173
As a collaborative entity, partners whose vision strategically relied on two sets of
173

The CEO of the Mara Conservancy, Brian Heath, aptly echoed this point in a 2008 interview with
Safaritalk. It was conducted on July 5, 2008 and the full interview can be found at Safaritalk website on
http://safaritalk.net/topic/266 -brian-heath-the-mara-conservancy/
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principles to inform their broader objectives spearheaded its initiation. These included
principles aiming at reforming institutions and enforcing operational rules for protected
areas management. As such, transparency and managerial efficiency became the leading
pillars of the MCPP’s organizational culture and operational mission.174 In essence,
restructuring of governance systems was the chief concern for the founding partners. This
was the first basis for an open reporting system for the MCPP’s budgets and revenues.
This goal has continued to define Mara Conservancy’s organizational culture. Online and
public digital domains are the key sources of information access.
Efficiency defines a second feature of the MCPP’s organizational culture. It is a
means to achieve profitability and mainstreaming programs that integrate and
operationalize incentive-based regulatory and compensatory tools. These include
disclosure of budgets and revenues, increasing co-management through the scouting
program, enabling a more transparently structured process of revenue sharing, support for
eco-ventures and support for compensation schemes. While securing participation of
local communities was an objective principle on which the founders initiated the MCPP,
participation was a weak feature of institutional design. It is clearly visible (in subsequent
sections) that it was going to be difficult to draw reasonable support for collaboration
with the community because effectiveness immediately became an overriding principle
defining MCPP priorities once the entity was initiated. Simultaneously, the urgency to
embed accountability in MCPP operations meant that transparency became a critical
complementing principle. This pushed representativeness as a sideline pillar for guiding
partnership operations.
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Indeed, the Mara Conservancy profiles as an entity designed to ensure accountability, transparency, and
efficiency by NGOs such as Artists for Conservation.
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The MCPP’s leadership affirmation of its support for a benefit-sharing program
was in its implementation of a payment system that guarantees surrounding communities
19% of the revenues accrued from the ticketed sales charged to users of the various
recreational services around the Mara Triangle. It is reasonable to mention that
effectiveness camouflages Mara Conservancy’s modest embrace of representativeness. In
part, the best interpretation is in terms of the effects of initial conditions that facilitated an
organizational culture that privileges effectiveness as the pillar principle of management.
Comparatively, the MCPP foundation was rooted on a reactive response to poor
governance. This differs from the initial conditions on which the Laikipia Wildlife Forum
was initiated where partners’ embrace of a proactive culture was a gateway to inclusive
co-management. It differs from the Amboseli Partnership’s putative roots embeddedness
onto Amboseli complex’s biosphere reserve status.
The primary objective of the Mara Conservancy is “effective management of the
Triangle’s riverine forest, the Mara River, the annual wildebeest and zebra migratory
phenomenon, and other flora and fauna” (Jones 2008). This objective is predicated upon
its mandate, granted for the protection of ecosystem integrity, and one of the most visited
protected areas in the world. At initiation, the Conservancy was under contract from the
County Council of Trans Mara that mandated it to manage the Mara Triangle on behalf of
the Maasai. This model of partnership was well received in some sections and criticized
by other sections of the community. The Conservancy had a tough task mobilizing and
institutionalizing local support for implementing the management plan. Its leadership
under Brian Heath is striving to enhance effectiveness with better commitment than
exhibited by the previous administration. This has led to both successful and unsuccessful
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program implementation outcomes. Comparatively, the Mara Conservancy does not have
a strong structure for building community capacity in co-management like the Laikipia
Wildlife Forum. It has weaker mainstreaming structures and programs compared to those
of the Amboseli Partnership. Its approach to capacity building is limited to technical
programs, and scaling-up is not functionally integrated or geographically alike in the two
other cases of MCPPs. The objectives of the Conservancy fall along these three
themes175:
1. Infusing and operationalizing the principle of effectiveness in co-management by:
• Initiating structures for effective management of natural and financial capital
of the Mara Triangle
•

Initiating, organizing and integrating regulatory and compensatory tools as comanaging elements in the Mara Triangle

•

Delegating and supervising MCPP units and departments mandated to
perform specific program and support tasks

•

Overseeing the effective implementation of the management plan

2. Promoting a network for collaborative practice by:
• Institutionalizing local support for the conservation of Mara Triangle’s
ecosystem
•

Mobilizing various stakeholders for collaborative management

•

Facilitating and supporting participatory co-management within the Mara
complex

•

Mobilizing financial resources for sustaining partnership’s activities

3. Protecting bio-diversity within the Mara complex by:
• Initiating contract-based ecosystem management programs such as PES
projects
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This list was compiled through an elaborate process of analyzing data from interviews with
governmental officials at Trans Mara and Narok offices and local Maasai community leadership, from the
vast review of literature on the Maasai Mara and MCPP documents such as monthly reports.
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•

Enhancing organizational capacity of CBOs around the Triangle and other
sections of the Mara complex.

4.2: Organizational rules guiding partnership operations
The legal status of the Mara Conservancy has its basis in two foundations. One is
formal which defines the entity’s mandate granted by the Trans Mara County Council
while the second one is informal, its network with the wider Maasai community around
the Mara Triangle and the Mara complex. Its formality grants it the status of a standard
non-profit entity. The Conservancy is a management company that operates under
ordinary company rules. The core governance rules are found in the organization’s
founding document called the Management Plan. Rules governing add-on initiatives are
set according to this plan. The Conservancy’s staff and the clients co-implement
contracts. As a not-for-profit management company, the Companies Act mandates that
the Conservancy organize around specific structures and statute-specific activities.
4.3: Organizational roles of key decision-makers
The Chief Executive Director of the Mara Conservancy is the head of the core
executive team. He/she assumes this position based on his/her specialized knowledge and
experience on conservation matters. The director has both managerial and fiduciary
responsibilities, oversees the day-to-day operations of the Conservancy, and is the key
convener of all the critical meetings and briefings organized by the secretariat. The first
and the only chief executive of the Conservancy has been Brian Heath, who is a
renowned Kenyan conservationist and rangeland management specialist. The director
also identifies and engages potential buyers and supporters of ecosystem service
provision within the Mara Triangle, prepares proposals with assistance from the staff and
the board, markets the Conservancy’s products, and fundraises for the projects that
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support the vast conservation activities within and without the Triangle. The director is
the chief informant on activities undertaken by the partnership. He prepares and
disseminates updates on infrastructural, administrative, capacity development, and
conservation programs.
The Mara Conservancy’s board is the highest formal authority within the
partnership. Like the Forum and the Amboseli Partnership, its board is a reflection of the
local social, administrative, and geographic representation. It is comprised of members
representing the central and local government, constituting the County Clerk, games and
forest committee members, and three committee members from the Maasai community.
Additional members are from a pool of experts encompassing protected areas managers,
ecologists, and finance and tourism experts. Board member selection occurs during the
annual meeting. Comparatively, the MCPP’s board composition is smaller. The key
functions of the board include ensuring an accountable, fair, and transparent revenue
sharing process, and reviewing and approving the Terms of Reference for its members
and the director. Additionally, it plays a role in supporting the review team on matters of
board governance, selecting and dismissing directors, reviewing annual work plans,
preparing proposals, negotiating lease agreements with surrounding group ranches,
identifying revenue collection agencies to help the organization manage its finances and
to prepare reports for auditors. The board is accountable to its members but unlike the
other two MCPPs, the level of involvement of governmental functionaries in this board is
more pronounced and much politicized (see for example, the Ecoforum 2002, 2003).
The secretariat of the Mara Conservancy is in Kilgoris. It has a core and support
staff encompassing a finance manager, a personal assistant to the director, and staff from
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different units in administration, security, and fundraising. The agreement between
county council and the Conservancy stipulates that a section of this staff obtain
secondment from the County Council though a good portion of support should be from
the community. This staff assists in the coordination and implementation of the
Management Plan. They are involved in the groundwork necessary to execute annual
work plans. The Conservancy’s aim is to ensure that benefits accrued from providing
ecosystem services around the Mara Triangle are locale-specific enough to trickle down
to its residents. In application of this principle, it has regularly maintained about a 95%
level of local staff who are native residents of the Trans Mara area.
The Mara Conservancy supports and advocates for increased CBO participation in
conservation of biodiversity not just within the Triangle but also across the entire Mara
complex. Like its counterparts in Laikipia and the Amboseli, the Conservancy works
closely with forest, wildlife and water resource-user associations. Within this partnership,
CBOs act as points of mobilization and interest aggregation for local communities. In the
entire Mara complex, CBOs face a much tougher role as partners and as representative
institutions.176 In fact, owing to this predicament, the Maasai are credited as the key the
initiators of the indigenous movement in Africa and the most active participants of the
global indigenous movement (Igoe 2006). CBOs serve social, political, and civic
purposes for local Maasai communities because they are the venues in which members
find expression, and articulate and defend their identity. Additionally, due to the
contentious nature of governance issues in the entire Mara complex, CBOs are, to borrow
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The existence of widespread and poor governance that plagues the Maasai Mara National Reserve
including inequitable resource distribution has been widely cited across research studies, opinion pieces,
and evaluations. Political, structural-systemic, and capacity related factors are blamed as catalytic elements
inhibiting effective governance in Kenya’s most lucrative reserve.
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Ndahida’s (2011) term, “sources and substance of identification of rights.” It is an
undisputed fact, and as Ndahida further avers, that the Maasai harbor historical
grievances over continued denial of their rights in this estate. More so, this reality cannot
be divorced from the daily practices within the social and ecological landscape, which the
Maasai feel have significantly altered if not destroyed their livelihood.177 CBOs are
definitive institutions for solving the human-wildlife conflict that is prevalent in
Maasailand.
The County Council of Trans Mara is a local authority with its administrative
headquarters located in Kilgoris. The Clerk of the county government sits on the board of
the Mara Conservancy and provides advisory services that are crucial to the partnership.
Prior to the 2010 Constitution, Trans Mara was one of the districts in the Rift Valley
Province. It emerged from Narok District in 1994 and became the only local authority in
the district. The key responsibility of this municipal government in the partnership is to
act as the public arm of co-management and support the stakeholders in operationalizing
the political and democratic realm of subsidiarity. It has received both accolades and
criticism from many quarters, yet its role in mandating the Mara Conservancy is laudable.
This was the first formal wildlife-based public-private initiative in the country and a
precursor to an MCPP platform. The Trans Mara county government is one of the most
powerful actors in the partnership. It closely works with the Conservancy in matters of
regulation and enforcement. This works to enhance the security apparatus of the
177

The impact of Maasai land dispossession is rooted in both colonial legacy and post-colonial state polices
which anchored on the fortress approach to conservation. Narok and Kajiado are some of the epicenters of
CBO activism where annexation was most rampant. Community activism has had a long contentious
history. Records indicate that the Maasai lost about 60% of their best pastures in two waves of land
alienation: first, in the 1911 evictions that created European settlements and the second one in 1945 during
the creation of parks and reserves across their lands (Mwangi 2007 and Galaty 1999 cited Aboud et al.
2012, 1).
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Conservancy to promote safety of both the residents and wildlife through its by-laws that
complement provisions in the Management Plan.
The Trans Mara county government also assists in the design and implementation
of environmental impact assessments (EIAs) for private operators within the region. Its
role is to complement other stakeholders in marketing and rapport building strategies for
potential buyers of ecosystem services within and beyond the Mara Triangle. This
government complements the work of the Conservancy because besides the Conservancy,
its regulatory unit is the only entity that authorizes and approves the establishment of
business ventures. It handles petitions and objections linked to land use aand business and
development programs undertaken by any partner or outside clients. The Trans Mara
county government’s authoritative appeal gives it a commanding presence that facilitates
expedient convening of barazas when salient issues such as human-wildlife conflicts
need addressing in a collective platform.
There is little public discussion about how the private sector contributes to the
enhancement of ecosystem provision in the Greater Mara.178 The Mara complex has a
large expanse of land leased to corporate and individual business ventures from all over
the world. In the Triangle section, the Mara Conservancy has instituted very stringent
rules for these ventures. Nonetheless, private sector entities have modestly adjusted to
these standards and have been collaborating with other stakeholders to preserve this
ecosystem. The Mara Triangle hosts one of the world’s most unique biodiversity and
ecosystem products, including its famous wildebeests migration, which has lured the
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This is largely because the wildlife cum tourist-based private sector has a tarnished image fully
ingrained in Kenyan society, one, which views it a conspirator that works with the county governments to
rob local communities.
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private business sector into this partnership. The major roles of the private sector in this
partnership are:179
•

Supporting the Mara Conservancy in achieving its mission and vision,

•

Integrating conservation into operations of its activities

•

Monitoring biodiversity conservation standards within the Mara
complex

•

Sharing information with other partners about changes in ecosystem
dynamics

•

Fundraising for and supporting community projects around the
complex

•

Extending credit opportunities to non-recreation based ecosystem
service programs

•

Assisting in the implementation of regulations stated in the
Management Plan, for example, through its support of the scouting
project

•

Establishing additional conservation areas through contract with
interested stakeholders

•

Marketing the Mara Triangle’s ecosystem products and services, and

•

Providing and accessing resources for conservation related projects.

4.4: Organizational relations among partnership sub-entities
The Mara Conservancy derives its revenues from various sources. The most
important source of its revenue is the gate fee charged to users of recreational facilities
around the Triangle and the wider Greater Mara Ecosystem. The Management Agreement
granted the Conservancy a 36% share of the revenues from ticketed sales and another
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This list was compiled from interviews with governmental officials at Trans Mara and Narok offices and
local Maasai community leadership, from the vast review of literature on Mara and MCPP documents such
as Monthly reports.
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30% from non-ticketed sales. The management of its transactions and financial
operations is contracted to by two revenue collection and management agencies called
KAPS and KATO.180 The Conservancy also relies on donations from local, national, and
global donor sources. It has, for example, sought donations for the Lion Census Projects
in order to provide wages for rangers, vehicle fueling, and maintenance used for
patrolling the reserve, updating its anti-poaching monitoring devices such as binoculars
and cameras, and paying for veterinary services. Because the Conservancy operates in
one of the world’s most famous reserves, it is normal for such an entity to record windfall
revenues. However, its reliance on a volatile tourist sector makes it vulnerable and
inefficient during off-peak season and shortfalls. It has established a reserve fund as a
contingent measure for supporting operations during tough economic times.
5: Evolution and growth of the MCPP
5.1: Initiation (1980s - 2001)
5.1.1: Power, veto players and contested governance
The beginning of the Mara Conservancy as a partnership traces from efforts
facilitated by the municipal government of Trans Mara in the late 1980s. Operational
failures in reserve management by the council occasioned this move. The MCPP’s
evolution has a history of tensions between pro-reform/pro-devolution and antireform/anti-devolution functionaries within the Mara complex. Its evolution is telling of
mechanisms through which initial conditions set a trajectory that affected the design of
interventions and eventually community empowerment. The Conservancy’s inception
was part of a reform of municipal co-management policy. However, by design (via its
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weak articulation of its organizational mission) and by default (occasioned by a
spontaneous surge in local demands and contestations), the MCPP was entangled onto a
complex web of politicized co-management dynamics. This change generated new claims
that the MCPP founders neither anticipated nor prepared for. Its evolution indicates that
successful collaboration entails not just facilitating the needed reforms but also
programmatic tactical management of administrative change and particularly of the
partnership’s task environment.
While it is incorrect to claim that local communities were not visible actors in
establishing the Mara Conservancy, it is important to note that their role was not
significant in the initiation of the partnership. The county council proposed, endorsed,
approved, and presided over the initiation of the Management Plan for governing the
Mara Triangle that the Conservancy currently administers.181 Unlike the Laikipia
Wildlife Forum and the Amboseli Partnership that were bottom-up initiatives targeting
direct participation of local community organizations, the Mara Conservancy’s goal of
broadening environmental citizenship was only an appendage of its core goal of
efficiency. Its initiation was also a top-down process. This does not imply that the agenda
of community empowerment was considered less a priority .182 Rather, it means that
initial organizational context matters for the design and operations of a given
partnership’s co-management system. In fact, the input from the community was
important through the participation and activism of the local Maasais living in the Trans
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In part, a major explanation for a dominant role of the local council is because by law, it is the custodian
of any protected area in this locality mandates it. It holds the authority to manage and protect the land in
trust for the resident locals. The Mara complex is a public PA that is under an adjudicated local authority.
Since the Mara Triangle falls on the Trans Mara side, its dominant manager is the Trans Mara County
Council, the Narok County Council manages the Eastern section of Maasai Mara.
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One of its goals was the institution of an effective benefit-sharing system for rewarding community
efforts in protecting the ecosystem in Mara Triangle.
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Mara Isuria Escarpment. The local tribal chiefs acted as representatives in the formal
meetings and negotiations for MCPP initiation though some groups contested these roles.
There are conflicting reports on the politics of representation discussed in
subsequent sections. Mara Conservancy’s evolution and role as the custodial entity for
managing the Mara Triangle seconds arguments in research that the establishment of new
public protected areas are generally tension-ridden and can inhibit socio-ecological
justice. There is also well-documented evidence indicating that in the long course,
“multifunctional commons are prone to generate conflict when converted into protected
area” (Dougherty and Peralta 2010, 68). The Mara Triangle’s management debacle which
ensued was due to weak design of co-management institutions at initiation is equally an
example and indication of the consensus by participatory development, resource
mobilization, and governance approaches. Their proponents agree that poor
representation compounded by elite influence is the most deleterious factors that weaken
and challenge empowerment projects in conservation and other development sectors.
Unfortunately, this is the very problem that the Mara Conservancy tightly enmeshed.
According to a debate captured in one prominent report, there were claims that the
signing of the Management Agreement was a “behind the scenes negotiation and
consultation that never came to public domain” (Ecoforum, 2003: 266). However, as
Ecoforum similarly claims, opponents to this assertion fired back positing that the
process was an open meeting that included many councilors who facilitated the endorsing
and initiation of the partnership (2003: 247-248). Regardless, the enunciation of the
Management Plan and the composition of the board created opposition and mobilization
against the initial inception of the Mara Conservancy. In essence, the MCPP was
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illegitimate in the eyes of some community members. There have been two dominant
conflicting views about the legitimacy of the Mara Conservancy during its initiation. The
first group of observers (the anti-devolutionists) argued that most locals did not endorse
the inception of the partnership. The second group (the pro-devolutionists) discounted
that view and argued that politicization was the real barrier to garnering a common
understanding about the motivations and intentions behind the Conservancy’s
establishment and its role for that matter.
Primarily, anti-devolutionists supported the claims by a section of the local
communities that the process of planning and design of the Management Agreement
excluded them. Captions in various local and global media including internationally
acclaimed The Economist discussed the tensions that surfaced in these oppositional
quarters.183 The systematic exclusion of local community organizations during the key
MCPP inception moment and the fear of potential disenfranchisement loomed large.
According to other reports, local communities resisted the MCPP’s inception arguing that
they were neither involved nor informed on how and when the agreement was endorsed
(Ecoforum 2003).184 The second factor was the fear that a private firm might take over
the reserve. The former view is in the Ecoforum edition that reiterates that the locals
bemoaned the fact that the Conservancy was enjoying patronage from powerful local and
national elites. An additional article in The Economist described the Conservancy’s
inception as an arena of contestation. The caption described the situation as one in which

183

This particular article is an online edition of the Economist dated 06/28/2001 and titled “A new game
plan: A private company has taken over one of Kenya’s most famous wildlife parks.”
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This is the most prominent but equally controversial report highlighting the devolution debacle in the
Mara Triangle. Its basis is on a collection of debates on criticisms and counter-criticisms from pro and antiConservancy groups.
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“opposition to the changes [was] muted by the strong support” from the president.
Opponents of the plan however argued that despite the local council’s approval, the
acquisition of the reserve was unlawful.
Figure 9: An organogram illustrating the structure of the Mara Conservancy

The visibility of powerful elite influence during the inception of the Conservancy
was a reality. In one interview with the Ecoforum, the Chief Executive of the
Conservancy acknowledged “we are a political organization…when you are dealing with
politicians …we do not have the kind of control and autonomy that we would have in the
private sector” (2003: 345). However, in the same interview, he also added that there was
initially some interference in the management of the Conservancy but this waned over
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time. A related claim by anti-devolutionists was that the board had tainted leadership that
lacked integrity. The local board members drawn from the local sub-tribes were
particularly unpopular and considered illegitimate by a section of local communities. In
fact, the in the same report, the Chief Executive averred that discontent was not about the
Conservancy but that “all the antagonism [was] … about the individuals around [them]
and … the longstanding feud between two different factions of Trans Mara leadership
(Ecoforum: 245).
Proponents of the second school castigated anti-devolutionists’ connotation of the
Conservancy as a partnership run on patronage. This “self-described” pro-reform group
argued that the Conservancy’s opposition force was “just a small clique unhappy with the
Conservancy’s presence as it had brought to an end the gravy train network” (Ecoforum:
248) of corrupt administrators. This group provided a rebuttal to the conflict-laden claims
arguing that the Conservancy was a collective enterprise for local community to benefit
from and that the Conservancy had noble intentions for the community. While
maintaining their support for the partnership with similar vitriolic responses across media
spaces, the pro-devolutionists did not deny the impact of elite influence. Ecoforum
ascertained that according to this group the Conservancy had “successfully desisted
attempts and intrusion from political interests” (262).
This group gathered some support from analysts who argued that political greed
proved to be a barrier to the partnership’s inception even in the face of a structured
Management Agreement, which had been enshrined in a transparent and accountable
process and fully pledged by negotiating stakeholders (Drummond 2005: 59). The claim
by skeptics of devolution that community organizations can resist reforms when
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interpretation of inclusion is not in their terms may fit the case of the anti-devolution
group from the local Siria community. Interestingly, Drummond’s argument partially
validates this claim. It may have been that a section of the local community resisted this
new yet important change as “…objection to administration by outsiders other than
indigenous fellowmen …” (2005, 60). A second but a related interpretation for local
opposition according to Ecoforum was that the fact that the Mara Conservancy was seen
as an imposition by KANU politicians.185
5.1.2: Fragile elite-community relations as a weak partnership pillar
During the Conservancy’s initiation, various actors were embroiled in vitriolic
debates over initiation, ownership and management of the Mara Triangle.
Simultaneously, each group invested resources in legitimating their preferred discourse
and counter-discourse. The effect of this struggle was that it produced ripe conditions for
new forms of elite capture and what participation scholars call “divisive competition”
(Chhatre 2008, Lankina 2008). This resulted into a protracted contestation of intra and
inter-elite conflict (and especially between and among local-bureaucratic, communityaffiliated, and national political elites), elite-community factions, and tensions between
the locals and the municipal functionaries. In addition, new leaders sprang up to manage
turf wars. There are two issues of particular importance in outlining the context of
inception of the Mara Conservancy as a partnership. It is not unusual for claimants and
counter-claimants to contest management changes in governance of any of the protected
area within the Mara-Serengeti system as it constitutes one of the world’s largest
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KANU is the Kenya African National Union, which was Kenya’s most dominant post-independent
party. Its leadership ruled Kenya from 1963 to 2002 until the democratic ouster of former President Moi.
Many Kenyans have blamed the party for entrenching a dictatorship and corruption across many sectors
and levels of government.
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biodiversity rich and lucrative ecological complexes. Usually, local authorities
themselves (Rogers 2002: 20, Child 2004) or the local communities (Ecoforum 2002,
2003, Drummond 2005, Nyarika et al. 2009) contest over these changes.
A partially valid interpretation from the Ecofroum is that opposition to the
partnership’s initiation was more due to the “centuries old factionalism in Trans Mara
and Narok regions than with the Conservancy per se” (Ecoforum, 265). This problem and
inter and intra-tribal rivalry are usually fomented through mobilization by community
political and tribal elites. A large number of contributors in the Ecoforum agreed that
powerful elite council members and leaders were a barrier and a legacy that has
challenged reform in the Mara especially at the county council level where jurisdictional
competition was extremely high. It is also important to note that the Mara complex has
more diverse and very powerful elite coalitions than in other eco-complexes such as
Laikipia and Amboseli. This diversity has been a perilous resource for communities as it
creates a complex in which elites and communities entangle in never ending factional and
coalitional divisions even when situations demand compromise and genuine
rapprochement. This competition has been counterproductive and has not enabled the
representation of community interests.
5.1.3: Deflecting community priorities and the radicalization imperative
The dynamics of the Conservancy’s initiation phase raises important questions
about what domain of activism and tactics best enhance empowerment outcomes for
communities. Two questions are paramount. Was the community (as a core section of the
anti-devolutionists coalition) rightfully dissenting at an imminent excision of community
land or merely resenting a change in status quo? Thus, was it mobilizing against genuine
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changes? Secondly, was community misgiving about the supposed “reform-oriented”
elite justified? In other words, do elites profess one thing in principle and apply another
in practice? The fragility that characterized the MCPP’s evolution would influence its
tumultuous development further. The local community's failure to organize and exploit
political opportunity, which was uniquely available through policy change, is partially
responsible for the community’s exclusion.
Weak empowering effects of the MCPP are not restricted to activities of elites
alone or internal MCPP politics. The structure and tactics of Siria-affiliated CBOs
illustrate how communities can equally jeopardize empowerment through excessive
confrontational politics. Resources were directed into local activism and endless struggles
with other partners instead of building nascent MCPP organs. This was more so with the
municipal government and the MCPP’s leadership. Preoccupation with protest politics
shifted the CBO locus of activism outside the MCPP confines. The Siria movement,
which was the key CBO representing community interests in the partnership, was
predisposed to fail as a partner. Its strategies also weakened community capacity right
from the start as the community’s real constituents isolated themselves. This is because
the Siria constituted a large cohort of the anti-devolution coalition. This created more
mistrust towards the municipality government, bureau-based elites, some communitybased elites and towards the MCPP leadership as well. The CBO leadership also failed to
cultivate new relationships and networks that could have enabled the community to
garner sympathizers and coalition supporters. This would enable them to learn how to
exploit resources and accommodate the undergoing reforms. In other words, the Siria
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community could not earn real advantages of collaboration as its leadership’s tactics
guided them into confrontational politics.
Conservation politics in the Mara complex face challenges of patronage. Largely,
“the county council members who serve on board are not [usually] committed to
change…” (Child 2006, 170). More importantly, pastoralist communities resist changes
because history showed that elites were prone to capturing most of the proceeds from
wildlife-linked revenues. A weak institutional framework is another factor at play. Elites
and “their cronies … members of fund management committees… [ensured that] they
steadily [garnered] all the revenues ...” (Maito, Odhiambo and Otipi 2013, 74). The Siria
community was well aware of the excessive political influence that some bureaucratic
and political elites wielded. As it would turn out, they were partially correct in raising
their misgivings.
5.2: Organization building (2001 - 2006)
The formal inception of the Mara Conservancy as a partnership was finalized
through a contract between the County Council of Trans Mara and the leadership of Mara
Conservancy. The local community had its representatives sitting in the council chambers
during this process. Despite the formidable tensions, leaders from both sides successfully
galvanized efforts that finally led to the design of a formal management plan that would
oversee the Mara Triangle. The MCPP founders approached renowned Kenyan
conservationist Willie Roberts, to help them devise this management plan with support
from James Robertson, a US-based conservationist, and the current CEO, Brian Heath.
Upon drawing this plan, the launching of the organization with departmental units and
staff spread across managerial, technical, supervisory, and advisory units took shape. The
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partnership’s structures were clearly indicative of its core mission. Mara Conservancy
began its operations as a not- for-profit management company on May 25, 2001, though
its normal functions only began on the June 12, 2001. The management agreement
awarded the Conservancy a five-year contract that expired in 2006 when it got an
extended 10-year contract. Some observers characterized the arrangement as a deal of its
kind in which for the first time, the private sector-led partnership took charge of a
Kenyan wildlife park (New York Times 2001).
Unlike the Laikipia Wildlife Forum, Mara Conservancy’s metamorphosis has
been slow and had only modestly scaled up its participatory interventions.
Comparatively, divisive politics had a significant impact on the speed of its formal
inception. This aspect partly explains why it has the lowest scale of modularity among
the three cases under study. It, therefore, exhibits a very low level of modularity. As
previously mentioned, transparency and effectiveness were the key drivers of
implementation of the management plan. This is the basis for its managerial orientation
and organizational culture. The clearest indication of a formal inception of the Mara
Conservancy was expressed when partners made a consensus that the following
challenges were deterring incentives for effective conservation and benefit sharing.186
•

At the administrative level, the staff lacked adequate infrastructure for
enhancing employee productivity and commitment,187

•

Inefficient and unaccountable revenue collection systems disjointed and
delayed revenue collection operations,

•

Low staff morale was prevalent due to poor and untimely payment of staff
salaries,
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These are the challenges identified as the most pressing by founding members. They are in the
Conservancy’s website.
187
For example, respective monitoring of rhe reserve lacked operational vehicles to undertake intensive
field operations.
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•

Weak monitoring and enforcement of tourist/visitor operation rules led to
destruction of reserve land,

•

Underutilization of the reserve’s production capacity impeded revenue
collection process,188

•

Extremely high levels of poaching had led to near extinction of the
reserve’s endangered species,

•

Extremely high levels of illegal grazing were threatening wildlife and
livelihoods,

•

Rampant human, livestock, and wildlife insecurity had increased tensions
and conflict within the Mara Triangle complex, and

•

Poor and uninspected infrastructure at the headquarters 189 had left the
reserve in a dilapidated status.

5.2.1: Private power concealed in bureaucratic silhouette?
In the preceding years past its formal inception, factional tensions within and
without the partnership continued to plague the development of the Mara Conservancy.
This was less perilous compared to its initiation phase. During this phase, councilaffiliated political and bureaucratic elites continued to exert significant political control
because the municipal government technically had legal authority and influence in
protected areas management within the Mara Triangle. This attests to the strong impact of
informal networks in compounding the challenges of fledgling MCPPs. It also reiterates
the concerns by skeptics of devolution that formal entities can only survive the
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This short report argued that the collected revenue at the time was only 20% of the total potential for the
Mara Triangle Reserve.
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These were buildings situated at the headquarters at Iseiya, Oloololo Gate, and outposts of Purungat
Bridge and Ngiro-Are.
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tumultuous process of organizational and identity change when informal networks
support rather than inhibit organization.190
Largely, the goals of achieving transparency and administrative efficiency
continued to dominate MCPP activities and somehow shielded them from strong
interference from the bureaucratic, political and municipal-based elites. Without this type
of organizational culture, elite influence from the community, council, and political
groups would have been more detrimental. However, the Conservancy’s managerial
culture created another private bureaucracy whose impact has made observers debate
over its role in empowering communities around the Mara Triangle. This depends on the
evaluator. Those who favor strong formal entities as the means to achieving MCPP goals
have labeled it a successful entity. Those who look beyond formality and technocratic
finesse have done otherwise. Accordingly, the former group argues that the MCPP
continued to be effective because of its formal technocratic structure. This may explain
why the Conservancy’s strong identity with a managerialist orientation may have
contributed to the nurturing a tutelage-based system in the design of a majority of its PES
partnership projects.
The MCPP’s attention targeted to skill-intensive activities, capital-intensive
projects, and knowledge-based programs. For example, a closer look at a majority of the
MCPP’s monthly reports provides evidence that an overwhelming 90% of its activities
focus on reserve infrastructure-improvements/construction and staff development. Thus,
the error or omission in the design was that no meaningful projects were earmarked to
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New institutionalists such as Helmke and Levistky (2004) profess complementarity as an attribute of
interactions in cases where informal institutions complement formal ones. The Conservancy’s leadership
was partly successful in this end as presented in the previous sections.
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directly involve the community at large. These partnership programs were not exclusive
as such; they only lacked a proper structure for inclusiveness. During this phase, the
Conservancy’s leadership continued to, among other roles to 1) expand its networks and
alliances for collaborative practice, 2) scale up its operations through functional and
geographic integration as means to enhancing CBO participation, and 3) strengthen
organizational culture by strongly embracing transparency. However, the MCPP
leadership continued to allocate roles largely to specialized departments and
mainstreaming, though at low scale, institutionalized payment for wildlife models.
Again, despite these efforts, community empowerment was limited because
platforms for community representation were relatively few compared to those of
Laikipia Wildlife Forum and the Amboseli Partnership. For example, committees, which
were supposed to be arenas of community representation, were few and elite-controlled.
Simultaneously, the expertise-driven orientation was compatible with administrative
reforms (in order to streamline functional units, financial governance, and staff
management) but was weak in mainstreaming inclusive participation. Additionally, the
formal design of the MCPP was deficient in enhancing community uptake of
conservation rewards due to its lower scope of modularity as indicated in the types and
number of functional units, including their level of interdependency. The Conservancy’s
leadership and its sympathizers continued to be on the defensive on these structural
matters. They justified their claims based on the strides made in streamlining revenue
sharing process within the Mara Triangle. However, this narrow conceptualization of
success did not abate or minimize socio-economic differences that continued to propagate
mistrust within the community.

294

5.2.2: Elite omnipresence as exhibit A: Coalitions and counter-coalitions as
impediments to formalization
The Mara complex’s elite coalitions are formidable networks in the area’s
lucrative conservation enterprise. This is occasionally beneficial, though it is detrimental
in most cases. During Mara Conservancy’s formal inception, renowned local and foreign
elite conservationists provided resource inputs in various direct and indirect ways by
offering financial, technical, legal, and material assistance. For example, the resource
input base of a handsome donation from two foreign donors of $300,000 and four new
Land Rovers proved to be crucial input (Jones 2008). The Trans Mara Council agreed to
match this support and to offer additional resources for the implementation of the
program but did not fulfill this commitment for some time. Despite the contentious and
adversarial politics that defined this MCPP’s inception, a consensus emerged that there
were major problems that needed urgent attention and concerted effort from all
stakeholders.
The ambivalence on the part of anti-devolution bureaucratic elites at the Council
of Trans Mara reflects an observation made by co-management scholars. On some
occasions, “communities tend to accept commercial joint ventures far more readily than
bureaucrats [who usually harbor] anti-private sector bias” (Child 2006: 170).
Additionally, governance and accountability continued to be challenging issues for the
local community. As such, their fears were genuine as they had doubted that linking the
new entity to local municipal and political system (for example, by nominating some of
the county officials to the Conservancy’s board) would enable any genuine management
reforms. Many elite coalitions continued to fight for their own group interests and
strategically displaced real community interests at hand. Elites’ parochial interests
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manifested in their fickle identification with community interests through their shifts in
support for the Conservancy (see for example, the Ecoforum 2003). These attributes of
elite behavior invoke the spirit of vigilant proponents of participatory development. They
argue that elite support does not preclude commitment on their part.
5.2.3: Building (weak) internal community capacity through social movement
organization
Protest politics continued to define the character of community participation in
the organization phase. The community led a frontal assault on a new coalition of elites
and some of the Conservancy’s board leadership. The years 2003 to 2006 were
particularly tense. This exposed the community to an arena that made them vulnerable
and weak in pressing for its demand as a partner entity. Simultaneously, the Siria
community continued to engage the MCPP leadership through a confrontational posture.
Nevertheless, as it turns out once again, the disadvantages of contestation outweighed the
merits of strategic collaboration. The Siria CBO’s very own tactics squeezed the
opportunity space available for community empowerment. This was largely because of its
emerging but weak CBO leadership and inadequate organizational resources. These dual
challenges were significant factors in assailing CBO strength in multifaceted areas.
The strategy of oppositional tactics (through protests, court appeals, public rallies,
marches, dissent) once again limited further CBOs access to the newly afforded policy
and decision-making arena. It also limited organization and stability for the Siria
community. The CBO leadership’s confrontational approach at the process of formal
inception of the Conservancy underscores the fact that leadership is a critical player in
influencing the direction and scale CBO capacity, sustenance and community
empowerment in the long run. The Siria community’s leadership guided and proposed
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strategies for CBO engagement. Unfortunately, this occurred through a semblance of
poor and CBO weakening tactics. The obvious reality, however, is that CBOs in lucrative
and contested protected areas in Kenya, and particularly in the Mara complex face two
options: the option of confronting “reformers” but with the expectation of being totally
sidelined or accommodating these reforms as weaker partners in order to gain some
advantages of institutional entry onto the arena of co-management. These are both costly
choices for CBOs.
5.3: Consolidation? (2006 to date)
The MCPP’ technocratic and expert-driven orientation continued to inform major
MCPP program implementation over the course beyond its formal inception. This
orientation served the purpose of instituting transparency and managerial effectiveness as
rubrics for implementing reforms in benefit sharing but failed to embed the principle of
representativeness. Accordingly, this orientation achieved laudable success in embedding
transparency in its operations through its open reporting system. As will be discussed,
this partnership dynamic explains the source of its resilience and durability as a
partnership and yet its poor record in facilitating real local empowerment through
proactive engagement with communities. MCPP operations translated into a question of
tradeoffs. This dynamic poses interesting implications for theoretical and empirical
analyses for this case and broadly for MCPPs design for managing critical and famous
protected area complexes across the globe.
5.3.1: Power to the experts: Salvaging reforms through an all too technocratic order
The formal inception (from 2002) and subsequent development of the Mara
Conservancy was tumultuous but nonetheless successful. Its leadership instituted radical
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administrative changes that saw significant improvements in management practices. As
the MCPP continued to evolve, the dilemma for its reform-oriented leadership was how
to handle the twin challenges of 1) a proliferation of new actors with diverse
expectations/demands and 2) how to successfully bridge these interests for a common
purpose that serve both the community and conservation efforts within the Mara
Triangle.
Fragmented loyalty and segmented interests among partners continued to
challenge the efforts toward achieving organizational consolidation. In the light of
growing negative publicity, the Conservancy’s leadership had to strategize ways to
address the problem. Stepping up systematic reforms could be one option and a
mechanism for rebranding the image of the administration. However, this meant one
thing: that a managerial orientation and a technocratic organizational culture would take
precedence as tools for change management over alternative tools and approaches. The
case of the Mara Conservancy provides two illustrations about the challenges of MCPP
consolidation and its impact on empowerment outcomes. The vision of the Conservancy
was, despite its rosy portrayal, incompatible with interests of the nearby pastoral
community, and particularly those of the Siria Maasai. Denial of rights of access to a
section of land within the Mara Triangle previously considered common property191 was
to the community a denial of justice. In light of this, the tensions over management
solutions and the impact of initial conditions set a path of protracted conflict in the Mara
Triangle. More importantly, contestation has continued to limit empowerment outcomes
for CBOs. Low levels of empowerment are not entirely a function of the Conservancy’s
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Community interpretation will be reviewed in subsequent sections. This interpretation has pitted many
groups with conflicting legal positions against each other. This is discussed in subsequent sections.
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operations. The community has a hand in it as well. The MCPP outcomes during this
phase suggests a grim reality for communities in public protected areas with weak or
ambiguous property rights regimes and conflict-ridden planning and implementation
processes. One practical option for the Siria CBO leadership is to mobilize their
constituents for collaboration rather than confrontation. The latter leaves communities in
an ambiguous position in which they cannot exploit empowerment opportunities.
5.3.2: Formidable elite influence and (re-emergence) of trans-boundary politics
Previous chapters have analyzed how the concurrence of elite interests with those
of the community is not an indication of elite support for empowerment. It bears
emphasizing that it is more so in newly established public protected areas. In fact, elites
may support a co-management program during its initiation but sabotage its development
during its formal inception. The longstanding assumption in major co-management
studies in wildlife PAs is that the lucrative earnings from the provision of recreation
services impel elites to direct their influence in these programs. This influence is rarely
directed at re-distributing property rights or changing the status quo.
The central implication for the study of elite behavior is for the durability of
MCPPs and its effect on community empowerment. This explains why a phased model
was selected as a relevant analytical tool for examining the intricate nuances of MCPP
evolution and development vis a vis the configuration of elite interests in different
phases. For example, the model can capture the fact that the initiation of the Mara
Conservancy was enabled by the municipal government’s strong role in problem
definition. It was obvious that the reserve was in a sorry state. Yet, still conflict ensued
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due to disagreement on how to interpret and solve the problem. Elites’ influence was a
significant barrier to facilitating MCCP-mediated empowerment.
There is also overwhelming evidence pointing to the fact that a group of powerful
elites captured partnership activities such as problem interpretation and implementation.
This constituted a diverse group of powerful local, regional, and national bureaucratic
elites, community leaders, party-linked, and conservation-affiliated elites. The phased
model of empowerment accounts for the hitherto ignored dynamics and nuances such as
issue definition, issue configuration, and preferred solution. It also serves to explain the
source of confusion over devolutionists’ questioning of community contest of
management reforms in protected areas. This puzzle can be solved by examining not just
the solutions devised by co-management partners alone, but also how these solutions are
structured, whom they serve, and which partner controls implementation. Reforms in
protected areas management are a necessary but not a sufficient condition for their
democratic governance.
The weak consolidation of the Mara Conservancy is due to the interplay between
politics and power struggles. Factional divisions and confrontations began with the
administrative fiat, but real struggles grew with disagreements on how to implement the
Management Plan. The divisions were so intense that the Mara Triangle became a
decisive factor in electoral politics in the Mara complex (Ecoforum 2003). Interestingly
enough, each faction believed that it was its opponent that betrayed the local
communities. This conflict increased the stakes for participation and influence by elites.
Bureaucratic and political elites in Narok and Trans Mara municipalities, communityaffiliated elites, party-affiliated national elites, and powerful conservation-affiliated elites
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intensified divisions across the community in order to protect the stakes of politicians
who favored their agendas. Intensified elite conflict and influence contributed to the
electoral success of some politicians and doom for others. These dynamics led to the
ascent of a new group of community elites in parties and communities, complicating the
politics even further. The increased costs of electoral outcomes within Trans Mara and
Narok continue to intensify today, as the new constitutional changes will see the
Conservancy’s administration transferred to the Narok County. After the 2013 elections,
elites who are privy to the political and bureaucratic municipal circles began to question
the legitimacy of the MCPP. They argued that “Mara Conservancy’s time is over” and
the Mara Triangle should be under Narok County government (as from 2013).
These dynamics validate the misgivings by proponents of participatory
development about the formidable nature of elite influence and how elite parochial
interests are a ubiquitous feature in all types of co-management structures. In the Mara
complex, elites’ ambiguous, transitory, and fickle support for co-management depended
entirely on how specific circumstances served their interests and those of their allies. The
local community members were thus justified in questioning and challenging the claims
of some of the pro-reform elites’ stewardship ethos and support for true reform. When
their interests were served (i.e., elites), they were pro-Conservancy loyalists; when they
felt otherwise, they became its outspoken critics.
5.3.3: The community’s waning influence and missed opportunity
Community capacity during the consolidation phase of the Mara Conservancy
was not strong enough to support local empowerment. As discussed in previous sections,
factors internal and external to the partnership impeded CBO capacity and empowerment.
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The protracted, polarizing elite discourses and elites’ patronizing of co-management
process did not end during formalization but continued through the MCPP’s
consolidation phase. The Conservancy’s leadership unsuccessfully attempted to quell the
divisive political culture that had infiltrated the partnership and continued to weaken
community influence in the implementation of the management plan. On the same note,
threats to the partnership emanating from both Narok and Trans Mara counties continued
to be barriers to effective community capacity building in this phase. The key factor was
the Conservancy’s reluctance to institutionalize a system of direct participation and
which could effectively build the capacity of CBOs.192
A simple interpretation is that the Conservancy leadership’s choice of
transparency and administrative effectiveness as the key principles guiding its operations
meant that managerial, technocratic, and regulatory instruments assumed a high priority.
The intention of the leadership was to enable significant reforms to take shape. They
succeeded as indicated by the new administrative approaches that took shape. In the
previous two cases of MCPP, representativeness rather than effectiveness defined the
initial design of partnership institutions and continued to be so though with variable
outcomes along the three phases. Simultaneously, in the previous cases of MCPPs,
modularity emerged as a complementary institutional design tool for operationalizing
vertical and horizontal accountability; again, with different levels of success in
empowerment.193
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The MCPP’s program succeeded in enforcing regulations that improved conservation outcomes by using
community resources. As will be subsequently discussed, these projects were not congenial to real
empowerment of CBOs and their communities.
193
The extent of success in empowerment is examined in Chapter 6.
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A more complex interpretation is that achieving effectiveness is akin to
embracing the reality of governance where leaders confront a stark choice. Implementing
co-management plans in protected area systems of significant national importance has
significant implications for prioritization and planning strategies of MCPPs. It means that
the selection of specific choices comes with a set of related payoffs and tradeoffs.
Accordingly, the role of MCPP leadership is to navigate this environment, provide
direction and select tools that strike at least a modest balance among choices.194 As such,
granting the reform project to experts was an approach that positioned community
organizations as sideline partners and promoted a system of tutelage rather than a direct
participatory PAs management platform. This approach weakened community capacity
and ability to be strong partners in co-management. This is because the existing
orientation nurtured an organizational culture that privileged pragmatism as the key
approach informing MCPP operations.
Put differently, for the Conservancy’s leadership, beyond partnership stabilization
and survival, only practical problem solving could directly tackle inefficiency and
corruption in the administration of the Mara Triangle. The case of Mara Conservancy
equally indicates that co-management is not so much an agreement over values as it is
over the process for holistic operationalization of these values. Mara Conservancy’s
partners were in agreement on what challenges the reserve faced; they disagreed on how
to implement the management plan and due to excessive politicization of reforms, its
leadership proceeded headstrong with a solution that they thought worked best. This
solution was to be a transparent and efficient co-management institution. Was this a
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This is because navigating through this process can be challenging depending on elite coalitions, the
scale of politicization, and structure of local property rights regime.
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practical solution to solving the problems of inefficiency bred uder the previous
administration? More precisely, was the technocratic approach an enabler of
effectiveness? Was it simultaneously an impediment to representativeness? In fact, it was
both.
6: Collaboration and negotiated stalemate: The Kichwa Tembo Eco-Camp as a case
study
The balance of this chapter is devoted to an examination of a PES-like ecotourism
project initiated and implemented in the Mara Triangle. It is important to point out that
the Conservancy recognizes that effective collaboration includes protecting the rights of
surrounding Maasai communities even in the face of strong elitist manouvering and/or
influence (Mara Conservancy CEO 2001). This is because the reserve is a property of the
Maasai community. The Maasai Mara National Reserve Management Plan 2009-2012
stated: “unlike Kenya’s national parks, which aim to benefit the entire nation, the Maasai
Mara National Reserve was established on community trust land and therefore, in
addition to the Reserve’s role in protecting the area’s exceptional natural resources, a
primary function is to provide economic benefits to improve the livelihoods of residents
of the two districts in which it is located…” (AFW 2009, 92).
6.1: History of the project
Kichwa Tembo is an Eco-Camp set up in 1982 in a portion of land leased from
Maasai proprietors.195 It is situated within the northwestern boudary of Maasai Mara
National Reserve at the foothills of the Oloololo (or Siria) Escarpment along the
Sabaringo. It is located within the Oloololo Group Ranch owned by the Oloololo Game
Ranch Ltd. and covers a land parcel of about 9,987 hectares of grassland and indigenous
195

Kichwa Tembo, correctly translated as ‘kichwa ya tembo’ is a Swahili language term which means the
head of the elephant.
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forests on a 10km corridor (Ecoforum 2002: 252). This corridor stretches within
conservation and dispersal areas adjacent to the eastern section of the Mara complex. The
lodge is located on a land area on leasehold run through a concession agreement. The
lodge is under ownership by a concessionaire called &Beyond (formerly, Conservation
Corporation Africa196) based on a lease arrangement formalized between the company
and Oloololo Group Trust. The communities are from the Siria Maasai, the core clan that
formerly constituted the Oloololo Group Ranch.197 Kichwa Tembo prides itself on being
Kenya’s best-loved safari lodge. It operates as a tented safari camp that overlooks the
Mara plains. However, there is controversy over the purchase and ownership of the lot in
which the camp is located. The dispute is over ownership between the lessee (i.e.,
Oloololo Game Ranch Ltd.) and a section of the Siria Maasai community and
specifically, the Oloirien Group Ranch (i.e., the Ilkarekeshe Self Help Group).198
&Beyond is the private investor in possession of leasehold rights to the land on which
Kichwa Tembo is located.
6.2: Operability of the project
The concession contract governing community – concessionaire roles in
managing the venture was the major source of conflict at Kichwa Tembo. Under this
concession agreement, Oloololo Game Ranch Trust granted rights to &Beyond to own
196

Ecosystem Marketplace categorizes &Beyond as a private ecotourism operator committed to “providing
world-class holiday experiences and to ongoing investment in sustainable conservation development and
community empowerment”. It is also Africa’s leading ecotourism company.
197
The Siria Maasai and other sub-tribes were originally members of the Oloololo Group Ranch. Group
ranch dissolution led to the fragmentation of this membership leading to divisions among the Siria and
elites who controlled the division process. Documented reports indicate the group ranch elites amassed
most of the land during the sub-division process and were able to take hold of the major parcels of the
Oloololo Group Ranch after sub-division. Details exist in subsequent sections of this analysis.
198
Such land-related conflicts are not unique to the Mara complex. In fact, most of Maasai land has in one
way or form bridled inter-factional or multi-factional conflicts over land tenure. It is worth noting that such
conflicts arise from unlawful acquisition of land, irregular allocation of land, and registration of members
in the group ranches (ole Koissaba 2009, 4).
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part of its land through a lease program. The agreement granted these rights over a
contracted period with additional specifications conditioning &Beyond as the
concessionaire to operate, manage, and improve recreation infrastructure within the given
piece of lot (see for example, USAID 2012).199 The title to the lot remained in the hands
of the Oloololo Game Ranch Trust. The strength of the concession is the leasehold
tenure200 and by both parties committing to the contract. In essence, the private investor
(&Beyond) holds the rights to use the land subject to it paying the stipulated fees to the
landowners. Simultaneously, as a contracts-based PES-like project, community rewards
and payments are specific performance targets. In PES language these are “effort based
payments” (see OECD 2010, 3, 2013, 62) linked to land use practices that must be
compatible with ecosystem conservation around the Kichwa Tembo camp. &Beyond
works closely with the community in these efforts and efforts are supplemented by that of
Mara Conservancy.
The role of relevant community CBOs is similar to those in the previous case
studies.201 CBOs’ roles are to mobilize community members to enforce sustainable
grazing practices and as such, spatial grazing is a chief requirement for ensuring
controlled grazing within the conservation area. Oloololo’s land and grazing committees
have apportioned acreage of land for some controlled grazing and set aside a core section
for conservation. These CBOs ensure protection of the buffer zone from human activities
and encroachment but because land ownership is in contestation, the community
199

Concessions belong in the cluster of market-based PES mechanisms for repaying or rewarding
communities and which is part of the larger Tourism User Fees (TUFs) programs that collect revenues from
tourism-based activities (USAID 2012).
200
Under the Lands Control Act, the Kenyan law disallows non-Kenyans from owning land though they
access land use rights through leases and concessions.
201
Like many other group ranches, Oloololo group ranch is governed by a legal trust –thus Oloololo Group
Trust. The landowners established the Oloololo Group Ranch Ltd. as a company limited by guarantee and
as the holding representative institution.
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herdsmen occasionally intrude into the conservation area claiming that they have rights
over salt licks, grazing land and water points. Additional communities’ roles include
checking, reporting, and securing conservation borders from encroachment by other
community members and working with the Mara Conservancy to enhance the success of
regulatory instruments and particularly those that help protect Mara’s ecosystems along
the reserve and the Mara River.
Concession rules aside, the Land (Group Representatives) Act of 1968 Cap 287
mandates communities organized around group titles to have land committees that have
the responsibility of overseeing land administration.202 The Act has provisions that
mandate the members through their respective committees to engage in sustainable
management of rangelands. The Third Schedule states, “The Group Ranch committee
shall assist and encourage members to manage the land or graze their stock in accordance
with sound land use, range management, animal husbandry, and commercial practice
principles.” Interestingly, this statute precludes full commitment from these institutions.
Kibugi (2008) reiterates, “…these provisions …are not binding and can expressly be
excluded from or modified by a group ranch’s constitution.” This calls for an important
monitoring role for institutions such as the Mara Conservancy whose role has been to
monitor, help articulate these statute rules and carefully translate them to local
communities.
The contests over the contract stemmed from weak and ambiguous ownership
regimes. The saliency of tenure systems is obvious in this project. Weak tenure
threatened and continues to undermine the effectiveness of many PES projects in the
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Group Ranches are prone to problems such as land intrusions (Waiganjo and Ngugi 2001), excisions
(Ecoforum 2002), sub-divisions and corruption (Bedelelian 2012, Mwangi 2007, Chege nd).
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Mara complex.203 Thus, it is is important to situate Kichwa Tembo’s existence within the
historical particularities and context of the deals that formalized its establishment.
Kichwa Tembo’s identity stems from a history of protracted intra-communal conflict that
pitted Siria elites against their own community. The community contest unsettled
usufruct rights over a portion of land on which Kichwa Tembo is located. To this end, comanagement process has been a constant volatile milieu of conflict and contestation. The
conflict has had the two warring parties engage numerous state institutions and has
witnessed interventions and interference from coalitions involving the Presidency, the
Kenyan High Court, communities, ministers, parliamentarians and various Maasai-based
social movements. &Beyond’s website indicated that its landlords are the Ilkarekeshe
Maasai tribe (and a constituent group of Siria) and by implication imply that that the
concession fees are paid to its tribesmen. Yet, this may not be the case as the Oloololo
Game Ranch Trust took over the land and therefore owns the title that it uses to formalize
transactions with &Beyond. In this case, the Ilkarekeshe group does not receive the
payments but Oloololo Game Ranch Trust does. Additionally, the rental fees go to the
Oloololo Game Ranch Trust for the traversing rights in the Maasai Mara Reserve.
The project was engulfed in conflict over the land but also about the payment
mechanisms for recreation services offered at Kichwa Tembo. This was because two
parties claimed to possess the title and rights to this land. The community claimed that
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Property rights regimes in Maasai land have always had a politicized dimension since the colonial
period. This has led to regular state intervention as a litany of cases load state offices with groups
demanding redress and justice. In Maasailand and particularly within the wider Mara complex, conflicts are
even more prevalent. Evictions and seizures of lands belonging to indigenous Maasai and their
marginalization through exclusive and/or inequitable benefit sharing have been widely studied (see for
example, Bedelian 2012, Homewood 2012, Nortons-Griffith and Said 2010). A second feature is that while
there is regular state intervention, it only offers qualified support as the usual story seems to indicate a
system that disfavors locals who rarely emerge with any success from cases and demands they put forth.
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the land, sought illegally, was sold to the owners who are elites who come from
prominent and well-connected families and bureaucratic circles. Due to the extensive
media coverage on the conflict over this land, it has become an all too familiar story of
dispossession and marginalization.204 Hardly any coverage was not damning. Illicit land
transactions caused tensions, social unrest, and internecine struggles that have been costly
to both the owners of the land and the protesting communities.
By all indications, it appears that besides losing their land, the community sees no
redress in their quest to win back the land. Equally troubling is that fact the community
has expressed frustration about their longstanding claims and complaints that they have
lodged yet find neither a response nor a solution. They bemoan government’s lackluster
approach that sends mixed signals and messages to warring factions, an ambivalent and
compromised court system, and a government that has forged an alliance with the
proprietors. The unresolved nature of the issue is a reality that the community may have
to deal with now. Data and commentaries from various local and international
newspapers reveal similar realities. Media coverage has provided evidence of the nature
of the dispute and struggles for land claims in the Siria community. To date, the status
and ownership of this land is embroiled in court cases that have been marred by appeals
and counter-appeals. Currently, the Siria community awaits decision by the High Court to
grant them the rights to this land. They also claim to be in possession of documents that
can attest their ownership rights granted by former President Kenyatta. On the other
hand, the proprietors continue to argue that they are the legal owners and similarly claim
to have a formal title to the property. According to various investigative reports, however,
204

The most prominent of this is the Minority Report by ole Koissaba. Otherwise, additional
comprehensive reports appear in the Kenyan newspaper dailies such as the Daily Nation, the East African
Standard, and the Star.
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they have yet to prove this (see for example, Tourism Concern 2009, Minority Rights
Report 2010).
6.3: Efficiency of the project under the MCPP model
6.3.1: Property rights framework
Dougherty and Peralta (2010, 68) reiterate, “…local elites can appropriate the
benefits of reform process and protected area co-management [by] converting it into an
initiative to declare commons and open access areas a protected area.” This is indicative
of the politics at Kichwa Tembo and the ensuing contestations over its management. The
battle over property rights stems from community claims that two prominent leaders
excised land that belonged to the community (originally under a group ranch arrangement
and under community common property system), who during a sub-division process that
occurred in a re-districting process manipulated their way into annexing the land from the
group. Both the elites and the locals are from the Siria community. An oft-cited
publication by the Minority Report (ole Koissba 2009), and as it is commonly presented
in public dailies, succinctly examine the history of this contestation. They allude to the
source of the longstanding tension to be elite grab of clan land. The narrative highlights
that because the deal stands shrouded in secrecy, it lacked the proper open arrangements
demanded by the relevant statutes.
The community successfully solicited and enlisted the support and assistance of
President Kenyatta who awarded them the land in the 1970s and further ordered that the
council return it to the Oloirien people (ole Koissaba 2009, 5) after an attempt of
takeover.205 The community was able to gain access rights with the understanding that
de-gazettement would allow the Maasai to access grazing areas and water points at the
205

This lot is about 10 kilometers stretch of land near the Mara Triangle
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Mara River that would support their livestock-reliant subsistence. After a few years, the
President’s orders went into disregard as the Ministry of Tourism and Wildlife’s
ambivalent posture led to the gazettement of the land and denied the Siria community
access.206 This re-ignited a new wave of local protests by community organizations.
By the 1990s, community struggles over the land shifted from use/access rights to
ownership rights. This was a herculean task and a miscalculation on the part of the
community as it turned out to be a weak frame for mobilizing the poorly organized
community. A group of Siria elites (with ties based on close familial and extensively
powerful political connections) acquired and expropriated one piece of the lot (of the
954.5 ha) without the community’s permission and registered it as a private trust. In
1992, the Ministry of Lands cancelled the sub-division process and the land remained a
trust land (Koissaba 2009). This failed sub-division process was the turning point for the
total dispossession of land rights for the Siria Maasai. These elites also became the
company directors when the land was formally registered and when the title was
published and completed in April 1993. What this meant was that community rights to
this land were completely retrenched while that of elites was now fully entrenched.
The latter claimed they had the title that many await to see to date. Meanwhile,
the Oloololo Group Ranch Trust also claimed to be in possession of a title. Despite the
fact that the Siria Maasai community transformed into a land rights movement and was
able to extend and diversify its support base, it did not solidify enough to achieve the
rights of its constituents. Neither could it wield enough power against the elites who had
taken possession of the contested land. The Siria movement continued to protest the
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ownership by the Oloololo Trust, re-mobilized once again and sought redress from the
courts. The Oloololo Trust elites had strong connections with the Presidency which
obviously meant that this time around, the community movement had very limited
strategies since they had no support from the executive (now under President Moi who
was a key ally of the elites from Oloololo Trust).
Adding to the community's waning influence, socio-political contests that were
occurring nationally also negatively influenced the growth trajectories of Kenya’s
environmental CBOs. This is evident in the low levels of local and national alliance
building and institutionalization. The weak structure of the national network of Kenya’s
environmental movement was evident in its incoherent and heterogeneous base. This
weak structure could not shield smaller affiliates such as the Siria movement.207 To this
extent, networking did not successfully culminate into empowering outcomes for many
grassroots social movements, including the Siria Maasai.208 Certainly, as it would turn
out, subsequent challenges had important ramification, both immediate and long term for
succeeding years of Siria land group activism. The movement had to realign and reframe its priorities away from the core objectives (that is, from access to ownership) as it
slowly but gradually morphed into a weaker organizational entity. Additionally, as the
elite network, particularly of the bureaucratic coalition’s coercive and administrative
infrastructure, expanded with new coalitions on their side, the movement was forced to
face an even more powerful opposition and complex environment. The Siria community
was not fully transformed or mature enough to confront this new environment. This
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A noteworthy feature of the core environmental SMOs was that it base was largely from international
groups and organizations with interests in Kenya’s PAs conservation.
208
The experiences of Kenya’s feminist, green, human rights, and liberalization movements are indicative
of this development.
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stifled the further mobilization and organization. All the dynamics of property rights wars
had significant impact on the Siria. These include, but are not limited to the fact that:
•

The Siria land rights movement had to shift its focus to new dominant
issues. This strategy force the organization to re-configure its
repertoires of action which progressively misaligned its core frames

•

Its core leadership was weakened vis a vis their counterparts numeric
and material strength. Others were co-opted into mainstream
politics209. This led to the de-politicizaation of some of the
movements’ demands

•

The movement lost its strategic niche as frame re-alignment (from
access to ownerships rights claims) disorganized collective effort and
encouraged micro rather macro-mobilization

•

Their political entrepreneur’s miscalculation in shifting their avenues
of contention from local to international levels so much so that they
expended enormous resources outside to the neglect of the local
mobilization

•

The movement’s support base was not as widespread or diverse
despite the aggressive contestation that it waged within local and
national arenas. Other land rights movements in Maasai land agitating
for similar rights fragmented the mobilization space

•

Stronger alternative platforms such as the Mara Civil Society Forum
are much visible, organized, and networked and thus acclaim more
stature and respect in fighting for Maasai land rights claims. It is a
stronger coordinating unit and an influential umbrella institution

•

Splinter groups emerged from the community itself with some allied to
the land grabbing elites and others opposed to the elites

The lack of a sustainable financial springboard weakened and
challenged the costly protest politics as frequent harassment and
evictions reinforced problems of organization and resource
mobilization.
The chain of organizational challenges and strategic mistakes affected collective
•

mobilization and management, thereby weakening the community’s capacity to be a
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A good example is the election of a longtime community leader, Hon. Konchella, whose election shifted
movement strength and focus with his transition from activism to politics.
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strong partner in co-management. It is proper to say that the movement had some initial
success but only enough to publicize its story rather than to strategically and fruitfully
situate its demands and enable successful claims for usufruct rights. It was also modestly
successful in articulating the realities of injustices that befell them building upon the
rights-based frame. Secondly, it was also in a weak position to demand ownership rights
to these resources. Elites exploited law and bought the land (ole Koissabe 2009) but did
not get the real titles until December 15, 2011.
The granting of the title to Oloololo Group Ranch created three disempowering
loopholes. The usufruct rights previously enjoyed by the community were relinquished.
Additionally, the revenue sharing system was now skewed and more advantageous to the
elite proprietors who transacted the concession contract with &Beyond. Finally, the grab
resulted in the Siria Maasai being squatters in a nearby escarpment. The camp is located
on community land with several villages in the vicinity. The dispute over allocation of
payments emanated over three payment clusters: over lease arrangements for the lodge
itself, daily access for traversing rights, and payments for the dances performed at the
lodge for the guests (Bruckely 2010). The reality is that the elites succeeded in extending
concession benefits to a private developer through a contract that excludes communities
from an equitable benefit-sharing process. Protests and resettling on this land by the
community bore no fruit. The Siria community’s dilemma proves that “only the wealthy
benefit in any kind of regime change in land transaction” in Kenya’s vast protected area
estate (Nyariki et al. 2009).
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6.3.2: Payments and rewards framework
Unclear property rights are significant barriers to the successful implementation
of PES projects (Padilla 2005, Greiber et al. 2009). The case of Kichwa Tembo is a
manifestation of how insecure tenure can limit empowerment opportunities for a local
community. It also illustrates the promise and challenges of how delicate tensions over
tenure can only be partially resolved. There is urgent need for an enabling legal
framework that supports community usufructs rights and particularly one that effectively
institutionalizes customary rights to resource use. In Kenya’s Maasailand, the protection
of community usufructs rights come in various forms and under various statutes that
recognize their dependence on ecosystem goods and services. This extends benefits to
customary access and use for water, grazing, food, medicinal, and religious uses. There
are additional provisions that require revenue-sharing systems to allot specified amounts
of accrued cash from PAs. Efforts are growing albeit with enormous challenges. There
has been an urgent need for restructuring of protected area management to involve and
reward local communities.210
Partnerships have sprung up to handle this void using different models and with
varied levels of success. MCPP-mediated innovations within the Mara Triangle such as
the ecotourism partnership model in Kichwa-Tembo eco-camp are examples of these
efforts. This Kichwa-Tembo eco-camp venture operates on resources that are provided by
a multinational firm (&Beyond), local landowners (Oloololo Group Ranch Trust), and the
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The central importance of designing efficient rewards mechanism is because the tourism sector’s
economic potential is largely from the conservation burdens that the local Maasai communities bear. The
Mara complex is the most important tourist biodiversity complex and the leading hub of tourist recreation
services fetching a significant portion of the country earnings from the sector. For example, in 2012, this
figure stood at KSh.96 billion (Republic of Kenya, RoK 2013).
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regulatory and advisory services of the Mara Conservancy. There are three facets of
innovation encompassed in this venture. The first element is in the design of comanagement. An institutional mechanism initiated by the Mara Conservancy saw the
devolution of financial management to Conservancy administration. This was
traditionally the preserve of the municipality. This shift aimed at enhancing effectiveness,
transparency, and accountability through the new organizational structure and culture. To
this end, the Conservancy has served as a public advocate for the re-conceptualization of
rewards by implanting efficiency-laden rubric to enhance the outcomes. It is attempting
to establish PES-linked institutions to mainstream proper revenue-transfer process to
communities. This served to dislodge the previous system that was corrupt. Nevertheless,
as has been discussed, the community barely receives this revenue because community
elites were the key actors who organized and transacted the project.
A second aspect is that the Conservancy instituted a design feature that aimed to
enhance efficiency through the institution of a system of direct payments to community
owners of the land under concession. This introduced a new PES-like program for
rewarding local communities who protect ecosystems and provide ecosystem services.
The MCPP-mediated model in which Kichwa Tembo is organized is categorized as
Payment for Wildlife Services (PWS), and is currently receiving a good deal of attention
from agro-ecological experts (see for example Bedelian 2012, Gitau et al. 2012, Silvestri
et al. 2012).211 This emerged in the wake of the failure of a system characterized by
ineptitude, corruption, and an inequitable system of payment through the municipality
and later through the wildlife associations/trusts. Under this new system, &Beyond can
211

The International Livestock Research Institute (ILRI’s) LiAPS conducts a large number of these
research studies, which is the Livestock Inclusive Agricultural Production Systems working group,
stationed in Nairobi.
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make direct payments to the elite landowners who receive this money without being
robbed of their earnings.
The third element of innovation is that the Conservancy instituted a new lowimpact recreation services provision model that nurtured conservation tourism as a new
paradigm for integrating social programs into their venture operations (Buckeley
2012)212. This introduced new avenues for receiving cash and non-cash payments through
both voluntary and non-voluntary means. The net effect was that it influenced the
participation process of local communities in many ways. The Kichwa Tembo eco-camp
currently is a very successful venture in terms of recreational visitation rates by tourists.
It has made its operator appreciate that the capacity of the ecosystem to produce these
services is reliant on a win-win approach that values the effort and cooperation of the
local communities. Buckley's (2010: 29-30) review of the eco-camp classified Kichwa
Tembo as a leading model of conservation tourism which provides cash and non-cash
payment such as “lease arrangements … daily access fees for traversing rights; and
payments for dances performed for guests at the lodge." Buckley ascertains that Kichwa
Tembo, a comparatively large venture of &Beyond’s properties, “provides substantial
local employment and opportunities for local artisans to sell their wares directly to lodge
guests…” Moreover, because of this, “relations between &Beyond and the local villages
are thus very good.” (30) These are observations made using only a partial account of the
dynamics of lease and access right dynamics. In order to evaluate the real empowerment
outcomes for Kichwa Tembo’s payment for wildlife services (PWS) program, we need to
evaluate three features of its operability.
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In other words, this is tourism which operates as a conservation tool, (p.2).
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7: Appraising Mara Conservancy’s game plan: Enter effectiveness, exit
enfranchisement
As we have seen, the MCPP-mediated program for changing power relations in
the operations of the Mara Conservancy was weak despite the fact that community
institutions participated in the initiation and organization structures. These mechanisms
failed as enablers of real power sharing. They also failed to expand programs for direct
inclusion and representation of communities. The Mara is a case of a highly contested
terrain for MCPP-mediated co-management. Equally, community power was on a weak
platform because its leadership failed to exploit collective power from relational and
transactional leadership when political opportunity became available through devolution.
The second observation was that the MCPP had established an organizational culture that
privileged transparent and effective management over over representativeness. This
attribute played out as a disempowering aspect for the communities. However, its impact
has indirectly served the purpose of anchoring biodiversity protection and provision of
recreation services. The Mara Conservancy has continued to provide various services by
acting as an intermediary in project implementation. This section situates the
Conservancy’s role as an intermediary in the implementation value chain of ecosystem
services.
The Mara Conservancy solely or jointly finances reserve operations in the
Triangle with various partners. Its goal is to ensure that the reserve’s infrastructure and
utilities serve not just Kichwa Tembo, but other ventures and the communities as well. A
good example is its partnership with Ann Kent Taylor Foundation. Both are financing the
training of rangers. This partnership creates and manages community ranger and reserve
personnel and provides training services that complement the work of Kenya Wildlife
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Service. The Conservancy’s leadership has strong connections, an attribute which enables
it to secure advantage in private funding.
The tourism-reliant informal economy and allied sectors within the Mara Triangle
are dependent on a dynamic tourist sector for employment and revenues. However, for a
long time the poor infrastructure had crippled the efficiency of provision of recreation
services and protection of the ecosystem as well. A Ministry of Tourism (2008) report
noted that the problems of inadequate and inefficient infrastructure in tourist circuits have
major impacts on operational costs of eco-ventures. The Mara Conservancy stepped in
and did tremendous work in infrastructure improvements and development. The
Conservancy is extremely an infrastructure-focused co-management system. Its goal is to
maintain reliability and efficiency within the eco-complex. It is not surprising that
currently the Mara Triangle’s status is immensely successful:
•

Capabilities of recreation services providers have expanded as clients
now enjoy accessible and dependable, tourist services. These reflected
in visit transit time, reliability, accessibility, and security

•

Services are now automated and are enabling effective logistical
coordination across partnership services and units

•

Ventures can now capitalize on economies of scale and complement
each other’s support systems for ecosystem goods protection and
services provision

•

Wildlife viewing paths and sites have improved immensely through
regular reconstruction initiatives

•

There has been improved safety and transportation in safari touring
because of greater transportation efficiency

•

Improved the logistics of PES projects as ecosystem preservation and
protection is relatively cheaper, faster, flexible

•

Enforcement of restriction has limited improper use of ecosystem
services by both sellers and buyers around and within the Triangle.
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As noted earlier, the Conservancy has ensured that the revenue-sharing
instruments and mechanisms result in an effective model that ploughs back rather than
siphons away deserved community revenues. This has served to lessen tenuous
relationships regarding access and benefits systems within the Triangle. It has also served
to advocate for some community participation in PES projects such as through the
Community Scouts Project. To this end, it has mobilized extensive technical and financial
support from local and international donors such as KWS, US Fish and Wildlife Service,
and Ann Kent Taylor. The scout project trains and employs local morans to ambush and
fight poachers and to prevent wildlife attack on humans. The program is one of the most
important finance-based and non-finance related benefits for local Maasai communities.
Through this project, the Conservancy is currently outsourcing and supporting security
operations at the Narok County Council that manages the eastern section of the reserve.
This program is operationally stable because of the Conservancy’s ability to mobilize a
game scout network around the Triangle’s landscape.
As a regulator of PES schemes, the Conservancy’s staff pursues and screens
institutional buyers and sellers of ecosystem goods and services. It also enhances
collaborative ecosystem protection and PES provision by identifying new areas of
collaboration. It also provides information about potential buyers of ecosystem services
to group ranches within and beyond the Triangle. It approves private ventures designed to
have low impact on the Triangle’s ecosystem. As such, it acts as a leader in enforcing,
publicizing, and promoting such programs and awarding permits only to qualified
candidates and those that comply with reserve regulations. The Conservancy’s leadership
role is its mandate as the primary contact for all providers within and around the Triangle.
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It convenes, conducts, and coordinates all PES programs that have a bearing on the
Triangle’s ecosystem. It conducts audits of all premises and has environmental impact
assessment laws that ventures must abide by.
&Beyond’s accession to the agreement with the local proprietors is strengthened
through regulatory and monitoring process. The most authoritative unit in this role is the
Mara Conservancy. It facilitates, prepares, and implements all the compliance protocols
as they relate to the wellbeing of the ecosystem and the community at large. Providers,
sellers, intermediaries, and buyers of ecosystem services must adhere to stipulated
provisions. The Mara Conservancy also monitors the investment climate by actively
engaging government officials and other stakeholders in dialogue on reforms needed to
enhance the incentive framework for increased private participation and profitability.
This opens up opportunities for expanding add-on projects that increase spaces for
community participation in the ventures-though usually with modest to minimal impact.
This also lowers the information costs for local ventures.
As a network facilitator, the Conservancy acts as a link institution mediating
interactions and transactions between buyers and sellers of ecosystem services. Through
its marketing strategies it articulates and communicates the positive benefits of low
impact venture operations and associated ecosystem services that are enhanced and
supported by Kichwa Tembo’s model. It has played the role of a marketing intermediary
in publicizing rewards schemes and clarifying their ameliorative and transformative
potential.

321

8: Conclusions
This chapter detailed the evolution of the Mara Conservancy which was initiated
as a co-management system for introducing management reforms. Its evolution and
maturation is a by-product of a myriad of factors. These include reforms in the legal
framework, local mobilization of elites, counter-activism of resource-user and resourceadjacent communities, and internal organizational dynamics of the MCPP itself. These
elements have defined its growth and outcomes for the partnership’s collaborative
process including institutional development, capacity for innovation, and overall
community development. The initial designing of an MCPP’s institutional system and
application of instruments for implementing collaborative policy mattered greatly for
empowerment outcomes. The Conservancy evolved in the midst of faction-led
controversies and contestations linked to property rights of local Maasai communities.
Additionally, due to the legacy of institutional corruption and predatory management at
the Triangle, the founders had no other basis but to establish working systems of effective
management and efficiency-based administrative processes that could boost staff morale
and performance.
In essence, the initial design process was a reactive response to the context of the
environment in which it evolved. Thus, unlike Laikipia Wildlife Forum, which enjoyed
the economies of scale and scope through social capital, diverse membership, and
funding, the Conservancy’s founders had to invest more resources on very specific goals
and activities. This explains why its functions revolve around animal security (antipoaching) and human security (compensation-based programs) although it supports other
PES/rewards-based initiatives within the Mara ecosystem.
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The Mara Conservancy case illustrates how partners in a co-management process
set the basis for designing their activities and operations in a given setting of PAs
landscape. This case particularly invokes the fact that a co-management system is a
system that links power and resources of partners. In this case, the Mara Conservancy
used a reform pillar to plan its initial activities and singled out effectiveness as the key
principle for coordinating and influencing collaborative management of human, natural,
and financial capital. For example, the collaborators came to a consensus that open
disclosure of revenues and internal operations of the partnership were primary trustbuilding and effectiveness-enhancing design parameters. In this regard, the principle of
transparency was articulated and well integrated into the management system and the
plans of Conservancy programs.
Finally, concerning the community’s role in co-management, the analysis
concludes that CBO leadership can define the difference between success and failure of
community empowerment through major or minor strategic errors of omission and
commission. Their focus on antagonistic rather than symbiotic collaboration may have
limited community ability to exploit political opportunity. This does not negate justifiable
claims for justice, but it does emphasize that communities can strategically exploit overt
and covert tactics for benefitting from a change in policy even if it means sacrificing
some autonomy. As indicated by the Conservancy’s developments, it seems the
community must find a way to navigate the tension-ridden platform and proactively
collaborate with other entities. This would allow it to engage the other partners. This is
particularly so with the municipal governments in both Trans Mara and Narok.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSIONS
1: Introduction
The intent of this chapter is to explain the variation in MCPP-mediated
empowerment with clear demonstrations of how partnerships enhanced the capacity of
community organizations and empowered them as representatives of their constituents.
Its central features are integration of within-case and cross-case comparative analysis
with an additional examination of partnership trajectories. On this basis, the pivotal
reforms that initiated each MCPP is viewed as an initial condition and evaluated
separately or in combination with other factors. I hypothesized the impact of five
variables. These are decentralization of power, elite support, capacity of a participating
community organization, partnership formalization process, and resources expended.
The findings confirm that three variables are indispensable and two minimally
influence empowerment. The more decentralized management structures are enabling and
supportive of empowerment. Elites are profoundly influential because they determine
opportunity and community agency. Contrary to expectation, greater community capacity
does not necessarily translate into empowerment. Additionally, rapid formalization
matters while the resource types expended are necessary but not sufficient for enhancing
empowerment. Additionally, the elite support variable interacts with the four variables as
they influence empowerment.
Unanticipated intervening variables that influenced empowerment were also
identified. The presence of intervening variables allows for an elaboration of the causal
mechanisms that influence partnership-mediated outcomes. These are 1) the legal and
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institutional framework 2) coalitional networks initiating and convening each partnership
3) property rights regimes 4) social and ecological features of a region and 5) innovative
capacity of each partnership. The final section of the chapter highlights lessons,
contributions (i.e., academic and policy merits) and potential future research. It then
provides important conclusions about this study.
2: Hypotheses and findings
A prominent conclusion about Kenya’s wildlife sector is that it is a conflict-ridden
arena controlled by government-affiliated entities that reinforce the systemic exploitation
of communities. This study found that the sector is organized around innovative
partnerships that are empowering communities in various ways but at the same time face
various structural challenges evaluated in the next sections.
2.1: H1: The more decentralized is power in co-management, the higher the
likelihood of CBO empowerment
This hypothesis was confirmed. The more decentralized MCPP structures were
more enabling and supportive of inclusiveness. Each partnership was organized to fulfill
common activities of co-management. These included identifying and prioritizing issues
to be constituted in the management plans for protected areas, endorsing these plans, and
implementing the plans. The most contentious components of these activities were the
selection and zoning of landscapes, delegation of roles, and implementation of
management plans. Decentralization efforts which enabled empowerment are those that
best handled these processes. The more decentralized and pluralistic structures
established during the initiation and formalization of the Forum and the Amboseli
Management Partnership enhanced the empowerment of communities both procedurally

325

and substantively compared to the less decentralized bureaucratic structures seen in the
Mara Conservancy.
The initiation phase of each partnership provided a more decentralized platform
for empowering community organizations. It is crucial to highlight that in all the three
MCPPs, power sharing was implemented as a kickoff incentive to get specific reforms of
each program to commence. Thus, during this phase, more consultative and pluralistic
apparatuses were institutionalized. Community organizations were engaged as agenda
setters and provided initial input for the design of institutions for selecting, designating
and managing of protected areas. Of course this participatory space was more extensive
in the Forum’s platform and less extensive in Mara Conservancy. More specifically
initiation created ripe political opportunity for participation than post-initiation phases of
partnership development. This phase enabled more pluralistic contexts than postinitiation which were usually inhibitive to inclusive engagement.
A related finding is that the three partnerships implemented dissimilar levels of
decentralization and especially during initiation and formalization phases. These
variations produced dissimilar outcomes because governance was formally implemented
through two models of protected area planning, namely opportunistic and systematic
designs.213 This study revealed that opportunistic designs (adopted by the Forum and
Amboseli Management Partnership) provided ideal conditions for proactively engaging

213

The key difference between opportunistic or community-driven and systematic approaches is the agenda
and institutional design that influence co-management operations and programs. Opportunistic approaches
“establish … protected areas where they are most easily implemented and enforced” (Hansen et al., 2011,
1887), while taking due consideration of preferences of the resource-user or resource-adjacent
communities. Systematic conservation planning on the other hand minimally or very rarely engages the
critical stakeholders. The basic aim is scientific acumen, while the paramount objective is usually to
“achieve maximum representation of conservation areas” (Hansen et al., 2011, 1886-1887; see also Pressey
and Bottrill 2009).
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local organizations. It allowed extensive actor networks linked to communities to forge
and reduced inter-partner conflicts and hurdles for CBO engagement. In the case of the
Forum, the proactive engagement of communities in designing management plans for
Laikipia’s wildlife corridors and partly in the Amboseli nurtured structures that engaged
community more immediately, extensively, and rapidly. In Laikipia, decentralization was
largely exercised by shifting the locus of power to communities. This enabled direct
engagement with and participation of communities. The process provided and extended
legitimate authority of community institutions and their role in managing and accessing
wildlife-based resources. This was a direct strategy to empower communities by
enhancing their capacity for representation and conservation. Partnerships in both
complexes faced some structural challenges in late formalization phase.
Systematic collaborative planning which was adopted by the Mara Conservancy
was less suited for empowering CBOs, much less post-initiation. It created direct and
indirect bottlenecks in the initial design of reserve selection (i.e the Mara Triangle) and in
the engagement of projected planning units. Further, the Mara case aptly demonstrates
that initial conditions as manifested in formulation of conservation regimes significantly
anchor partner intentions and future interventions. Mara Conservancy’s exclusive design
prevented community buy-in, handicapped its start-up structures and undermined the
scaling up of participatory programs. The real bottlenecks were embedded in the initial
design of reserve selection and in the weak authority-legitimacy nexus for conservation
planning and implementation.
The Mara Conservancy presents a test for devolutionists. The strategy implemented
by the municipality clearly transferred extensive roles to a non-governmental entity.
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Unlike many decentralization efforts which are usually not fully committed to extending
powers to non-governmental entities, the Trans Mara Council shifted authority to the
Mara Conservancy. The plan was a tough sell to surrounding communities and especially
the Siria. This led to a near stalemate during the inception of the partnership and
exclusion of the Siria in governance. It can be interpreted that decentralization was
implemented, at best as privatization. The private interests working in collaboration with
elite coalitions at the county positioned strategically and exploited the opportunity which
allowed them to strategically sideline the Siria.
For sure, the level of decentralization of power made a significant difference in
MCPP-mediated outcomes. From the vantage of power sharing and interest in collective
appropriation of resources, each MCPP initiation platform can be evaluated as an
indispensable condition for empowerment. The Forum and the Amboseli Management
Partnership were designed to engage communities more extensively than was the Mara
Conservancy. For example, the Forum’s strategy was anchored on collective benefit
sharing and collective management of biodiversity across the wildlife corridors that
traversed communal and private land. The Amboseli Partnership’ strategy was ecological
justice and advocacy. Furthermore, in the Amboseli, alliance-building during MCPP
initiation and formalization was a relatively participatory arena because it embodied
consultation, public deliberation, and evidence sharing. This not only allayed fears and
suspicion of dispossession, but it also reduced confrontation and allowed communities to
mobilize resources for participation in co-management. On the other hand, the Mara
Conservancy’s strategy leaned more towards transparent administration. Accordingly,
mainstreaming of community participation was implemented (respectively) through
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associationalism, pluralism through pacted governance, and bureaucratic management.
These choices determined the entry and engagement of community organizations with the
bureaucratic strategy allowing the least participatory avenue for community participation.
Additionally, better conditions for community buy-in partially explains the presence of
many partnership networks in Laikipia and in the Amboseli.
2.2: H2: The more extensive is elite support for co-management, the higher the
likelihood of CBO empowerment
The expectation that greater elite support for co-management increases
empowerment finds strong support in the experience of each partnership. In fact, the
centrality of elite support as a key determinant of empowerment is evident across all the
cases and phases of MCPP evolution. A key observation made is that in each partnership,
elites were more supportive at initiation than during formalization and post-formalization
phases. The distinguishing contrast, however, is that for initiatives in the Amboseli and
the Mara Triangle, elite support for formal co-management was exhibited by erratic and
transitory postures. This observation finds support in studies which express consistent
fear by elite when transfer of real decision making power to communities is implemented
or suggested. A related interpretation may be that elite support during initiation was a
mere show that they were receptive to co-management programs, while their real
intentions were to enhance their benefit streams from reforms and strengthen their own
interests rather than those of the collective. For example, in Laikipia, communities
benefited from a favorable dispensation that was relatively free of jostling and intercoalitional elite conflicts at initiation of the Forum. This enabled proactive participation
of communities. During post-formalization phase when the wildlife cropping program
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was terminated, elite demands from political and ranching business coalitions nearly
disrupted the structures that had helped extend significant rights to communities.
In the Amboseli, the initiation phase was slightly confrontational. However, the
stronger alliance between the Amboseli Association and pro-co-management elites
weakened opposing elite groupings (specifically from the pro-privatization community
affiliated elites, political, and some bureau-bases elites. This ensured that communities
were empowered to negotiate and participate in early co-management processes. During
the post-formalization phase, however, communities faced a harsher environment which
prevented empowerment. Thus, while the Amboseli Association was equally spared of
intense elite collisions, it suffered the consequences of poor craftsmanship (of a weak
compact) and collusion between the partnership’s leadership and external functionaries.
In the case of the Mara Conservancy, weak support from political and bureau-based elites
and elite competition inhibited the construction of a platform for consensus on how to
implement the management plan and how to engage the Siria right from initiation.
Conflict was nurtured by elite coalitional struggles over power for leadership and the
need to appease communities for electoral support. Fickle elite support produced a fragile
community organization. Intense and protracted coalitional conflicts among political,
bureau-based, and community-affiliated elites diminished the ability of the Siria to
effectively organize and participate in co-management.
The lessons here are twofold. First, elites disfavor decentralization when it is
strategized as a power shifting process but they may put up with power sharing programs.
As documented earlier, the elite support variable interacts with the decentralization
variable and thus the extensive dissimilarities in empowerment stem further from
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differential levels of elite support. Weak empowerment outcomes occurred where there
were high risks of elite capture of co-management processes. Second, the more united
and consensus-oriented elite networks in Laikipia managed to thwart threats from
disruptive networks that emerged during the implementation and termination of the
wildlife cropping program. This facilitated community mobilization and empowerment,
and more so because the Forum had a strong organizational identity embedded on its
modular structures. However, diverse constellations of fragmented elite coalitions
increased chances for elite capture in the Mara and the Amboseli eco-complexes. This
problem was extensively mentioned by respondents in the interviews as well.
Why did elite support significantly influence MCPP-mediated outcomes? An
illustrative account of elite role suffices. In the Amboseli and the Mara Triangle, the key
conveners of MCPP were elites constituted by political, bureau-based, and NGOaffiliated elites from leading conservation institutions. These diverse groupings with
fragmented identities fronted agendas that were remotely linked to community interests.
This process nurtured more confrontational arenas and the absence of endorsement of the
management plans by communities. Equally coalitional interactions led by consensusoriented and relatively pro-inclusive elites in Laikipia provided collaborators an arena
through which representational identity, legitimacy, and vitality could be achieved. Such
opportunities lacked in the Mara where political and bureau-based elites imposed their
preferences on co-management agenda. Furthermore, in the Amboseli and the Mara
Triangle, communities negotiated but highly contested the co-management processes.
Partnerships compacts with a steady evolution (such as the Forum) provided an
immediate boost to representation than consortiums and compacts with unstable
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evolution (such as the Amboseli Management Partnership and the Mara Conservancy).
This variability was linked to variations in institutional proprietorship and stewardship
from the elite leadership whose actions and strategies directly influenced CBO’s
resilience, vigilance and leadership capacities.
2.3: H3: The higher the level of capacity of a participating CBO, the higher the
likelihood of CBO empowerment
Contrary to expectation, a surprising finding was that higher levels of CBO
capacity did not necessarily increase the likelihood of empowerment. The capacity
hypothesis is only partially confirmed. The expectation was that capacity variable would
be more influential than the findings suggest. In essence, while there were obvious
contrasts in capacity among the three community organizations, there was no strong
evidence that community capacity greatly conditioned their empowerment. This apparent
explanatory weakness of this variable was manifested in different aspects. For one,
organizational capacity provided limited additional benefits for community organizations.
All the three organizations faced vulnerabilities and opportunities that thwarted or
enhanced empowerment. Each partnership arena empowered or weakened these
organizations regardless of their capacity. More so, this process was determined not by
community capacity but by the scale of decentralization and level of elite support.
Second, CBO capacity only minimally reinforced empowerment outcomes once
these two variables had shaped the dynamics of co-management. For instance, the
Rangeland Trust’s success at representational ability and its effectiveness at conservation
were enabled by the ready embrace from a cross section of elite coalitions straddling
community, bureaucratic and NGO-based professional groups. Similarly, the Amboseli
Association which was dormant during the late formalization phase of its parent MCPP
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was revived and reconstituted not because of its mobilization and its leadership but
because the municipal governments of Olkejuado and Loitoktok, working in concert with
KWS re-organized structures for engaging stakeholders within the Amboseli.
Community leaders rallied their constituents under this dispensation.
Third, there were instances where even a community organization with high
capacity interacted as a weak partner because power had been extensively tilted towards
municipal-affiliated and private sector partners. This was especially so with the Amboseli
Association. At the same time, the association’s capacity was attenuated by imprecise
boundaries that stipulated roles and responsibilities of municipal and private sector
partners. Even within the Forum, the private sector partner was presumably a stronger
network than its counterparts. Clearly, capacity had a weak influence on empowerment.
The factors that enhanced empowerment were favorable structural and contextual
conditions. Arguably, when partners were not committed to reforming co-management
structures to allow inclusive and extensive participation of community organizations, it
did not matter what level of capacity a community organization possessed. Otherwise, an
alternative explanation is that both the Rangelands Trust and the Amboseli Association
were cushioned by co-management structures while Siria were alienated.
Organizations exhibited contrasting attributes in terms of capacity at initiation and
during formalization phases of MCPPs. The communities in the Forum lacked a
representational chaperon during the initiation of the Forum because the Rangelands
Trust was not yet established. The Rangelands Trust became an effective partner during
the formalization of the Forum because an amenable context facilitated by elite coalitions
encompassing community’s ranching, political and bureaucratic groups embraced and
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nurtured it to be a stable proactive partner. The Amboseli was essentially a strong partner
at initiation. Internally, it possessed valuable resources including leadership and a track
record of proactive engagement in designing and planning of Amboseli management
plans of 1991 and 1996. Externally, it was for similar reasons an indispensable partner in
the institutional infrastructure for fast-tracking the operationalization of the biosphere
reserve regime post-designation.
The Rangelands Trust and the Amboseli Partnership also participated as formal
partners, provided community land, social capital, and human resources. This had two
effects; communities were valued as strategic and legitimate partners, creating trust and
credibility, and the partnership start-up process was effectively institutionalized with
relatively stable structures. In contrast, the shaky and tension ridden initiation of the Mara
Conservancy prevented the types of initial empowerment (via representation and
effective engagement) seen during the initiation of the Forum’s and the Amboseli
Management Partnership. In the formalization and post-formalization phases, the three
community organizations possessed different capacities as negotiators and decisionmakers. The Siria movement and its alienated structure meant its continual absence in
formal decision-making. Furthermore, due to Siria leadership’s pursuit of tactics of
dissent, its ineffectiveness was inevitable.
The Siria continued to contest for their rights while directing all the energies to
protests, while the Rangelands Trust and Amboseli Association struggled to negotiate
rights to manage resources. These challenges were less intense for the Rangeland Trust.
The challenges for Amboseli Association stemmed from conflicting internal
organizational and MCPP forces. Essentially, stable but conservative institutions and an
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unstructured and delicate identity of the Amboseli Management partnership clearly
derailed CBO empowerment. In the case of the Siria in Mara, alienation was
compounded further by repression when its leadership was occasionally accosted by the
police and through systemic elite manipulation. Additionally, the surge in group ranch
privatization gained foothold in the Amboseli and Mara when each of the partnerships
were beginning to re-organize and consolidate. This coupled with other social and
ecological changes continue to inhibit progress in participation and empowerment.
Despite, its weak influence on MCPP-mediated outcomes, why did CBO capacity
impact empowerment? Community capacity in each of the cases indicted that it was a
factor that depended on both internal CBO and external partnership-based variables. For
example, the Forum produced a proactive and a better organized community organization
while its counterparts produced fragile and polarized community organizations. The key
difference is that the putative role of the Amboseli Management Partnership in
institutionalizing the biosphere reserve regime created relatively better incentives for
collaboration with community institutions than the Mara Conservancy. This was the
participatory space that enabled the proactive inclusion of the Amboseli Association.
2.4: H4: Co-management reforms have a higher likelihood of increasing
empowerment with higher levels of formal and rapid coordination at initiation and
formalization
In these three ecosystems under study, opportunistic collaborative planning had a
higher propensity to produce conservation and empowerment targets than systematic
design because it enhanced effectiveness of communities in managing conservation
programs. It also enabled them to simultaneously enhance the benefit streams from
engagement in collaborative conservation. The advantage provided by immediate
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democratic processes for engaging communities in Laikipia and in the Amboseli quelled
tensions and empowered communities to mobilize organizational and leadership
resources necessary for collaborating with their partners. A surprising finding was that
the initial formulation of management plans, reserve selection and inception of protected
areas could only be achieved and built on not just decentralized inclusive structures, but
community buy-in as well. For example, in Laikipia and in the Amboseli, community
buy-in meant that a relatively rapid process that allowed inbuilt consensus to be
translated into a program for action had to be implemented with a sense of urgency.
When MCPP initiators were not impelled to translate informal strategies into formal
institutions or when they were challenged by tenuous inter-partner relations as was with
the Mara, the slow pace influenced expectations and interactions. It subdued effort and
commitment, the level of trust and action within the partnership, and community
institutions as well.
Evidently, with the Forum in Laikipia, both participation and buy-in were high at
initiation and early organization phases. With the Amboseli Management Partnership,
community participation was extensive but partners had to aggressively ensure high level
of buy-in for the partnership to be initiated. In the Mara Triangle, where decentralization
was implemented but significant powers were directed to the private sector. Community
participation was not fully attained and community buy-in is yet to be achieved to date.
These structural challenges limited rather than enabled empowerment. It is usually
assumed that expanding participation is the panacea for enabling positive co-management
outcomes, yet the all the three cases reveal that buy-in must be achieved regardless of the
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scale of participation. In other words, communities must also accept and endorse the
program as meaningful and rewarding.
2.5: H5: The higher the number and more diverse the resource types exchanged,
shared, and expended by partners, the greater the benefits for empowerment
The main observation regarding this hypothesis is that high resource levels have
weak influence on empowerment. While it is true that adversarial relations stems largely
from historical dispossession of local communities and progressive accumulation by
governments and the private sector, this equation is changing. Marginalization of
resource-adjacent and user communities is decreasing and the relationship between
communities and the government is improving. This is indicated by the types and
amounts of resources expended and exchanged in conservation related programs. The
amount of (financial, human, social and symbolic) resources used continue to increase
over the years. However, the findings indicate that increase in resources has not been
matched by increased empowerment of CBOs. The Amboseli Management Partnership’s
experience clearly demonstrates this. Similarly, the unique position of the Mara
Conservancy is that it relied on support from many government institutions for program
implementation. This relationship has informally bounded the partnership onto a system
of entrenched parochial connections to local, political, and bureaucratic elites. However,
because of its strong focus on an intervention prism of transparency (rather than
representation), it has stayed a stable compact than its counterpart in the Amboseli. Its
conservation programs are extensive; these are however more focused on supplanting and
enhancing regulatory incentives rather than compensatory and participatory incentives.
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2.6: Interaction of variables
Three variables are indispensable and two minimally influence empowerment
outcomes. To a great degree, the elite support variable interacts with the four variables as
they mediate upon empowerment. Thus, the impact of each variable interconnects with
the elite support variable. Elites are co-opted or engage coercively in partnership
activities and processes that enhance or inhibit empowerment. Arguably, the more
decentralized structures were influential empowerment factors only when they were
anchored on strong elite support systems. Thus, in the Forum where power was widely
decentralized, hence widely distributed across co-management partners, the net effect
was more pronounced because elite support and a united elite coalition provided
resources for a stable partnership initiation and formalization process with commitment
towards inclusiveness. There was consensus about the selection of protected area
landscapes, in planning of strategies for implementation, and tools for enabling
community engagement in the implementation process. These were crucial enabling
initial conditions and institutions for empowering communities.
In sharp contrast, where decentralization vis a vis power distribution and power
sharing attempts were poorly facilitated, it was because elite formations straddling
bureaucratic, political, traditional, and landed elites prevented the type of stable evolution
seen in the Forum. This is demonstrated in Amboseli Management Partnership where
elite consensus was weak but, at least, cooptation enabled efforts towards a consensusdriven MCPP inception process. However, the cumulative effect of exclusive coalitional
alliances ended up nurturing inclusive yet fragile structures. Elite fragmentation and weak
support during formalization later on directed energies and agenda away from the pro-
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decentralization coalition. With the Mara Conservancy, its inception was largely
undermined by elite control and lack of local legitimacy. This weakened the ability of the
MCPP to secure representation and effectiveness of its core community organization.
Thus, in the Amboseli and Mara, empowerment was compromised and less participatory
programs were instituted.
Further, empowerment was less likely when the level of support from communityaffiliated and bureaucratic elites was weakest. These were the groups most prone to
sabotaging participatory governance which occurred either through elite capture,
interference, and process manipulation. The Mara complex is a key case in point. Elite
interests determined opportunity and CBO agency. Seldom did elites seek to fully
improve community interests, but this does not imply that they were not supportive of
community-affiliated programs. They were in support to allow them to exploit
opportunities as key players, and this was particularly so with the bureaucratic and
professional elites. Once opportunities were availed, community interests were sidelined.
These types of systemic exclusion occurred progressively in Laikipia and the Amboseli.
In the Amboseli, empowerment initially occurred because of a process of co-opted
activism allowed for a negotiated CBO engagement. In the Mara Triangle, exclusion was
an immediate element of wildlife conservation and planning because elites were the key
initiators and catalysts of reforms that would end up benefitting other partners and
excluding communities. Empowerment was not achieved because of this conflict-ridden
platform in the Mara Triangle.
The matrix in Table 6 below highlights the level of CBO engagement and
empowerment as a consequence of elite support and elite role in each MCPP arena vis a
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vis decentralization. It presents the findings which are summarized along typologies
descriptive of four types of outcomes. In essence, elites predominated co-management
through their support and prominent participation in specific MCPP programs. It is
important to restate that despite the presence and participation of many elite groups, the
significant (positive or negative) impact of the elite support variable was more
pronounced with the participation and legitimation of political and bureau-based elites.
Significant evidence points to the fact that elites either participated as activists (i.e.,
supported co-management) or as catalysts (i.e., captured co-management benefits). A
related observation was in establishing the two distinguishing instances of elite role in
decentralizing or allowing inclusive governance, including supporting the scaling up of
operations and resources for mainstreaming participation. Findings show that elite
coalitions participated as facilitators of MCPP and as initiators of MCPPs. Along these
instances, evidence also indicated that the scale to which decentralization was achieved
or undermined largely was as a result of these four elements described elite participation.
Table 6: A matrix describing the impact of elite support on MCPP arena and
empowerment of community organizations

Elite as facilitators of
MCPP

Elite as initiators of MCPP

Elites as activists (support)

Elites as catalysts (capture)

Consensus-oriented arena

Concealed conflict

Proactive CBO engagement
(The Forum)

Dissipated CBO engagement
(The Forum; the Amboseli
Partnership – formalization
phases)
Conflict-ridden

Co-opted activism

Negotiated CBO engagement Contested CBO engagement
(The Amboseli Partnership) (Mara Conservancy)
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3: MCPP- mediated empowerment: Procedural and substantive outcomes
3.1: Empowerment as representativeness
A clear illustration and explanation of empowerment outcomes are revealed by
assessing both procedural and substantive outcomes. The evidence for interconnections
between the level of decentralization of power and elite support variables is more
pronounced in the operations of the Mara Conservancy. The diverse and fragmented elite
coalitions invaded the initiation process, cemented their control and disrupted its stable
evolution. The dominance and leadership of the private sector was institutionalized with
assistance from the bureau-based officials at the municipal office. This created struggles
over implementation process of the Management Plan, the outcome of which was an
alienated and disenfranchised the Siria community. Poor representation and the
entrenchment of administrative fiat resulted in protecting elites and their agendas, not the
community’s. When a CBO was a proactive partner in “creating spaces” (see for
example, Gaventa 2006), such as in the Forum, communities were empowered and
successfully represented community interests. Otherwise, where community entities were
merely “invited to participate” (Gaventa 2006) such as in the Mara Conservancy and the
Amboseli Management Partnership), contestation and disruptive evolution created less
effective institutions and weak conditions for empowerment.
The factors that motivated the initiation of each partnership presented varying
implications for empowerment. Since the Forum’s wildlife cropping experiment was
designed as an entitling program, it was better suited as program for enabling community
representation and participation than those of the Amboseli Partnership and the Mara
Conservancy which were gate-keeping and housekeeping programs respectively. In the
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Amboseli the goal of mainstreaming a biosphere reserve status within the complex
resulted in a biased focus on landscape management through gate-keeping strategies. This
process was entrenched by a coalition that emerged from alliance between
conservationists, the privates sector and the Kenya Wildlife Service. This led to the
distancing of agendas on livelihoods enhancement, meaning that the roles of community
organizations were important only is as far as they participated as conservators. In the
Mara, the real deal was to install radical housekeeping measures, and this was to take
shape even at the cost of representativeness.
A second but a more nuanced specification of the impact of decentralization on
representation is exhibited in outcomes linked to partner influence and authority in
decision-making and revenue management. Comparatively, the Forum was more
successful in extending participation rights than its counterparts in the Mara and
Amboseli. This is reflected in its board structure, management and board operations. The
board appointment process was a key factor that influenced start-up processes and
community buy-in within each partnership. For example, selected board members were
more prone to catalyze conflict than boards with elected membership. With the Mara
Conservancy and Amboseli Partnership where board appointments were distinctively
based on selection, decision-making was heavily controlled by bureaucratic entities at the
municipal offices and those outside MCPP confines.
Additionally, board appointment in these two partnerships poorly reflected
regional and group representation of the social landscape. In the Mara, this exacerbated
credibility crises as the local community cried foul that they were not consulted on the
matter and therefore disapproved of the process. Locals argued that the board leadership
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was imposed on them. Complex and unrepresentative structures and biased board
operations influenced the distribution of power away from community institutions. The
Amboseli Partnership relied on board units at consortia and consortium levels to transact
and implement projects. This created a very complex structure for engaging community
organizations. These developments signaled the beginning of a disruptive evolution of the
Amboseli Partnership and divisive politics in the Mara complex, the consequence of
which was a fragile entity (i.e., the Amboseli Association in Amboseli) and an alienated
organization (i.e., Siria social movement). On the contrary, the Forum’s board was and
continues to be convened through voting process and decisions by consensus. Its
composition and decision making units reflect the local and geographic jurisdiction.
Members, staff and managers of financial committees and departments are appointed
through rigorous interviewing by the executive and board. Additionally, officials elected
from five geographical units in Laikipia and surrounding regions are representative of its
membership. The board is accountable to the Forum members and structured as so in
order to limit bureaucratic interference.
To a great extent, the distribution and locus of fiscal authority was a key factor in
shaping empowerment outcomes. For example, the Forum’s reliance on its members’
contributions allowed its community-affiliated partners to develop clout and influence on
agendas of the association. The Forum’s apolitical identity also enabled it to streamline a
more flexible mobilization process. In contrast, Mara Triangle’s management debacle
ensued as a result of its technocratic and bureaucratic postures which amassed fiscal
powers to structures affiliated with the private sector. Thus, despite its strong compact
which enabled structural reforms for reserve management, this orientation was
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debilitating to enhancing participation of an alienated community partner. A more
important factor is that statutory roles of state-affiliated entities granted these institutions
more influence regardless of how much decentralized a co-management program sought
to be. For example, the Maasai Mara is under the custodianship of Narok county
governments while the Amboseli’s complex is managed by the KWS. Custodial roles of
each manager granted them extensive administrative and fiscal authority over community
and private sector entities.
Representation was better enhanced when a partnership established and engaged
the existing or newly created formal or surrogate community institutions. These included
institution such as environmental committees and village forums. These were important
arenas for community deliberation and participation. However, poor representation of
community interests also emanated from internally exclusive community structures that
were protected by social norms and customs. Infact, there is an inherent dualism openly
displayed in the community institutions. Community-affiliated partners in each
partnership are the apex structures (i.e, the most important organizations) representing the
relatively insular Maasai social institutions. These institutions represented by platform
CBOs were relatively popular and influential and regardless of their roles as barriers to
empowerment.
Like any other arena, MCPP platforms are political spaces where actors negotiate
for and allocate resources. Empowerment outcomes find explanation in commitment by
partners to scale up participatory processes. Belaboring on the links between institutional
design and strategic interests of MCPP leadership explain the variability in strategies for
mainstreaming participation and empowerment outcomes. In Laikipia, the dense nature of
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cross-sectional networks and the Forum’s organizational structure amenable to
geographic and functional replication reveals why it was better in scaling up benefits and
incentives for representation and participation. Accordingly, its modular structure (with
eight independent but tightly knit departments) performed better than the consortiumbased (i.e., Amboseli Management Partnership) and delicate compact (i.e., Mara
Conservancy). The less modular systems (i.e., the latter two) that relied on regulatory and
command type of management were weak at mobilizing resources and scaling up
participation. They were limited in their ability to create collective identity because
differentiated and competing identities prevailed. In the Amboseli, the amorphous
structure of the partnership ended up alienating the Amboseli Association which was the
main organization representing communities in the complex. A 2013 USAID evaluation
report indicated that the Laikipia Wildlife Forum has been proactive in providing
programs that target institution building. Such include strengthening capacity for
communities to have their own governance structures, by-laws, elections, and recruiting
members for conservation groups (USAID 2013).
On the other hand, the primary reason why the Forum’s success in mediating
conservation initiatives generates a lot of enthusiasm while the Mara Conservancy’s
equally dedicated industry at institutionalizing reforms is viewed with so much
controversy is because analysts have been looking at partnership-mediating factors onesided. One way to address this shortcoming is to analyze partnerships platforms from the
vantage of what backstopping processes that continually define partnership interventions
and success. A relevant example here is the Mara Conservancy which was and still is
proactive in using external support and its internal resources to enhancing transparency
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and administrative efficiency. While enhancing representativeness is important, it is a
secondary goal.
3.2: Empowerment as nurturing of accountability
Partnership activities must also be understood in the context of how MCPPmediated structures enabled accountability across MCPP governance systems. Of
particular concern here is each platform’s role in nurturing and enabling institutional
accountability. Weak accountability can handicap operations in an organization and
undermine empowerment. A striking institutional design element is that decentralization
was a critical determinant of the level of access to information and decision-making. The
difference between structures that were enabling of empowerment from those that
inhibited it was the level of access to information guaranteed to community partners. In
the former, such as in the Forum, communities could organize and mobilize resources
useful for scrutinizing the benefits of the wildlife cropping program. Accordingly,
accountability and transparency were initial strengths of the Forum’s establishment.
Community partners in Laikipia also extensively benefitted from the cropping program’s
open system for informing potential program participants.
This led to two outcomes; empowered partners with awareness about the
program’s benefits and more importantly, the incentive for initiating and implementing
innovative community-managed conservation programs. Equally important was the
platform for information sharing, as was indicated by the large networks across the
Forum. The Forum was a compact with a large and diverse membership and could
therefore avail extensive arenas for information sharing and learning. In contrast, the
Amboseli Association faced significant hurdles as a community representative because
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the MCPP structures lacked accountability. This was nurtured by imprecise boundaries of
authority that arose from coalitional transformations and a weak compact. As for the
Mara Conservancy, the local community claimed that they were denied access to
pertinent information during the preparation and endorsement of the management plan
for Mara Triangle. Communities decried the overbearing role of the private sector. To
date, the community continues to contest the entity’s operation and seeks to win back the
usufruct rights that they feel they deserve.
Capacity building of strong and popular yet insular local institutions was a general
challenge for the three partnerships. In essence, the lack of empowerment was
accentuated by the weak intra-CBO institutions as well. It was not merely a product of
partnership operations. However, the overall differences depended on whether program
interventions were modeled on delegate or tutelage mechanisms and the forms and
sources of democratic deficit within structures of co-management. These were reflected
differently in each phase of each partnership and across each MCPP. The Forum’s
strategy for mainstreaming participation was geared simultaneously to simultaneously
enable accountable grassroots institutions.
3.3: Empowerment as effectiveness
Community effectiveness is an important empowerment outcome that was
influenced by variations in institutional design of the three partnerships. The more
decentralized co-management structures within the Forum enabled widespread
congruence of interests between elite coalitions and community institutions and
consequently led to the establishment of an inclusive system. In the Amboseli and Mara
Triangle this was only partially or poorly achieved. One notable difference is that the
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leadership of the Amboseli Partnership directed its current efforts towards revamping
community institutions that were needed to enhance effective collaboration. The
Amboseli Association was revived in the mid-2000s and is now redefining its role and
modestly representing community interests in this new process.
The less decentralized Mara Conservancy evolved under conditions of low
legitimacy compounded further by mistrust among partners and between its leadership
and the local communities. This mistrust debilitated the structures that could have
enhanced collaboration because it produced a partnership that marginalized its
community partner but institutionalized dominant control by elites and the private sector.
First and foremost, policy entrepreneurs commanding the Conservancy’s initiation could
only pursue the small coalition of elites whose interests and values mirrored their
position. Secondly, the interests of the community remained a tangential goal with
regards to MCPP efforts because the local organization was excluded from decision
making. This limited the ability of the Siria movement nurture collective resources from
its community. The ramifications for community effectiveness were largely
organizational in nature. To cite examples; this conflict-ridden process led to an
outgrowth of a vulnerable, less resilient and ineffective organization. The Siria
Movement, unlike its peers, was weak at appropriating the benefits of a collaborative
arena, in safeguarding gains of devolution, and innovatively enlarging its network. In
essence, the Siria evolved as a less productive organization than the Northern Rangelands
Trust and the Amboseli Association. It still remains doubtful whether the Siria will
succeed in having their demands addressed by the Conservancy’s leadership.
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A related finding is that representation alone could not guarantee empowerment.
Representation is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for empowerment, even
though poor representation in co-management is a conduit for disempowerment.
Community stewardship in Laikipia’s conservation efforts was effectively realized
because the Northern Rangeland Trust was well represented in co-management. But the
CBO was also proactively engaged in decision making at the platform and project level.
In the Amboseli complex, the Amboseli Association was relatively well represented as
well. However, the well-organized partners (i.e, the municipal governments and the
private sector) appropriated more benefits when they established a network with leading
conservation institutions. The interest of this network was to fully preserve the Amboseli;
an agenda which was more often antagonistic to community interests. Furthermore, the
Amboseli Association, which represented community interests had to contend with a
large number of more powerful partners and coalitions.
Conservation outcomes in the three landscapes are by inference a product of CBO
ability to harness community resources in (more) decentralized structures. For example,
the Rangelands Trust and its umbrella partnership the Forum have exceeded expectations
in these indicators. Laikipia is the only ecosystem complex in the country where wildlife
stocks have steadily increased. This is more so for the endangered species such as the
black rhino. This stems largely from a relatively decentralized co-management process.
The key areas of interest to many partners in each of the three MCPPs were to enhance
the restoration and preservation of rangelands and to enhance and stabilize wildlife
populations. Laikipia has succeeded in achieving both goals. Mara and Amboseli have
succeeded in neither of the two.
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A unique set of explanations can be advanced about the distinctive elements of
collaboration and MCPP effectiveness at integrating communities into structures of comanagement. Partnership commitment to scaling up substantive engagement help
illustrate this better. Contrasting efforts and processes were observed. In the case of the
Amboseli Management Partnership, the Amboseli Association’s membership in the
various boards and committees did not necessarily translate into empowerment. A
progressive history of internal fragility and coercive conservation institutionalized and
entrenched the power of two municipalities (i.e., Olkejuado and Loitoktok) and the
Kenya Wildlife Service. This process resulted in the displacement of the power of the
partner CBO (i.e, the Amboseli Association).214 The strategy was deliberately designed as
a gate-keeping process. It was designed as a mechanism for limiting participation of
communities, the consequence being dis-enfranchisement. In the Mara, repeated calls by
the Siria community to establish a new negotiation and representation platform was
futile. The Siria claims of disinheritance were repeatedly ignored. This case illustrates
how partnerships take different paths to scaling, at times exhibitive of pressures from
bureaucratic control and competing interests of disparate elite formations. The Mara
Conservancy’s platform was characteristically an antagonistic elite controlled arena and
less suited for scaling participation and substantive empowerment.
The design Forum’s institutions were anchored on relatively strong interdepartmental linkages with Forum’s commitment from business, community, and
political elites. This coalition directed its energy towards ensuring the Forum’s
214

As previously discussed in chapter 4, coercive conservation entails the state using and justifying
coercion as a strategy for implementing conservation efforts with significant support from the international
NGOs (Peluso 1993a, 1993b). The real intention is usually to use regulation and enforcement in order to
control and own systems for appropriating the lucrative wildlife-based resources.

350

organizational stability and inclusiveness. These interconnections facilitated and
enhanced collective action across the landscape while modularity enabled
implementation of conservation programs. Thus, unlike its counterparts in the Mara and
Amboseli, the Forum’s level of efficiency ensured success in realm of conservation and
livelihood enhancement.
4: Unanticipated intervening variables
Despite the fact that decentralization of power, elite support, and CBO capacity
account for a great portion empowerment, a key finding is that empowerment was
conditional upon additional unanticipated intervening variables. In the process of
discerning these impacts, the discovery was that a considerable influence of variables
such as the existing legal and institutional framework, MCPP conveners’ identity,
property rights regimes, social and ecological features of a region, and the scale of
innovation was obvious. Rather than view these as competing accounts, they are analyzed
as intervening variables whose influence generated impact only via the mechanisms
catalyzed by decentralization of power and elite support. The next section analyses their
impact.
4.1: Local institutional framework
The attributes of the national institutional framework were analyzed in chapter 2
and there were evident implications that spanned regional and local arenas. The empirical
chapters documented how the local apparatuses provided the basis for implementing comanagement. In essence, besides their interconnections with other regimes and local bylaws, the wildlife cropping program in Laikipia, the Man and Biosphere Reserve regime
in the Amboseli, and the devolution of management rights to the Mara Conservancy were

351

the key legal anchors of MCPP activities. These legal devices significantly reveal crucial
variations that shaped initiation and evolution of co-management, including
empowerment of community organizations. However, each program produced a distinct
institutional design. For example, since the Forum was established to enhance collective
appropriation in Laikipia, resources were deliberately and strategically earmarked for
extensive participation of communities in designing and implementing the wildlife
cropping program. The Forum equally established structures modeled on high
modularity, nodality, and diversity. These features incentivized communities to
participate proactively in the program and well beyond the termination of the wildlife
cropping program. The impetus was driven further by a statute on quota law, consensus
and political will among powerful coalitions. This was a more amenable dispensation for
associational activism.
In the Amboseli, the provision requiring a pact with local communities (vis a vis
the biosphere reserve regime) was amenable to inclusiveness and therefore enabled
community participation. Additionally, its affiliate soft law regulations and the
partnership’s role were supportive of community entry. However, weaker organizational
development of the partnership made the Amboseli Partnership fragile and vulnerable.
Mara Conservancy’s legal device was a management plan which was contested from the
very beginning. More importantly, the entity’s low modularity anchored on principles of
transparency and efficiency could not afford communities an expanded participation
space. The result was a very reactive and vulnerable community organization.
Exacerbating the problem was the fact that the leadership of the Siria movement was
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occasionally accosted when it sought redress or demanded recognition in comanagement.
4.2: Coalitional networks initiating and convening an MCPP
Partnership conveners who mobilized resources for co-management affected
empowerment outcomes in different ways. For example, the type of elite constellations
involved during the initiation of each MCPP mattered. More critical was their role as
torch bearers whose initiatives and interests varied in intensity and support level. But an
important finding is that in many instances and across each case, each progressive phase
emboldened elite coalitions and enabled them to disproportionately appropriate material
and/or symbolic benefits than their local communities. The difference is what role elites
performed. In cases where bureaucratic and political elites were influential, or where elite
influence and resources prominently monopolized all aspects of planning and agenda
building, community organizations were weak; otherwise community organizations
evolved as resilient entities. Additionally, fractious elite constellations indicated by
intense struggles were an acute problem as the Conservancy evolved. Besides
subordinating the interests of the Siria community, this context made it difficult for the
leadership to institutionalize representative structures.
Secondly, the contrasting roles and influence of local municipal governments lays
bare a crucial source of variation. The Nanyuki municipality was a relatively weaker
partner in the operations of the Forum while that of the communities and private sector
were stronger. This allowed transactional processes to develop devoid of tensions and
clamor over rights and roles. By comparison, in the Amboseli Partnership and the Mara
Conservancy, the municipal structures of Ol Kejuado, Loitoktok, Trans Mara and Narok
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were very influential partners. There is no denying that municipal actors provided direct
benefits for co-management but they were occasionally a source or anchor of formidable
opposition to inclusive engagement as well. It is also true that the participation of
council-affiliated bureaucrats in municipal boards served both public and policy input
roles. However, in cases where they extended their powers, they perpetuated the
entrenchment of interests that were peripheral to community agenda and demands. In the
case of the Amboseli Partnership, municipal structures were key conduits for
strengthening a destabilizing coalition that eventually disrupted and weakened
community structures of the Amboseli Association. In the Mara Conservancy, the
debilitating effect of an elite-aligned municipal structure failed to secure a formal
platform for negotiating and facilitating the participation of the Siria Maasai. It solidified
elite interests and polarized its partners.
4.3: Property rights regimes
Property regimes in the ecosystems served by these three partnerships straddle
public, community and private regimes. The definitive impact of this variable was
revealed by the scale and presence (or lack of) secures regimes and the authority granted
to state agencies and functionaries in wildlife management. Many studies have indicated
that the reality in many pastoral rangelands is that customary community regimes are at
odds with or conflict with formal regime structures (Ensminger 1997). Unless a legal
medium is in place to address ambiguities and contradictions, empowerment cannot be
achieved. This is a rare occurrence. Besides, the boundaries for ownership, access, and
management are inherently “fuzzy, fluid, and flexible” (Fernandez-Gimene’z 2012, 8). In
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cases where more formal regimes were prominent and secured on private-based regimes,
community empowerment was more likely as was in Laikipia.
However, it is important to qualify how much formal rights enhance
communities’ leverage in negotiating and benefitting from co-management. In Laikipia,
strong private property regimes were able to secure better conservation outcomes but
were not able to guarantee greater community benefits vis a vis the interests of the rich
landed ranchers. In contrast, ambiguous regimes compounded the problems for
partnership operations and empowerment. For example, in the Mara, the Siria’s contested
the designation of the Mara Triangle and its management plan while the Siria
organization itself lacked the legal protection that explicit stated its rights to the reserve.
The case of the Siria in Mara attests to the crucial importance of strong property rights
regimes and formal validation of community rights to resource use. Certainly, granting
exclusive rights to communities is not a panacea for redressing social and ecological
challenges in these complexes, (see Kimani and Pickard 1998, Mwangi 2007).
A more important impact can be attributed to the fact that a public property (i.e.
wildlife) was left as a major burden in private hands (Ngeta 2007, 2010). Mainstream
economic theories emphasize that private property rights can incentivize not just
participation in conservation but can also yield stronger institutions for managing
resources. This is because they are more apt to extend rights and privileges to
communities. This can translate into empowerment outcomes in terms of allowing local
organizations to mobilize and organize resources while they participate in comanagement programs. In essence, ownership, administration, management and
monitoring of biodiversity (i.e. wildlife and rangelands) and revenues defined the scope
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of empowerment based on the scale and scope of community participation. When access
was denied, community empowerment was low or clearly absent.
Where relatively more formal and intact property rights to land existed, regardless
of who owns the assets, (as was in Laikipia), community representation in comanagement translated into more substantive outcomes. This is common in Laikipia
where many wildlife management areas operate under private regimes governed as
private protected areas. Communities secured some leverage from asset ownership which
they used for bargaining and negotiating with buyers of ecosystems services, brokering
ownership of ventures and securing official management of revenue streams.215 The
experience of the Northern Rangelands Trust is telling of how strong tenure systems can
help dissipate and deflect conflict among entities that are frequently prone to compete for
resources.
In the case of the Amboseli, beginning late 1980s, traditional customary
institutions lost broad appeal because of their role in instituting weak governance of
group ranches and in jeopardizing community land. The reluctance by the leadership of
traditional institutions’ to allow smooth transition to individual property tenure coupled
with other social and ecological factors significantly destabilized the Amboseli
Partnership and community institutions. Community tenure is not a sign of strong
property rights regime, though group ownership and titles increase the probability of
more access to wildlife resources. The evolution of the Mara Conservancy and the Siria
movement was animated by weaker and ambiguous property rights to communities.
Another key observation made was that complementary institutions such as traditional
215

In Laikipia where most wildlife management areas operate under private regimes, but where rangelands
are not abundant for livestock (and with inadequate stock shared with wildlife), conflicts have been
common among the Samburu and the Maasai.

356

structures must support strong tenure regimes as well regardless of whether the tenure
systems are private or communal. This can minimize conflicts and weaken the structures
that accentuate exclusion.
4.4: Social and ecological features of a region
The three partnerships support initiatives are all located in regions predominantly
inhabited by indigenous Maasai tribes. The Maasai practice agro-pastoralist transhumant
cultures alongside ecotourism as means of sustaining their livelihoods. A major challenge
for the three programs was addressing one key conundrum; the fact that the two
significant modes of survival for Maasai were intensely in competition. In fact, many
Maasais are skeptical of conservation projects that peg benefits to ecotourism because
they believe these projects have historically exploited their livestock-reliant livelihood
structures (Galaty 1992). It has been also shown that wildlife-based ventures rarely yield
enough benefits to transform the livelihoods of Maasais (Cheung 2012, Homewood et al.,
2012). But because Maasais inhabit wildlife rich areas, they faced immense pressures to
sedentarize and privatize their land. Equally problematic was a legal regime which left
Maasai land prone to excision, while increasing economic insecurity continued to
pressurize them to sell their land cheaply to immigrants and greedy entrepreneurs who
later sold the land lucratively.
Anthropogenic influences such as urbanization, industrialization and the
expansion of human settlements exacerbated these challenges further. These factors
created and triggered negative effects on social and economic bases of Maasai
communities. Whereas decentralization of power and elite support conditioned a host of
empowerment elements, the severity of these influences were disruptive and
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transformative to social institutions. Of the three regions, the Amboseli was the most
affected while Laikipia was the least affected. In terms of geography and ecology, these
regions are classified as arid and semi-arid areas. Thus, they are epicenters of ecocomplexes where poverty strongly intersects with extremely harsh climate conditions. A
good example is the drought of 2005. This drought led to a large number of human and
livestock deaths. The prevalence and influence of weakly governed customary
institutions did not serve the communities any better. Each of these sub-factors impacted
empowerment differently; even though privatization in the Amboseli and the Mara
destabilized communities quite significantly. These factors imposed significant
constraints on community capacity and undermined the credibility of collaborative
ventures perceived as exploitative by some communities.
4.5: Innovative capacity of a MCPP
An important finding is that the innovative capabilities of partnership must be
factored in accounting for variability in empowerment outcomes. Low levels of
empowerment did not necessarily imply a lack of innovation, though low innovation
amplified the challenges for empowerment. As previously described, the Forum applied
more rewards-based incentives while the Amboseli Management Partnership and the
Mara Conservancy placed more premiums on regulatory and compliance-based strategies
which usually precipitated tensions and were less able to promote cooperation from
communities. Essentially, entities can experiment with various tools to ensure and
enhance cooperation and consequently enable empowerment. The Forum had to deal with
internal deficiencies and external pressures just as did its partners, but its
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pro-innovative leadership continued to mobilize resources to enhance diverse strategies
of innovation.
At the peak of the growth of these partnerships, it was established that there was
both local and global willingness to pay (WTP) for the conservation of endangered
species and habitats in most of Southern African ecosystem complexes and more
promising was the fact that the global investors were a promising market ( see for
example, Krug 2001, 16-17). It was incumbent upon the leadership of each partnership to
effectively tap into this market. Comparatively, the Forum’s inclusive leadership initiated
several successful recreation-based and biodiversity conservation markets which
competed with and continue to surpass some established entities in the Mara Triangle and
the Amboseli. Another contrast is that while the Mara is a leading tourism destination in
the country, the Forum and the Amboseli are growing as key attraction nodes, presenting
new implications for community empowerment.
All the three partnerships have markets which are growing and diversifying with a
common goal of to tapping into potential carbon markets. However, the Forum was more
adept at attracting new buyers, sellers and potential investors in ecosystem services
markets in its wildlife protected area complexes which can modestly target community
empowerment. Certainly, all of these three partnerships were and continue to be prime
points of contact and contracting intermediaries, serving the roles of matching buyers to
sellers and other intermediaries, soliciting of funds to expand PES programs, establishing
and supporting markets that incentivize stewardship, and convening buyers and sellers in
a more effective way though partnership platform. However, markets for ecosystem
service diversified faster in Laikipia and Amboseli than the Mara. A related finding is
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that the prominence of compliance-based markets in the Mara (and to some extent in the
Amboseli) limited community stewardship and benefit streams.
Finally, as noted earlier, contestation is a common feature within co-management
structures in the ecosystems served by these partnerships. Thus, another defining attribute
of innovation were each partnership’s capacity to diffuse or abate these conflicts and
effectiveness at conflict resolution. This process enabled the creation of an arena for
negotiating the use and access to resources. The partnerships at the Amboseli and the
Mara have performed weakly at nurturing platforms that address community partners’
interests. When this was done, it was only partially achieved because placation featured
prominently as the main strategy for appeasing communities rather than addressing the
real challenges. In Laikipia, challenges exist as well but with less intense conflict and the
medium of implementation of innovation located in conjoined structures that integrate the
secretariat and grassroots institutions.
5: Contributions of the dissertation and lessons learnt
This section examines the contributions of the dissertation and addresses the
lessons learnt including analyzing the gaps in mainstream studies. It highlights key novel
methodological, analytical and policy insights that the study raises and how they will
shape research and policy studies on co-management.
The study’s findings support and validate some but not all of the key tenets of the
three lines of inquiry which guided this study (i.e. participatory approach, resource
mobilization theory, and collaborative governance approach). From this study, it was
observed that the participatory approach is explicit about elite interference and capture,
but in these three cases it was less explicit in outlaying how shifting inter-elite interests
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(exemplified by conditions of interest polarization) occurred. It is also less explicit in
helping explain why the confluence of elite interest with community interests occurred
and enhanced an inclusive interactive arena of co-management. Similarly, mainstream
studies focus solely on elites as a monolithic group with interests always inhibitive to
collaboration and community organizations as complacent and/or as a weak partner.
Observations in Laikipia and pre-formalization phases of Amboseli indicate otherwise.
Resource mobilization theory also argues that groups can recruit collaborators and
establish self-organized units, with or without leadership of the elite. In the Mara
Triangle, elite divisions, in fact, weakened local civil society vis a vis the arena of
environmentalism. Elites did not bolster nor solidify local organizations’ ability to
demand for their rights.
The organicist orientation of the proponents of participatory management cannot
explain why very influential and strong communal structures of traditional Maasai
institutions broke down when pressures for privatization of tenure and sedentarization
overwhelmed them. More importantly, group ranch status was anchored not just on law,
but on solid communal structures as well. The instrumentalist orientation of resource
mobilization theory cannot adequately explain the appeal towards the protection of
indigenous rights to elites who are usually labeled as selfish exploiters of resources.
Neither can it explain how the consensus and values such as benefit sharing was created
by groups espousing completely different values. The weakness of collaborative
governance approach lies in its overemphasis on relational aspects and resource exchange
as solutions to conflict management while underestimating the structural factors that
define collaboration.
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Thus, the study emphasizes that to better advance our understanding of
conservation-linked empowerment, there is a need for a rethinking in how partnershipmediated empowerment is theorized. First, there is need for an holistic analysis of the
sources and loci of conflicts in co-management. More importantly, the study highlights
the saliency of trajectories of co-management. Second, the study highlights that a new
agenda should broaden the debate on how institutional design, including organizational
principles of co-management and convening leaderships’ identity shape outcomes. Third,
there is need for synchronizing analysis of prerequisites for and trajectories of
partnerships so as to allow for holistic evaluation of partnership–mediated outcomes.
In terms of policy contributions, this study suggests that to better guide
interventions, policy paradigms on empowerment must incorporate and elaborate on
historical particularities of partnership evolution. The goal should be establishing the key
interfaces with community structures that are supportive of or inhibitive of
empowerment. By prioritizing the trajectories that partnerships assume, this study
provided the tools that allow future studies to identify and analyze the complex and
ambiguous elements of co-management planning and implementation process. The study
proposes a typology of platform models for policy implementation and their
consequences in terms of tradeoffs and payoffs. The entitlement, housekeeping, and gatekeeping models provide variable instruments and ramifications for empowerment. There
are associated tradeoffs to institutional choices and possibilities that very often will goals
interact as mutually exclusive rather than mutually supportive systems.
This dissertation challenges research on co-management to design studies that
establish concrete linkages among principles such as representativeness, accountability,
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and effectiveness. The MCPP model is uncompromisingly resource-based in terms of its
strong focus on material resources, yet it also emphasizes apprenticeship, stewardship
and a proactive response from community institutions. The policy element is that
communities must be given the opportunity to play their role as responsible partners with
equal or near equal rights. Finally, by ascertaining the inner workings of MCPPs, the
study provided useful policy insights on why there is need for synergy and
complementary efforts between compliance-based and rewards-based projects. It
introduces a clear role for contracts and expands the attributive features of comanagement structures.
The dissertation’s analytical contributions are rooted in evaluation of trajectories
and analysis of prerequisites of empowerment. Additionally, the glaring omission by
mainstream analysis on how initial conditions impact co-management outcomes is
addressed. But more importantly, the study takes cognizance of the fact that conservation
discourse must underpin dynamic changes in social and ecological context to fully
confront the reality of generational structural changes that impact co-management
outcomes. Finally, the introduction of new tools and indicators for empowerment can
improve both analysis and policy interventions. These include the application and
analysis of MCPP as: 1) a unit of analysis, 2) the locus of operations of markets for
ecosystem services, 3) a platform for transformative or inhibitive outcomes 4) a
collaborative network for expending and exchanging resources 5) a contract enforcing
system, 6) a rewards enhancing system that addressed the gaps in the existing legal
framework, and 7) its members as units of analysis.
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6: Conclusions
This last section highlights the main conclusions of the dissertation. Based on the
findings of this dissertation it is valid to infer that empowerment requires two critical
factors. The first one is that power must be decentralized in ways that allow communities
to be decision makers and to occupy positions in planning and implementation of comanagement. Second, elite support is paramount to positive empowerment outcomes.
The study documented that the Forum attempted to mainstream both processes in comanagement. MCPPs in the Mara and Amboseli did neither. The outcomes were
empowered communities in the former and weaker partners in the latter two.
Furthermore, a prolonged contestation led the Siria (in the Mara Triangle) to use
ineffective modes of social action such as protests, lawsuits, and disrupting tourism.
While these were public expressions of grievance over their exclusion from appropriating
resources in the Mara Triangle, they only created a reactive and turbulent process. The
community lacks a true formal organization. In the Amboseli the partner CBO, the
Amboseli Association is reviving its role through its platform MCPP’s renewed but none
the less a weak strategy.
A surprising finding is that community capacity has little impact on
empowerment. However, while the variable may seem weak in explaining partnershipmediated outcomes, it does not imply that its influence should be underestimated.
Scholars and policy makers should venture more into evaluating further why this is the
case. Additionally, rapid formalization of a partnership influences empowerment while
the resource types expended are necessary but not sufficient to enhance empowerment.
The elite support variable interacts with the five variables as they influence
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empowerment. After evaluating if the hypotheses were confirmed, it was crucial to
explain why MCPP structures (effectively) generated incentives for conservation. The
Forum’s institutions and programs created incentives that were strong enough to generate
the response that enabled its consolidation, community buy-in and stewardship. The
Amboseli Partnership emerged with strong institutions but gradually transformed into an
exclusive network serving the interests of the state (and conservationists). It is now
struggling to establish its identity. The Mara Conservancy was established under
conditions of low buy-in from community and fewer attempts have been made to scale up
community participation.
Based on these assessments, a foremost conclusion from this study is that when
partnerships pay lip service to inclusion, they limit opportunities for empowerment not in
one but several ways. Communities provide and commit material and symbolic resources
with an interest in collaborating and benefitting from conservation. Operations that limit
these interests handicap them as partners. A related impact is that because communities
have stakes in these platforms as much as other partners, ineffective structures undermine
their capacity for participation because they accentuate alienation. Third, while these
platforms are ineffective, partners continue to benefit by using and exploiting human and
natural resources from communities. The experiences of the three partnerships provide
compelling evidence that they can have debilitating impacts because they embolden the
private sector and elites. As was explained in the empirical chapters, there is no denying
the progress made by these platforms in comparison to pre-MCPP structures. It was also
observed that incomplete accounting of partnership operations provide inaccurate
analysis.
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The analysis has shown that various additional interlocking factors explain
empowerment outcomes. It is conclusive that the prospect for substantive empowerment
of communities inhabiting Kenya’s critical biodiversity complexes hinges on an amalgam
of factors but the overarching factor is the dual linkage between decentralization and elite
support. Admittedly, a continuum of incentives enabled by partners reflects the models
that guided the implementation of the principles of participation. These straddled
prosecutory, regulatory and compensatory programs which often rendered CBOs and
communities ineffective because they were implemented ineffectively or were
themselves ineffective. For example, when a platform strived to achieve bureaucratic
finesse, it was achieved at the expense of representativeness and ended facilitating elite
capture and vice versa.
Another conclusion is that some cautious optimism is appropriate. Progress is
taking shape but challenges abound. Empowerment is conditional upon a multitude of
factors and MCPPs are not a substitute for establishing reforms for empowerment, though
they initiate innovative programs and structures for mainstreaming community
participation. This study concurs with research that has consistently shown that
partnerships are not a panacea for addressing social and ecological justice. It is also
persuaded that biased stereotyping of local communities as destructive to wildlife
resources continues to hamper efforts because it is misplaced and inaccurate. Local
communities are at least conservators and true agents who have been marginalized and
denied the true benefits streams from a very lucrative system that they support. This
study revealed the complex and crosscutting issues that define empowerment. Despite the
potential for MCPPs to act as avenues for collaboration and innovation, their effective
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role as empowering entities requires investments in stable institutions, extensive elite
support, and commitment from all stakeholders.
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Listing and Description of Used Non-English Terms
Banda: A Swahili term, a community residential unit at the homestead level
Baraza: a Swahili term, an institutionalized village level public forum for deliberating
issues that affect local communities
Boma: A Swahili term, a highly guarded livestock enclosure where livestock are kept
within a given homestead
Harambee: A Swahili term A public forum in which people voluntarily contribute money
to support local social, welfare and other charitable purposes
Katiba: A Swahili term, a formal constitution
Loita: A Maasai term, which means the ‘forest of the lost child’. It is a community
conserved forest in Narok county and located within the Maasai Mara Reserve
Maa: A term pertaining mostly to the Maasai ethnic community
Maasai (Masai): An indigenous agro-pastoral community that inhabit the Rift Valley
region in Kenya and Tanzania
Manyatta: A Maasai term, a temporary settlement area constructed and used by many
pastoral Maasai communities
Moran: A Maasai term, a member of a young mare Maasai warrior group
Oloibon: A Maasai term, also known as the Laiboni is a spiritual/religious leader of the
Maa speaking communities who officiate rituals and ceremonies. While they have no
political power, they have ceremonial and significant symbolic power among the
community
Oloshon: A Maasai term, considered as the largest grazing unit within a territory.
Jurisdictionally, it is the largest administrative unit of the age-set-defined power clusters
Porini: A Swahili, which means wild or in the wild which constitutes a forest vegetation
that provided habitat for wildlife
Safari: A Swahili term, used to describe the touristic observation of wildlife ecosystems
in East Africa’s biodiversity hotspots such as the Maasai Mara
Wananchi: A Swahili term, (single mwananchi), a person with citizenship rights
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Wazee: A Swahili term, a forum or a group of old age people (and usually males) with
influence and command over social and political matters that affect grassroots level
institutions
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Interview Questions
These questions were used in interviewing participants representing local municipalities,
the private sector and community based organizations.
Introduction: The process of managing natural resources has recently seen significant
changes with regards to how decision making, planning and implementation of projects
and programs related to wildlife management.
1. What is the makeup of natural resource management partnerships in this locality? To
what extent would you say that these processes have been decentralized with regards to
the participation of local community organizations?
2. How would you compare decision-making across issues and activities? Across how
many salient issues or activities does the local government command more influence? Is
it by de jure or de facto power? Is this written in a formal contract?
3. How would you describe the types of common routinely acceptable rules for power
sharing within the existing co-management structures? To what extent do these rules
influence whether partners can effectively sanction or question each other with equal or
near equal powers?
4. How competitive are processes for electing the leaders who are supposed to head the
management programs? What is the duration of official tenure for these selected or
elected leaders of your partnership?
5. Could you identify and describe the types of units or programs established for
integrating participation, gender, and environmental issues into structures of
collaboration? How would compare the level of funding and the level of technical
support across these issues?
6. What are some of the dominant issue positions of the leading elites? How do they
frame their opinions about these issues and what are the dominant arenas which they use?
7. How would you describe the organizational profile of a participating CBO in terms of
its structure, membership size, leadership, and financial resources?
8. Could identify and describe some of the benefits that partnerships have made to the
organizational needs of local community organizations.
Please check where appropriate for the following and then describe how the have been
implemented.
●Book keeping
●Conflict resolution strategies
●Fundraising skills
●Leadership skills
●Management skills
●Training programs
●Civic and collective bargaining skills
9. Collaborative programs that specifically involve local community’s organizations
generally revolve around various important aspects that affect the interest of this group of
stakeholders. These include:
● Regulated access to forest resources for local communities, including respect fr
community land rights
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● Inclusion of CBO representatives into planning and management of projects
● Incorporation of indigenous social, spiritual, and customary norms into projects
● Institution and/or implementation of local market-based instruments which value
products and services offered by communities’ restoration and preservation activities
● Joint and/or equal share of proceeds from tourism, eco-tourism and environmental
restoration efforts
● Initiation and support for agro, bio and eco-related enterprises
To what extent would you say that MCPPs have effectively initiated, or addressed any or
all of these issues?
10. Would you say that these partnerships have made local governments and private
corporations involved to have a better understanding of problems, priorities and needs of
local resource-user and resource-dependent communities?
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Appendix E
Document from the Trans Mara County Granting Authorization for Field Research
Activities in the Mara Triangle
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